Future of the Battleship

[swerve]

Probably the modern variant of the battleship is the Arsenal ship. I thought that concept was long ago dead and burried, but last year came through that:
Arsenal Ships - The Phoenix ThinkTank - Naval Think Tank
I would appreciate any comments, also on the PhoenixTT.

Some quotations from that article:

Instead the MOD selected the A50 Sylver VLS, which is too short to even take Storm Shadow, a shorter range cruise missile.

Storm Shadow is air-launched only. It does not & did not fit in any VLS when Sylver A50 was selected, & tThere was no VLS-compatible version planned.

Tactical Low Altitude Missiles (TLAMs)

TLAM = Tomahawk Land Attack Missile, NOT "Tactical Low Altitude Missiles".

The author hasn't grasped the idea of the Arsenal Ship. It was meant to be relatively cheap, apart from its missile load, & with a small crew. It would not have its own sensors or combat system. It was, in short, what the name implies: an arsenal, in the sense of a store of weapons. It would supplement much more expensive cruisers, destroyers, aircraft carriers etc., which would have the sensors On board or on their aircraft), combat management system, & crew to operate them, which the arsenal ship would lack. In the RN context, it would probably be controlled by a Type 45.

What Clarke proposes has all the expensive kit that the Arsenal Ship concept was meant to dispense with. It even has a sonar!

Just one ‘container’ could take 30 SM-3 (or Aster 45 if that is what is selected

An impossible number of Mk 41, which comes in 8-cell modules, & the Aster 45 project (only ever on paper) was dropped several years ago.

120 containers each with 30 VLS silos = 3600. Clarke proposes that we buy FOUR of these ships. What the hell would we put in 14400 cells? That's over twice the number of Tomahawk-capable launchers the USN has, many of which are also used for BMD & other purposes. It's over ten times the total number fired in the 1990-91 Iraq war, Bosnia, Kosovo, & the 2003 Iraq war. It's about three times the greatest number of Tomahawks the USA has ever had in its inventory.

Then there is this -

It would not just be the 4 Arsenal ships which would have to be procured, but also a vessel type capable of resupplying them.
...
Procurement would therefore be of 4-8 vessels, equally divided between roles of Arsenal and Auxiliary, with the former costing probably less than £350million and the latter less than £150million to purchase and convert

Resupply? He thinks we need 28800 cruise missiles? Where's he going to find the targets?

I'm very interested in how he thinks he's going to build a ship with SAMPSON, S1850M, & the CMS to use them, for £350mn.

the ‘containers’ would of course be extra and this figure would depend upon how many were procured, as well as what missiles were loaded into them

Get all he wants, & the cost of missiles alone would be £13 billion (at 2006 USD prices, current exchange rate), assuming they're all Tomahawks. SM3 costs a lot more, as would BMD-capable Asters. 14400 Mk 41 silos wouldn't come cheap, either.

He's proposing something costing at least £20 billion to give us a cruise missile arsenal bigger than those of the rest of the world combined.

The USN Arsenal Ship concept had about 500 cells, & one of the reasons it was dropped was the concern about too many eggs in one basket.

This paper has no connection with reality. It's insane.

 

[StobieWan]

It's unhinged - I mean, "Piiiggsss Innnnnn Spaaaace" made. I've no idea why anyone would think we'd need to launch 3500 cruise missiles in total at anything, then I hit the discussion about resupplying this ocean going porker and I needed a lie down after that.

I've seen some nutcase stuff from Phoenix Think Tank but this is the mutts nuts for "daft"

 

[rip]

Didn’t work very well. While it takes many times the pocket battleship’s cost in warships to hunt it down, that hunt is relatively brief, and generally without compensating losses on the hunter’s side. The camouflaged auxiliary cruisers, like the Atlantis, were much more effective.

Back then submarine detection by aircraft was visual only. A pair of helicopters with sonar buoy’s is worth more than a ‘jeep’ carrier for ASW.

Sounds more like a job for a DE than a battleship, and you while you probably can’t afford enough of either, you can get 2x to 3x as many for the same cost. You need numbers for this task more than overwhelming capabilities.

Sounds like a slant deck cruiser to me. So let’s use a Kiev class carrier, the original Baku/Admiral Gorshkov would be the closest to the design, as the model. Looks like it could handle the air wing and UAVs. Probably have to stretch it some to add space for the surface and subsurface drones, a lot more if you want to add the nuke, let’s say 50,000 tons with conventional power, and 60,000 tons with nuclear. Probably cost at least 1/3 to 1/2 as much as a Ford class carrier.

And don’t stint on the fuel, without escorts you will need to keep those ASW helicopters in the air on an almost constant basis. You might even need to increase the number.

As too your comment, “Didn’t work very well. While it takes many times the pocket battleship’s cost in warships to hunt it down, that hunt is relatively brief, and generally without compensating losses on the hunter’s side. The camouflaged auxiliary cruisers, like the Atlantis, were much more effective.”


