Todjaeger
Potstirrer
The option for the 4th AWD/Hobart-class DDG expired in 2008 IIRC, the option to add on a 4th vessel in 2013 was well dead by then. It would have required its own orders for kit to be placed and contracts signed.
Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0
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But that is where the problem was, it was felt it was too late, as Sea5000 was coming.
The 4th (and 5th) should have had new spec equipment fitout. newer Aegis, Spy6 or similar, new engines, new pretty much everything. It could derisk the existing batch 1 upgrade. We still had to pay and do all the work for this anyway in retrofitting our new but outdated ships.
But Sea5000 wasn't right on top of us. While selected, the design wasn't ready to cut steel. So we again, had this huge valley of death in shipwork. Not just for the yard, but for suppliers too. Now we have to update the existing hobarts of which we have too few, and build new Type 26.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
If there had a been a 4th or 5th vessel built as you suggest should have happened, then it would have required redesign from the Hobart-class DDG's that ASC built. If essentially all the systems should have been changed as you seem to suggest, then it would likely have been better, and potentially faster and easier, to just go with a clean sheet design. That would likely have been a more successful plan than attempting to cram new/different kit into the spaces available in the Hobart-class design. As we have already observed, the space/margins aboard the vessels are limited as it is, and IIRC there was a certain amount of work needed to take the plans provided by Navantia and turn them into something which could be worked with and built.
Once the option for the 4th Hobart-class destroyer was not exercised before it expired from the contract where the three destroyers were actually ordered, then objectively it was no longer a realistic possibility. If there had been inquiries about building a 4th destroyer when Smith was MinDef in 2013, then I am certain any such inquiries would have quickly realized the contracts signed for SEA 4000 would have had no relevance and that a new set of contracts would be needed for any additional vessels ordered at that point. It would have also been distinctly possible that no contracts could have been signed, or even redesign work completed, before there was a change in gov't towards the end of 2013 which could easily have upended work being done.
I do agree that Australia should have been ordering and building more warships, and doing so more frequently, to ensure that the RAN has the numbers needed, as well as to maintain an industrial base to support the RAN into the future. Unfortunately successive gov'ts have, for a variety of reasons/justifications, failed to do so repeatedly. Where things stand now, there has been a national continuous naval shipbuilding programme put together and released in May 2017, but some six and a half years later, there is some question as to whether the plan will survive. I cannot help but feel dismayed, because if some of the changes are made, I strongly suspect the reasons for doing so will primarily be because it was in someone (a decisionmaker or lobbyist) else's best interests, and not the actual CoA or RAN.
Going Boeing
Well-Known Member
I believe that the existing ASC North will be used for the Collins class FCD/LOTE for the next 14 years while the land recently acquired to the North will have new facilities constructed for the AUKUS SSN assembly.
I’ve previously read that the buildings at ASC South that were recently completed for the Hunter build have the capacity for a faster drumbeat.
We've chatted over the years of our difference of opinion on the Armidales but i loved serving on them, especially when I started on FFG with 60 man mess and ended with 2 man cabins
The advantage ABF Marine unit have for getting ex-RAN personal is that its fifo from any capital city. Instead of living in Darwin, you can live in Melbourne where you have a better lifestyle and family options for school and work. ADF would never implement something similar even though it could have worked when Armidales had crew swaps. I did enjoy Darwin but given the option of my 4 weeks off living elsewhere, id have taken it.
The current Junior Warfare Officers program has been set for generations and teaches Middies how to understand Command on a scale Majors cannot match. Phase 2 and 4 was(I might be out of date for this) was Major units posting. You did initial phase for 6mths ob Major to learn roles and responsibilities, plus Assistant Officer of Watch for Nav, DC, Briefings etc. It gave early experience. Phase 3 was Minor War Vessel Nav theory followed by 6mths Prac on Armidales or Huons. This allowed practical training and most trainees to experience watches on their own after certification. Running a small team, making navigation decisions and leadership. This was a huge task for someone at 22yrs to do and built confidence. It also identified those not ready and needing more time to learn. They were also exposed to Op Resolute/Sovering Borders and boardings.
This would be difficult on Majors as at that time, we were rotating ships in Middle East. Phase 4 officers could receive their OOW Tickets while on deployment where they were exposed to alot of navigation and operational pressures following much supervision. If they didnt do the phase 3 part, it would have been more of a drain on an operational ship and its officers having to spend more time teaching/supervising. This would also put further strain on the fleet for time at sea teaching.
