John Newman
The Bunker Group
Here we go again.
Bloody fantasy fleets....
Bloody fantasy fleets....
Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0
- Thread starter OPSSG
- Start date
If someone said in 1938 that Australia would in, 15 years time, have :
- two carriers,
- three cruisers (in reserve),
- ten modern destroyers,
- twelve frigates, and
- over forty corvettes.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Just like they would if told the RCN was the third largest navy at the end WW2.
John Newman
The Bunker Group
Except this is not 1938.
cdxbow
Well-Known Member
Yes.
WW2 numbers of 'everything' are mind boggling, sort of unthinkable today, with a population of a bit over 7 million:
"In late 1944, the RAAF peaked at over 182,000 personnel and 6,200 aircraft in 61 squadrons. In 1945, Australia had the fourth-largest air force in the world (after the USA, USSR and UK). " History | Royal Australian Air Force
Different world, war economy, existential threat etc.
braddmlewis
New Member
I would not be so sure we are not at just as an important inflection point. Sooner than later it is going to dawn on people that the post Cold War era just finished and all bets are off with what comes next
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Unfortunately the dawn will be later for some and not at all for others.
Part of the answer is what do you want the RAN to look like in 2030?
For myself it's an issue of time.
I don't disagree with many of the proposals suggested, but they generally provide increased capability beyond 2030.
Keeping the conversation to maritime assets, how do we increase capability across the fleet in the 2020's ?
Regards S
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Realistically, we do not. Short of a major, international war breaking out, which would justify both a massive increase in defence funding, a wartime /command economy, and widespread conscription, there is not a great deal more that could be done and take effect this decade.
Kit would need to be selected which meets a variety of Australian requirements. Personnel would need to be recruited and trained up in order to crew new assets. All of this takes time.
I definately hope not. If a war starts in the next decade we are stuffed.
Getting a new ship specified, designed, selected, built and in-service by 2030 would be a huge ask.
The UK started the Type31 program back in 2017 which grew out of the earlier GPFF 2015. The RN expects the initial service date for the first ship in 2027. The Type 31 as a 57mm gun, 2 x 40mm, 24 CAMM, and UK systems and sensors.
Even bypassing any selection process (which would basically be impossible), the ship currently built uses systems and weapons the RAN does not operate or support. Changing that would take time (like the Hunters). You would also have to acquire those, or replace those. Where would the ships be built? Which yard? How busy is that yard? If there is no yard in Australia and you want them built in the UK you would be waiting for the UK orders to be completed before starting.
There is no magic genie here. Its not just fantasy fleets, its magical wishing fantasy fleets. Theoretical designs that fall out of the air, designed by genies, built by genies, in magical genie shipyards, crewed by said genies, with deadlines even genies would struggle with. We use all our genie wishes, all to get us some light frigate power approximate to an existing Anzac(type 31e) or less than a Hunter(going back to the IH OMT parent and modifying), either way something we actually have a large number of.
Of course if you up gun it, put on all the VLS, you have now built a less capable Hobart class, without Aegis, without SPY, without those things the RAN probably wants and needs. Similar size, of a ship we already own and operate and has a clear mission for.
I understand how we got here, the A140 design is a nice design. As is the parent Iver Huitfeldt design. But that doesn't mean its do-able in the timeframe or gains the RAN or the ADF what it needs.
Even worse, the OMT IH design has been reviewed by the Gov/DMO/RAN as part of Sea5000. Its been looked at, and rejected. We are covering ground previously covered by existing programs and rejected. It wasn't shortlisted.
Often people assume the initial conflict is what we are preparing for. There is will also be a period after the conflict. Say war breaks out over Taiwan, taiwan is bombed to dresden levels, its out of the picture either way, but it all happens very quickly, there is no invasion just a lot of fighting. The US, SK, JP and China all suffer significant loses very quickly. Say the US wins, but now has a navy/AF that is 50% smaller. JP, SK, China are even worse off, with very high levels of casualties.
