Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
How do we accelerate the Hunter class? We have been trying to accelerate it for the last 4 years and its gone backwards. We are cutting first production steel 2024? (https://www.theaustralian.com.au/sp...s/news-story/f3c6b757ac14840995fa00d5b4a8e166) The first of the type 26 ships, Glasgow is expected to be in commission sometime after 2027, and they started work on that back in 2017. I would be pretty surprised if Australia's Hunter program rocket ahead to match the commissioning date of Glasgow. If we can get HMAS Hunter commissioned by 2030 I think we will be doing well for a 6 year from cutting steel to commissioning of a first of class. The Australian program was always going to be at least 2-3 years behind the UK one. Realistically, it could very much be 2034 for the commissioning of the first hunter. Its not like our program has had less issues than the UK, and its not like we are build to print this one.

I wonder why the yanks passed over it for constellation class.

Even if you increase the tempo, it isn't until the 2040's we start getting ahead. Increasing the tempo will just make up for lost time from delays. Anzacs aren't getting any younger or more relatively capable. Given the first ship will take 6+ years, I think it again optimistic to expect the next two ships to move to a 18 month drum beat. Now we are looking in the middle of 2030 for the second ship, building a crew.

2024 is when we also start the Hobart upgrades. BTW tenders and contracts are already out. Every day makes it harder to kill or change this project. We are loosing the Hobarts between 2024-2030, minimum. So we say good bye to things like SM-2, SM-6, Tomahawk, Aegis, Hawklink etc. I presume no more indo-pacifics or other regional tours with the LHD's. We would just be embarrassing ourselves. Any delays or complications and we could really be up a creek. To make things more difficult we are going to be pulling apart Collins at the same time.

Again the Americans have inadvertently helped us with options. The F-105 design was refreshed for US FFG(X) bid. IF we wanted a design speced with Spy-6, AEGIS, SeaRAM, they have already paid and got detailed designs and design assessments for that. Years worth of work, Bath had input, USN had input, years of work by dozens of top people. While the US went another way, the Constellation supply chain was very similar for all candidates. The US bid required significant reworking of the ship. They would be batch II. Related but different. Mostly same systems and layout. Warren confirmed all of this before stepping down as CEO of Navantia Australia. The Americans went with FREMM but the spanish proposal went pretty far.

We are already committed to spend $5.1 billion upgrading the existing hobarts. Obviously an expensive and comprehensive upgrade. This isn't just changing the toilet roles and fresh coat of paint. We are talking literally about a refit costing 85+% of a new build. Think about everything except plate steel being replaced on a 1 year old ship. Its a cunning plan with all the hallmarks or timing of Baldrick.

I am skeptical of the Spanish proposal, which lacks all detail. @ngatimozart I don't trust the Europeans bearing gifts. I don't know if Spain will be a country in 10 years, and there is more motivations that just EU trade at play (although it certainly is). I believe the Aus government is actively canvasing options to avoid a capability gap or at least minimize it, its not like the Spanish prime minister shirt fronted albo on the way to the shitter with a ship building proposal at the NATO meet.

I think @Todjaeger has hit the nail on the head. There aren't many options out there. Hobart is in service with the ran, Navantia has experience and an office in Australia. Maybe we lease F-105 from the Spanish, with crew. I don't know. Maybe we buy F-105 from them? Maybe we lease the FFG's back from Chile as a training platform? Maybe we make a bid on the Norwegian Navy ships + sailors? Again, there is disbelief when we ask the Americans about leasing a Destroyer or submarine, they are not so secretly panicking about the Ticos and the first gen Burkes and the subs. The Koreans and Japanese are already asking us to help them out, their position is even more fragile, and Japan just had a political assassination for the history books. Maybe we can buy the Type 45 destroyers (all of them) and the Astute class (all of them) from the UK?

The Australian was running a story today on how the US production can't help us with destroyers or subs. New subs look more like a 2040 thing. The Guardian too.

Australia is actively touring the globe, putting the call out who can help us. No one is replying (except for Spains offer/plea). Marcus is also going further crazy claiming SSN will cost us $120 billion.

Also if you love the more Hobart idea, you will love what our smartest best paid strategists at Australia's premier defence think tank are suggesting:

Both Patrick and Hellyer said buying a conventional (non-nuclear powered) submarine from another country “off the shelf” would be another way to fill the capability gap.

From where? Germany? Japan? Canada? New Zealand? Sweden? Does it come with crew? How many? Their entire fleet of 3? What weapons are we firing from it? Why do they have a spare submarine fleet? Good thing we didn't pour any resources into Collins Batch II, we can just beg other countries for submarines, much more effective strategy. That is how you build a navy. So glad we had such an economical plan for our submarines. Our region turns to us, and we turn to others to solve our problems.