The German approach was a complete failure I fully agree but the circumstances now are far different. The Germans were looking at the situation as a weak navy challenging a strong one. We are the strong navy now but we do not have the numbers to guard the sea-lanes from today’s asymmetric threats and the question is how best to address that reality. And if you think that anyone would ever consider building the number of small escorts they did back then I would like to sell you some Florida real state.

As to your comment, “Back then submarine detection by aircraft was visual only. A pair of helicopters with sonar buoy’s is worth more than a ‘jeep’ carrier for ASW.”

Your statement is simply not true on both counts. We had other methods of detecting submarines even way back then or we would have lost the battle of the Atlantic as far back as WW II. Do some more research? They were highly classified methods at that time, as is everything to do with submarines and submarine warfare you may not have been aware of them but they existed. Second even with the other methods of detection it was still difficult to track and pursue a target even after it had been detected in a small general area even way back then. I think you way over evaluating the abilities of ASW helicopters when used as submarine hunters versa their use as defenders form submarines.

As to you comment, “Sounds more like a job for a DE than a battleship, and you while you probably can’t afford enough of either, you can get 2x to 3x as many for the same cost. You need numbers for this task more than overwhelming capabilities.”

The cost is higher but the value is far greater. First is the known fact that big ships last allot longer and are easier and more efficient to man. The Enterprise is on its last deployment and it is fifty years old. It was big and expensive but it lasted a long time and proved its worth many times over. Also you are completely disregarding the force multiplier effect of the subsurface drones. They provide the numbers the only way that the required numbers can be provided, they are cheap and dispersed and always at sea and the Battleship is the killer part of the ASW team. The way you need to think about it is that the 3D battleships' relationship to its UAV’s in the same way as a Strike Carries'r is to its aircraft. The type and tempo of its operations are far different but the concept is still the same. One of the differences is that it is highly unlikely that we will ever give autonomous robots kill authority and probably for cost reasons most will not have kill capacity. For obvious reasons the kill functions and the detection and tracking functions, will have to done by separate components and in the deep oceans what way would be better?

As to you comment, “Sounds like a slant deck cruiser to me. So let’s use a Kiev class carrier, the original Baku/Admiral Gorshkov would be the closest to the design, as the model. Looks like it could handle the air wing and UAVs. Probably have to stretch it some to add space for the surface and subsurface drones, a lot more if you want to add the nuke, let’s say 50,000 tons with conventional power, and 60,000 tons with nuclear. Probably cost at least 1/3 to 1/2 as much as a Ford class carrier.”

It would not be cheap, but then again name a new warship that is? The big difference will be its manning levels will be less than six hundred men and half of them will be involved is servicing the drones which will have to be serviced anyway and would be done far cheaper and easier in most cases while still at sea because they would not be require separate deployment and retrieval evolutions separate from the 3D battleships regular patrols so you would get maximum use out of them.

As to you comment, “And don’t stint on the fuel, without escorts you will need to keep those ASW helicopters in the air on an almost constant basis. You might even need to increase the number.”

It would have plenty of fuel but the primary detection function will be done by the drones and only the defensive area around the ship, 75 t0 a 100 miles need secondary coverage.

As an aside, I never thought much about Russian designs, just a personal opinion. They were built for the big battle type scenario so I will not compare them to my proposal. They were not ships that did by and large very well with long periods at sea. But that would be completely different disc

 

[My2Cents]

We had other methods of detecting submarines even way back then or we would have lost the battle of the Atlantic as far back as WW II. Do some more research? They were highly classified methods at that time, as is everything to do with submarines and submarine warfare you may not have been aware of them but they existed. Second even with the other methods of detection it was still difficult to track and pursue a target even after it had been detected in a small general area even way back then. I think you way over evaluating the abilities of ASW helicopters when used as submarine hunters versa their use as defenders form submarines.

Could you give some references or at least examples of detecting submerged submarines from aircraft in WWII? The Mk.1 eyeball was the only one that could spot a shallow submarine. Centimeter range radar could only spot a sub on the surface. I am not aware of other systems of note.

We are the strong navy now but we do not have the numbers to guard the sea-lanes from today’s asymmetric threats and the question is how best to address that reality. And if you think that anyone would ever consider building the number of small escorts they did back then I would like to sell you some Florida real state.
As to you comment, “Sounds more like a job for a DE than a battleship, and you while you probably can’t afford enough of either, you can get 2x to 3x as many for the same cost. You need numbers for this task more than overwhelming capabilities.”

You don’t need as many escorts as used in WWII. With ASW helicopters and weapons like ASROC, and drones when they become available, the coverage per hull has improved significantly. The problem is that there are too many locations requiring coverage, and you need those enough hulls to provide as much of that coverage as practical. Your battleship is VERY impressive, but it can only be in one place at a time.

The cost is higher but the value is far greater. First is the known fact that big ships last allot longer and are easier and more efficient to man. The Enterprise is on its last deployment and it is fifty years old. It was big and expensive but it lasted a long time and proved its worth many times over. Also you are completely disregarding the force multiplier effect of the subsurface drones. They provide the numbers the only way that the required numbers can be provided, they are cheap and dispersed and always at sea and the Battleship is the killer part of the ASW team. The way you need to think about it is that the 3D battleships' relationship to its UAV’s in the same way as a Strike Carries'r is to its aircraft. The type and tempo of its operations are far different but the concept is still the same. One of the differences is that it is highly unlikely that we will ever give autonomous robots kill authority and probably for cost reasons most will not have kill capacity. For obvious reasons the kill functions and the detection and tracking functions, will have to done by separate components and in the deep oceans what way would be better?