When you compare this to the US, its a very different beast. You can watch on youtube midshipman selecting their postings according to ratings. Its fascinating to watch but my understanding is they can spend years on that ship or just that type, DDG, Amphib, Carrier etc. In RAN, the officers need exposure to different types as they may end up NAV, PWO, XO or CO on different class of ships. Having seen a Nav posted at short notice to a class they didnt have alot of exposure to and cause damage during berthing, i can see the need for cross-platform training instead of single hull type. (Of note, was FFH and they'd been FFG/LPA trained, following Long N posted to us at short notice, really miss that bollard that was ripped off the Qtr Deck
)Our current training program attempts such a thing, changing it out would have long term implications.
Were any of those attributed to a lack of command experience in virtually un-armed patrol boats?
I agree with everything you have written but will qualify that other vessels, including hydros, MCMVs, LCHs (their replacements) and actual small warships such as FACs, and corvettes, can also provide all of this.We've chatted over the years of our difference of opinion on the Armidales but i loved serving on them, especially when I started on FFG with 60 man mess and ended with 2 man cabins
The advantage ABF Marine unit have for getting ex-RAN personal is that its fifo from any capital city. Instead of living in Darwin, you can live in Melbourne where you have a better lifestyle and family options for school and work. ADF would never implement something similar even though it could have worked when Armidales had crew swaps. I did enjoy Darwin but given the option of my 4 weeks off living elsewhere, id have taken it.
The current Junior Warfare Officers program has been set for generations and teaches Middies how to understand Command on a scale Majors cannot match. Phase 2 and 4 was(I might be out of date for this) was Major units posting. You did initial phase for 6mths ob Major to learn roles and responsibilities, plus Assistant Officer of Watch for Nav, DC, Briefings etc. It gave early experience. Phase 3 was Minor War Vessel Nav theory followed by 6mths Prac on Armidales or Huons. This allowed practical training and most trainees to experience watches on their own after certification. Running a small team, making navigation decisions and leadership. This was a huge task for someone at 22yrs to do and built confidence. It also identified those not ready and needing more time to learn. They were also exposed to Op Resolute/Sovering Borders and boardings.
This would be difficult on Majors as at that time, we were rotating ships in Middle East. Phase 4 officers could receive their OOW Tickets while on deployment where they were exposed to alot of navigation and operational pressures following much supervision. If they didnt do the phase 3 part, it would have been more of a drain on an operational ship and its officers having to spend more time teaching/supervising. This would also put further strain on the fleet for time at sea teaching.
When you compare this to the US, its a very different beast. You can watch on youtube midshipman selecting their postings according to ratings. Its fascinating to watch but my understanding is they can spend years on that ship or just that type, DDG, Amphib, Carrier etc. In RAN, the officers need exposure to different types as they may end up NAV, PWO, XO or CO on different class of ships. Having seen a Nav posted at short notice to a class they didnt have alot of exposure to and cause damage during berthing, i can see the need for cross-platform training instead of single hull type. (Of note, was FFH and they'd been FFG/LPA trained, following Long N posted to us at short notice, really miss that bollard that was ripped off the Qtr Deck
Our current training program attempts such a thing, changing it out would have long term implications.
PBs don't help grow MEOs or WEOs, they are pretty useless for junior technical sailors too. They really needed to be an experienced AB to be much use as the engineering department was so small.
They were referred to as Charge factories and also had a reputation of producing a lot of Boardos and Buffers
But there were more than a few old guys, I'm talking in their 60s, in those roles, and reservists, because there just weren't enough younger guys making it through.
There were even quite a few of the Chiefs being commissioned, but the sad thing is, without their PWO formal engineering quals, they had to stay in minors or shore jobs. There were even degreed ADFA graduates who had their careers derailed by spending too long on minors.
Sadly, the limitations of the patrol boats combined with the political need to keep them crewed, saw too many good people stuck in Darwin or Cairns and missing out on postings that could have made their careers much more successful.
I've worked with people from PBs, Majors and subs, all of them good, even great (even the ones with dodgy personalities) but those from the more complex capable platforms are much more rounded, flexible and capable than those with too much PB time.
You don't know what you don't know and if your workplace/home doesn't expose you, you never know. I've had a few heated words with people on occasion who know one type of platform and its capabilities very well, but who lack the exposure or context to understand what someone is trying to explain to them about another capability they have no experience in.