** Post edited due to expletives and language **

All this, of course, presuming we don't have any other disruptions, pandemics, floods, bushfires, energy crisis, food crisis, silicon shortage, mineral shortage, metal shortage, cyberattack etc. People are worried, quantifiably, in Australia. Won't take much for the electorate to be stirred up.


Its this environment we are in. Its terrible. Its mad. Its batshit crazy. Yet we continue down deeper into the ravine. We don't seem to have a workable plan, at all, for the Navy. In two years we effectively won't have one. Our destroyers and Subs capabilities will be on coat hooks, and with them, our ability to navigate the region with credibility. With record low unemployment and no platforms our sailors will evaporate, both incoming and existing.
 
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FormerDirtDart

Well-Known Member
An interesting prospect.
While this could obviously be helpful for both navies involved. Support bot the RN's ambitions for operations in the indo-pacific theater, while also giving RAN personnel needed experience.
I can also see this as part of the overall sales pitch.
And I would in no way suggest that anyone should speculate (especially in written form HERE) what this could mean in certain aspects for future RAN procurement programs....
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
@StingrayOZ it will be interesting to see if the Hunters progress is faster than our CSC version. The RCN seems to be limiting the modifications compared to the RAN but we are very capable when it comes to FTU.
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
If we were to increase the build tempo there would also be an opportunity to exploit the second hand warship market. We didn’t seem to have too many problems selling off a couple of 25 year old FFGs. Countries like the UK almost seem to routinely dispose of surplus naval vessels after relatively short service lives.

Ironically you could probably thank China for helping to produce a potentially large regional secondhand warship market.
 

oldsig127

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
If we were to increase the build tempo there would also be an opportunity to exploit the second hand warship market. We didn’t seem to have too many problems selling off a couple of 25 year old FFGs. Countries like the UK almost seem to routinely dispose of surplus naval vessels after relatively short service lives.
You don't even have to increase the tempo. The Shipbuilding Plan tempo was set to allow the completion of the last vessel early enough in the life of the first ship to allow their disposal and replacement with follow on ships rather than the eye watering cost of MLU. Sell them on!

oldsig
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
How do we accelerate the Hunter class? We have been trying to accelerate it for the last 4 years and its gone backwards. We are cutting first production steel 2024? (https://www.theaustralian.com.au/sp...s/news-story/f3c6b757ac14840995fa00d5b4a8e166) The first of the type 26 ships, Glasgow is expected to be in commission sometime after 2027, and they started work on that back in 2017. I would be pretty surprised if Australia's Hunter program rocket ahead to match the commissioning date of Glasgow. If we can get HMAS Hunter commissioned by 2030 I think we will be doing well for a 6 year from cutting steel to commissioning of a first of class. The Australian program was always going to be at least 2-3 years behind the UK one. Realistically, it could very much be 2034 for the commissioning of the first hunter. Its not like our program has had less issues than the UK, and its not like we are build to print this one.

I wonder why the yanks passed over it for constellation class.

Even if you increase the tempo, it isn't until the 2040's we start getting ahead. Increasing the tempo will just make up for lost time from delays. Anzacs aren't getting any younger or more relatively capable. Given the first ship will take 6+ years, I think it again optimistic to expect the next two ships to move to a 18 month drum beat. Now we are looking in the middle of 2030 for the second ship, building a crew.

2024 is when we also start the Hobart upgrades. BTW tenders and contracts are already out. Every day makes it harder to kill or change this project. We are loosing the Hobarts between 2024-2030, minimum. So we say good bye to things like SM-2, SM-6, Tomahawk, Aegis, Hawklink etc. I presume no more indo-pacifics or other regional tours with the LHD's. We would just be embarrassing ourselves. Any delays or complications and we could really be up a creek. To make things more difficult we are going to be pulling apart Collins at the same time.

Again the Americans have inadvertently helped us with options. The F-105 design was refreshed for US FFG(X) bid. IF we wanted a design speced with Spy-6, AEGIS, SeaRAM, they have already paid and got detailed designs and design assessments for that. Years worth of work, Bath had input, USN had input, years of work by dozens of top people. While the US went another way, the Constellation supply chain was very similar for all candidates. The US bid required significant reworking of the ship. They would be batch II. Related but different. Mostly same systems and layout. Warren confirmed all of this before stepping down as CEO of Navantia Australia. The Americans went with FREMM but the spanish proposal went pretty far.

We are already committed to spend $5.1 billion upgrading the existing hobarts. Obviously an expensive and comprehensive upgrade. This isn't just changing the toilet roles and fresh coat of paint. We are talking literally about a refit costing 85+% of a new build. Think about everything except plate steel being replaced on a 1 year old ship. Its a cunning plan with all the hallmarks or timing of Baldrick.

