This is an interesting interview, but not without some spin.
Interesting he mentions more seahawks....or am I misunderstanding.
Interesting he mentions more seahawks....or am I misunderstanding.
Yep, sure...The cost of 9 Hunters ballooned out to 65 billion, 7+ billion per unit. Now we are looking at 6 Hunters with no design changes for approx 45 billion.
With 6 Tier 1 Hunters, we may not even see the Hobart class replaced, instead more LOSVs with even more VLS cells and the Tier 2 frigate production line continue at Henderson past the planned 8 or get more built overseas on top of the 3. With the money put forward by government, tier 2 frigates look to cost a 1/3 or less than that of 1 Hunter class.
It’s what the Government/Navy wanted when the Tier 1 and 2 fleet structure came out, huge cost savings, significantly less crew required and more numerous ships.
at approx 06:04This is an interesting interview, but not without some spin.
Interesting he mentions more seahawks....or am I misunderstanding.
Yep, sure...
The LOSV right now are really just vapourware that IIRC the USN is conducting some technical trials, and is well away from having a deployable capability.
I personally also believe that the gov't plans regarding the new/additional frigate are rather optimistic. Having only a year between design selection and first steel being cut really does not allow much time for the all the additional/extra bits of kit a warship will need to get ordered. Similarly it really does not allow much if any time for the detailed design work to fit Australian compatible systems
Another thing to consider is how early the first Hunter-class frigate could potentially have been brought into service, particularly if the drumbeat had been accelerated. IIRC prior to the release of the naval review, the lead Hunter-class frigate was planned to be in service by 2032 (which is the year the lead-yet-to-be-selected-frigate is now supposed to enter RAN service) after having conducted ships and builders trials following the end of construction which had been anticipated for 2029.
Somehow the RAN is supposed to get newly built modern warships into RAN service in only about eight years. This whilst completing all tasks necessary for selecting a design, getting the contracting to order said design, getting the required systems integrated and ordered, getting the design built and then through the various acceptance trials. Given that acceptance trials, particularly for a new class of vessel can take a couple of years, then one it talking about a build (for the lead ship anyways) which is completed by ~2030. Where this gets really questionable is the expectation that construction could commence in 2026, as it is my belief that there are too many things which would need to be resolved or take place before construction could actually start. This is all also assuming that Australia can find an acceptable overseas yard able to to do the build and within the timeframe expected.
Why does it take 10 years to build a Type 26, approximately 3 years for a GPF, and the Chinese can pop out a Type 55 cruiser every 2 years?The drumbeat has been accelerated by about 2 months each, 1st Hunter 2034, 6th 2043. The timeline for delivery of the first Hunter is no guarantee either, they are using the HMS Glasgow build time as a reference. Laid down in 2017, expected service 2027.
GPF selection was set for 2025 (avoiding major Aus modifications), GPF steel cutting 2026, 1st overseas built GPF in service 2029, a further 2 before the first Hunter in 2034 and possibly 1 of the locally built GPFs in the same year.
I think the above is a possible future outcome. While I suspect the platforms to be made through to the late 40s will be locked in this decade (we will be making Hunters, GPs and LOCSVs), the makeup of these three remains fully open to change.The cost of 9 Hunters ballooned out to 65 billion, 7+ billion per unit. Now we are looking at 6 Hunters with no design changes for approx 45 billion.
With 6 Tier 1 Hunters, we may not even see the Hobart class replaced, instead more LOSVs with even more VLS cells and the Tier 2 frigate production line continue at Henderson past the planned 8 or get more built overseas on top of the 3. With the money put forward by government, tier 2 frigates look to cost a 1/3 or less than that of 1 Hunter class.
It’s what the Government/Navy wanted when the Tier 1 and 2 fleet structure came out, huge cost savings, significantly less crew required and more numerous ships.
I think it takes longer than 2 years to build a type 55, they just have a hot production line that is rolling them off every two years (so several in parallel construction). The Type 26 will get to this point where they are finishing each platform at a similar cadence shortly as well. So will our Hunter production line (eventually).Why does it take 10 years to build a Type 26, approximately 3 years for a GPF, and the Chinese can pop out a Type 55 cruiser every 2 years?
