Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[StevoJH]

The 6 should at least keep the majors out of that sort of work.
Aside from that the cut back was based on budgetary and personnel restrictions so to bring it back to 12 it may compromise the future plans as they currently sit.

If one of the problems facing the navy is having enough of those mid career people, having more OPV's should allow you to train up more people, especially if you slightly over crew them in critical area. This is likely going to be especially critical in future years with the number of major units in decline for the next 10-15 years.

Use them as operational training ships.

 

[Anthony_B_78]

Is there any merit in looking at a dedicated new LHD with F-35 capability?
I know this has been thrashed about before and is pretty well unlikely but what would be required?
I don't want to open a can of worms and I'm aware of our limitations. This is just hypothetical, of course.

Like SammyC said, you have to be able to make an argument for value versus the immense cost. This discussion has been had time and time again, but it is an interesting one.

Most tend to focus the conversation on fighters, but, for me, when HMAS Melbourne was retired without replacement, I think the greatest loss was the ASW capability. With more MH-60Rs, and the goal of a larger surface fleet, that situation is being improved, and that begs the question as to whether we would need a "dedicated" ship. e.g. If you had a (future) task force of, say, a Hobart, two Hunters / interim frigates, and an LHD, you would likely have six Romeos afloat and with two sorties a day each, they could certainly maintain one in the air at all times on ASW patrol. This is without considering too what role drones could play in ASW in the future.

The other question that is often raised is even with embarked F-35Bs, what do they do for you? Go back to Todjaeger's post, where he talks about eight aircraft flying three sorties a day - 24 in total. Ok, could be useful. But what about maintaining a CAP? I believe you'd need about eight to ten sorties a day to keep one aircraft airborne. Doesn't leave you with much does it? Without a CAP, you're more vulnerable; with one you can't send out as many strike sorties. Then, as Sammy said, you start to do the maths on using F-35As with tanker support.

To confer useful capabilities, I'd suggest the "dedicated" ship would need to be akin to the Cavour, which is currently visiting Australia, at the minimum. But how do we afford that, and nuclear submarines and everything else, and where do we get the crew from? And is it worth it, all things considered?

 

[swerve]

Yes, take a lead from the Japanese and upgrade the flight deck to be able to operate F-35Bs. Even if we don't get our own aircraft we need the crossdeck capability. If we end up in a hot war our allies are going to need alternative landing platforms.

Juan Carlos was designed with F-35B in mind. Would the flight deck really need upgrading?

 

[swerve]

IIRC aviation fuel bunkerage was one issue. I seem to recall the Canberra-class having space/displacement for up to 800 tonnes of aviation fuel which works out to around 100 sorties with full fuel load. Another problem area would be magazine storage and access for F-35 ordnance. No idea how much space or displacement is available for that, but if adequate aviation magazine capacity was not designed in, then any regular tempo of F-35 ops would likely force an LHD to be refueled and/or replenished by an AOR very frequently. A back of the napkin calculation suggests that a force of eight F-35's operating from a RAN LHD, with each aircraft conducting three sorties per day, could empty the onboard aviation fuel supply in about four days.

From what I remember reading many years ago Juan Carlos I was supposed to need to undergo a quick dockside conversion to operate a significant number of fixed-wing aircraft at a significant tempo. Displacement & space would be borrowed from the amphibious function. IIRC it included aviation fuel tanks & ordnance storage in the dock & vehicle deck. Fixing points & plumbing were supposed to be in place, so it'd be a wheel in, lock down, & plug in job, & the rear door would be sealed.

I doubt that the Australian LHDs are fitted for that. I don't know if even JC1 is actually fitted for it, or it was a plan for the future.

 

[Todjaeger]

From what I remember reading many years ago Juan Carlos I was supposed to need to undergo a quick dockside conversion to operate a significant number of fixed-wing aircraft at a significant tempo. Displacement & space would be borrowed from the amphibious function. IIRC it included aviation fuel tanks & ordnance storage in the dock & vehicle deck. Fixing points & plumbing were supposed to be in place, so it'd be a wheel in, lock down, & plug in job, & the rear door would be sealed.

I doubt that the Australian LHDs are fitted for that. I don't know if even JC1 is actually fitted for it, or it was a plan for the future.

