The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

[Feanor]

It seems the first T-90 S have been lost in Ukraine -- could this be an Indian T-90 S?

Ukraine Weapons Tracker on Twitter: "https://t.co/3yxDc77FAf" / Twitter

Indian Army T-90S Bhishma tanks may be fighting in Ukraine for Russia

Mid-September saw the release of a video on a Telegram channel showing T-90 tanks with the caption indicating that the

frontierindia.com

It's about time India start to think more seriously about who should provide their weapons in the future... The developing relationship between Russia and China should also make India think more about the future reliability of Russia as a weapons provider.

I think this is the same one T-90S we saw earlier. Until we get more confirmation, I would assume that they simply took a T-90S demonstration tank or prototype and used that.

EDIT: There is actually another interesting piece in all of this. Russia deployed the T-73B3 Biathlon models to the front line, and within a month some were spotted destroyed. Russia deployed a lonely T-90S, and we see one destroyed within a month. I suspect these vehicles are being rotated in as part of fresh units being thrown into offensives.

 

[Feanor]

Update. Dec. 9th-10th

Kherson-Nikolaev-Odessa.

Shahed-136 strikes in Odessa. Reportedly the targets were energy infrastructure.

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A cafe in Kherson that allegedly served Russian soldiers is being vandalized and attacked as "collaborators".

Moscow calling

Тема, которую я затронул на сегодняшнем стриме (запись будет выложена в ближайшее время) - амнистия на Украине для тех, кто сотрудничал с РФ. Как видите, по факту репрессиям и гонениям подвергаются не только работники администрации, учителя, которые учили по российским стандартам, не говоря уже...

t.me

Zaporozhye-Dnepropetrovsk.

Melitopol' got hit, allegedly a HIMARS strike. The person speaking appears to be a Ukrainian civilian. The target was a hotel, allegedly a Russian staging area.

Moscow calling

18+!!! Просто пиздец из Мелитополя в результате прилёта HIMARS, о чём нам многократно напоминает оператор. Видео крайне жёсткое, предупреждаю. Ожоги вещь страшная...

t.me

Moscow calling

Вероятнее всего, HIMARSировка Мелитополя, с учётом максимальной дальности ракет в 84 км, произошла из Степногорска. Город находится в 7 км от линии фронта, вне досягаемости миномётов, а время реакции российской артиллерии чрезмерно велико, чтобы "подловить" HIMARS. От возможных ДРГ ВС РФ...

t.me

Moscow calling

Судя по всему, активизация ВСУ на участке Мелитополь-Бердянск началась.

t.me

Moscow calling

Мелитополь, сообщают о HIMARSировке казармы ВС РФ. Официальной информации по погибшим и пострадавшим нет, а с учетом Приказа ФСБ "О военной цензуре", вероятно, и не будет.

t.me

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Russian volunteer unit Crimea, in Zaporozhye area, near the front line.

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The Oskol Front.

Russian forces attacking Novoselkovskoe, the village is disputed.

Военкор Среда

Новоселовское. В населённом пункте продолжается штурм. Сейчас заняты почти все улицы. Остались последняя и предпоследняя, на которых еще работает украинская техника. Ну, впрочем, противнику тут же прилетает "ответка" от 60-го ОМСБ "Ветераны". https://t.me/veterany_60omsb

t.me

LDNR Front.

DNR 3rd Bde dropping grenades on Ukrainian forces.

Colonelcassad

Бойцы 3-й гвардейской бригады 1-го АК кошмарят укров https://t.me/voenacher/35384

t.me

Combat action on the outskirts of Artemovsk/Bakhmut.

Colonelcassad

Бои на окраинах Артемовска. Видно, что идет обработка позиций ВСУ на окраинах города, куда постепенно смещаются бои (стрелковые бои на окраинах шли уже в ноябре). Тем не менее, пока не взято Опытное, полноценного штурма Артемовска можно не ждать - слишком затратно получится. Исходя из действий...

t.me

Ukrainian sniper team, and other soldiers, in a residential building, Artemovsk/Bakhmut.

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Ukrainian Chechen fighters in Artemovsk/Bakhmut.

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Russian artillery fires in Mar'inka.

Операция Z: Военкоры Русской Весны

‼️Точно в цель: удар армии России по спецгруппе ВСУ у Донецка Беспилотная разведка выявила передвижение подразделения ВСУ на фронте в районе Марьинки, по цели оперативно был нанесён удар реактивной артиллерией. На 53 секунде снаряд прилетает по группе украинских боевиков. t.me/RVvoenkor

t.me

Russian irregulars 6th Cossack Rgt, artillery work near Ugledar.

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Some footage from around Ugledar. Note the damage to the top floors in the 2nd/3rd links. It's possible that Ukrainian forces were using these as vantage points for either LP/OPs, or firing positions. We saw this during the fighting for Mariupol', and Ugledar is a great position over looking Russian forces in Pavlovka.