What does that mean for global security over the next ~20 years after the conflict?
The US would then frantically be focused on getting it back together. If you don't make it yourself you are going to be at the back of a very long line. Building anything, even here could be quite problematic. Forget combat systems and missiles. Everything will be problematic, laptops, radios, phones, etc. Meanwhile threats and fears will significant increase globally, for everyone.
The UK started the Type31 program back in 2017 which grew out of the earlier GPFF 2015. The RN expects the initial service date for the first ship in 2027. The Type 31 as a 57mm gun, 2 x 40mm, 24 CAMM, and UK systems and sensors.
Even bypassing any selection process (which would basically be impossible), the ship currently built uses systems and weapons the RAN does not operate or support. Changing that would take time (like the Hunters). You would also have to acquire those, or replace those. Where would the ships be built? Which yard? How busy is that yard? If there is no yard in Australia and you want them built in the UK you would be waiting for the UK orders to be completed before starting.
There is no magic genie here. Its not just fantasy fleets, its magical wishing fantasy fleets. Theoretical designs that fall out of the air, designed by genies, built by genies, in magical genie shipyards, crewed by said genies, with deadlines even genies would struggle with. We use all our genie wishes, all to get us some light frigate power approximate to an existing Anzac(type 31e) or less than a Hunter(going back to the IH OMT parent and modifying), either way something we actually have a large number of.
Of course if you up gun it, put on all the VLS, you have now built a less capable Hobart class, without Aegis, without SPY, without those things the RAN probably wants and needs. Similar size, of a ship we already own and operate and has a clear mission for.
I understand how we got here, the A140 design is a nice design. As is the parent Iver Huitfeldt design. But that doesn't mean its do-able in the timeframe or gains the RAN or the ADF what it needs.
Even worse, the OMT IH design has been reviewed by the Gov/DMO/RAN as part of Sea5000. Its been looked at, and rejected. We are covering ground previously covered by existing programs and rejected. It wasn't shortlisted.
This. <10 years we are basically stuck with what we have today. Not just ships, but basically everything. We will be lucky to see the fruits of existing programs already well underway. Not only that, all our existing old gear will be another 10 years older. Anything that was difficult to support in peacetime will be completely inoperative with war time logistics, priorities and tempos.
Often people assume the initial conflict is what we are preparing for. There is will also be a period after the conflict. Say war breaks out over Taiwan, taiwan is bombed to dresden levels, its out of the picture either way, but it all happens very quickly, there is no invasion just a lot of fighting. The US, SK, JP and China all suffer significant loses very quickly. Say the US wins, but now has a navy/AF that is 50% smaller. JP, SK, China are even worse off, with very high levels of casualties.
What does that mean for global security over the next ~20 years after the conflict?
The US would then frantically be focused on getting it back together. If you don't make it yourself you are going to be at the back of a very long line. Building anything, even here could be quite problematic. Forget combat systems and missiles. Everything will be problematic, laptops, radios, phones, etc. Meanwhile threats and fears will significant increase globally, for everyone.
I suppose the question is what is the best we could have in service by 2030.
Hunters are not going to be it, the options are what has the least lead time that will provide the most capability, while having the least effect on current force levels.
The options I can see are what can we build or acquire, and effectively induct into service, before the first Hunters are due. Answer, not much.
We do, I believe, have the capacity to build corvettes or light frigates / patrol or GP frigates, using systems designed for the ANZACs, but that is about it. We have the capacity to continue building Arafuras but maybe make provision for self defence measures and introduce some systems that will help grow the number of operators and maintainers required going forward.
Do we need the Hunters, yes, should we look at enhancing them during the design phase, yes again. Do we need to seriously look at hypersonics for them another yes. Do we need to revisit F-35B and look at naval AEW options, yes. Do we need to look at interim submarine options, yes.