Size does not matter as much as technological evolution, a ship survives as long as it can keep upgrading, but you eventually reach the point where it is cheaper to scrap and replace than rebuild the ship from the hull up.

Carriers are a poor choice for comparison with because they are a fairly mature design, nearly all of the significant advances in the last 40 years have been in the aircraft it launches and the weapons that the aircraft carry, not the ship systems and design. Drones are going to cause a LOT of changes in doctrine and ship design to meet them. Until that is settled expect any vessel to have a lifespan more in line with other early designs, like the USS Langley (15 years) or HMS Dreadnought (17 years). Probably less, because technology is evolving faster than it was a century ago.

As to you comment, “Sounds like a slant deck cruiser to me. So let’s use a Kiev class carrier, the original Baku/Admiral Gorshkov would be the closest to the design, as the model. Looks like it could handle the air wing and UAVs. Probably have to stretch it some to add space for the surface and subsurface drones, a lot more if you want to add the nuke, let’s say 50,000 tons with conventional power, and 60,000 tons with nuclear. Probably cost at least 1/3 to 1/2 as much as a Ford class carrier.”

It would not be cheap, but then again name a new warship that is? The big difference will be its manning levels will be less than six hundred men and half of them will be involved is servicing the drones which will have to be serviced anyway and would be done far cheaper and easier in most cases while still at sea because they would not be require separate deployment and retrieval evolutions separate from the 3D battleships regular patrols so you would get maximum use out of them.

As an aside, I never thought much about Russian designs, just a personal opinion. They were built for the big battle type scenario so I will not compare them to my proposal. They were not ships that did by and large very well with long periods at sea. But that would be completely different disc

The Baku member of the Kiev class looked like a good match for your description in terms of VLS missile and aircraft capacity (but no catapult). And it is the only ship with that combination of characteristics that I am aware of.

And I am not sure what you mean “built for the big battle type scenario”? I assume that you mean that it would deploy with escorts, not alone. But that is a matter of doctrine more than design. Other than adding drones and deleting the heavy anti-ship missiles, what other changes would be necessary to convert it to a non-“big battle type”?

As to you comment, “And don’t stint on the fuel, without escorts you will need to keep those ASW helicopters in the air on an almost constant basis. You might even need to increase the number.”

It would have plenty of fuel but the primary detection function will be done by the drones and only the defensive area around the ship, 75 t0 a 100 miles need secondary coverage.

• Can you clarify what you mean by ‘secondary coverage’?
• Do you mean the ASW helicopter will be covering the area with 75 to 100 miles?
• What would be the range of the primary coverage?

 

[swerve]

Could you give some references or at least examples of detecting submerged submarines from aircraft in WWII? The Mk.1 eyeball was the only one that could spot a shallow submarine. Centimeter range radar could only spot a sub on the surface. I am not aware of other systems of note.

You didn't say submerged submarines. You said Mk 1 eyeball was the only means aircraft had of detecting submarines - unqualified.

WW2 submarines spent as much time as possible on the surface, for good reasons. We should really think of them as submersibles rather than submarines. Airborne radar (initially about metre range, not centimetric) was therefore a very good way of detecting them, & it enabled the sinking of many subs. At worst, it forced them to stay submerged, thus reducing their operational effectiveness. It increased transit times, for example.

MADs were used, initially ineffectively, but they eventually became useful. Sonobuoys (non-directional) were in use from the middle of the war, & in conjunction with MAD enabled aircraft to locate submerged submarines.

 

[rip]

Could you give some references or at least examples of detecting submerged submarines from aircraft in WWII? The Mk.1 eyeball was the only one that could spot a shallow submarine. Centimeter range radar could only spot a sub on the surface. I am not aware of other systems of note.

You don’t need as many escorts as used in WWII. With ASW helicopters and weapons like ASROC, and drones when they become available, the coverage per hull has improved significantly. The problem is that there are too many locations requiring coverage, and you need those enough hulls to provide as much of that coverage as practical. Your battleship is VERY impressive, but it can only be in one place at a time.

Size does not matter as much as technological evolution, a ship survives as long as it can keep upgrading, but you eventually reach the point where it is cheaper to scrap and replace than rebuild the ship from the hull up.

Carriers are a poor choice for comparison with because they are a fairly mature design, nearly all of the significant advances in the last 40 years have been in the aircraft it launches and the weapons that the aircraft carry, not the ship systems and design. Drones are going to cause a LOT of changes in doctrine and ship design to meet them. Until that is settled expect any vessel to have a lifespan more in line with other early designs, like the USS Langley (15 years) or HMS Dreadnought (17 years). Probably less, because technology is evolving faster than it was a century ago.

The Baku member of the Kiev class looked like a good match for your description in terms of VLS missile and aircraft capacity (but no catapult). And it is the only ship with that combination of characteristics that I am aware of.