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Moscow calling

Угледар, Донецкая область (под контролем ВСУ). Выжженные дома и опустевший шахтерский город - как итоги Z-операции.

t.me

Colonelcassad

Видео ВСУ из Угледара. Видны характерные подпалины на верхних этажах многоэтажек, которые используются как позиции для корректировщиков, наблюдателей, расчетов ПТРК и снайперов, по которым периодически прилетает со стороны Павловки и Никольского. Впрочем, здания после таких прилетов остаются...

t.me

Some footage of Ukrainian forces around Soledar. Note the upgraded M-240.

Colonelcassad

Украинский военный запечатлел кадры ситуации в Соледаре. видео: @XU_kraine

t.me

Stakhanov, LNR area, the Zhdanov hotel allegedly housing Wagner fighters got hit. No word on casualty figures.

Позывной Брюс

⚡️Первые фото из разрушенной гостиницы «Гостевой дом Жданова в Стаханове. Удар нанесен из РСЗО HIMARS. В здании находились бойцы ЧВК «Вагнер». @brussinf

t.me

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Shelling of Donetsk continues. Apparently the third day in a row of Grads being used against the center of a major urban area.

Война Глазами Журналиста

Прилёт РСЗО «Град» в район Донецкого планетария в Ворошиловском районе Донецка.

t.me

Война Глазами Журналиста

Прилёт РСЗО «Град» по Ворошиловском району Донецка 15 минут назад, 2 прилёта в районе Южного Автовокзала.

t.me

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Russian truck column moving through Mariupol', towards Volnovakha and Ugledar, likely supplies for the front line. Notable is that this street looks far less destroyed then much other footage from Mariupol'.

Russia.

Russian air defenses firing near Simferopol'. Possibly a Ukrainian UAV.

Colonelcassad

Кадры работы ПВО в районе Симферополя. Скорее всего какой-то дрон был.

t.me

A combination of mobilized and volunteer personnel from Maykop heading to Ukraine.

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Russian troop trains, the 1st is allegedly the 4th Guard Tanks, 12th Tank Rgt, but they're T-72BAs, and I think the 4th Guards has T-80UDs. Of course they took losses they could be re-armed with T-72BAs. The 2nd is a troop train full of trucks. 3rd is a troop train in Samara with T-80BVs, 2S5s, BTR-80s, and T-72Bs.

Russian T-72B3 column in Bryansk region, not far from Belarus.

Misc.

A Russian Su-25 making an emergency landing. Location, context, and date unclear.

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A destroyed Ukrainian Varta armored car, location and context unclear.

Colonelcassad

Уничтоженная украинская бронемашина СБА «Варта» где-то в зоне проведения СВО. видео: @ChDambiev

t.me

A destroyed T-64BV, allegedly Ukrainian. Location and context unclear.

Colonelcassad

Уничтоженный танк Т-64БВ ВСУ.

t.me

A Ukrainian M-777 damaged while towing. Likely a vehicular accident.

Moscow calling

Вот что значит на летней резине ездить

t.me

LOSTARMOUR | Carthago delenda est!

Гаубица М777 ВСУ, пострадавшая в результате ДТП https://lostarmour.info/svo

t.me

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Some footage from Russian BARS-8. BARS was initially designed to provide reservist replacements to other units but were converted into separate btlns and sent to the front. Iirc BARS-8 was in action near Krasniy Liman, unclear where they are now.

Боевой путь БАРС-8

Видео о боевых буднях добровольцев из БАРС-8.

colonelcassad.livejournal.com

Belarus.

A Russian troops train at the rail station in Baranovichi.

- YouTube

Enjoy the videos and music you love, upload original content, and share it all with friends, family, and the world on YouTube.

www.youtube.com

NATO/EU.

Ukraine will allegedly be getting two batteries of the Oerlikon Skynex AAA.

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[Vivendi]

Announced yesterday: The US is donating Bradley M2s, and Germany is donating Marder IFV. In addition, Germany is going to ship a Patriot battery to Ukraine! M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles Will Be Sent By U.S. To Ukraine

Things are really developing now. Although by itself the Marder announcement is probably not that significant (I question how many they are able to ship), however, I think it's significant in the sense that it lowers the bar significantly for Germany to agree to send one of the items that Ukraine really needs now: Western MBT.

The Bradley M2 is highly praised by those that have used it in combat:

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1608841001791295488

Frm Gen. Mark Hertling on all 3:

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1610784020098613248

In addition to Bradleys, radar-guided Sea Sparrow anti-air missiles will also be in the next package -- these will be used with Ukraine's BUK launchers.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1611155617158254593

 

[Vivendi]

Many have wondered why the Wagner groups seems so obsessed with Bakhmut. It does not have any clear strategic value, so the main driver must be something else.

Perhaps it's related to Wagner's main driver in general: money.

According to a White House official, their aim is to take control of salt and gypsum mines close to the city of Bakhmut. Putin ally fighting to control salt and gypsum mines near Ukraine city of Bakhmut, says US

This makes a lot of sense. In Africa the Wagner group has focused on getting access to minerals -- and in the ME, access to oil. Once they get access, they steal as much as they can.

 

[ngatimozart]

Many have wondered why the Wagner groups seems so obsessed with Bakhmut. It does not have any clear strategic value, so the main driver must be something else.

Perhaps it's related to Wagner's main driver in general: money.

According to a White House official, their aim is to take control of salt and gypsum mines close to the city of Bakhmut. Putin ally fighting to control salt and gypsum mines near Ukraine city of Bakhmut, says US

This makes a lot of sense. In Africa the Wagner group has focused on getting access to minerals - and in the ME, access to oil. Once they get access, they steal as much as they can.

Yes I have read that story on Reuters earlier this arvo U.S. thinks Putin ally Prigozhin wants control of salt, gypsum from mines near Bakhmut Given the way that prigoz. He's always been about the money, how to acquire it and keep it. Mind you that is true of Putin's advisors and govt, just Prigozhin is a bit more organized and possibly cunning than the rest.

A former senior USAF commanding general has called for Ukraine to be given permission and the capabilities to attack Russian military targets wherever they find them. Gen Phillip Breedlove for SAC NATO has said that Ukraine should be allowed to attack military targets inside Russia and that the West should give them the tools for the job. He said that the current US and NATO view is shackling Ukraine and gives Putin a sanctuary from which to rain missiles etc., on Ukraine. He said that the best defense against the kamikaze UAVs was to destroy them on the ground before they get airborne. The current policy is just playing into Putin's hands, and he believes that the biggest danger to Ukraine is not tactical nukes or the like, but US domestic politics, and Putin's attempts to drive a wedge between NATO and Western countries electorates and the elected.

An interesting BBC OPED on the Ukrainian strike killing the Mobiks in Makiivka.

Video of Ukrainian T-64s being used as artillery near Bakhmut.

UK Forces TV item on the Russian hypersonic Zircon missile.

Haven't done one of these for a while.

ISW Updates. Part 1/3
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
January 4, 7:30 pm ET

Full article : Institute for the Study of War

The pdf can be downloaded here.

Main Points.

• The Russian milblogger information space continues to seize on official responses to the Ukrainian HIMARS strike on a Russian base in Makiivka to criticize endemic issues in the Russian military apparatus and its unwillingness to address systemic failures.
• The continued construction of Russian units using solely mobilized recruits will not generate combat power commensurate with the number of mobilized personnel deployed.
• The Russian MoD has again shifted the rhetoric and format of its daily situational reports (SITREPs) likely to flood the information space with insignificant claimed successes and distract from its significant military failures.
• Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Chief Kyrylo Budanov stated that Ukrainian forces intend to launch a major counteroffensive throughout Ukraine in the spring of 2023.
• Russian forces are increasingly reliant upon Iranian-made drones to strike Ukrainian critical infrastructure, and Russia will likely seek further bilateral cooperation with Iran in order to secure a greater number of high-precision weapons systems for use in Ukraine.
• Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line as Ukrainian strikes reportedly damaged Russian military logistics in Luhansk Oblast.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut amid continued indicators that the broader offensive may be culminating.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations on the western outskirts of Donetsk City.
• Russian forces continued to rebuild force capability and conduct defensive operations in Kherson Oblast on January 4.
• Select Russian private armament manufacturers are continuing to criticize the Russian military campaign.
• Russian occupation authorities continued to take measures to resolve administrative issues associated with consolidating Russian control of occupied territories on January 4.

 

[ngatimozart]

ISW Updates. Part 2/3
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
January 4, 7:30 pm ET

Full article : Institute for the Study of War

The pdf can be downloaded here.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The Russian milblogger information space continues to seize on official responses to the Ukrainian HIMARS strike on a Russian base in Makiivka to criticize endemic issues in the Russian military apparatus. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) released an official response to the strike on January 4 and attributed it to the "presence and mass use by personnel, contrary to prohibitions, of mobile telephones within range of enemy weapons systems."[1] The Russian MoD also claimed that the death toll of the strike is now 89, including a deputy regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Bachurin.[2] The clear attempt by the Russian MoD to blame the strike on individual mobilized servicemen, as ISW assessed the Russian MoD would likely do on January 2, drew immediate ire from Russian milbloggers.[3] One milblogger emphasized that it is "extremely wrong to make mobile phones guilty for strikes" and concluded that "it is not cell phones and their owners that are to blame, but the negligence of the commanders."[4] Several milbloggers noted that the use of cell phones on the frontline in the 21st century is inevitable and that efforts to crack down on their use are futile.5] The milblogger critique of the Russian MoD largely converted on the incompetence of Russian military command, with many asserting that the Russian military leadership has no understanding of the basic realities faced by Russian soldiers on the frontline and is seeking to shift the blame for its own command failures on the "faceless masses" of Russian mobilized recruits.[6]

The Russian milblogger response to the Russian MoD deflection of blame onto individual servicemen accurately identifies the endemic unwillingness or inability of the Russian military apparatus to address systemic failures Cell phone use may have aided the Ukrainian strike to some degree, but the Russian MoD’s fixation on this as the cause of the strike is largely immaterial. An appropriately organized and properly trained and led modern army should not permit the convergence of the factors that contributed to the Makiivka strike in the first place. The Russian command was ultimately responsible for the decision to pack hundreds of mobilized men into non-tactic positions within artillery range of the frontline and near an ammunition depot.[7] The Russian MoD is likely using the strike to further deflect blame for its own institutional failures in the conduct of the war onto mobilized forces, whose own conduct is additionally emblematic of the Russian force generation failures.[8].

