Ha. I didn't even notice that. I assume any image with a defence article is just imagestock stuff.Funniest looking B1Bs I've seen in a while. The MSM attention to details and accuracy strikes again
US Deployments in Asia
- Thread starter gf0012-aust
- Start date
It has already been confirmed this will not be happening by both the US and Australia, the person involved in the statement "miss-spoke" and minced his words
Cheers
Cheers
Exactly, nothing new, B-52's are regular visitors to Darwin
Which made the B1 comment seem odd. Wouldn't it be easier to launch from Guam? B1/B2/B-52
However... might be something we don't know, the local rag, NT News ran a storey this am about B1's being rotated through RAAF Tindal at Katherine.
The article quoted ANU's Dr Andrew Carr saying that the AUSMIN discussions under the Gillard govt. gave a "nod and recognition that strategic bombers might be included as part of the re-balance and would include an occasional presence"
gazzzwp
Member
Could China's huge sand constructions compel the Japanese to re-evaluate their decision about US forces on their homeland?
gazzzwp
Member
China's Island Building Project.
This is causing the US and it's allies in the region serious concern.
Are the motives economic or military or a combination of both?
Is China taking a huge risk in terms of provoking a confrontation with the US?
Could the issue of division of resources in the South China Sea have been mutually resolved by diplomacy?
Is a conflict inevitable or will the US and her allies acquiesce?
Exclusive: China warns U.S. surveillance plane - CNNPolitics.com
This is causing the US and it's allies in the region serious concern.
Are the motives economic or military or a combination of both?
Is China taking a huge risk in terms of provoking a confrontation with the US?
Could the issue of division of resources in the South China Sea have been mutually resolved by diplomacy?
Is a conflict inevitable or will the US and her allies acquiesce?
Exclusive: China warns U.S. surveillance plane - CNNPolitics.com
According to the Sydney Morning Herald, reporting on 22 May 2015, Australian Defence Minister Kevin Andrews voiced Australia's concern over any military build-up on artificial islands in the South China Sea. Mr Andrews said: "We'd like to be best friends with all our neighbours in the region, including China and Japan, because if we can achieve that we'll live in a peaceful region and we'll all thrive."
Security analysts regard the South China Sea as a potential flashpoint, with China dredging sand onto shallow reefs to create new islands for building runways and radar stations prompting fears of military confrontation in the region. Formal allies such as Japan and Australia bear the burden of atomicity — that is, they are bound by their security arrangements to support the U.S. in conflicts it gets involved in.
China promised that its construction activities are not meant for confrontations with the US; instead, they will be used to “provide public goods for all.” In fact, Chinese Navy commander, Admiral Wu Shengli, welcomed the US Navy to use these facilities for humanitarian and anti-piracy purposes.
As I have stated before in more detail in another thread, not all US allies see China as a threat. While China has tense relations with the Philippines and Japan, Thailand and South Korea each enjoy close bilateral ties with China. With relations with Washington strained over the latest coup, Bangkok finds Beijing to be a useful counter weight. In a state visit to South Korea by Chinese President Xi Jinping in July 2014, the parties signed 12 deals to enable direct trade between the Korean Won and the Chinese renminbi; as well as work towards a Sino-Republic of Korea (ROK) Free Trade Agreement by the end of the year. On the 'China threat theory', there are some points to note:-
Beyond the above discussion on formal allies in Asia and the Asia Pacific (like Australia, Japan, S. Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines), the quasi-ally model is also being replicated across Southeast Asia, with Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia drawing closer to the US. In Feb 2015, US and Singapore celebrated the 10th anniversary of the bilateral Strategic Framework Agreement, which underpins the bilateral defense and security partnership between the countries. This reflects a growing desire to pre-empt Chinese military opportunism via informal military relationships with the US — links that would prove useful in the event that things go pear-shaped. Ultimately, such covert moves to build up military ties with the US enable these military-to-military relationships to fly under the radar undetected, but their potency remains very real.