And I am not sure what you mean “built for the big battle type scenario”? I assume that you mean that it would deploy with escorts, not alone. But that is a matter of doctrine more than design. Other than adding drones and deleting the heavy anti-ship missiles, what other changes would be necessary to convert it to a non-“big battle type”?

• Can you clarify what you mean by ‘secondary coverage’?
• Do you mean the ASW helicopter will be covering the area with 75 to 100 miles?
• What would be the range of the primary coverage?

For just for one example, how about radio direction finding of their submarine radio transitions. This network was kept mostly secret long after the war as to just how successful it was in locating the localized areas of submarine operations and their concentrations. And the ASW carriers (you called jeep carriers) with their escorts were the hammer that hunted them down and destroyed them after their general locations became known. At the end of the war the German submarines still went to sea but there were no more radio transmissions back to base and no more wolf pack tactics.

 

[akulashark]

There is no future for battleships or any non-aircraft carrying vessel bigger than a frigate. If you look at the specs of modern frigates, most would have previously been classified as corvettes in the 50s or 60s. In short, all vessels are getting smaller and more agile and the days of only big ships being able to carry huge firepower are gone. Big vessels are a liability and have to protected by a fleet of smaller ships and submarines to compensate for their vulnerabilities. This makes them unviable in the modern age. Also, as radar and fire-control systems have advanced technologically and decreased in size, even the smallest vessels can now carry a complement of ASMs, SAMs and a CIWS system. One could argue that larger vessels could survive multiple missile/torpedo hits, but modern warfare isn't about survivability anymore - It's about hit and run. Smaller vessels fit in with this doctrine.

 

[the concerned]

Sorry but i don't agree with that take a look at the latest warships that have gone into service T-45/arliegh burke/F-100/kdx -3 there all heading towards criuser size even the sovermeny class is a near on 9000 ton boat not what i would excatly call small. i actually think your going to end up with 2 classes of ship. the small frigate /corvette for countries who have limited resources something between 1800tons and 3500 tons . Then you'll have destroyers for the more capable countries again between 6,000tons and 10,000tons.

 

[PO2GRV]

after weeks pondering RIP's post I feel that while I disagree with the need for the kind of vessel he described, I do think he raised an invaluable point concerning sea control [versus sea denial] type assets

sea control and sea denial are often generalized as blanket terms for a Navy's doctrine (as in the USN was a sea control navy and the Soviet Navy was sea denial) but it is often ignored that platforms can be broadly defined as control or denial assets over and above more specific platform descriptions such as air defense, patrol et cetera

RIP made an excellent point that battleships were the sea control assets of yesteryear, but he argues that battleships (or a variation of such) could still be sea control assets in today's Navy. I on the other hand mentioned that modern large and expensive sea control assets require alot of investment in the way of operating costs and escorts, and that aircraft carriers are the pinnacle of sea control assets today. The investment we put into operating aircraft carriers justifies the costs (unless ofcourse your Navy chooses to operate 11 of them . . .) because of the high "return" we get on the investment, eg the massive capability aircraft carriers give a navy

a battleship either a) brings far less capability for the high costs of operating it in groups, or b) ends up being a big expensive target, or as someone else said before, "too many eggs in one basket" if operated on its own (and more expensive to boot if one tries to make it more capable of defending itself by adding more missiles and more radars and more drones and more aircraft etc)

 

[My2Cents]

There is no future for battleships or any non-aircraft carrying vessel bigger than a frigate. If you look at the specs of modern frigates, most would have previously been classified as corvettes in the 50s or 60s. In short, all vessels are getting smaller and more agile and the days of only big ships being able to carry huge firepower are gone. Big vessels are a liability and have to protected by a fleet of smaller ships and submarines to compensate for their vulnerabilities. This makes them unviable in the modern age. Also, as radar and fire-control systems have advanced technologically and decreased in size, even the smallest vessels can now carry a complement of ASMs, SAMs and a CIWS system. One could argue that larger vessels could survive multiple missile/torpedo hits, but modern warfare isn't about survivability anymore - It's about hit and run. Smaller vessels fit in with this doctrine.

While I agree with your opinion of the battleship, or any other single vessel battlefleet concept, but frigates are just too small for most jobs. It is not the types of systems that they carry, but the magazines capacity to back those systems up, along with the fuel, etc. to produce the required combat radius.

An 8 cell VLS module full of ESSM is sufficient for self-defense, but degrades quickly if you start adding ASROC, Tomahawk, or long range SM-2 and SM-3 capability. Contrast this to the capabilities of a Burke class destroyer with 12 modules for 96 cells.

And it is the size of corvettes that is growing from 500 tons to 3000+ tons, not the frigates that are shrinking, to the point that corvettes are now larger than older frigates. Meanwhile frigates are growing to the size of older destroyers 5000 to 6000 tons (the size of a Spruance class destroyer). This is probably being driven by the need to have helicopter capacity (now more than 1) with hangers.