The continued construction of Russian units using solely mobilized recruits will not generate combat power commensurate with the number of mobilized personnel deployed. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin remarked in the wake of the Makiivka strike on January 4 that some of the officers of the targeted regiment were mobilized servicemen.[9] Pushilin’s indication that certain Russian units are relying on newly mobilized and poorly trained recruits for leadership roles, as opposed to drawing from the combat-hardened officer cadre, adds further nuance to the poor performance of and high losses within units comprised of mobil. Mobilized servicemen with minimal training and degraded morale in the role of officers are likely contributing to poor operational security (OPSEC) practices and lack the basic acumen to make sound tactical and operational decisions.

The Russian MoD has again shifted the rhetoric and format of its daily situational reports (SITREPs) likely to flood the information space with insignificant claimed successes and distract from its significant military failures. The Russian MoD instituted this shift on January 3, doubling the length of its previous SITREPs and focusing on claimed strikes against Ukrainian military assets that often lack operational significance rather than on its largely unsuccessful ground attacks.[10] These SITREPs focus on small settlements and group strikes by target type rather than location, making it difficult for its audience to geographically orient the SITREP and verify the claimed strikes. The Russian MoD also dedicated multiple Telegram posts to featuring a new missile carrier, the Admiral Gorshkov , that is very unlikely to conduct operations supporting Russian forces in Ukraine, a productive measure similar to those that Russian milbloggers have recently criticized, as ISW has previously reported.[11] The Russian MoD had previously attempted to emulate the Ukrainian General Staff’s SITREPS in response to widespread milblogger criticism of the lack of transparency in official war coverage following Russia’s military failures in the fall of 2022.[12]

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Chief Kyrylo Budanov stated that Ukrainian forces intend to launch a major counteroffensive throughout Ukraine in the spring of 2023. Budanov stated in an interview with ABC News published on January 4 that he expects fighting to be the most intense in March of 2023 and that the Ukrainian military is planning a major push in the spring that will liberate territory "from Crimea to Donbas" and deal "the final defeats to the Russian Federation."[13] Ukrainian officials have previously indicated that Ukrainian forces will attempt to maintain the initiative through a series of ongoing and subsequent counteroffensive operations in the winter of 2023.[14] This reportedly planned major Ukrainian counteroffensive in the spring of 2023 would not be mutually exclusive with Ukrainian counteroffensive operations continuing this winter, as Ukrainian forces could use ongoing and subsequent counteroffensive operations this winter to set conditions for a. ISW has not observed any indicators that Ukrainian forces intend to halt counteroffensive operations this winter in order to conduct a major counteroffensive this spring. Budanov stated that there would be further strikes "deeper and deeper" inside Russia but declined to comment on Ukraine’s involvement in previous strikes on Russian rear areas in Russia.[fifteen]

Russian forces are increasingly reliant on Iranian-made drones in their campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure and have likely significantly depleted their current stock of these systems. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative Vadym Skibitsky reported on January 4 that Russian forces have used about 660 Iranian-made Shahed-131 and -136 drones in Ukraine since their first use in September of 2022.[16] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces have increased the pace of drone attacks against Ukrainian critical infrastructure in the past month primarily using Shahed drones.[17] Ukrainian Air Force Command Spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat reported on January 4 that Russian forces use Shahed drones because they can better evade detection on radar because of how low they fly to the ground, particularly along the Dnipro River in attack routes focused on targets in Kyiv.eighteen] Ihnat reported that Ukrainian air defenses have shot down 540 Russian strike drones but stated that even at a 100 percent shoot-down rate Shaheds are still able to damage Ukrainian cities as their warheads do not necessarily always explode when intercepted by Ukrainian anti-aircraft to the ground.[19] Skibitsky reported that Russian forces use massive swarms of Shahed drones to break through Ukrainian air defenses and noted that Russian forces could not achieve similar results if they use five to 10 drones at a time.[20] Russian forces, as a result, are running through a significant number of these drones that arrive from Iran in batches of 200 and 300 units.[21]

Skibitsky reported that Russia’s contract with Iran stipulates the transfer of 1,750 drones and that Russian forces currently need to replenish their stocks following a high use of these systems in previous days.[22] Skibitsky also reported that the GUR has intelligence that suggests that Russia will receive another shipment of Iranian-made drones on an unspecified date.[23] Russian forces have likely become reliant on the use of Iranian-made drones because they are a cheap alternative to more conventional high-precision missiles, the stock of which the Russian military has likely significantly depleted.[24]

 

[ngatimozart]

ISW Updates. Part 3/3
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
January 4, 7:30 pm ET

Full article : Institute for the Study of War

The pdf can be downloaded here.

