Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[Abraham Gubler]

I can just imagine the looks on the faces of the then RAAF top brass at the thought of the navy acquiring the 28 F4B Phantom II and the 8 E1 Tracer AEW aircraft needed to support the proposed embarked squadrons!

It’s an interesting question and thing to ponder as to how the RAAF and its supporters (Minister for Air) would have responded to a highly capable RAN Fleet Air Arm.

The RAAF would have had its F-111s when they were finally delivered. The 24 F-111s was always meant to be a first batch of two but cost overruns and the delays meant the second batch was never brought and Canberras were kept in service until they ran out of airframe life. But with the RAN floating around with F-4J Phantom IIs (the F-4B was superseded in production for when they would have brought them) maybe their minister would be able to secure funding for the second 24 for 48 in total. Also the RAAF was due to replace the initial 50 Mirage IIIO(F) around 1970 and in the end just went with upgrading them to IIIO(A) standard. But they wanted F-4E Phantom IIs…

 

[aussienscale]

It’s an interesting question and thing to ponder as to how the RAAF and its supporters (Minister for Air) would have responded to a highly capable RAN Fleet Air Arm.

The RAAF would have had its F-111s when they were finally delivered. The 24 F-111s was always meant to be a first batch of two but cost overruns and the delays meant the second batch was never brought and Canberras were kept in service until they ran out of airframe life. But with the RAN floating around with F-4J Phantom IIs (the F-4B was superseded in production for when they would have brought them) maybe their minister would be able to secure funding for the second 24 for 48 in total. Also the RAAF was due to replace the initial 50 Mirage IIIO(F) around 1970 and in the end just went with upgrading them to IIIO(A) standard. But they wanted F-4E Phantom IIs…

It was an interesting read Abe, only just caught up on posts, and as Tasman said "what could have been ?"
Was curious, in the second pdf there was a map with the radius of action. Obviously current official information is not available, but do you know of any reputable sources that show this for current and/or planned forces for the region ?

Cheers

 

[Tee_Centre_10]

No it isn’t. Five tankers is about the number needed to support four squadrons of strike fighters.

Peacetime support, limited operations support, or high sortie operational support?
So just the F-18A/F or F-35 squadrons, but not the refueling requirements of the Wedgetails, Poseidons, C-17s or the MRTTs themselves?
What about allied aircraft? Would they be involved in any operations RAAF strike aircraft might be deployed to, or will they come with their own tankers?
Will all of these MRTT be operating from the one area, or might the fleet need to deploy to two or more widely separated operational areas or even different theatres altogether?
Does it cover peacetime fleet upgrades, or increased maintenance schedules due to higher than expected sortie rates?
What about fleet attrition suffered due to accidents, crashes or combat damage during the life of the fleet, or even the attrition suffered due to mechanical issues before and during missions?
What about the the second T in MRTT? Is that no longer required when the four strike squadrons need their tankers?

Hmm. I would have thought that 10 or more would have been more like a operationally useful number. 5 seems more like maintaining a bare minimum capability.

 

[Tee_Centre_10]

I'm surprised no one has mentioned the Force Posture Review progress report, or is everyone still mulling some of the implications and recommendations and nodding or shaking their heads intelligently?

Should we try to keep the RAAF aspects in the RAAF thread and the RAN aspects here? It is a single joint services document and it is sometimes difficult to pick out service specific items, but it would make for better threads.

RAN highlights:
* No need for a FBNW in the Pilbara, but that the ADF should arrange for greater access to commercial ports in the NW. Which is what has been said here.
* FBW should get expanded wharf space to cater to fleet growth and visits by allied vessels (US subs).
* Serious consideration should be made to the construction of a FBNE. It suggests that this would be good for basing the LHDs and some Future Submarines. East-coast SSG basing has been suggested here.
* Brisbane has been suggested as the ideal location for this possible FBNE for several reasons, including being nuclear capable for USN visits. I have suggested that a good name for such a base is HMAS Moreton, so I'm pleased and nicely surprised to find it in there.
* Expand the bases in Darwin and Cairns to accommodate the larger OCVs and LCH replacements.
* The OCV should be ice-hardened like the RNZN's Protector-class.
* Improved fleet munitions handling at FBW.
* Fwd naval EO storage at the Qld Govt EO storage site at Bajool near Rockhampton including a munitions wharf at Port Alma.
* Amphibious mounting facilities for the LHDs are on track in Townsville.
* There are no such facilities in Brisbane (and seemingly not planned) and that in Darwin is inadequate. It seems that the plan to load the LHDs in Darwin include loading and embarkation conducted by watercraft (WTF???) and no roll-on roll-off capability planned. So that discussion that took place some months back about the East Arm Wharf was a bit off.
* Consideration should be taken into how ADF facilities and capacity might aid in the mobilisation of a larger ADF. Should I be preparing my bunker?

There is discussion of the logistics of supplying the northern air bases during high tempo operations, and I wonder whether expanding the capabilities of the ports near to the bases might help. All the bases except Tindal (but especially Darwin, Townsville, and Learmonth and to a lesser extent Curtin and Scherger) are close to either a port or to the sea.
Moving bulk aviation fuel by tanker might be a better way to transport fuel, and it would also negate the seasonality of many northern highways. I would think it might be the only way in the case of Weipa.
Ship movement of other stores might be appropriate as well, including munitions.
Problems might come from the poor state of Australian-flagged shipping. Can't rely totally on the good-will of foreign-flagged vessels in conflict areas.

I'm not impressed by the transcript from the Def Min Press Conference. I can't tell some of the journalists are just dim or they have deliberately misread the progress report in order to generate some controversy.

 

[Tee_Centre_10]

I like part that it isn't that the ADF presence and surveillance patrols in the N and NW that have slackened off since the '80s and '90s, but rather the public perception that they have that has led to the opinion that the area isn't defended properly.

Solutions?
* Don't do your border protection thingies so far out at sea. Your visible presence comforts and soothes.
* Move ADF units through the area so that it looks like something is happening.
* Move senior officers through the area meeting and greeting the restless natives (AKA anxious resource fat cats with squeaky wheels).
* