Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[Milne Bay]

Is there a requirement for the GP Frigate to carry SM2 or SM6?

If its primary loadout is to be ESSM, 16 Cells would allow up to 64 ESSM to be carried.

What are the odds of the ship surviving if it needs to fire 64 ESSM? Also, surely someone has planned extremely badly if a single ship is put into such a situation with no support?

That Thai frigate has interesting systems, it does look odd though. Its almost like they have cut the bow off one deck level lower then planned.

If a ship is at sea, it has no facility to re-load the expended missile cells.
Given that 64 missiles may not be used in one engagement then there will still be some magazine depth remaining.
However, if there are more engagements - even in a single day - the numbers start to drop.
If there are engagements daily over even a short period of time, the missiles will be used up.
Better to have them and not need them, than to need them and not have them
MB

 

[Wombat000]

Logic says that a % of magazine cells will surely be intentionally quarantined from use, as the ship will not want to retire from the AO completely unarmed, if it can help it.
So the actual planned usable cells will be less than that fitted.

The good thing is that metric should also apply to an adversary too.

i still content that 16 cells is todays minimum standard, and tomorrows early insufficiency.

 

[StevoJH]

What is the expectation for these ships?

What are they supposed to be able to face alone and for what duration of time?

I think some people might be getting a little bit over ambitious on what these ships are to be capable of accomplishing. Even the Hunter class is only expected to have 32 VLS cells.

Remember that these are tier 2 combatants, in a high threat environment they should not be operating solo unless something has gone very wrong.

 

[Wombat000]

It just means that they will be forced to leave earlier than they would otherwise.
even if the ship survives, if they have no persistence then they’re not even there, and it’s possibly a tactical loss.

if we operate in our local waters, then a dash back is still days or week removed and a predicable track.
if we are in more remote SLOC choke points then it implies a lot longer transits for likely not much action time, and perhaps still predictable resupply tracking.

ships with larger magazines will always dominate.

 

[StevoJH]

It just means that they will be forced to leave earlier than they would otherwise.
even if the ship survives, if they have no persistence then they’re not even there, and it’s possibly a tactical loss.

if we operate in our local waters, then a dash back is still days or week removed and a predicable track.
if we are in more remote SLOC choke points then it implies a lot longer transits for likely not much action time, and perhaps still predictable resupply tracking.

ships with larger magazines will always dominate.

Lucky we have C-17's and C-130's then that can transport reloads to where they need to go.

And lucky we have quite close relationships with the Navies and Governments of many of our surrounding nations.

Its not like the ships need to return to FBE or FBW to rearm.

 

[iambuzzard]

If a ship is at sea, it has no facility to re-load the expended missile cells.
Given that 64 missiles may not be used in one engagement then there will still be some magazine depth remaining.
However, if there are more engagements - even in a single day - the numbers start to drop.
If there are engagements daily over even a short period of time, the missiles will be used up.
Better to have them and not need them, than to need them and not have them
MB

32 VLS quad packed is 128 rounds. Hard pressed to use them in a day unless it's WWIII and then it's all over.

 

[Todjaeger]

32 VLS quad packed is 128 rounds. Hard pressed to use them in a day unless it's WWIII and then it's all over.

32 VLS cells quad-packed with ESSM is indeed 128 missiles, however that is not likely the planned/expected number of possible intercepts. IIRC the planned guide is for two air defence missiles to be targeted/launched per inbound to be intercepted, which means a 32-cell VLS might be able to intercept ~64 inbound missiles, aircraft and/or drones. That might sound like a significant number, but IMO is entirely plausible.

People need to remember that the RAN can and has deployed vessels all over the world, for a number of different reasons and therefore one must not get too caught up in, or focused on a single potential adversary or threat. Focusing solely on the potential security situation in/around the SCS and ECS could cause potential maritime security risks and threats in other major SLOC chokepoints to be overlooked or ignored. In recent years we have seen threats to shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden from the Houthis in Yemen, as well as problems with piracy, with the Somali pirate threat extending into parts of the Indian Ocean. There are potential threats in the eastern Med from state and non-state actors in Lebanon and Syria. All of these areas are potential RAN deployment opportunities, which could also include an air threat component. Now of course the RAN might decide that such areas demand a "Tier 1" capability, but realistically how many does or will the RAN have, and how many of these would be available at any one time?

Another important consideration IMO is that one needs to not only consider what should be a viable capability now, but also 15 and perhaps even 30 years into the future. For now, the ANZAC-class frigate fitout of an 8-cell VLS loaded with quad-packed ESSM works, but that also might prove inadequate if a hot conflict were to break out. In another 15 years, particularly if drone swarms become even more capable or prevalent, or if security conditions deteriorate further, then more intercept capable (quantity as well as quality) and perhaps even greater range might be needed.