 

[Wall83]

I agree, todays oceangoing warships is becomming larger. For the example you have the Type-45 destroyer at 8,000 tons replacing the 3,500 ton Type-42.
French is replacing smaller classes with the 6,000 ton Horizon class.

In the east South korea, Japan and China is in a naval build up with classes like the Kongo, Atago, KD-III and Type-52C classes.
Not to mention the Hyūga class and the future 19500t class destroyer.

 

[rip]

I agree, todays oceangoing warships is becomming larger. For the example you have the Type-45 destroyer at 8,000 tons replacing the 3,500 ton Type-42.
French is replacing smaller classes with the 6,000 ton Horizon class.

In the east South korea, Japan and China is in a naval build up with classes like the Kongo, Atago, KD-III and Type-52C classes.
Not to mention the Hyūga class and the future 19500t class destroyer.

My proposal may not be perfect but it does address the new modern realities of naval warfare.

1. The most flexible and survivable of assets in the fleet are air capable.

2. The robots are coming, are coming, and we at this point can’t even predict how much it will change all aspect of warfare. But this ship will be big enough and versatile enough to handle them however they develop.

3. Modern submarines are the weapon of choice for the weaker navy and have the asymmetric advantage though I think our fleet can defend itself from submarines, I hope? The protection of our supply lines are not protected from submarine that are operating today and redeploying the combat fleet's assets may weaken it beyond any effectiveness.

4. It is a big ship about half the size of a strike carrier with a crew only one eighth the size, it will just like a strike carrier, not become obsolete nearly as fast as destroyers or cruisers will. Why? Because just like a strike carrier it main punch is in its aircraft and its drowns (air, surface, and sub-surface). They will be updated continually far more cheaply than upgrading a ship.

The point was made that this ship in the stand along operating mode could not stand up by itself against a squadron of ships. Yes but if so we must of have already lost control of the enemy’s coastal zone or they would not have been able to set them to sea in such numbers. That is a completely different kind of war than the one we are building ships for now which are very focused on controlling the littorals.

 

[My2Cents]

My proposal may not be perfect but it does address the new modern realities of naval warfare.

No.

1. The most flexible and survivable of assets in the fleet are air capable.

No. The carriers are survivable because they are protected by the fleet that escorts them, while the carrier’s aircraft protect the rest of the fleet and provide the majority of the striking power. Carriers do not operate on their own. The comparison does not hold.

2. The robots are coming, are coming, and we at this point can’t even predict how much it will change all aspect of warfare. But this ship will be big enough and versatile enough to handle them however they develop.

No. We still don’t know how much about how the capabilities of the surface (USVs) and subsurface (UUVs) robots will work out or how they will evolve. In particular we don’t know how big they will be. We are already getting a feel for UAVs.

One thing we can be sure of is USVs and UUVs will have severe range and speed constraints, as an inherent limitation from their size and operating media. This may lead to warships with robots needing to operate in pairs or more if those systems are to be deployed and maintain a significant rate of advance. The one in the lead would launch the drones, while the one at the back retrieves them and prepares them to be launched again, then the vessels would swap positions and start over.

3. Modern submarines are the weapon of choice for the weaker navy and have the asymmetric advantage though I think our fleet can defend itself from submarines, I hope? The protection of our supply lines are not protected from submarine that are operating today and redeploying the combat fleet's assets may weaken it beyond any effectiveness.

Actually, in an anti-ship situation, submarines are probably everyone’s first choice. The trick is getting the sub into position so it can attack undetected. It helps if there is a choke point that can be used to force the targets into range or onto pre-laid mines, or an external surveillance feed for submarine launched standoff missiles. Carriers get most the press because they have more uses, are easier to use correctly, and are MUCH more photogenic.

4. It is a big ship about half the size of a strike carrier with a crew only one eighth the size, it will just like a strike carrier, not become obsolete nearly as fast as destroyers or cruisers will. Why? Because just like a strike carrier it main punch is in its aircraft and its drowns (air, surface, and sub-surface). They will be updated continually far more cheaply than upgrading a ship.

Why shouldn’t it become obsolete quickly? It is a just cruiser/destroyer with half a light carrier shoved on the rear. Mixed designs like this have been evaluated before, they have the vices of both and the virtues of neither. The cruiser/destroyer half will become obsolete as quick as the rest of the cruiser/destroyers and you don’t have enough other capabilities to justify the costs without it.

Then there is the problem on the drone side. We don’t know enough about using drones to set requirements and trade-offs for the logistics to support them, and we know nothing about the logistics of combat USVs and UUVs. If this is going to be one of the 1st ships out of the blocks it is extremely unlikely that it’s operational life will reach 2 decades before it can no longer adapt. Fielding a major combatant designed around USVs and UUVs before at least 2030 would probably be an unacceptable technology risk. It would be like trying to design a Forrestal class carrier back in the 1930’s.

The point was made that this ship in the stand along operating mode could not stand up by itself against a squadron of ships. Yes but if so we must of have already lost control of the enemy’s coastal zone or they would not have been able to set them to sea in such numbers. That is a completely different kind of war than the one we are building ships for now which are very focused on controlling the littorals.