I am skeptical of the Spanish proposal, which lacks all detail. @ngatimozart I don't trust the Europeans bearing gifts. I don't know if Spain will be a country in 10 years, and there is more motivations that just EU trade at play (although it certainly is). I believe the Aus government is actively canvasing options to avoid a capability gap or at least minimize it, its not like the Spanish prime minister shirt fronted albo on the way to the shitter with a ship building proposal at the NATO meet.

I think @Todjaeger has hit the nail on the head. There aren't many options out there. Hobart is in service with the ran, Navantia has experience and an office in Australia. Maybe we lease F-105 from the Spanish, with crew. I don't know. Maybe we buy F-105 from them? Maybe we lease the FFG's back from Chile as a training platform? Maybe we make a bid on the Norwegian Navy ships + sailors? Again, there is disbelief when we ask the Americans about leasing a Destroyer or submarine, they are not so secretly panicking about the Ticos and the first gen Burkes and the subs. The Koreans and Japanese are already asking us to help them out, their position is even more fragile, and Japan just had a political assassination for the history books. Maybe we can buy the Type 45 destroyers (all of them) and the Astute class (all of them) from the UK?

The Australian was running a story today on how the US production can't help us with destroyers or subs. New subs look more like a 2040 thing. The Guardian too.

Australia is actively touring the globe, putting the call out who can help us. No one is replying (except for Spains offer/plea). Marcus is also going further crazy claiming SSN will cost us $120 billion.

Also if you love the more Hobart idea, you will love what our smartest best paid strategists at Australia's premier defence think tank are suggesting:

Both Patrick and Hellyer said buying a conventional (non-nuclear powered) submarine from another country “off the shelf” would be another way to fill the capability gap.

From where? Germany? Japan? Canada? New Zealand? Sweden? Does it come with crew? How many? Their entire fleet of 3? What weapons are we firing from it? Why do they have a spare submarine fleet? Good thing we didn't pour any resources into Collins Batch II, we can just beg other countries for submarines, much more effective strategy. That is how you build a navy. So glad we had such an economical plan for our submarines. Our region turns to us, and we turn to others to solve our problems.

From what I can see we are approaching very much a colossal shit storm combined with a double clusterfuck. Bearing in mind our Chinese friends are breathing down our necks, and heck, licking our eyelobes and firing chaff into our nose, tickling our balls. Meanwhile the Ukrainian ambassador is asking for 100 extra bushmasters to help secure Europe. Munitions/equipment globally are being depleted. We are at war, we just aren't putting our people in the front line, yet, but our equipment sure is. I do not think of asking people for free/spare submarines or destroyers is going to solve our real problems. The reason why Ukraine is asking us for bushmasters is because we can make them.

All this, of course, presuming we don't have any other disruptions, pandemics, floods, bushfires, energy crisis, food crisis, silicon shortage, mineral shortage, metal shortage, cyberattack etc. People are worried, quantifiably, in Australia. Won't take much for the electorate to be stirred up.


Its this environment we are in. Its terrible. Its mad. Its batshit crazy. Yet we continue down deeper into the ravine. We don't seem to have a workable plan, at all, for the Navy. In two years we effectively won't have one. Our destroyers and Subs capabilities will be on coat hooks, and with them, our ability to navigate the region with credibility. With record low unemployment and no platforms our sailors will evaporate, both incoming and existing.

If we want to have ships or submarines we are going to have to come to the conclusion, we are going to have to build them ourselves. #Marcus #Patrick #Marles #Albo #Dutton
I think ultimately we do need to moderate our expectations. We need to accept that there will be a capability gap with both our submarine and frigate fleets and look at ways of mitigating those problems. Like it or not this is the situation we are in and it will be decades before we can fix that problem.

As for mitigation? Well extra air asserts such as the P-8, unmanned vessels, land based weapons … there are other options. Not necessarily ideal but we have to be realistic as to what can be achieved in a 5 to 10 year time frame.
 

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
If we were to increase the build tempo there would also be an opportunity to exploit the second hand warship market. We didn’t seem to have too many problems selling off a couple of 25 year old FFGs. Countries like the UK almost seem to routinely dispose of surplus naval vessels after relatively short service lives.

Ironically you could probably thank China for helping to produce a potentially large regional secondhand warship market.
The 2nd hand warship market is nothing like it use to be, it was mainly centred on 20-25yo NATO Frigates at a time when the UK had 40-50, the Netherlands about 16-18, the US had 50 odd Perry's to dispose of, today the UK has 13, the Netherlands 6 and the US nil in service. The last RN Frigate decommissioned was Monmouth and she was 28yo
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
I’m going to upset some people with my comment, but who cares...