Under current plans, it appears that whatever the still yet-to-be named or selected frigate design will end up comprising nearly half the RAN's escorts, which means that they are likely going to be around in RAN service for years. Selecting a design which is adequate for now but with little margin for future needs would likely prove quite wasteful. Unfortunately though I do not have much confidence in the current plans given the circumstances.

 

[John Fedup]

32 VLS cells quad-packed with ESSM is indeed 128 missiles, however that is not likely the planned/expected number of possible intercepts. IIRC the planned guide is for two air defence missiles to be targeted/launched per inbound to be intercepted, which means a 32-cell VLS might be able to intercept ~64 inbound missiles, aircraft and/or drones. That might sound like a significant number, but IMO is entirely plausible.

People need to remember that the RAN can and has deployed vessels all over the world, for a number of different reasons and therefore one must not get too caught up in, or focused on a single potential adversary or threat. Focusing solely on the potential security situation in/around the SCS and ECS could cause potential maritime security risks and threats in other major SLOC chokepoints to be overlooked or ignored. In recent years we have seen threats to shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden from the Houthis in Yemen, as well as problems with piracy, with the Somali pirate threat extending into parts of the Indian Ocean. There are potential threats in the eastern Med from state and non-state actors in Lebanon and Syria. All of these areas are potential RAN deployment opportunities, which could also include an air threat component. Now of course the RAN might decide that such areas demand a "Tier 1" capability, but realistically how many does or will the RAN have, and how many of these would be available at any one time?

Another important consideration IMO is that one needs to not only consider what should be a viable capability now, but also 15 and perhaps even 30 years into the future. For now, the ANZAC-class frigate fitout of an 8-cell VLS loaded with quad-packed ESSM works, but that also might prove inadequate if a hot conflict were to break out. In another 15 years, particularly if drone swarms become even more capable or prevalent, or if security conditions deteriorate further, then more intercept capable (quantity as well as quality) and perhaps even greater range might be needed.

Under current plans, it appears that whatever the still yet-to-be named or selected frigate design will end up comprising nearly half the RAN's escorts, which means that they are likely going to be around in RAN service for years. Selecting a design which is adequate for now but with little margin for future needs would likely prove quite wasteful. Unfortunately though I do not have much confidence in the current plans given the circumstances.

Will it still be SOP for using two missiles with the newest version of ESSMs?

 

[Vivendi]

32 VLS cells quad-packed with ESSM is indeed 128 missiles, however that is not likely the planned/expected number of possible intercepts. IIRC the planned guide is for two air defence missiles to be targeted/launched per inbound to be intercepted, which means a 32-cell VLS might be able to intercept ~64 inbound missiles, aircraft and/or drones. That might sound like a significant number, but IMO is entirely plausible.

People need to remember that the RAN can and has deployed vessels all over the world, for a number of different reasons and therefore one must not get too caught up in, or focused on a single potential adversary or threat. Focusing solely on the potential security situation in/around the SCS and ECS could cause potential maritime security risks and threats in other major SLOC chokepoints to be overlooked or ignored. In recent years we have seen threats to shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden from the Houthis in Yemen, as well as problems with piracy, with the Somali pirate threat extending into parts of the Indian Ocean. There are potential threats in the eastern Med from state and non-state actors in Lebanon and Syria. All of these areas are potential RAN deployment opportunities, which could also include an air threat component. Now of course the RAN might decide that such areas demand a "Tier 1" capability, but realistically how many does or will the RAN have, and how many of these would be available at any one time?

Another important consideration IMO is that one needs to not only consider what should be a viable capability now, but also 15 and perhaps even 30 years into the future. For now, the ANZAC-class frigate fitout of an 8-cell VLS loaded with quad-packed ESSM works, but that also might prove inadequate if a hot conflict were to break out. In another 15 years, particularly if drone swarms become even more capable or prevalent, or if security conditions deteriorate further, then more intercept capable (quantity as well as quality) and perhaps even greater range might be needed.

Under current plans, it appears that whatever the still yet-to-be named or selected frigate design will end up comprising nearly half the RAN's escorts, which means that they are likely going to be around in RAN service for years. Selecting a design which is adequate for now but with little margin for future needs would likely prove quite wasteful. Unfortunately though I do not have much confidence in the current plans given the circumstances.