Anyone capable of launching attacks at global shipping powerful enough to merit such a ship in response is powerful enough to deny access to their coastal zone. But in any case, I don’t recall anyone suggesting that this ship would have to defend itself from a ‘squadron’, but most of us question it’s capability to defend the trade routes as well as 2 lesser vessels for the same cost. Vessels which it should be added are much more expendable than yours if a sub gets the drop on one.

And they are not building a navy focused on the littorals, it is just an area that has been ignored up until recently which has become a critical problem. Then the Navy decided to make the LCS a jack-of-all-trades and ended up with master-of-none. They are still building destroyers and carriers and nuclear submarines, and the main area of concern is still ‘blue water’ operations. But now they also need the capacity to do ‘green water’ and probably some ‘brown water’ as well.

Come to think of it, your proposal is also for a jack-of-all-trades ship. Might it turn into another LCS, just 20x bigger? :hul

 

[the concerned]

These days alot of navies are likely to be invovled in UN/NATO embargos where i think a big capable warship is more liable to convince the enemy to behave themselves that is something you can't do with submarines no matter how capable they are

 

[StobieWan]

These days alot of navies are likely to be invovled in UN/NATO embargos where i think a big capable warship is more liable to convince the enemy to behave themselves that is something you can't do with submarines no matter how capable they are

The last time an SSN was used in anger, the entire opposing navy went home and stayed there. I'd say that was pretty convincing.

 

[akulashark]

Sorry but i don't agree with that take a look at the latest warships that have gone into service T-45/arliegh burke/F-100/kdx -3 there all heading towards criuser size even the sovermeny class is a near on 9000 ton boat not what i would excatly call small. i actually think your going to end up with 2 classes of ship. the small frigate /corvette for countries who have limited resources something between 1800tons and 3500 tons . Then you'll have destroyers for the more capable countries again between 6,000tons and 10,000tons.

1980s destroyers. Have you seen the proposed replacement for the Arlegh Burke? It proves my point perfectly. You cannot judge modern ship design by throwing examples out the 80s.

 

[My2Cents]

1980s destroyers. Have you seen the proposed replacement for the Arlegh Burke? It proves my point perfectly. You cannot judge modern ship design by throwing examples out the 80s.

There are hundreds (possibly thousands) of proposed designs, probably covering a range from 3,000 tons to 60,000 tons displacement (including submersibles), to replace any of the current classes of destroyer/cruisers. You will need to be a bit more specific as to which proposal, study, or blog you are referring to.

I know you cannot post links yet, but you could at least give us an idea where to look so we have something to talk about.

 

[rip]

No.

No. The carriers are survivable because they are protected by the fleet that escorts them, while the carrier’s aircraft protect the rest of the fleet and provide the majority of the striking power. Carriers do not operate on their own. The comparison does not hold.

No. We still don’t know how much about how the capabilities of the surface (USVs) and subsurface (UUVs) robots will work out or how they will evolve. In particular we don’t know how big they will be. We are already getting a feel for UAVs.

One thing we can be sure of is USVs and UUVs will have severe range and speed constraints, as an inherent limitation from their size and operating media. This may lead to warships with robots needing to operate in pairs or more if those systems are to be deployed and maintain a significant rate of advance. The one in the lead would launch the drones, while the one at the back retrieves them and prepares them to be launched again, then the vessels would swap positions and start over.

Actually, in an anti-ship situation, submarines are probably everyone’s first choice. The trick is getting the sub into position so it can attack undetected. It helps if there is a choke point that can be used to force the targets into range or onto pre-laid mines, or an external surveillance feed for submarine launched standoff missiles. Carriers get most the press because they have more uses, are easier to use correctly, and are MUCH more photogenic.

Why shouldn’t it become obsolete quickly? It is a just cruiser/destroyer with half a light carrier shoved on the rear. Mixed designs like this have been evaluated before, they have the vices of both and the virtues of neither. The cruiser/destroyer half will become obsolete as quick as the rest of the cruiser/destroyers and you don’t have enough other capabilities to justify the costs without it.

Then there is the problem on the drone side. We don’t know enough about using drones to set requirements and trade-offs for the logistics to support them, and we know nothing about the logistics of combat USVs and UUVs. If this is going to be one of the 1st ships out of the blocks it is extremely unlikely that it’s operational life will reach 2 decades before it can no longer adapt. Fielding a major combatant designed around USVs and UUVs before at least 2030 would probably be an unacceptable technology risk. It would be like trying to design a Forrestal class carrier back in the 1930’s.

Anyone capable of launching attacks at global shipping powerful enough to merit such a ship in response is powerful enough to deny access to their coastal zone. But in any case, I don’t recall anyone suggesting that this ship would have to defend itself from a ‘squadron’, but most of us question it’s capability to defend the trade routes as well as 2 lesser vessels for the same cost. Vessels which it should be added are much more expendable than yours if a sub gets the drop on one.

And they are not building a navy focused on the littorals, it is just an area that has been ignored up until recently which has become a critical problem. Then the Navy decided to make the LCS a jack-of-all-trades and ended up with master-of-none. They are still building destroyers and carriers and nuclear submarines, and the main area of concern is still ‘blue water’ operations. But now they also need the capacity to do ‘green water’ and probably some ‘brown water’ as well.