I suspect that the build time for the first Hunter is partly to do with pushing back the ballooning costs of sustaining those ships and the requirement of training (large) crews for them into the future. In the middle of the Hunter program‘s development Australia also decided to acquire SSNs (the first of which is planned to be transferred to RAN service before the first Hunter is finished). That has absorbed funding and effort from a host of other ADF programs.Why does it take 10 years to build a Type 26, approximately 3 years for a GPF, and the Chinese can pop out a Type 55 cruiser every 2 years?
I love the Hunters and especially the FFG version and would love to see five or six of each going forward but realistically the the new GP frigates are the reconstitution of the Tier 2 concept to replace the OPVs and increase numbers.This just one of the reasons why I question the thinking behind the announcement of a plan to select, order and then build 11 frigates of a new and yet to be determined class, designer and shipyards. It still strikes me that the Hunter-class frigates which are already under construction could more likely be brought into service by the originally planned 2032 in-service date. Attempting to jumpstart an all new class acquisition programme, get it built and then brought into RAN service before the Hunter-class sounds rather optimistic if I am being kind.
If one also factors in what will then need to happen in order for the rest of the vessels to be built in Australia, the language becomes... less kind.
HMS Dreadnought was vapourware until she was built, and she kicked off a naval revolution.Yep, sure...
The LOSV right now are really just vapourware that IIRC the USN is conducting some technical trials, and is well away from having a deployable capability.
I personally also believe that the gov't plans regarding the new/additional frigate are rather optimistic. Having only a year between design selection and first steel being cut really does not allow much time for the all the additional/extra bits of kit a warship will need to get ordered. Similarly it really does not allow much if any time for the detailed design work to fit Australian compatible systems
Another thing to consider is how early the first Hunter-class frigate could potentially have been brought into service, particularly if the drumbeat had been accelerated. IIRC prior to the release of the naval review, the lead Hunter-class frigate was planned to be in service by 2032 (which is the year the lead-yet-to-be-selected-frigate is now supposed to enter RAN service) after having conducted ships and builders trials following the end of construction which had been anticipated for 2029.
Somehow the RAN is supposed to get newly built modern warships into RAN service in only about eight years. This whilst completing all tasks necessary for selecting a design, getting the contracting to order said design, getting the required systems integrated and ordered, getting the design built and then through the various acceptance trials. Given that acceptance trials, particularly for a new class of vessel can take a couple of years, then one it talking about a build (for the lead ship anyways) which is completed by ~2030. Where this gets really questionable is the expectation that construction could commence in 2026, as it is my belief that there are too many things which would need to be resolved or take place before construction could actually start. This is all also assuming that Australia can find an acceptable overseas yard able to to do the build and within the timeframe expected.
The LOCSVs themselves will be relatively simple vessels. People might be imagining super sophisticated warships but they will essentually just be missile and sensor barges controlled by an electronic brain not much more sophisticated than what you would find in your average mobile phone. They will be somewhat limited in what they can do but that fits in with the more focused force structure being touted in the DSR.I think the above is a possible future outcome. While I suspect the platforms to be made through to the late 40s will be locked in this decade (we will be making Hunters, GPs and LOCSVs), the makeup of these three remains fully open to change.
Maybe we make more GPs and less Hunters. I think a lot comes down to the success or otherwise of the LOCSV concept. If it matures (and I agree there is a lot more to do here) then it makes big ships with big magazines largely redundant. If it doesn’t, then we need to be able to pivot back to the traditional platform in a hurry.
I would view the government will wait for clarity on this before deciding on the Hobart DDG replacement. Given we will likely pick the USN LOCSV platform we should get an understanding if it is going to work (or not) this decade.
So it could be we keep the six Hunters and make 14 GPs rather than 11. And we upgrade the GPs to interface with the LOCSVs. And then we make a lot more LOCSVs. All combined with a heap of AI drones. This represents a lower cost, lower crewed and larger missile capacity solution.
Or alternatively LOCSVs turn out to be a dud. We pivot to making 12 Hunters, with 6 in the DDG configuration. This is a higher cost, higher crewed solution, but provides a backup contingency.
My personal reflection is that there is a lot resting on the success of the LOCSV program. It is about the only way we can develop an asymmetric capability in time to offset the expanding Chinese fleet.
Apart of the challenge I suspect for the LOCSV''s concept will be mission creep and cost.I
The LOCSVs themselves will be relatively simple vessels. People might be imagining super sophisticated warships but they will essentually just be missile and sensor barges controlled by and electronic brain not much more sophisticated than what you would find in your average mobile phone. They will be somewhat limited in what they can do but that fits in with the more focused force structure being touted in the DSR.