How will a frigate with 128 quad-packed ESSM fare in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden when the Houthis start launching ballistic missiles? I thought ESSM was not very capable in dealing with ballistic missiles but I may be wrong. If I am not wrong then would I be correct in assuming that a frigate with ESSM missiles only, may need protection from a dedicated AAM frigate/destroyer with ABM capabilities, in regions where anti-ship ballistic missiles may be launched...? China already got such missiles and perhaps they study carefully what the Houthis are doing, and are learning as much as possible from what they are doing with very primitive missiles (compared to what the Chinese are working on in their labs).

 

[Milne Bay]

32 VLS quad packed is 128 rounds. Hard pressed to use them in a day unless it's WWIII and then it's all over.

No one is saying that they will all be used in one day.
But ships are at sea for long deployments and even a couple of attacks per day over a period will empty the magazine.
What happens then? The escort cannot contribute to defence and becomes a liability. It cannot re-arm at sea and must leave the escort duty to do so.
See the problem with small magazines.....
MB

 

[SammyC]

How will a frigate with 128 quad-packed ESSM fare in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden when the Houthis start launching ballistic missiles? I thought ESSM was not very capable in dealing with ballistic missiles but I may be wrong. If I am not wrong then would I be correct in assuming that a frigate with ESSM missiles only, may need protection from a dedicated AAM frigate/destroyer with ABM capabilities, in regions where anti-ship ballistic missiles may be launched...? China already got such missiles and perhaps they study carefully what the Houthis are doing, and are learning as much as possible from what they are doing with very primitive missiles (compared to what the Chinese are working on in their labs).

I think it depends on the type of ballistic missile. An ATACMS, GMLRS or PRSM are all a type of ballistic missile, however they are entirely atmospheric, have a relatively flat trajectory and an ESSM would deal with them fine. I would view this is the kind of stuff (the Chinese or Russian equivalents) that the Houthis might get their hands on, or would be fired from shore.

The Chinese DL21, however are an exo atmospheric type of ballistic missile. Their balistic trajectory is much higher and they come down at a near verticle angle. ESSM has a range of about 50km horizontally, but can only go up in the order of about 10-10km. This is where ESSM is fallable as it can only engage very close, and its warhead is the smaller fragmentation type that may not have the mass to disrupt a heavy inbound slug.

The SM6 and the SM3 both have rocket boosters, so can get higher to engage the threat further away. That is why they are more capable at exo atmospheric ballistic threats. Less of a requirement in the Red Sea, more of a need in the South China Sea.

 

[Bob53]

Is there a requirement for the GP Frigate to carry SM2 or SM6?

If its primary loadout is to be ESSM, 16 Cells would allow up to 64 ESSM to be carried.

What are the odds of the ship surviving if it needs to fire 64 ESSM? Also, surely someone has planned extremely badly if a single ship is put into such a situation with no support?

That Thai frigate has interesting systems, it does look odd though. Its almost like they have cut the bow off one deck level lower then planned.

I think the issue with magazine depth has many fathers…

1. Self defence from modern swarming tactics will require depth.
2. If operating far from home or on a lengthy deployment and you use 50/60/70% of your magazine…are you out of the fight? What % do you keep as critical reserve? What if annother fighting ship in the fleet takes a hit and is out? What about the ships you’re escorting. Do they turn around too?
3. Missile mix? Do you just carry ESSM or want SMs with longer range and other capabilities?
4. The ship is probably not acting in isolation but needs to expend rounds to protect other fleet assets that don’t have their own magazine.
5. Stuff ups do happen and enemies are smart. Planning mistakes are made, system fail, people cock up. See for example that SAMbush of the AWAC in the Ukraine. The Russians thought it was over 100 miles out of range of Ukrainian SAMs. Until it wasn’t.

If Money was no object …..if you can sail with 16, 32 or 64 cells… what would be the choice? My view is more cells brings versatility and endurance.

 

[Armchair]

What is the expectation for these ships?

What are they supposed to be able to face alone and for what duration of time?

I think some people might be getting a little bit over ambitious on what these ships are to be capable of accomplishing. Even the Hunter class is only expected to have 32 VLS cells.

Remember that these are tier 2 combatants, in a high threat environment they should not be operating solo unless something has gone very wrong.