Why is Naval Shipbuilding in Australia treated as some sort of ‘sacred cow’? Why?
Just bringing this up to address the question raised directly. From my POV, it appears that Australia seems to have largely, finally, realized in a bi-partisan fashion that a sustained national naval shipbuilding capability is, for a number of reasons, in Australia's best interests.

After looking around at who among Australia's friends and allies have naval shipbuilding programmes with in-service vessel designs and potentially spare production capacity, it does appear that the reality of the situation is that there really is not all that much currently running and available. Various countries do have yards that might have production capacity, but without a currently active build programme there is no supply chain running to supply needed kit and systems. Basically if Australia did opt to order warships from overseas, virtually all the same issues would be encountered as if XXX design warships were ordered from an Australian yard. At the same time all of the coin Australia spends would go towards overseas companies and personnel, rather than having significant portions of that funding going back into Australian coffers. I do recall when I first joined here on DT that a study had been done which had determined that an Australian-built warship, even if the cost was 30% than one ordered from elsewhere, was still financially more beneficial to Australia.

There are also the flow-on effects/advantages of sustaining Australian yards, by enabling a yard workforce to be maintained and skilled so that future maintenance, upgrades and/or repair work can be not only carried out, but also be more likely to be of lower costs, faster turnaround times, and/or better quality, because a pool of skilled yard works has been retained.

Let’s assume for a minute that the Government, and RAN, agreed/decided to take the Spanish up on their offer, 3 x DDG delivered before 2030 for the relatively cheap figure of $6b, why would it be the end of the world?

When it comes to aviation assets for the ADF no one blinks an eye when we spend many tens of billion of dollars on aircraft that are built overseas, primarily in the US.

For example: F-35A, F/A-18F, EA-18G, P-8A, C-130J, C-27J, C-17A, MH-60R, AH-64E, CH-47F, MQ-4C, MC-55A, PC-21, etc, etc, etc. I could make an even longer list...

Why is that ok? But spending a relatively small amount of dollars on a few ships built overseas is wrong?

I’m more than happy for Australian industry to be supported, but if we found it necessary for the RAN to receive a capability quicker by building overseas, then just bloody do it (as was done with the 2 x AOR).

Anyway, I’m not saying that three more DDG is right or wrong, just that arguing over where they are built, or not, is stupid.
I disagree, discussing and even potentially arguing about where some of the industrial activities which provide kit and capabilities to the ADF take place is IMO not stupid at all. Depending on the industrial capabilities required, it is possible for a nation to support and sustain a domestic military industrial complex which provides both financial advantages to the nation, but also provides enhanced national security options and capabilities.

One thing which does sometimes get lost or forgotten is that such capabilities need to be maintained and sustained in order for the advantages to continue. Given the comparatively small size of the Australian population and the ADF, there are a few areas of defence industry that it is just not realistic for Australia to be able to have and sustain. Military aircraft production is one such area. Yes, Australia could have potentially invested a fair bit of coin so that domestic assembly of MH-60R helicopters could be done, not unlike was done with Australian Aerospace in Brisbane which manufactured 42 of the MRH90 Taipans for the ADF. However, AFAIK since that Airbus subsidiary finished building the MRH90's, there has not been any additional domestic helicopter production at the facility. Military aircraft can be kept in service for years or even decades, long after it would take to complete production for relatively small orders of aircraft. This leads to Australia having a choice of either repeating boom/bust production for various pieces of kit for the ADF, or importing kit that Australia is not able to sustain a domestic production capability for.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
I think ultimately we do need to moderate our expectations. We need to accept that there will be a capability gap with both our submarine and frigate fleets and look at ways of mitigating those problems. Like it or not this is the situation we are in and it will be decades before we can fix that problem.

As for mitigation? Well extra air asserts such as the P-8, unmanned vessels, land based weapons … there are other options. Not necessarily ideal but we have to be realistic as to what can be achieved in a 5 to 10 year time frame.
Agree that aviation will increasingly shoulder some of the load.
Some reflection on the current fleet numbers of existing platforms may need to be reviewed.
A P-8 is not a destroyer but it is still in production and provides some deterrence at range.
KC-30A's help provide endurance for the P-8 and the other things "that fly.
A modest increase in these numbers would be prudent.

Another thing is to look at our current fleet to ensure if any opportunity is missed within the space and weight of the platform.

Many examples.

Just one - If we stay with Phalanx as a CIWS, then ensure each of our 5 large ships have 360 degree coverage.
IE a minimum of two units.

I'm sure you could think of other soft and hard kill additions across the fleet.