Russia will likely seek further bilateral cooperation with Iran in order to secure a greater number of high-precision weapons systems for use in Ukraine. An Iranian state-run media source claimed on December 28 that Iran will soon receive 24 Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets from Russia likely in exchange for Iranian-made drones and ballistic missiles.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that these high-precision weapon systems will allow Russian forces to more effectively target Ukrainian rear areas defended by Western anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems than their current manned aircraft.[26] Senior US officials reported on December 9 that Russia is providing an unprecedented level of military and technical support to Iran in exchange for Iranian-made weapons systems.[27]

Russian forces would use all the pledged 1,750 Iranian-made drones in Ukraine by May 2023 if they consume them at the same rate as between September and December 2022. Russia will therefore likely look to secure further agreements with Iran on the provision of Iranian-made high-precision weapons systems in order to augment its campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure. The Iranian government’s Islamic Republic News Agency claimed on January 1 that Russia and Iran are building a new transcontinental trade route to bypass sanctions and "foreign interference."[28] Russian and Iranian officials may be negotiating a trade route in part to support more consistent arms transfers between the two countries. ISW has previously assessed that Iran may be supplying drones and potentially ballistic missiles to the Russian Federation to more clearly establish an explicitly bilateral security relationship with Russia in which Iranians are more equal partners.[29]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut on January 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Bakhmut, north of Bakhmut near Krasna Hora, northeast of Bakhmut near Soledar, and south of Bakhmut near Mayorsk.[38] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces captured three unspecified former Ukrainian defensive positions south of Soledar and seized the Deksonska railway station on the southern outskirts of Soledar.[39] Russian forces likely hope to capture Soledar northeast of Bakhmut in order to reach the T0513 Bakhmut-Siversk highway, one of two major logistics lines supplying Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut. Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces Colonel-General Oleksandr Syrsky stated that Russian forces failed to meet their command’s deadline of capturing Soledar and encircling Bakhmut by December 26.[40] Russian sources claimed that fighting is ongoing north of Bakhmut near Krasna Hora and Pidhorodne, and south of Bakhmut near Kishchiivka, Kurdyumivka, and Opytne.[41] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces made unspecified advances towards Pidhorodne and that Wagner Group forces broke through Ukrainian defensive lines near Opytne, but ISW cannot verify these claims.[42]

Continued Russian offensive operations around Bakhmut, particularly claims of marginal tactical gains around Soledar, are not incompatible with ISW’s standing assessment that the Russian offensive in Bakhmut is likely culminating. Spokesperson for Ukraine's Eastern Group of Forces Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated on January 4 that Ukrainian and Russian forces clashed on the ground 22 times in the past day and that Russian forces conducted over 238 artillery, MLRS, and tank strikes in the same period.[43] The Ukrainian Border Guards Service shared footage on January 4 that shows Ukrainian journalists driving into Soledar without fear of Russian fire.[44] Ukrainian soldiers in the video near Soledar said that Russian forces changed tactics and now throw infantry into battle without preparatory artillery fire, and that Ukrainian forces shoot 15-person Russian infantry groups from 20 meters away.[45]This apparent change in tactics suggests that Russian forces in the Soledar-Bakhmut area may be intensifying attempts to gain ground on the tactical level but remain unlikely to secure operationally significant terrain. The culmination of an offensive does not mean that all tactical activity will cease, and such activity could even increase in intensity—but the activity is unlikely to produce meaningful results. Continued Russian tactical operations and claimed gains around Soledar do not preclude the likely culmination of the ongoing offensive.

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the western outskirts of Donetsk City on January 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Krasnohorivka (on the western outskirts of Donetsk City) and Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City) and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka and Pobieda.[46]

Russian forces did not conduct any reported ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on January 4. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka, Zaporizhia Oblast.[47] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces continued routine indirect fire in western Donetsk Oblast, including Vuhledar and its environs.[48]

 

[relic88]

I have a question for the pros here. In almost every photo or video from either side we see markings on infantry - yellow, blue or what have you. I understand the concept, mark yourself and friendly or foe. I have not seen this before in previous conflicts, at least at this granularity. So is this new, is it effective?

 

[Feanor]

I have a question for the pros here. In almost every photo or video from either side we see markings on infantry - yellow, blue or what have you. I understand the concept, mark yourself and friendly or foe. I have not seen this before in previous conflicts, at least at this granularity. So is this new, is it effective?

In the fluidity of modern war PID of friend and foe is very important. Especially when both sides have similar weapons/gear.

 

[relic88]

In the fluidity of modern war PID of friend and foe is very important. Especially when both sides have similar weapons/gear.

Yeah, I figured in this particular conflict with the extreme similarities in kit that it would be prudent to differentiate.