Not in so many words. However the general thrust was that their JOs needed more intensive training and experience in real world situations - something, as Icelord has suggested, that our system provides,
Personally at least, I can't really see the logic of going down the smaller hull form path to effectively perform the tier two function.
Surely one of the key lessons learned from Anzac is that margins and flexibility are worth their weight in gold?
The Arrowhead 140 appears to be the option that seemingly ticks all the boxes, and actually applies these crucial lessons from Anzac.
It has roughly the same core crew requirement as the other designs, a huge amount of through-life margin for growth and adaptation, and no trade off in regards to range and endurance.
The main issue with Hobart is not the location of bits of steel in its hull, its that its fitout was spec'd a long time ago. Contract signed for in 2007, but essentially based off the F104 fitout spec, which was an even older spec. The Hobarts aren't really F-105 based, they are F-104 with the F105 modifications.
So in trying to reduce risk, by doing a newer detailed specification, we seemed to be locked into to a much earlier fitout, circa 2000. A now 20+ year old spec. Trying to buy washing machines, and fridges, and air conditioners, Aegis and networking, and sewer macerators using model numbers from 20 years ago is an expensive and fairly pointless task.
Its not so much cramming new and different kit, as in more modern version of kit. I am not talking about changing the specification of the performance of the ship rather the actual equipment model type fitted to the ship. These are designed to replace existing older models so have the same or very similar electrical, weight, volume, cooling etc. But they are different. The F100 design should have plenty of margin for those type of upgrades which are typically a few tons here, a few watts there.
The Anzacs are different, because their margins are so tight, they probably can't even upgrade even the sewer system to a model that is sold and supported today. That is when you need a new ship. Which is where we are probably at the point where margins are so tight the small differences between each ship will eliminate some from the upgrade and we will need those fittings and equipment from other hulls to keep some of the existing operational.
We are already doing this work to continue supporting the existing Hobarts. Otherwise they will be laid up too and canibalised.
This would allow the Hunter's and the Hobart's to have more commonality, good for SME, training, crews, logistics, availability etc.
2 extra Hobart's wouldn't have reduced the Hunters build volume. Its a continuous ship building project, once finished the 2 AWD, the Hunters would go ahead unchanged. I imagine the Hobart's will be overtaken by capability needs before they wear out. We were never going to have the first hunter in the water by 2020 and commissioned by 2022. No one was going to meet that kind of schedule. It was wrong pretending anyone was going to be able to.
But we would now haven't a huge hole in our fleet and our capabilities.
Given that we will probably now cut hunter numbers and build newer smaller ships.
The issue of the Anzacs isn't just one of size, its is of design. Battleships are huge, however replacing guns with missiles, well the design is all sorts of wrong. Small ships have their place, doing small ship things. Everyone has small ships, even the USN, coastguard, China, UK, Japan, Korea etc. The Anzacs were designed as light patrol frigates for middle powers at the end/after the cold war. There are small ships with significant weapons and sensor capabilities, and some small ships with long endurance capability. It wasn't designed around larger, more powerful, modern radars, or quad packing, or fighting China in the SCS. New ships don't always have to be bigger to be better. One of the compromises on the new ships is probably top speed, they are a fair bit wider, than the ships designed earlier. But top speed isn't as much as an advantage these days.
Issues with the a140, would be who would build it, how much would it cost, how quickly they can build it, who would run the build and how does it do its mission better than other ships.
Bearing in mind there is a legal dispute between the UK MoD and Babcock over the type 31 costs already. While each ship is supposed to cost £250m as a program average, there is already ~£100m in extra costs, and the first ship isn't even finished yet. I'm not sure its Babcocks fault, but Babcock is currently up to its eyeballs in work with the Type31 program, it may not be able to offer a fixed price contract for a 6 ship RAN build. Indonesia is also building them. There is also the legacy that the RAN assessed the Iver Hutt design as part of the Sea5000, and rejected it. So it has some mountains to climb.
The A140 is a pretty big small ship. While air is free and steel fairly cheap, the want to "pack it out" or fill space with capabilities is always there. Larger ships also have great birthing and support requirements. Particularly if you want this ship to port in and across the region.
As we have seen in many selections from all round the world, the most capable platform isn't always the one that gets selected.
IF the new class is considering ships of around 5,000t then I think the A140 may get a good look in. Navantia has their A5000 thing, but that is probably seen as more high risk, but it would still be backed by Navantia and Spain and their local dealings and capabilities. I think things are heading more toward the smaller ship range to try to distance it from hunter mission wise, to limit costs, and looking for a very rapid build strategy.