The 26–27 April 2015 ASEAN Summit in Malaysia did not issue any groundbreaking new declarations on the organization’s direction. ASEAN did not come out swinging at China, but a nuanced reading of the summit suggests that it did set the stage for important developments down the road. Press attention at the summit was focused on the South China Sea, and the chairman’s statement issued on April 28 said the ASEAN heads of state/governments “share the serious concerns expressed by some leaders on the land reclamation being undertaken in the South China Sea, which has eroded trust and confidence and may undermine peace, security, and stability in the South China Sea.”
I note that China is not even mentioned by name in the chairman’s statement. Just framing ASEAN-China relations against the backdrop of the South China Sea dispute is not helpful. And just seeing ASEAN-China relations through the prism of the South China Sea dispute is "getting it completely wrong", said Singapore's Foreign Affairs Minister and Law Minister K Shanmugam on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur on 26 April 2015. Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam and the Philippines are among the claimant states within ASEAN, over the mineral-rich seas. ASEAN, together with China, are working towards a Code of Conduct on the South China Sea to mitigate conflicts but progress has been slow. "If you start looking at ASEAN-China relations through the prism of South China Sea, you are getting it wrong completely. That may be a sexy way of looking at it. That may make newspaper headlines but that certainly isn't the facts on the ground. The facts on the ground are the very substantial economic, security, political relationship between China and every country in ASEAN and ASEAN as a whole. South China Sea forms part of it and we will not be doing our duty for our country and our people if we forget that."
Security analysts regard the South China Sea as a potential flashpoint, with China dredging sand onto shallow reefs to create new islands for building runways and radar stations prompting fears of military confrontation in the region. Formal allies such as Japan and Australia bear the burden of atomicity — that is, they are bound by their security arrangements to support the U.S. in conflicts it gets involved in.
As William Johnson for writing for Reuters noted on 21 May 2015:
"In order to justify an aggressive approach, the United States must determine that the creation of these islands is threatening some vital U.S. interest. The claim that the new islands are disrupting the United States’ freedom of navigation is a red herring. To date, China has done nothing in the South China Sea to disrupt shipping. It has countered activities by other countries who assert their ownership and control in the region, notably Vietnam and the Philippines, and has asserted its own ownership and control by intercepting fishing vessels and placing oil rigs in the area. Yet none of these actions have disrupted shipping in the region. It is disingenuous for the United States to claim that by using military force to counter the island-building, it is asserting the freedom of international shipping to sail close to rocks and submerged reefs — an action no merchant vessel is likely to take.
Another flawed justification for U.S. military involvement is to defend peace and stability in the region. There have so far been no major military confrontations in the disputes between the five other countries that lay claims to the South China Sea. Journalists as well as President Obama argue that this is simply because the smaller countries are afraid to confront China due to an imbalance in military might. While this imbalance exists, it isn’t a reason for the United States to step in. The United States has taken no position on any of the territorial claims, and has urged the parties to settle their disagreements peacefully. As long as the disputing countries are not coming to blows, the United States would be rash to risk a fight with a nuclear-armed China over China’s pursuit of its claims.
A final hollow justification for military action is that the United States needs to reassure its partners and allies in the region. The only U.S. ally that is a party to the dispute is the Philippines, which should need little reassurance; after 9/11 U.S. troops spent more than a decade on the ground in the Philippines conducting Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines to help the country rid itself of the terrorist threat from Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah. The United States has always stood by its treaty obligations, but will not commit to defending disputed grounds in the South China Sea, because it doesn’t consider them Philippine territory."
Another flawed justification for U.S. military involvement is to defend peace and stability in the region. There have so far been no major military confrontations in the disputes between the five other countries that lay claims to the South China Sea. Journalists as well as President Obama argue that this is simply because the smaller countries are afraid to confront China due to an imbalance in military might. While this imbalance exists, it isn’t a reason for the United States to step in. The United States has taken no position on any of the territorial claims, and has urged the parties to settle their disagreements peacefully. As long as the disputing countries are not coming to blows, the United States would be rash to risk a fight with a nuclear-armed China over China’s pursuit of its claims.