Cheers S
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
Just bringing this up to address the question raised directly. From my POV, it appears that Australia seems to have largely, finally, realized in a bi-partisan fashion that a sustained national naval shipbuilding capability is, for a number of reasons, in Australia's best interests.

After looking around at who among Australia's friends and allies have naval shipbuilding programmes with in-service vessel designs and potentially spare production capacity, it does appear that the reality of the situation is that there really is not all that much currently running and available. Various countries do have yards that might have production capacity, but without a currently active build programme there is no supply chain running to supply needed kit and systems. Basically if Australia did opt to order warships from overseas, virtually all the same issues would be encountered as if XXX design warships were ordered from an Australian yard. At the same time all of the coin Australia spends would go towards overseas companies and personnel, rather than having significant portions of that funding going back into Australian coffers. I do recall when I first joined here on DT that a study had been done which had determined that an Australian-built warship, even if the cost was 30% than one ordered from elsewhere, was still financially more beneficial to Australia.

There are also the flow-on effects/advantages of sustaining Australian yards, by enabling a yard workforce to be maintained and skilled so that future maintenance, upgrades and/or repair work can be not only carried out, but also be more likely to be of lower costs, faster turnaround times, and/or better quality, because a pool of skilled yard works has been retained.



I disagree, discussing and even potentially arguing about where some of the industrial activities which provide kit and capabilities to the ADF take place is IMO not stupid at all. Depending on the industrial capabilities required, it is possible for a nation to support and sustain a domestic military industrial complex which provides both financial advantages to the nation, but also provides enhanced national security options and capabilities.

One thing which does sometimes get lost or forgotten is that such capabilities need to be maintained and sustained in order for the advantages to continue. Given the comparatively small size of the Australian population and the ADF, there are a few areas of defence industry that it is just not realistic for Australia to be able to have and sustain. Military aircraft production is one such area. Yes, Australia could have potentially invested a fair bit of coin so that domestic assembly of MH-60R helicopters could be done, not unlike was done with Australian Aerospace in Brisbane which manufactured 42 of the MRH90 Taipans for the ADF. However, AFAIK since that Airbus subsidiary finished building the MRH90's, there has not been any additional domestic helicopter production at the facility. Military aircraft can be kept in service for years or even decades, long after it would take to complete production for relatively small orders of aircraft. This leads to Australia having a choice of either repeating boom/bust production for various pieces of kit for the ADF, or importing kit that Australia is not able to sustain a domestic production capability for.
Is there an argument that fitting out the ships here as per the Canberra,s means we keep those essential skills but have some acceleration in supply rather than expanding the shipyards to meet a program that may close down on finish
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Is there an argument that fitting out the ships here as per the Canberra,s means we keep those essential skills but have some acceleration in supply rather than expanding the shipyards to meet a program that may close down on finish
Honestly I do not think so. One of the major issues is that there really are no active building programmes (which means an already established supply chain) which Australia could join up with. This lack of existing programmes means that time, likely several years at least, would be eaten up by design work and contracting for both the ship's build, but also the establish the needed supply chains for everything which would go into the ships. All of this would need to be in place before first steel gets cut. In fact, supply chains would need to be established so that there is steel to be cut first.

I suspect that if space in Australia could be found to fitout hulls produced elsewhere, then the space needed to also produce those hulls could be found. The caveat being that if Australia decided that some examples of larger hulls were needed, Australia might not have a currently active yard large enough to build such a vessel. IIRC that was at least part of the reason behind why the Canberra-class and Supply-class vessels were built overseas, though local fitout was done with the Canberra-class IIRC.

Now once the Constellation-class programme for the USN is ticking along, then there might be opportunities for RAN participation, but that again would almost certainly not be able to deliver any new/additional vessels to the RAN within the decade.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
How do we accelerate the Hunter class? We have been trying to accelerate it for the last 4 years and its gone backwards. We are cutting first production steel 2024? (https://www.theaustralian.com.au/sp...s/news-story/f3c6b757ac14840995fa00d5b4a8e166) The first of the type 26 ships, Glasgow is expected to be in commission sometime after 2027, and they started work on that back in 2017. I would be pretty surprised if Australia's Hunter program rocket ahead to match the commissioning date of Glasgow. If we can get HMAS Hunter commissioned by 2030 I think we will be doing well for a 6 year from cutting steel to commissioning of a first of class. The Australian program was always going to be at least 2-3 years behind the UK one. Realistically, it could very much be 2034 for the commissioning of the first hunter. Its not like our program has had less issues than the UK, and its not like we are build to print this one.

I wonder why the yanks passed over it for constellation class.
The Type 26 and subsequent derivatives were not in contention for what was then the USN's FFG(X) programme and now called FFG-62.