I recall the RAN LHD's are not configured exactly as the JC1. From memory, JC1 has a RAS capability to refuel other, smaller naval vessels whilst the RAN did not have such a capability fitted to the Canberra-class. I had also asked once years ago about the possibility of containerized fuel and/or magazine storage aboard RAN vessels and was informed that it was not viable from a safety standpoint. Too much potential for something to go wrong and then be unable to effect fire suppression and/or damage control under normal circumstances. Attempting to respond to something like battle damage would likely be even worse.

 

[Stampede]

Like SammyC said, you have to be able to make an argument for value versus the immense cost. This discussion has been had time and time again, but it is an interesting one.

Most tend to focus the conversation on fighters, but, for me, when HMAS Melbourne was retired without replacement, I think the greatest loss was the ASW capability. With more MH-60Rs, and the goal of a larger surface fleet, that situation is being improved, and that begs the question as to whether we would need a "dedicated" ship. e.g. If you had a (future) task force of, say, a Hobart, two Hunters / interim frigates, and an LHD, you would likely have six Romeos afloat and with two sorties a day each, they could certainly maintain one in the air at all times on ASW patrol. This is without considering too what role drones could play in ASW in the future.

The other question that is often raised is even with embarked F-35Bs, what do they do for you? Go back to Todjaeger's post, where he talks about eight aircraft flying three sorties a day - 24 in total. Ok, could be useful. But what about maintaining a CAP? I believe you'd need about eight to ten sorties a day to keep one aircraft airborne. Doesn't leave you with much does it? Without a CAP, you're more vulnerable; with one you can't send out as many strike sorties. Then, as Sammy said, you start to do the maths on using F-35As with tanker support.

To confer useful capabilities, I'd suggest the "dedicated" ship would need to be akin to the Cavour, which is currently visiting Australia, at the minimum. But how do we afford that, and nuclear submarines and everything else, and where do we get the crew from? And is it worth it, all things considered?

Sacrifice the flight deck and light vehicle deck for aviation assets and 3 to 400 bunks for their pilots and maintainers and we still have spare bunks and significant vehicle storage on the heavy vehicle deck.
In fact employ no amphibious assets and use the LHD as is for purely maritime aviation support.

The LHD was designed to be a flexible asset.
Repeat flexible asset.

Lets not confuse engineering with intent.

In the public realm we really don't know how similar or modified the Canberra Class is compared to the Juan Carlos or Turkeys TCG Anadolu.
That said there is enough in the public realm to suggest they are very close.

So how much would the Canberra Class need in capital and time to be modified to support the F35 B and would it be justified.

Good questions.

I still see merit in the endeavour

100 sorties over 4 days or spread over four weeks looks attractive.
It would give a very significant and unique capability to the ADF and government.
A sovereign capability.

Prudent for our times.


Cheers S

 

[Volkodav]

Well when the Arafura class actually enter service the RAN shouldn't need to use Frigates to support border protection operations.

I honestly think cutting them back to 6 units was a mistake.

They are more capable, but more expensive than PBs, but significantly less capable than a GP, or even light frigate.

No matter what we weld, bolt or strap on them, they will never have the capability, let alone survivability of a proper corvette such as a K130. Something like the Mogami absolutely leaves an ANZAC for dead, let alone an Arafura or corvette.

I am not a fan of the Austal papermache PBs but using them appropriately, in conjunction with the OPVs is probably a better value for money solution than an all OPV fleet.

In an ideal world we would have three tiers of combatants but cost and timing after decades of under investment means we don't have that option.

 

[Armchair]

Aircraft carriers are incredibly useful assets and Australia is fortunate to have allies that operate them, but as an option for the RAN, F-35B on the Canberra class is increasingly less realistic for the near future. That is because of the intense national effort to acquire SSNs (and a surface fleet with viable numbers) and the decision to retain F-18F rather than procure a fourth squadron of F-35 (So there goes the fantasy air wing). Without returning to the merit of either SSN or F-35 decision they would now be very difficult to reverse.

What replaces LHDs in the 2040s is probably a more productive (but still fanciful) line of debate.