The surface fleet analysis specifies they are to be optimised for undersea warfare and would carry a limited number of point and self defence weapons for air defence.

from the analysis

https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-02/Enhanced_Lethality_Surface_Combatant_Fleet_web.pdf

*****
Tier 2
At least seven, and optimally 11, Tier 2 ships, optimised for undersea warfare, to
operate both independently and in conjunction with the Tier 1 ships to secure
maritime trade routes, northern approaches and escort military assets. Consistent
with the DSR and our Terms of Reference, it is essential these vessels include the
ability to:
• operate a Maritime Combat Helicopter
• provide undersea warfare through a depressed active/passive towed array
sonar and have the ability to store, handle and employ lightweight torpedoes
• provide air defence through a limited number of point and self-defence
systems
• provide maritime and land strike
• provide force protection.
*****

My interpretation is that “independent operations“ means sub hunting, and “escorting military assets” / “force protection” is primarily about contributing to the ASW screen. The anticipated threats during independent operations would be submarines, shore batteries and isolated maritime patrol aircraft launching cruise missiles. I think you are correct that in high threat environments (e.g, those involving hostile ballistic missiles, air wings, and surface fleets) the Tier 2 vessel would be operating in a task force with (at a minimum) a Tier 1 vessel.

My guess is that a design with 16 VLS cells will be selected but will be found to be inadequate in the 2030s (hopefully a base design that can accommodate a larger magazine, and future hypersonic weapons for ships 7-11 will be selected).

 

[Reptilia]

The surface fleet analysis specifies they are to be optimised for undersea warfare and would carry a limited number of point and self defence weapons for air defence.

from the analysis

https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-02/Enhanced_Lethality_Surface_Combatant_Fleet_web.pdf

*****
Tier 2
At least seven, and optimally 11, Tier 2 ships, optimised for undersea warfare, to
operate both independently and in conjunction with the Tier 1 ships to secure
maritime trade routes, northern approaches and escort military assets. Consistent
with the DSR and our Terms of Reference, it is essential these vessels include the
ability to:
• operate a Maritime Combat Helicopter
• provide undersea warfare through a depressed active/passive towed array
sonar and have the ability to store, handle and employ lightweight torpedoes
• provide air defence through a limited number of point and self-defence
systems
• provide maritime and land strike
• provide force protection.
*****

My interpretation is that “independent operations“ means sub hunting, and “escorting military assets” / “force protection” is primarily about contributing to the ASW screen. The anticipated threats during independent operations would be submarines, shore batteries and isolated maritime patrol aircraft launching cruise missiles. I think you are correct that in high threat environments (e.g, those involving hostile ballistic missiles, air wings, and surface fleets) the Tier 2 vessel would be operating in a task force with (at a minimum) a Tier 1 vessel.

My guess is that a design with 16 VLS cells will be selected but will be found to be inadequate in the 2030s (hopefully a base design that can accommodate a larger magazine, and future hypersonic weapons for ships 7-11 will be selected).

16 definitely too few imo, 24 should be the minimum (8TL+16SL). Both the MEKO A200 and Chungnam may be able to fit 24.
ALFA 3000 + Daegu should not even be considered. Any new frigate should also have room for DEWs and the MEKOs (A200/A210) have that space for it forward of the bridge.

 

[Wombat000]

My own impression is when ANZAC was commissioned 8 VLS was the basic requirement for a GP frigate in the relatively benign strategic environment of the day.
- today we are in an arms race, China (as an example, to my knowledge) is not building ships with 16 VLS.
if they are, then I’m gunna say they’re for close proximity operations.

i think the current build logic of 16 VLS is a natural evolution of the past, but also dominated by CONOPS principles of operation in closer home waters, not extended longer range operations.

I also think that when Hobarts were designed, 32 was pretty bloody good. I think they themselves will struggle, especially as weapons load types expand and we start packing ‘less of more’.
i think the reason Hunters initially will be built as initial design is simple expedience to get hulls asap, but further builds will evolve from the basic design and be forced to increase the number of VLS as was speculated in the AAW variant design.

what will stop this current race in VLS magazine sizes is:
- the ability to reload efficiently at sea (this will be a Dreadnaught moment)
- an alternate gun round that mimics VLS launched weapon effect.
- maturing of unmanned AI loyal boatman concepts.

I do appreciate the ASW screen role, I reckon that’s vital.
however a smaller magazine inevitably implies it will be obligated to depart the AO early, and if it’s not there than it’s not relevant.
- the fact it will rely on the airworthiness and location of its helicopter for that ASW is another sad story, if ever RAN employs ASROC that will eat further into the VLS magazine, but at least the ship itself can engage targets!

in an effort to produce a new ANZAC replacement we should avoid a literally making a new ANZAC.

 

[Armchair]

My own impression is when ANZAC was commissioned 8 VLS was the basic requirement for a GP frigate in the relatively benign strategic environment of the day.
- today we are in an arms race, China (as an example, to my knowledge) is not building ships with 16 VLS.