A final hollow justification for military action is that the United States needs to reassure its partners and allies in the region. The only U.S. ally that is a party to the dispute is the Philippines, which should need little reassurance; after 9/11 U.S. troops spent more than a decade on the ground in the Philippines conducting Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines to help the country rid itself of the terrorist threat from Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah. The United States has always stood by its treaty obligations, but will not commit to defending disputed grounds in the South China Sea, because it doesn’t consider them Philippine territory."
China promised that its construction activities are not meant for confrontations with the US; instead, they will be used to “provide public goods for all.” In fact, Chinese Navy commander, Admiral Wu Shengli, welcomed the US Navy to use these facilities for humanitarian and anti-piracy purposes.
As I have stated before in more detail in another thread, not all US allies see China as a threat. While China has tense relations with the Philippines and Japan, Thailand and South Korea each enjoy close bilateral ties with China. With relations with Washington strained over the latest coup, Bangkok finds Beijing to be a useful counter weight. In a state visit to South Korea by Chinese President Xi Jinping in July 2014, the parties signed 12 deals to enable direct trade between the Korean Won and the Chinese renminbi; as well as work towards a Sino-Republic of Korea (ROK) Free Trade Agreement by the end of the year. On the 'China threat theory', there are some points to note:-
One, according to a July 2014 Pew Research Center poll, most countries do not see China as their top threat. In fact, only respondents in Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam see China as their top security threat (i.e. countries that have active maritime disputes with China). And in three Asian nations, China, Pakistan and Malaysia, the US is seen as the top security threat. Incredibly, Indonesians see the US as their top security threat and their greatest ally (see this article: "Asia Fears But Likes China" for a discussion on the poll results).
Two, China's foreign aid program is now the sixth largest in the world. Only the UK, US, Germany, France and Japan provided more in 2013. This is according to a new paper from the JICA Research Institute estimating China's foreign aid program from 2001 to 2013. Their calculations put China's total official development assistance (ODA) at US$7.1 billion in 2013, with concessional loans, provided by China Eximbank, making up nearly half of the total aid. Economic and state interests are the main reasons why most states would not want to risk their relationship with China to give unqualified support for Vietnam over China's placement of the Haiyang Shiyou 981 rig in dispute waters. Only those that have poor relations with China, or those trying to counter-balance China are willing to support Vietnam — namely the Philippines, Japan and the US. Therefore, the US does not have unqualified support of its other allies in Asia to act in a manner that increases tensions with China. Thus far, China has withdrawn workers, frozen investments and even stopped state-owned enterprises from bidding for projects in Vietnam, since the riots in Vietnam, that were directed at Chinese factories have occurred. China is Vietnam’s largest trade partner (bilateral trade totaled US$65.48 billion in 2013). It is also the largest export market for Vietnamese rice, coal and crude rubber and remains the major source of imports for Vietnam’s demand for textiles, steel, oil products, electronics and other high value-added products. Meanwhile, the riot has left about 60,000 people jobless in Vietnam.
Three, Beijing is an important security partner especially with regards to managing the North Koreans. In recent years, this includes the sinking of a ROK warship in March 2010; and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010. While the ROK is an US ally, they also enjoy a great bilateral relationship with China; and during certain periods, the US-Korean alliance relationship can be strained. In particular, when the left-wing Roh Moo-Hyun ascended to the Korean presidential office on an anti-American platform. The then President Roh was ambivalent about the future of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. In fact, up to 2007, relations between the US and ROK had suffered because of disagreement over how to handle North Korea, with views in Seoul and Beijing on the issue had been in rough alliance. A strong Sino-ROK bilateral relationship inserts space between China and it's client, North Korea — more importantly, ROK is making the case that China's future status on the Korean peninsular is built on ties with the South.