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That's actually what I was trying to say. If it wasn't for the margins within Anzac's design when it was acquired as a rather lightly armed platform, we would've found ourselves in a very bad place.
For me the learning is that, if anything, even more margin would've been helpful (in hindsight) and would have made upgrades to the platform significantly less complex and expensive. It's about being realistic in the sense that we can't predict the future, but we can make our job easier by building in flexibility from the get go.
Anzac actually did this rather well, we could've very easily been stuck with patrol corvettes with next to zero ability to adapt.
Poland's also started work on building its first Miecznik AH140. Three on order with an option for five more. I won't hold my breath waiting for those five, though: the Poles have huge plans of which I suspect many elements will end up being scaled down.
The £250 mn per ship (production cost only, & not including a lot of GFE, IIRC) was set in 2017, & would be about £320 million now just from general inflation. The combination of the pandemic & disruption caused by the Russo-Ukrainian war have pushed prices up a lot. Total programme cost was set at £2 billion including GFE & development in 2019, with £1.25 billion for production. At the general inflation rate, that would now be £2.55 bn, with £1.6 bn for production. And that doesn't include some extra capabilities which have been added, such as 32 Type 41 VLS cells.
Type 31 is based on Iver Huitfeldt, but there have been changes under the skin to make it meet RN construction standards.
But as you say, it may be too big
Well they are at a near state of war. They have huge concerns which may suddenly dissipate (the war ends) or escalate (the Russians roll into to Poland after defeating Ukraine).
Yeh, hence why I don't blame Babcock. Again, governments changing minds make price comparisons hard, as listed increases, don't always actually include real cost of changes.
The Saudis have their corvettes, and I do wonder if there is an interest into trying to supply into that. Also, we could even station these in the Gulf. Then the range and size become less of an issue.
With no public document, and seemingly given the dramatic announcements and models at IP23, nothing clear behind the scenes, I guess we will wait to see what happens.
But the whole middle east thing has further highlighted need. There is a high intensity peer war in Ukraine, and a war in the middle east right now. American ships are actively being targeted now. None of this stuff has basically anything to do with China which is entirely another loose end and what we normally fixate on.
Maybe there will be a wider and more expansive defence view next year.
That was a structural and doctrinal issue at fleet level.
This may sound odd but in hindsight, the only way Australia would/could have avoided the fleet structure issues and obsolescence we have today, is if the ANZAC had either been smaller, or more specialised.
The inability to significantly upgrade the ANZACs would have forced the issue of replacing the DDGs and FFGs earlier and with a greater number of hulls.
Alternatively, a larger platform, with greater margins, may have resulted in an even worse situation, where upgraded ANZACs becoming the only major combatants retained becoming our only major fleet units.
I think this is one of the fears going with a much larger platform.
Where as a small more limited platform, its basically it.
I hated the idea of corvettes of tier 2, 12 months ago, I really disliked it. Now, seeing that a corvette is in fact a fairly capable small ship with a small crew and ~3000t, and the issues the wider RAN fleet is having and going to have, its much more agreeable. We aren't looking at something like 1000t with 2 x anti-ship missiles, or just a OPV with 2 x anti-ship missiles and basically no self defence capability.
Osborne already has its new huge halls for the Hunter class. I can't imagine any further expansion will have anything to do with hunter builds. But as the work force increases, and production gets up and running, I would imagine build time will improve. If the RAN wanted to keep ~15-16 major surface combatants, I believe the existing facilities setup for the hunter would easily cater for something like that going forward. Its not the facilities at Osborne that are holding things back, they are world class modern yards. Its really the design aspect. Although many prototype blocks are already ready, and many of those could be used.
There is some concern about Hobart upgrades, Collins upgrade, Anzac upgrades all happening at the same time. But that is more a workforce issue than a shipyard build hall issue.
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Post above by StingrayOz shows report clearly listed training of watchkeeppers as an issue.
In the case of the USS Fitzgerard unclasified report under the section 8 titled "Training" listed multiple concerns over lack of knowledge about both procedures and operation of equipment.
So the USN itself seems have decided that lack of training of watchkeeppers was a real thing.
To be clear I never said that lack of training was the only or even a major factor, just that it was an issue.
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I totally agree mate, seamanship takes many many years to accomplish, whether it is in a tinny, yacht or a larger vessel, you need to be able to navigate the vessel first, let alone taking it to a fight.