I agree with your broad argument but I want to tease out a point.
The PLA‘s strategic mission is to demonstrate the ability to launch an amphibious assault on a heavily populated island that MIGHT be defended by a politically unpredictable hyperpower and its numerous allies (who have weapons constantly in range of every single Chinese surface vessel and port, which is not to suggest those potential targets could not be defended).
The PLAN‘s needs are thus very different from the RAN’s.

In very rough terms, the RAN is building submarines to threaten PLAN ships (chiefly with torpedoes) and building ships to threaten PLAN submarines (chiefly through helicopters). To the extent that the PLAN is responding to the RAN it is almost reciprocal - subs to threaten ships (but chiefly with missiles so ASROC could be outranged).

Yes it is an oversimplification but different “arms” (ships and subs) are racing against each other in the two forces.

 

[Todjaeger]

My guess is that a design with 16 VLS cells will be selected but will be found to be inadequate in the 2030s (hopefully a base design that can accommodate a larger magazine, and future hypersonic weapons for ships 7-11 will be selected).

Here in lies an issue. If a 16-cell VLS is indeed selected, and is found to be at least partly if not entirely inadequate in the 2030's, that would indicate that the wrong design and/or design criteria was used from the start of the selection process onwards. If the GP frigate plan does progress according to the plans as currently know, they are going to start entering RAN service in the 2030's. If in the 2030's is turns out that they are kitted out with too few VLS cells, that would mean that within a few years of the new class first entering service, it's fitout would be insufficient, and that would be for the lead vessels built overseas. By the time the last Australian-built GP frigate entered RAN service which IIRC would be at the end of the 2030's if into already into the 2040's, it is possible that such a GP frigate design would be suitable for relatively benign areas if without an escort.

 

[Redlands18]

Would the USN send a 9500t Burke Flt III with 96 VLS Cells into a hostile SCS all on its lonesome? Without any air cover, with only its own fairly moderate ASW and ASuW capabilities? no. So why do we think a 5000t Frigate with even 32 VLS would be expected to survive on its own. Ships do not operate in isolation, they would operate as part of a TF with DDGs, Hunters, Subs, with air cover provided from air bases, Carriers etc. If the enemy can get 32 war shots on an escort, then the entire force is going to be in serious trouble.

 

[MickB]

If a ship is at sea, it has no facility to re-load the expended missile cells.
Given that 64 missiles may not be used in one engagement then there will still be some magazine depth remaining.
However, if there are more engagements - even in a single day - the numbers start to drop.
If there are engagements daily over even a short period of time, the missiles will be used up.
Better to have them and not need them, than to need them and not have them
MB

Not every situation requires an ESSM or better.
Part of increasing missile numbers (against drones in perticular) may may be the adoption of lighter, smaller missiles.
I know this comes at the penalty of range and adds another supply chain but a high/low mix may benifit with lower cost and increased numbers.

If the ESSM can be quad packet in a VLS something like the UKs Martlet (for example) could perhaps be 10/12 packed.

Another way to increase numbers and not use valuable VLS space is to replace 1 or more NSM launcher boxes with ones filled with the Martlet or similar missiles.
Loitering munitions such as the Raytheon Coyote could also be employed this way.
Trying to find ways of employing addition missile capability within existing deck space.

 

[Sandson41]

Not every situation requires an ESSM or better.
Part of increasing missile numbers (against drones in perticular) may may be the adoption of lighter, smaller missiles.
I know this comes at the penalty of range and adds another supply chain but a high/low mix may benifit with lower cost and increased numbers.

If the ESSM can be quad packet in a VLS something like the UKs Martlet (for example) could perhaps be 10/12 packed.

Another way to increase numbers and not use valuable VLS space is to replace 1 or more NSM launcher boxes with ones filled with the Martlet or similar missiles.
Loitering munitions such as the Raytheon Coyote could also be employed this way.
Trying to find ways of employing addition missile capability within existing deck space.

I would not be too surprised if someone soon works out how to fit an active seeker into a 2.75-inch rocket - they've apparently put a fire-and-forget infrared homing package into one version - and fit a 9 or 16 round pod into a Mk41 VLS cell. I have no idea if they can launch vertically, but if not, a box launcher on deck would do. Useful for anti-drone work?

Small step from there to mount something (that or a 2 or 3 round RAM launcher) on a large UAV or small USV and potentially have your own missile defence picket/CAP. Assuming of course you have a large space aboard for carrying drones - some kind of multi mission bay perhaps - but I read on the internet these are now generally considered a waste of space...

EDIT: Wiki (I know...) gives the Maximum canister width of a Mk41 as 28 in (0.71 m). Assuming the rockets could be closely spaced, that could be 9x9 rockets (24.75 inches or 0.63 m a side).