Come to think of it, your proposal is also for a jack-of-all-trades ship. Might it turn into another LCS, just 20x bigger? :hul

First let me address the fact that you keep bringing up Soviet ships that were not only poorly designed and constructed but were designed for completely different purposes coming from a basically a costal defense navy. A navy that failed to ever become a successful blue water navy. They looked very dangerous I grant you that but they had poor reliability, they were way overly complicated, they were over manned, they were crammed with far too much stuff, had lousy crew accommodations, poor underway replenishment, poor damage control, and they generally never came to grips with the differences between what a costal defense navy is and what a blue water navy must be able to do. Given enough time they could I am sure would have made the adjustments but the ships they did make never did.

But there is another problem. Though they may be big convention naval battles in the future, that future war if it comes will be like WW II in that it will primarily be a war of attrition. A completely different mindset from the big battle story line where the winner takes all narrative of the past that doesn’t seem to want to die. The last great naval battle in the world was the battle of the Philippine Sea. It was an Japanese attempt to stave off the fact that they had already lost the war. But even if they had won that battle they would of still lost the war. It would of only meant that it would of taken a little long and cost a few more lives.

Form follows function in ships as with everything else. Yes there is more to it than that but it is still true. If you have a true blue water navy and not a costal defense navy, your ships will be bigger and be more expensive than ships of equal striking power that are deployed in the costal defense roll. And those bigger ships will be better equipped to fight in a war of attrition.

The reason why as you put it “We still don’t know how much about how the capabilities of the surface (USVs) and subsurface (UUVs) robots will work out or how they will evolve. In particular we don’t know how big they will be. We are already getting a feel for UAVs”.

Exactly my point. If you were a carrier pilot in the year 1920 you could not have foreseen the changes in aircraft development capacity, range, speed, endurance and everything else that would have occurred by 1930 and the same again between 1930 and 1940. True we do not know how big they will be or how long there endurance will be but what we can predict is that it will be far more rapid than we can safely predict. Having a big ship means that it can always be able to handle these assets and only the numbers of them will vary. Using small ships for this roll, that statement is not as certain and for so many more reasons. It is better to build too big than too small until you know better. We are at the same point with robots that we once were with aircraft a century ago. The only way to define these parameters is to build something that is intended to be an operational asset not just an experimental platform. We need to develop doctrines not just technologies for this coming new reality that is the only way to be ready.

Your idea of using pairs of ships, not necessarily war ships, is interesting. But two things. If they are warships they will in the end be more expensive and less flexible than the single ship solution. Unless you build a lot of them where you can then mix and match endlessly.Then if they are auxiliary ships that just cover the functions of recovery, repair, and redeployment of the robots, the servicing ships become the primary targets and the weakest links in the sea control system that can’t defend themselves or pursue attack options . And don’t say they are cheap and you can build lots of them. The robot repair facilities will need to be extensive, expensive, and manned by very skilled and difficult to replace robot specialists’. Remember in WW II more merchant marine sailors died at sea in that war than navy sailors.

Now finally about the littorals. This is a subject that far exceeds the premise of this thread. The driving force however behind the concentration on the littorals is that the navy is trying to stay relevant. Though it may change in the future with the buildup of naval forces in China, India and others the fact is that the US navy had not been challenged at sea for a long time. All of our recent wars have been fought on land. It could rightly be argued that the very fact that the US navy was so powerful that other potential competitors didn’t even try to challenge us in this way and so that was a measure of its success but with our shrinking navy that may no longer be true. Once again the Soviet attempt never came in the end to be a real challenge. We have enjoyed for a long time the advantage that we have fought our wars in other people countries. An advantage we will try to maintain if we can but one we cannot guarantee. In any case the navy we are building today is designed to project power to and upon the land and not the historical function of a navy of primarily in controlling the sea. It is only because we have not be challenged that our forces are no longer built to secure that traditional roll but that can change very fast if we are prepared.

 

[My2Cents]

First let me address the fact that you keep bringing up Soviet ships that were not only poorly designed and constructed but were designed for completely different purposes coming from a basically a costal defense navy. A navy that failed to ever become a successful blue water navy. They looked very dangerous I grant you that but they had poor reliability, they were way overly complicated, they were over manned, they were crammed with far too much stuff, had lousy crew accommodations, poor underway replenishment, poor damage control, and they generally never came to grips with the differences between what a costal defense navy is and what a blue water navy must be able to do. Given enough time they could I am sure would have made the adjustments but the ships they did make never did.

I have not mentioned Soviets in the last 2 posts, so I don’t know why you say I keep bringing them up. But since you brought them up, don’t you think it interesting that the USSR, who you describe as “A navy that failed to ever become a successful blue water navy.” were the only navy that ever built a ship similar in concept to what you are proposing? Did you even pause to think that just might be a significant coincidence?

The reason why as you put it “We still don’t know how much about how the capabilities of the surface (USVs) and subsurface (UUVs) robots will work out or how they will evolve. In particular we don’t know how big they will be. We are already getting a feel for UAVs”.