 

[Bob53]

IIRC aviation fuel bunkerage was one issue. I seem to recall the Canberra-class having space/displacement for up to 800 tonnes of aviation fuel which works out to around 100 sorties with full fuel load. Another problem area would be magazine storage and access for F-35 ordnance. No idea how much space or displacement is available for that, but if adequate aviation magazine capacity was not designed in, then any regular tempo of F-35 ops would likely force an LHD to be refueled and/or replenished by an AOR very frequently. A back of the napkin calculation suggests that a force of eight F-35's operating from a RAN LHD, with each aircraft conducting three sorties per day, could empty the onboard aviation fuel supply in about four days.

Yeah wasn’t suggesting operational tempo. Emergency landing, and take off Was really the question. Assume they could have a few fuel trucks with the gas.

 

[Bob53]

They are more capable, but more expensive than PBs, but significantly less capable than a GP, or even light frigate.

No matter what we weld, bolt or strap on them, they will never have the capability, let alone survivability of a proper corvette such as a K130. Something like the Mogami absolutely leaves an ANZAC for dead, let alone an Arafura or corvette.

I am not a fan of the Austal papermache PBs but using them appropriately, in conjunction with the OPVs is probably a better value for money solution than an all OPV fleet.

In an ideal world we would have three tiers of combatants but cost and timing after decades of under investment means we don't have that option.

But also significantly more comfortable for the crew on a 3 week patrol.

 

[icelord]

Well when the Arafura class actually enter service the RAN shouldn't need to use Frigates to support border protection operations.

I honestly think cutting them back to 6 units was a mistake.

Frigates only showed up when they started dishing out medals...

I was on Patrol Boats when this occurred, around new Govt and Policy change which reduced the boats to zero. Frigates were lucky to have done 10 boardings in that time compared with Ashmore patrols of 10 per ACPB the 12mths prior.

There has always been a need for OPV to support PB. Customs into ABF used this well with Triton and Ocean Protector being a mothership to Bays and Armidales on patrol. Larger vessel could take offloads and also provide stores as needed. When we go through another round of illegal immigrants/Unexpected arrivals/new deckhands which is bound to happen at some point, the OPV will show a good utilisation with Capes to provide better coordination at sea.

Its like owning a Ute, everyone makes fun of you for having one deeming it "unpractical" until they want to move house...

 

[Volkodav]

Looking at it holistically the RAN has not had it ships it has needed for most of its existence. They have been well aware of their requirements, the needed capability and the best value for money way to achieve this, but have never had the political clout to make it happen.

Often far too much has been invested in gold plated, niche capabilities that have an external sponsor. I include the LHDs, AORs and PBs in this.

At the same time, operational capability is compromised by going as cheap as possible, then spending huge sums on modification, rectification and upgrades, while failing to acquire the necessary numbers, supplementary capabilities, ensuring timely replacement, or making adequate investment in sustainment.

Basically we delay acquiring something perfectly good enough until the existing capability is completely shagged, waiting for the next bigger better thing.

We determine we can't afford what we actually need so reduce numbers, size, capability with no thought for future margins. We have to spend huge sums on the remediation of the existing shagged capability, while fluffing around with its delayed replacement.

To compensate for the replacement not actually being what is needed, we bling it up, gold plate it.

It enters service and the gold plating isn't what was needed, so we strip the plating and, at great expense in time and treasure, replace the plated components with actual gold items.

This overloads and compromises the platform, increasing sustainment costs and reducing effective service life.

Because so much has been spent on rectification and upgrades, we reduce fleet size, life extend and delay replacement.

Process repeats.

 

[Stampede]

Frigates only showed up when they started dishing out medals...

I was on Patrol Boats when this occurred, around new Govt and Policy change which reduced the boats to zero. Frigates were lucky to have done 10 boardings in that time compared with Ashmore patrols of 10 per ACPB the 12mths prior.

There has always been a need for OPV to support PB. Customs into ABF used this well with Triton and Ocean Protector being a mothership to Bays and Armidales on patrol. Larger vessel could take offloads and also provide stores as needed. When we go through another round of illegal immigrants/Unexpected arrivals/new deckhands which is bound to happen at some point, the OPV will show a good utilisation with Capes to provide better coordination at sea.