The RFT for what became the Hunter-class was released in March 2017, whilst the USN released the RFI for what became the Constellation-class in July of that same year. As part of the RFI, the USN was looking for an existing design which could then be modified to meet USN wants/needs in terms of systems fitted. At around the time of the release of the USN's RFI, first steel was just being cut for the lead Type 26 ship, so there were no existing examples which could be looked at and examined.

Even if you increase the tempo, it isn't until the 2040's we start getting ahead. Increasing the tempo will just make up for lost time from delays. Anzacs aren't getting any younger or more relatively capable. Given the first ship will take 6+ years, I think it again optimistic to expect the next two ships to move to a 18 month drum beat. Now we are looking in the middle of 2030 for the second ship, building a crew.

2024 is when we also start the Hobart upgrades. BTW tenders and contracts are already out. Every day makes it harder to kill or change this project. We are loosing the Hobarts between 2024-2030, minimum. So we say good bye to things like SM-2, SM-6, Tomahawk, Aegis, Hawklink etc. I presume no more indo-pacifics or other regional tours with the LHD's. We would just be embarrassing ourselves. Any delays or complications and we could really be up a creek. To make things more difficult we are going to be pulling apart Collins at the same time.

Again the Americans have inadvertently helped us with options. The F-105 design was refreshed for US FFG(X) bid. IF we wanted a design speced with Spy-6, AEGIS, SeaRAM, they have already paid and got detailed designs and design assessments for that. Years worth of work, Bath had input, USN had input, years of work by dozens of top people. While the US went another way, the Constellation supply chain was very similar for all candidates. The US bid required significant reworking of the ship. They would be batch II. Related but different. Mostly same systems and layout. Warren confirmed all of this before stepping down as CEO of Navantia Australia. The Americans went with FREMM but the spanish proposal went pretty far.
It also bears giving some consideration to why the USN decided to not select an updated/refreshed F-105 design for their then FFG(X) programme, particularly given some of the stated limitations in the variant in RAN service.
 

Richo99

Active Member
So given the issue at hand is increasing hull numbers quickly, i have three options to consider, at least one of which has been raised by others:

1) take up the spanish on their offer (built here or there) using systems ordered for the Hobart upgrades in order to expidite the new build, and delay the Hobart upgrade until after the completion of the three new builds

2) take up the spanish offer, but to expite the process, dumb down the ships as necessary eg where systems have a long lead time or are obselete, substitute MOTS systems with minimal changes eg maybe dont use aegis or CEAFAR, but a simplified system. Maybe dont cater for SM2 / SM6, but only ESSM Blk2. Maybe reduce the number of VLS to only 16 or 24 cells. Whatever it takes to get the hulls in the water ASAP. Upgrades can happen later. And if uncommon systems have to be introduced, is that such a huge dilemma ? Is it more of an issue than not having sufficent MFUs ?

3) expidite the hunter build by 'dumbing down' the first flight, similar to option 2, but allowing for future upgrade.

Perfection is the enemy of good enough. Good warships within say 8 years are surely better than perfect warships in 20 years.

Not sure if any of these options can achieve a shorter time frame, but desperate times and all...
 

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
The long lead time items are largely hull systems- gear boxes, controllable pitch propellers, that sort of thing. You can’t dumb them down. And of the combat systems, Aegis, or some equally competent equivilant which would then require integration, is so central to the design, and the ability to offer a ship capable of surviving in modern war, that it cannot be replaced - else all you are building is cannon fodder for the other side. And you better make sure the sensors that feed it are up to the job so that you have some chance of detecting threats.

You drive what you want to build from a requirement set; you don’t dumb down the requirement set if you want to achieve the outcomes that requirement set is designed to achieve. It’s not about number of hulls so much as capacity to achieve those desired outcomes - that sets the quantum of capability, and hence the number of hulls, required.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
So given the issue at hand is increasing hull numbers quickly, i have three options to consider, at least one of which has been raised by others:

1) take up the spanish on their offer (built here or there) using systems ordered for the Hobart upgrades in order to expidite the new build, and delay the Hobart upgrade until after the completion of the three new builds

2) take up the spanish offer, but to expite the process, dumb down the ships as necessary eg where systems have a long lead time or are obselete, substitute MOTS systems with minimal changes eg maybe dont use aegis or CEAFAR, but a simplified system. Maybe dont cater for SM2 / SM6, but only ESSM Blk2. Maybe reduce the number of VLS to only 16 or 24 cells. Whatever it takes to get the hulls in the water ASAP. Upgrades can happen later. And if uncommon systems have to be introduced, is that such a huge dilemma ? Is it more of an issue than not having sufficent MFUs ?

3) expidite the hunter build by 'dumbing down' the first flight, similar to option 2, but allowing for future upgrade.

Perfection is the enemy of good enough. Good warships within say 8 years are surely better than perfect warships in 20 years.