Exactly my point. If you were a carrier pilot in the year 1920 you could not have foreseen the changes in aircraft development capacity, range, speed, endurance and everything else that would have occurred by 1930 and the same again between 1930 and 1940. True we do not know how big they will be or how long there endurance will be but what we can predict is that it will be far more rapid than we can safely predict. Having a big ship means that it can always be able to handle these assets and only the numbers of them will vary. Using small ships for this roll, that statement is not as certain and for so many more reasons. It is better to build too big than too small until you know better. We are at the same point with robots that we once were with aircraft a century ago. The only way to define these parameters is to build something that is intended to be an operational asset not just an experimental platform. We need to develop doctrines not just technologies for this coming new reality that is the only way to be ready.

Who said anything about the pilots, it is the naval architects that had to foresee the requirements, and it is highly unlikely back then that many of them had ever had a ride on an airplane, much less flown one.

It does not matter if the drone operators cannot foresee how the drones will evolve, it is what the ship designers that have to know:

1. What do you need to store them?
2. What do you need to operate them?
3. What do you need to launch them?
4. What do you need to retrieve them?
5. What do you need to maintain them?
6. What, where, and when do you arm them, and how is that ordinance delivered to the arming point and kept safe?
7. What … well the list just goes on …

You don’t jump into unknown waters head first, and you do not dump money into a huge vessel in the hopes that it might be possible for it to develop a doctrine where it would prove useful. First you develop the equipment, then design and test the doctrine, then you design and build the vessels, not the other way around. Unless, of course, you like expensive failures.

Your idea of using pairs of ships, not necessarily war ships, is interesting. But two things. If they are warships they will in the end be more expensive and less flexible than the single ship solution. Unless you build a lot of them where you can then mix and match endlessly.Then if they are auxiliary ships that just cover the functions of recovery, repair, and redeployment of the robots, the servicing ships become the primary targets and the weakest links in the sea control system that can’t defend themselves or pursue attack options . And don’t say they are cheap and you can build lots of them. The robot repair facilities will need to be extensive, expensive, and manned by very skilled and difficult to replace robot specialists’. Remember in WW II more merchant marine sailors died at sea in that war than navy sailors.

I am having trouble interpreting some of this:

1. Unless your ship can be in 2 places at the same time, it cannot be as flexible as 2 ships of similar though lesser capabilities in 2 widely separated locations. Numbers are sometimes less important than individual capabilities, but usually numbers are much more important. I would rather have 5 units that are good enough than 3 that are the best, because you are lucky if you don’t have more than 6 places they need to be.
2. Are you saying that your ship will NOT have the capacity to maintain and repair those robots?
3. The use of ships in pairs would be required (barring a new form of propulsion) if you intend to operate USVs and UUVs as escorts for a convoy. Small USVs will probably lack the necessary speed to keep up in sea states over 2. The UUVs performance should have performance about the same as a type 212 submarine, so it will lack the endurance and speed to keep up for extended periods. The solution may be to just have the mothership carry them forward of the convoy and then another collect them at the rear to bring them forward again.

Now finally about the littorals. This is a subject that far exceeds the premise of this thread. The driving force however behind the concentration on the littorals is that the navy is trying to stay relevant. Though it may change in the future with the buildup of naval forces in China, India and others the fact is that the US navy had not been challenged at sea for a long time. All of our recent wars have been fought on land. It could rightly be argued that the very fact that the US navy was so powerful that other potential competitors didn’t even try to challenge us in this way and so that was a measure of its success but with our shrinking navy that may no longer be true. Once again the Soviet attempt never came in the end to be a real challenge. We have enjoyed for a long time the advantage that we have fought our wars in other people countries. An advantage we will try to maintain if we can but one we cannot guarantee. In any case the navy we are building today is designed to project power to and upon the land and not the historical function of a navy of primarily in controlling the sea. It is only because we have not be challenged that our forces are no longer built to secure that traditional roll but that can change very fast if we are prepared.

I am unsure what to make of this statement. The US Navy has never abandoned the role of controlling the sea (in the classical, not the literal sense). If they did the Navy would be a good deal smaller. What happened in the Cold War is that somehow the sea became only the high seas (blue water). Now, with the emphasis off the Soviet Fleet, most the trouble is in the littorals (green water), like the Persian Gulf, the Yellow Sea, and off the coast of Somalia. But it is still part of the same mission, just like fighting on land includes both the open plains, the tall forests, and the cities.

Besides, any way you cut it, if you don’t control the sea there is no way you can project power onto any non-adjacent land. Even if you can deliver the troops and equipment you still need a steady stream of vessels to provide logistical support, as well as fuel and munitions for the fleet itself, and all the materials that have to be shipped on the water to the USA to make those items to send over to the battle. And so on …
The classic case here would be Argentina in the Falkland Islands -- Argentina never had sea control or the ability to deny it to the British so they were doomed to eventually lose, which they did.

 

[My2Cents]

_

It occurs to me that we are talking a lot about using USV’s and UUV’s without agreeing to just what they are going to be used for.

Any suggestions? :wave