Surely the best we can do at this stage is to take the existing naval shipbuilding plan, accelerate it as much as possible (ie eliminate all the drumbeat slowdowns) and accept that this results in a bigger overall fleet (which we need anyway)?
We are installing new, enhanced systems, on to old platforms, thereby compromising the potential capability of the new systems.
At the same time we are withdrawing existing platforms from service to fit the new capability. This reduces, not only the size of the fleet, but the ability of the RAN to grow the number of operators and maintainers, as well as leaders, it needs going forward.
The route cause of this is that what was meant to be the second tier, 1/3 (33%) of the combatant fleet, the eight ANZACs, has become 3/4 (73%) of it. There were meant to be eight or nine more capable ships above the ANZACs, (there are three), and about a dozen with similar combat capability but lower endurance (the corvettes) below.
A fleet that was meant, after the conclusion of the cold war, to grow to between twenty four and twenty nine missile armed, armed helicopter equipped, survivable combatants, as part of a continuous shipbuilding program, currently consists of eleven ships and there have been two shipbuilding black holes.
The strategic situation is now far worse than it was 30 years ago yet we are only planning / talking about like for like replacement of our current undersize fleet. This is despite both sides of politics saying we needed and they are going to pay for an expansion.
At the same time we are withdrawing existing platforms from service to fit the new capability. This reduces, not only the size of the fleet, but the ability of the RAN to grow the number of operators and maintainers, as well as leaders, it needs going forward.
The route cause of this is that what was meant to be the second tier, 1/3 (33%) of the combatant fleet, the eight ANZACs, has become 3/4 (73%) of it. There were meant to be eight or nine more capable ships above the ANZACs, (there are three), and about a dozen with similar combat capability but lower endurance (the corvettes) below.
A fleet that was meant, after the conclusion of the cold war, to grow to between twenty four and twenty nine missile armed, armed helicopter equipped, survivable combatants, as part of a continuous shipbuilding program, currently consists of eleven ships and there have been two shipbuilding black holes.
The strategic situation is now far worse than it was 30 years ago yet we are only planning / talking about like for like replacement of our current undersize fleet. This is despite both sides of politics saying we needed and they are going to pay for an expansion.
The Australian government seems to have a habit of under estimating the future requirements of new weapons systems, particularly naval vessels. We selected Anzac frigates only to find that they would need to be heavily modified to meet the threat of a rising China. You could argue that we should have got ABs instead of Hobarts. The Arafuras also now seem somewhat inadequate for the challenges they are likely to face in the 2030s.
There will always be a requirement for simple patrol vessels but perhaps these sorts of vessels should not be operated by the navy. Maybe it is time to start thinking of the navy as purely a warfighting service and hand the Arafuras over to Border force.
There will always be a requirement for simple patrol vessels but perhaps these sorts of vessels should not be operated by the navy. Maybe it is time to start thinking of the navy as purely a warfighting service and hand the Arafuras over to Border force.
The ANZACs were selected to serve as patrol frigates in support of a force of eight or nine guided missile destroyers, and/or frigates, and a force of a dozen or so missile and helicopter corvettes.
It was only after the Howard government decided not to replace the DDGs or, initially, the FFGs that it was decided to upgrade the ANZACs. First there was dumb arse idea to fit them with AEGIS and SPY-1F and a second 8 cell VLS, for a grand total of 16 SM-2. Even this pretty useless configuration was two much for the platform, hence the innovative and effective ASMD program.
None the less, trying to use the ANZACs as FFGs is pretty much like telling the army they were replacing the tanks, LAVs and APCs with different variants of armed and armoured landrovers.
If the balloon ever did go up I would feel for those sailors that had to go to war in the ANZACs. Unfortunately we are hamstrung by decisions that were made ... or to be more precise not made, decades ago.
If I had to propose a shorter term solution it would be to start exploring Unmanned vessels but whether that technology is sufficiently advanced to start bringing them online before the end of the decade remains to be seen.