 

[ngatimozart]

I have a question for the pros here. In almost every photo or video from either side we see markings on infantry - yellow, blue or what have you. I understand the concept, mark yourself and friendly or foe. I have not seen this before in previous conflicts, at least at this granularity. So is this new, is it effective?

In the fluidity of modern war PID of friend and foe is very important. Especially when both sides have similar weapons/gear.

Historically in state on state war most enemies have had different uniforms so it has been easy to differentiate the two. WW2 is a classic example where the individual combatants uniforms were different all being differing shades of green, style, helmets etc. Even when camouflage clothing was issued towards the latter part of the war, there was distinctive difference between the German, British and US, patterns, styles and colouring.

 

[Feanor]

There are reports of a Russian breakthrough in Soledar. The extent is unclear but there are also reports of Ukrainian forces leaving Krasnaya Gora, north of Artemovsk/Bakhmut, south of Soledar. Some sources claim it's a breakthrough of the front, but it's unclear at this time. Like last time, I believe we're looking at opportunistic gains by Wagner, with no strategic plan to exploit this in place. Of course if Soledar falls this significantly worsens Ukraine's positions in Artemovsk/Bakhmut, and in Seversk, which begins to turn into a salient.

Продвижение в Соледаре

Как уже отмечают https://t.me/militarymaps/31336 , на представленном видео из Соледара https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74611 отмечается присутствие наших штурмовых групп в районе Соляного рудника №1-3 в самом центре Соледара. Это очень серьезное продвижение, если сравнивать с ситуацией в Соледаре еще с…

colonelcassad.livejournal.com

Военкоры: Центр Соледара взят под контроль бойцами группы «Вагнера», противник отступает

В преддверии объявленного президентом России в одностороннем порядке рождественского перемирия на украинском фронте боевые действия за минувшие сутки скорее усилились, чем стихли. Напомним, официальный Киев на предложение Москвы о прекращении огня с 12 часов 6 января до 24 часов 7 января ответил

topwar.ru

Похоже, наши взяли Соледар

UPD, Теперь у повара Темнейшего будет достаточно соли :-) - взяли соляные шахты 1, 2, 3. Свидомиты держутся на кладбище UPD2. Местные пишут, что бандерлоги бежали с Красной Горы к северу от Артемьевска... Фронт, говорят, обвалился

afirsov.livejournal.com

 

[relic88]

Historically in state on state war most enemies have had different uniforms so it has been easy to differentiate the two. WW2 is a classic example where the individual combatants uniforms were different all being differing shades of green, style, helmets etc. Even when camouflage clothing was issued towards the latter part of the war, there was distinctive difference between the German, British and US, patterns, styles and colouring.

An interesting thing to me is that the practice does not appear to be readily "spoofed". In other words a Russian squad with markings for a Ukraine one. Perhaps this is due to the demarcation of lines.

 

[ngatimozart]

An interesting thing to me is that the practice does not appear to be readily "spoofed". In other words a Russian squad with markings for a Ukraine one. Perhaps this is due to the demarcation of lines.

Rules of war and the Geneva Conventions. If you are caught wearing enemy uniforms etc., you can be executed for espionage. IIRC some Wehrmacht personnel were executed by the US after the Battle of the Bulge in 1944 for wearing US uniforms in combat. It still holds today and rightly so.

Having said, that if you were using enemy vehicles in a "ruse de guerre" but wearing your own uniforms, then I don't think that the espionage rule applies. I could be wrong in this. However if the Russians, PLA and a some others caught you, summary execution would probably occur regardless of the legalities and technicalities.

 

[buffy9]

An interesting thing to me is that the practice does not appear to be readily "spoofed". In other words a Russian squad with markings for a Ukraine one. Perhaps this is due to the demarcation of lines.

It probably does occur on a small scale (there is an active grey zone), but there are still nuances in the equipment and the environment that make deception difficult.

The colour can also change on order for a specific purpose. If one colour has been used for too long and infiltration tactics are being used and/or an assault is planned, commanders may change the colour. When seconds matter, especially around buildings, a flash of yellow or blue could prevent a friendly fire incident

Rules of war and the Geneva Conventions. If you are caught wearing enemy uniforms etc., you can be executed for espionage. IIRC some Wehrmacht personnel were executed by the US after the Battle of the Bulge in 1944 for wearing US uniforms in combat. It still holds today and rightly so.

Having said, that if you were using enemy vehicles in a "ruse de guerre" but wearing your own uniforms, then I don't think that the espionage rule applies. I could be wrong in this. However if the Russians, PLA and a some others caught you, summary execution would probably occur regardless of the legalities and technicalities.

The UA is wearing a patchwork of different uniforms and camouflages, as are the Russians. The implication being whether there is even a uniform to be defined as friendly? .

 

[Hone C]

Rules of war and the Geneva Conventions. If you are caught wearing enemy uniforms etc., you can be executed for espionage. IIRC some Wehrmacht personnel were executed by the US after the Battle of the Bulge in 1944 for wearing US uniforms in combat. It still holds today and rightly so.