Two, China's foreign aid program is now the sixth largest in the world. Only the UK, US, Germany, France and Japan provided more in 2013. This is according to a new paper from the JICA Research Institute estimating China's foreign aid program from 2001 to 2013. Their calculations put China's total official development assistance (ODA) at US$7.1 billion in 2013, with concessional loans, provided by China Eximbank, making up nearly half of the total aid. Economic and state interests are the main reasons why most states would not want to risk their relationship with China to give unqualified support for Vietnam over China's placement of the Haiyang Shiyou 981 rig in dispute waters. Only those that have poor relations with China, or those trying to counter-balance China are willing to support Vietnam — namely the Philippines, Japan and the US. Therefore, the US does not have unqualified support of its other allies in Asia to act in a manner that increases tensions with China. Thus far, China has withdrawn workers, frozen investments and even stopped state-owned enterprises from bidding for projects in Vietnam, since the riots in Vietnam, that were directed at Chinese factories have occurred. China is Vietnam’s largest trade partner (bilateral trade totaled US$65.48 billion in 2013). It is also the largest export market for Vietnamese rice, coal and crude rubber and remains the major source of imports for Vietnam’s demand for textiles, steel, oil products, electronics and other high value-added products. Meanwhile, the riot has left about 60,000 people jobless in Vietnam.
Three, Beijing is an important security partner especially with regards to managing the North Koreans. In recent years, this includes the sinking of a ROK warship in March 2010; and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010. While the ROK is an US ally, they also enjoy a great bilateral relationship with China; and during certain periods, the US-Korean alliance relationship can be strained. In particular, when the left-wing Roh Moo-Hyun ascended to the Korean presidential office on an anti-American platform. The then President Roh was ambivalent about the future of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. In fact, up to 2007, relations between the US and ROK had suffered because of disagreement over how to handle North Korea, with views in Seoul and Beijing on the issue had been in rough alliance. A strong Sino-ROK bilateral relationship inserts space between China and it's client, North Korea — more importantly, ROK is making the case that China's future status on the Korean peninsular is built on ties with the South.
Beyond the above discussion on formal allies in Asia and the Asia Pacific (like Australia, Japan, S. Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines), the quasi-ally model is also being replicated across Southeast Asia, with Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia drawing closer to the US. In Feb 2015, US and Singapore celebrated the 10th anniversary of the bilateral Strategic Framework Agreement, which underpins the bilateral defense and security partnership between the countries. This reflects a growing desire to pre-empt Chinese military opportunism via informal military relationships with the US — links that would prove useful in the event that things go pear-shaped. Ultimately, such covert moves to build up military ties with the US enable these military-to-military relationships to fly under the radar undetected, but their potency remains very real.
The 26–27 April 2015 ASEAN Summit in Malaysia did not issue any groundbreaking new declarations on the organization’s direction. ASEAN did not come out swinging at China, but a nuanced reading of the summit suggests that it did set the stage for important developments down the road. Press attention at the summit was focused on the South China Sea, and the chairman’s statement issued on April 28 said the ASEAN heads of state/governments “share the serious concerns expressed by some leaders on the land reclamation being undertaken in the South China Sea, which has eroded trust and confidence and may undermine peace, security, and stability in the South China Sea.”
I note that China is not even mentioned by name in the chairman’s statement. Just framing ASEAN-China relations against the backdrop of the South China Sea dispute is not helpful. And just seeing ASEAN-China relations through the prism of the South China Sea dispute is "getting it completely wrong", said Singapore's Foreign Affairs Minister and Law Minister K Shanmugam on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur on 26 April 2015. Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam and the Philippines are among the claimant states within ASEAN, over the mineral-rich seas. ASEAN, together with China, are working towards a Code of Conduct on the South China Sea to mitigate conflicts but progress has been slow. "If you start looking at ASEAN-China relations through the prism of South China Sea, you are getting it wrong completely. That may be a sexy way of looking at it. That may make newspaper headlines but that certainly isn't the facts on the ground. The facts on the ground are the very substantial economic, security, political relationship between China and every country in ASEAN and ASEAN as a whole. South China Sea forms part of it and we will not be doing our duty for our country and our people if we forget that."
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