If I had to propose a shorter term solution it would be to start exploring Unmanned vessels but whether that technology is sufficiently advanced to start bringing them online before the end of the decade remains to be seen.
The contract for the Type 31 Program (Arrowhead 140) was only awarded and singed in late 2019 - with first steel being cut in late 2021.
It's worth noting that the whole point of the design is being space rich, super flexible, and efficient to build. According to Babcock, it's even perfectly capable of fielding the Aegis CMS if so desired. The midship VLS silo on the Arrowhead 140 is identical to the Iver, retaining the same space and depth which allows for up to 32 strike length Mk-41 cells.
These high margins in space, power, and weight allow such changes with greatly reduced impact on both cost and time.
The modular design also allows for multiple site construction of blocks, reducing the need for a large workforce at a single shipyard - Babcock makes this point specifically in their brochure linked below.
"Designed to provide maximum capability and value for money, Arrowhead 140 uses modular construction combined with proven and commercially available systems and equipment. If required, its configuration is suited to a multi-site, distributed build strategy, with final assembly centred on one site but with the potential advantage of spreading the economic benefits and supply chain opportunities throughout shipyards."
Babcock's Arrowhead 140 Brochure.
It's worth noting that the whole point of the design is being space rich, super flexible, and efficient to build. According to Babcock, it's even perfectly capable of fielding the Aegis CMS if so desired. The midship VLS silo on the Arrowhead 140 is identical to the Iver, retaining the same space and depth which allows for up to 32 strike length Mk-41 cells.
These high margins in space, power, and weight allow such changes with greatly reduced impact on both cost and time.
The modular design also allows for multiple site construction of blocks, reducing the need for a large workforce at a single shipyard - Babcock makes this point specifically in their brochure linked below.
"Designed to provide maximum capability and value for money, Arrowhead 140 uses modular construction combined with proven and commercially available systems and equipment. If required, its configuration is suited to a multi-site, distributed build strategy, with final assembly centred on one site but with the potential advantage of spreading the economic benefits and supply chain opportunities throughout shipyards."
Babcock's Arrowhead 140 Brochure.
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Both ASC and Civmec have demonstrated they can build the Arafuras quickly and efficiently with few if any issues. BAE and SAAB have demonstrated they can design and manage major capability upgrades for existing designs, that the designs were never intended to incorporate.
Then there is the Iver Huitfeldt / Arrowhead 140, three in service in Denmark, blocks for which were built to print in Estonia and Lithuania, now the modified Type 31 under construction for the UK and selected by Indonesia and Poland. The RN specified their own systems including some used in the Type 23 and Type 26, which Babcock have apparently integrated seamlessly.
So we have the teams that can deliver a timely supplement and replacement for the ANZACs, the only missing part is a decision.
The plusses:
Then there is the Iver Huitfeldt / Arrowhead 140, three in service in Denmark, blocks for which were built to print in Estonia and Lithuania, now the modified Type 31 under construction for the UK and selected by Indonesia and Poland. The RN specified their own systems including some used in the Type 23 and Type 26, which Babcock have apparently integrated seamlessly.
So we have the teams that can deliver a timely supplement and replacement for the ANZACs, the only missing part is a decision.
The plusses:
- The ASC shipbuilding workforce expands earlier and cuts its teeth on a more advanced platform than the Arafuras.
- Hundreds of highly qualified and capable people available due to the end of SEA 1000, can be retained and gainfully employed.
- Civmec and BAE can take over the build when the Hunters start, ASC helping.
- Pressure taken off the ANZACs, i.e. not an many need to be upgraded as urgently.
- Capability can be increased without reducing active numbers.
- Active numbers can be increased.
- Arrowhead can be easily tailored to Patrol Frigate and GP frigate roles.
- Arrowhead can replace both the never built corvettes and the original role of the ANZACs, allowing the Hunters to supplement the Hobarts as replacements for the DDGs and FFGs
- New systems designed for the ANZACs and some designed for the Hunters can be incorporated into the Arrowheads