Having said, that if you were using enemy vehicles in a "ruse de guerre" but wearing your own uniforms, then I don't think that the espionage rule applies. I could be wrong in this. However if the Russians, PLA and a some others caught you, summary execution would probably occur regardless of the legalities and technicalities.

Wearing enemy uniforms is acceptable if used for infiltration or deception, but not in combat, as this would constitute perfidious conduct.

Otto Skorzeny and other SS officers were tried in 1947 for their troops wearing of US uniforms during the Ardennes offensive, but were acquitted by the court, who ruled the tactic was a legitimate ruse de guerre.

I suspect you're right about the difference between the legal nicities and what happens on the ground though.

 

[Feanor]

There are reports of a Russian breakthrough in Soledar. The extent is unclear but there are also reports of Ukrainian forces leaving Krasnaya Gora, north of Artemovsk/Bakhmut, south of Soledar. Some sources claim it's a breakthrough of the front, but it's unclear at this time. Like last time, I believe we're looking at opportunistic gains by Wagner, with no strategic plan to exploit this in place. Of course if Soledar falls this significantly worsens Ukraine's positions in Artemovsk/Bakhmut, and in Seversk, which begins to turn into a salient.

Продвижение в Соледаре

Как уже отмечают https://t.me/militarymaps/31336 , на представленном видео из Соледара https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74611 отмечается присутствие наших штурмовых групп в районе Соляного рудника №1-3 в самом центре Соледара. Это очень серьезное продвижение, если сравнивать с ситуацией в Соледаре еще с…

colonelcassad.livejournal.com

Военкоры: Центр Соледара взят под контроль бойцами группы «Вагнера», противник отступает

В преддверии объявленного президентом России в одностороннем порядке рождественского перемирия на украинском фронте боевые действия за минувшие сутки скорее усилились, чем стихли. Напомним, официальный Киев на предложение Москвы о прекращении огня с 12 часов 6 января до 24 часов 7 января ответил

topwar.ru

Похоже, наши взяли Соледар

UPD, Теперь у повара Темнейшего будет достаточно соли :-) - взяли соляные шахты 1, 2, 3. Свидомиты держутся на кладбище UPD2. Местные пишут, что бандерлоги бежали с Красной Горы к северу от Артемьевска... Фронт, говорят, обвалился

afirsov.livejournal.com

It appears some of the information is accurate and some is premature. Wagner assault teams have taken Podgornoe, north of Artemovsk/Bakhmut south of Krasnaya Gora. Wagner fighters have also gained some streets inside Artemovsk/Bakhmut, and are pushing Ukrainian forces out of Opytnoe but the situation there remains in flux. They've also made significant gains in central Soledar, and have begun moving in on Soledar from the village of Yakovlevka. Ukraine's 46th Para-Assault Bde has shown up in the area.

Освобождено Подгородное

Перемирия для слабаков. Штурмовые группы ЧВК Вагнер освободили село Подгородное на северо-восточных окраинах Артемовска. Отметили Рождество по-взрослому. Относительно сообщений про взятие Красной Горы. Пока что Красная Гора под ВСУ. Наших войск в самом поселке еще нет. В…

colonelcassad.livejournal.com

Обстановка на Артемовском направлении. 07.01.2023

Обстановка на Артемовском направлении. 07.01.2023 1. К югу от Бахмута бои идут в районе н.п. Клещеевка, у которой вагнера долбят и штурмуют укрепы ВСУ. В саму Клещеевку еще не зашли. К югу наши пытаются продвинуться из района Курдюмовки и Озеряновки, но о результатах пока неизвестно.…

colonelcassad.livejournal.com

Moscow calling

Соледар тем временем остаётся под контролем Украины, город обороняет 46-я ОДШБ ВСУ - Бутусов. Впрочем, и т.н. "ЧВК "Вагнер" достигли тактических успехов, взяв под контроль восточные окраины города. В целом, городской тяни-толкай - занятие вялотекущее, особенно с учётом, что, в отличие от...

t.me

Moscow calling

Соледар - в настоящий момент, Соляной рудник №1-3, предположительно, находится под контролем ВСУ. Линия фронта установилась на юге Соледара плюс-минус по реке Мокрая Плотва, отделяющая пром. зону от частного сектора в пригороде.

t.me

Colonelcassad

В Бахмуте ситуация для ВСУ крайне тяжёлая, хохлы сидят по подвалам боясь высунуть свои пятаки наружу из-за непрекращающейся работы нашей артиллерии. @voenacher

t.me

GREY ZONE

Карта @milchronicles, где отмечено продвижение и направление основных ударов штурмовых отрядов «Группы Вагнера» в боях за Соледар

t.me

МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЙ ФАН

Под контроль ЧВК "Вагнер" перешел еще один пригород Бахмута — село Подгородное. #Бахмут #Вагнер #карта #Россия #Украина @riafan_everywhere

t.me

Colonelcassad

Агент СБУ Бутусов подтверждает, что в северо-западную часть Соледара переброшены силы 46-й бригады ВСУ (ранее действовала на Бериславском направлении, затем переброшена на Запорожское направление в интересах подготовки наступления на Токмак и Пологи, но в силу кризиса на Донбассе, брошена под...

t.me

Colonelcassad

Уличные бои в Соледаре. Видео со стороны ВСУ. Снято в северо-западной части города.

t.me

Colonelcassad

Последнее прощальное видео ВСУшника из Артемовска. Сообщает о прорыве ВС РФ и ЧВК Вагнер в районе Соледара.

t.me

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Wagner fighting claiming that Ukrainian forces used chemical weapons in Artemovsk/Bakhmut at the Street Trudovye Rezervy. He's claiming they got burns to their respiratory organs. Of course there are many plausible explanations here, starting with the most obvious, the heavy fighting damaged some chemical storage facility.