Its like owning a Ute, everyone makes fun of you for having one deeming it "unpractical" until they want to move house...

Just moved house and don’t like utes
Brother in law has a Ute……ta for the loan


Inshore / off shore vessels will be a good mix

Our third tier…….not perfect but better than the past.

Cheers S

 

[Volkodav]

Just moved house and don’t like utes
Brother in law has a Ute……ta for the loan


Inshore / off shore vessels will be a good mix

Our third tier…….not perfect but better than the past.

Cheers S

I bought a dual axel cage trailer so all I need is a towbar. I wouldn't even have an SUV if there were more large wagons on the market.

Really really regretting getting a PHEV SUV instead of the Skoda Superb I really wanted.

 

[Stampede]

I bought a dual axel cage trailer so all I need is a towbar. I wouldn't even have an SUV if there were more large wagons on the market.

Really really regretting getting a PHEV SUV instead of the Skoda Superb I really wanted.

Cars types are like defence

lots of trade offs

Cheers S

 

[iambuzzard]

Looking at it holistically the RAN has not had it ships it has needed for most of its existence. They have been well aware of their requirements, the needed capability and the best value for money way to achieve this, but have never had the political clout to make it happen.

Often far too much has been invested in gold plated, niche capabilities that have an external sponsor. I include the LHDs, AORs and PBs in this.

At the same time, operational capability is compromised by going as cheap as possible, then spending huge sums on modification, rectification and upgrades, while failing to acquire the necessary numbers, supplementary capabilities, ensuring timely replacement, or making adequate investment in sustainment.

Basically we delay acquiring something perfectly good enough until the existing capability is completely shagged, waiting for the next bigger better thing.

We determine we can't afford what we actually need so reduce numbers, size, capability with no thought for future margins. We have to spend huge sums on the remediation of the existing shagged capability, while fluffing around with its delayed replacement.

To compensate for the replacement not actually being what is needed, we bling it up, gold plate it.

It enters service and the gold plating isn't what was needed, so we strip the plating and, at great expense in time and treasure, replace the plated components with actual gold items.

This overloads and compromises the platform, increasing sustainment costs and reducing effective service life.

Because so much has been spent on rectification and upgrades, we reduce fleet size, life extend and delay replacement.

Process repeats.

Defence procurement is like a spin dryer, constantly going round and round but never really achieving anything properly.

 

[76mmGuns]

Yep the complete failure of just about every administration to deliver actual capability is impressive.


Yet another change of government brings us to the present where we have now seen 6 or 7 changes of administration in the 15 years since the 2009 white paper that started it all and we seem to have very little to show for it.

I don’t think the constant changing of administrations has helped.

I have seen so much chopping a changing over that time that I remain sceptical about how much of the latest navy review will actually see the light of day.

Reminds me of how those of us old enough to remember used to look down on Italy because of their frequent Govt changes back in the day. It's not a happy situation.

 

[Swifty87]

https://www.theaustralian.com.au/special-reports/secrecy-adds-to-uncertainty-about-general-purpose-frigate-program/news-story/d34d45110f489280a6b5b28c7da9cd42

An interesting read. Some valid points have been raised...

 

[justinterested]

An interesting paragraph in The Australian article(link) is:
"Overall, the contract known as SEA 1180 has not gone well, mainly because the RAN has continued to tinker with the OPV design and at last count had made an extraordinary 800 changes after the contract was signed. Rather than take the blame and fix the problem, Defence is doubling down, claiming that everything is the fault of Luerssen for not better understanding the Australian regulatory environment – without themselves having done anything about the issue during the comprehensive ship design process. "
This would seem to imply that the "no changes" policy for the new GPF's will make for interesting times.

 

[ADMk2]

https://www.theaustralian.com.au/special-reports/secrecy-adds-to-uncertainty-about-general-purpose-frigate-program/news-story/d34d45110f489280a6b5b28c7da9cd42

An interesting read. Some valid points have been raised...

Another Bergman special.

First of all Chief of Navy has already testified to Senate Estimates, that certain legislatively imposed changes will have to be made and that will include English language used on all systems of the ship.

That he ignores this, demonstrates his intent.