Not sure if any of these options can achieve a shorter time frame, but desperate times and all...
Excellence is the enemy of good has its place.

How that translates to our future fleet and time table I just don't know.
There is however merit in availability and numbers even if compromised by capability.

Cheers S
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Just bringing this up to address the question raised directly. From my POV, it appears that Australia seems to have largely, finally, realized in a bi-partisan fashion that a sustained national naval shipbuilding capability is, for a number of reasons, in Australia's best interests.

After looking around at who among Australia's friends and allies have naval shipbuilding programmes with in-service vessel designs and potentially spare production capacity, it does appear that the reality of the situation is that there really is not all that much currently running and available. Various countries do have yards that might have production capacity, but without a currently active build programme there is no supply chain running to supply needed kit and systems. Basically if Australia did opt to order warships from overseas, virtually all the same issues would be encountered as if XXX design warships were ordered from an Australian yard. At the same time all of the coin Australia spends would go towards overseas companies and personnel, rather than having significant portions of that funding going back into Australian coffers. I do recall when I first joined here on DT that a study had been done which had determined that an Australian-built warship, even if the cost was 30% than one ordered from elsewhere, was still financially more beneficial to Australia.

There are also the flow-on effects/advantages of sustaining Australian yards, by enabling a yard workforce to be maintained and skilled so that future maintenance, upgrades and/or repair work can be not only carried out, but also be more likely to be of lower costs, faster turnaround times, and/or better quality, because a pool of skilled yard works has been retained.



I disagree, discussing and even potentially arguing about where some of the industrial activities which provide kit and capabilities to the ADF take place is IMO not stupid at all. Depending on the industrial capabilities required, it is possible for a nation to support and sustain a domestic military industrial complex which provides both financial advantages to the nation, but also provides enhanced national security options and capabilities.

One thing which does sometimes get lost or forgotten is that such capabilities need to be maintained and sustained in order for the advantages to continue. Given the comparatively small size of the Australian population and the ADF, there are a few areas of defence industry that it is just not realistic for Australia to be able to have and sustain. Military aircraft production is one such area. Yes, Australia could have potentially invested a fair bit of coin so that domestic assembly of MH-60R helicopters could be done, not unlike was done with Australian Aerospace in Brisbane which manufactured 42 of the MRH90 Taipans for the ADF. However, AFAIK since that Airbus subsidiary finished building the MRH90's, there has not been any additional domestic helicopter production at the facility. Military aircraft can be kept in service for years or even decades, long after it would take to complete production for relatively small orders of aircraft. This leads to Australia having a choice of either repeating boom/bust production for various pieces of kit for the ADF, or importing kit that Australia is not able to sustain a domestic production capability for.
Having worked on sustainment and on build projects with experts (actual and self proclaimed) in both I can confirm that those with build experience are in general much higher skilled, transition very easily to sustainment and back again, while many of those who specialised only in sustainment don't know what they don't know. Old school navy who went through the DDG upgrades, FFGs builds and upgrades, ANZAC and Collins builds where some of the most rounded and talented people I have ever come across, they were also of an age that their initial training had been as apprentices under the old schemes meaning their technical training was some of the best in the country at the time.

It would shit me to tears when dealing with self proclaimed sustainment experts who not only knew sweet FA about engineering in general, they weren't in my estimation even proper tradespeople, i.e. they knew nothing outside of their very limited focus but seemed to think they knew it all and everyone else was a dumb Ar$e. Why use a configuration tool or have a CM and data management function when you can track things on a spreadsheet, why have systems engineering when they know it all, why have risk management when they believe they have experience and common-sense.

This is the biggest part of local builds that the layman misunderstands, the depth and breadth of training and experience it provides to the people who work on the projects and the flow on effects to sustainment and acquisition in the future. The relationships it builds, the institutional knowledge, above all the ability to identify who the delusional self promoters are.

Something else people don't understand is building ships is more like building buildings and infrastructure, while building aircraft is not dissimilar to building cars. No two ships are identical, they are similar but highly complex and are unique in their own way, the more often you do it the better you get at it but it is not mass production by any means, it is not the same as building aircraft or armoured vehicles.

Major projects with multiple hulls and multiple yards can introduce synergies and further increase efficiency. Look at the arrangement between EB and Newport News on the Virginias, each yard builds the same sections for every boat and ship some to the other yards for each to consolidate and complete the submarines they are contracted to deliver. Australia could theoretically build sections for the US Virginia program and ship them to the US in the same heavy lift ships that bring the reactor and other sections to Australia. This could help the US overcome the production constraints they are experiencing and justify speeding up our deliveries.