Позывной Брюс

Бойцы ЧВК Вагнер сообщают, что ВСУ применяют неустановленное химическое оружие на Бахмутском направлении. До этого появилось видео зачистки "музыкантами" здания в Соледаре. Все указывает на то, что никакого отступления ВСУ даже близко нет, напротив, наших штурмовиков сдерживают всеми силами...

t.me

 

[ngatimozart]

The US has / is supplying RIM-7 Sea Sparrow SAM to Ukraine. The Ukrainians are integrating them into their BUK systems. That has to be a mean job but since US AGM-88 HARM missiles have been integrated on to Ukrainian Mig-29 and SU-27 aircraft, it may not be so difficult after all. It also appears that the Poles adapted a 2K12 Kub to take the RIM-162 ESSM Blk 1 in 2008 but I don't know what the story is with that.

Sea Sparrow RIM-7 Surface-To-Air Missiles Are Headed To Ukraine

The RIM-7 Sea Sparrow will be paired with Soviet-era Buk launchers and radar systems in a bizarre but potentially much needed mash-up.

www.thedrive.com

US DOD fact sheet on US weapons supplies to Ukraine. This one is dated 9/12/22 so won't include the Bradley IFVs or Sea Sparrows. This is not the full list.

• Over 1,600 Stinger anti-aircraft systems;  Over 8,500 Javelin anti-armor systems;
• Over 46,000 other anti-armor systems and munitions;
• Over 700 Switchblade Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems;
• 142 155mm Howitzers and up to 1,004,000 155mm artillery rounds;
• 4,200 precision-guided 155mm artillery rounds;
• 9,000 155mm rounds of Remote Anti-Armor Mine (RAAM) Systems;
• 36 105mm Howitzers and 180,000 105mm artillery rounds;
• 276 Tactical Vehicles to tow weapons;
• 22 Tactical Vehicles to recover equipment;
• 38 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems and ammunition;
• 20 120mm mortar systems and 135,000 120mm mortar rounds;
• 1,500 Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles;
• Four Command Post vehicles;
• Eight National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) and munitions;
• Missiles for HAWK air defense systems;
• Four Avenger air defense systems;
• High-speed Anti-radiation missiles (HARMs)
• 20 Mi-17 helicopters;
• 45 T-72B tanks;
• Over 1,000 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs)
• Over 100 light tactical vehicles;
• 44 trucks and 88 trailers to transport heavy equipment;
• 200 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers;
• 250 M1117 Armored Security Vehicles
• 440 MaxxPro Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles;
• Mine clearing equipment and systems;
• Over 11,000 grenade launchers and small arms;
• Over 104,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition;
• Over 75,000 sets of body armor and helmetets;
• Approximately 1,800 Phoenix Ghost Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems;
• Laser-guided rocket systems;
• Puma Unmanned Aerial Systems;
• 15 Scan Eagle Unmanned Aerial Systems;
• Two radars for Unmanned Aerial Systems;
• Unmanned Coastal Defense Vessels;

So quite a bit of gear, but in areas that the Ukrainians really need stuff not a lot. Total is US$19.3 billion since 24/2/22.

 

[Aerojoe]

There have been various calls on social media for US to now deliver F16 having crossed the previous red-lines on Bradley IFV and Patriot. But before rising to F16 what has ever happened to the earlier claims by Poland and Slovakia on transferring Mig29s?

 

[SolarisKenzo]

The US has / is supplying RIM-7 Sea Sparrow SAM to Ukraine. The Ukrainians are integrating them into their BUK systems. That has to be a mean job but since US AGM-88 HARM missiles have been integrated on to Ukrainian Mig-29 and SU-27 aircraft, it may not be so difficult after all. It also appears that the Poles adapted a 2K12 Kub to take the RIM-162 ESSM Blk 1 in 2008 but I don't know what the story is with that.
...

Study on KUB and BUK systems were made from 2008 and 2013 by MBDA and RETIA ( but also likely by US companies) on polish and czech soviet-made systems.
The work consisted not only on the conversion to western-made missiles, but also to implement western canisters, radars and electronics in general.
Of course, if confirmed, RIM-7 integration on BUK systems may have benefited from those previous studies to cut integration time.

Thats one of the systems modified by MBDA, this should have been equipped with Aspide missiles, if I'm not wrong...