There will be issues dealing with maintainence and system reliability but I think the big issue will be our ability to effectively communicate with these vessels. A highly secure communication capability will be absolutely crucial. Without that capability you are essentually unleashing AI controlled weapons without any human control.
You would be even have to question whether we could control a rouge AI even if we were able to communicate with it.
I asked a programmer friend of mine his opinion and he gave me an analogy. The first computers designed to play chess were programmed by humans. They simply executed a string of intructions. How well that computer played was limited by the ability of the programmer to play chess.
With AI you simply give it the rules of chess and then start to play it. It will probably play very badly to begin with but it will quickly learn from its mistakes until it becomes unbeatable. There is no programmer involved. The machine essentually is now running without any human in the loop.
When you apply that same principle to AI controlled weapons you had best hope it has a good grasp of the rules. There are already examples of AI ignoring human instructions in order to complete a mission.
Air Force said AI drone killed its human operator in a simulation
An Air Force AI got a little too good at its job, deciding to kill its human overseers to accomplish its missiontaskandpurpose.com
That is the problem with self learning machines. We can't really ever be sure what it is learning or its reaction to real world situations. Better just hope there is a human standing by ready to hit the off button.
I wouldn't just limit it to LOCSVs. You will have a whole range of UUVs, USVs and AUVs. A lot of these vessels will be expendable and even sacrificial. The whole concept of how to conduct naval warfare may have to be reassessed.Apart of the challenge I suspect for the LOCSV''s concept will be mission creep and cost.
Vessel will need to be respectable size to accommodate VLS and associated machinery.
Vessel by default becomes a significant asset ( target )
Vessel needs defending ( theory sails under the protective umbrella of the fleet )
What realistically does that look like!
Will it be able to sail independently. Technically I'm sure feasible. real life application I'm concerned it will not need manned escorts.
Therefore dos it have minimum crew.
That crew then grows due to experience.
The LOVSC becomes a small manned vessel.
Small manned vessels prove inadequate.
The LOCSV now evolves to become a major fleet unit..
The unmanned space has a place, just guarded about the concept of a floating optionally unmanned missile barge.
Cheers S
I
The LOCSVs themselves will be relatively simple vessels. People might be imagining super sophisticated warships but they will essentually just be missile and sensor barges controlled by an electronic brain not much more sophisticated than what you would find in your average mobile phone. They will be somewhat limited in what they can do but that fits in with the more focused force structure being touted in the DSR.
There will be issues dealing with maintainence and system reliability but I think the big issue will be our ability to effectively communicate with these vessels. A highly secure communication capability will be absolutely crucial. Without that capability you are essentually unleashing AI controlled weapons without any human control.
You would be even have to question whether we could control a rouge AI even if we were able to communicate with it.
I asked a programmer friend of mine his opinion and he gave me an analogy. The first computers designed to play chess were programmed by humans. They simply executed a string of intructions. How well that computer played was limited by the ability of the programmer to play chess.
With AI you simply give it the rules of chess and then start to play it. It will probably play very badly to begin with but it will quickly learn from its mistakes until it becomes unbeatable. There is no programmer involved. The machine essentually is now running without any human in the loop.
When you apply that same principle to AI controlled weapons you had best hope it has a good grasp of the rules. There are already examples of AI ignoring human instructions in order to complete a mission.
Air Force said AI drone killed its human operator in a simulation
An Air Force AI got a little too good at its job, deciding to kill its human overseers to accomplish its missiontaskandpurpose.com
That is the problem with self learning machines. We can't really ever be sure what it is learning or its reaction to real world situations. Better just hope there is a human standing by ready to hit the off button.
You are quoting project cost, that is not unit cost, very different, with different projects taking into account many factors in the overall project cost, like new or upgraded wharf facilities, more complex ships mean more expensive refits and equipment upgrades, crew operating costs etc.The cost of 9 Hunters ballooned out to 65 billion, 7+ billion per unit. Now we are looking at 6 Hunters with no design changes for approx 45 billion.
The $65 Billion figure originated from the current government and I do not know if it’s a genuine estimate or something that they plucked out of a dark space to make the previous government look incompetent - I suspect that it’s mainly the latter. It certainly allowed them to reduce the number of Hunters without any scrutiny from the press.The cost of 9 Hunters ballooned out to 65 billion, 7+ billion per unit. Now we are looking at 6 Hunters with no design changes for approx 45 billion.