Hobart blocks were built in Adelaide, Melbourne, Newcastle and Spain, there were meant to also be built in Queensland. If it was an emergency build each yard could have built multiple shipsets of blocks with two or more of the yards consolidating blocks and completing ships. Taking it a step further, BAE has done the upgrade and modernisation work on the ANZACs in their Henderson Yard, logically they could also be part of this arrangement.

There are a great many options to build ships and submarines, the key is effectively project managing it. Perhaps more importantly, once a plan is initiated it needs to be followed, adapted by all means and improved, but followed, with out constant stops, restarts, moves and changes in direction. Its the failure to follow through with plans that does more damage than any other single factor.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
The Type 26 and subsequent derivatives were not in contention for what was then the USN's FFG(X) programme and now called FFG-62.

The RFT for what became the Hunter-class was released in March 2017, whilst the USN released the RFI for what became the Constellation-class in July of that same year. As part of the RFI, the USN was looking for an existing design which could then be modified to meet USN wants/needs in terms of systems fitted. At around the time of the release of the USN's RFI, first steel was just being cut for the lead Type 26 ship, so there were no existing examples which could be looked at and examined.



It also bears giving some consideration to why the USN decided to not select an updated/refreshed F-105 design for their then FFG(X) programme, particularly given some of the stated limitations in the variant in RAN service.
I suspect part of the reason the F105 didn't get up with the USN was US industry got to see how Navantia performed in the Australian program. There were a lot of "what the..." moments on the project where the BIW staff embedding in Adelaide were dumbfounded at what Navantia had done, where doing, or were not doing.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
Having worked on sustainment and on build projects with experts (actual and self proclaimed) in both I can confirm that those with build experience are in general much higher skilled, transition very easily to sustainment and back again, while many of those who specialised only in sustainment don't know what they don't know. Old school navy who went through the DDG upgrades, FFGs builds and upgrades, ANZAC and Collins builds where some of the most rounded and talented people I have ever come across, they were also of an age that their initial training had been as apprentices under the old schemes meaning their technical training was some of the best in the country at the time.

It would shit me to tears when dealing with self proclaimed sustainment experts who not only knew sweet FA about engineering in general, they weren't in my estimation even proper tradespeople, i.e. they knew nothing outside of their very limited focus but seemed to think they knew it all and everyone else was a dumb Ar$e. Why use a configuration tool or have a CM and data management function when you can track things on a spreadsheet, why have systems engineering when they know it all, why have risk management when they believe they have experience and common-sense.

This is the biggest part of local builds that the layman misunderstands, the depth and breadth of training and experience it provides to the people who work on the projects and the flow on effects to sustainment and acquisition in the future. The relationships it builds, the institutional knowledge, above all the ability to identify who the delusional self promoters are.

Something else people don't understand is building ships is more like building buildings and infrastructure, while building aircraft is not dissimilar to building cars. No two ships are identical, they are similar but highly complex and are unique in their own way, the more often you do it the better you get at it but it is not mass production by any means, it is not the same as building aircraft or armoured vehicles.

Major projects with multiple hulls and multiple yards can introduce synergies and further increase efficiency. Look at the arrangement between EB and Newport News on the Virginias, each yard builds the same sections for every boat and ship some to the other yards for each to consolidate and complete the submarines they are contracted to deliver. Australia could theoretically build sections for the US Virginia program and ship them to the US in the same heavy lift ships that bring the reactor and other sections to Australia. This could help the US overcome the production constraints they are experiencing and justify speeding up our deliveries.

Hobart blocks were built in Adelaide, Melbourne, Newcastle and Spain, there were meant to also be built in Queensland. If it was an emergency build each yard could have built multiple shipsets of blocks with two or more of the yards consolidating blocks and completing ships. Taking it a step further, BAE has done the upgrade and modernisation work on the ANZACs in their Henderson Yard, logically they could also be part of this arrangement.

There are a great many options to build ships and submarines, the key is effectively project managing it. Perhaps more importantly, once a plan is initiated it needs to be followed, adapted by all means and improved, but followed, with out constant stops, restarts, moves and changes in direction. Its the failure to follow through with plans that does more damage than any other single factor.
Interesting what you said about the difference between manufacturing Cars ships plane and armoured vehicles.

I had a friend working on the Anzacs build for many years doing drafting work.
Hows it going I would ask
Yep another days locating pipes from one end to the other.
To the layman like myself I would of thought once you have ship one correct ( ANZAC ) the rest would be identical.

Apparently not the case!

Complicated bloody things ships.
........................................................................................................................................................

An interesting example of ship construction was the Liberty Ship in WW11.
A cargo ship designed for mas production, they reached an average medium time to build of just 39 days in 1943.
Simplicity and consistency were key to punching out such numbers.



Cheers S
 
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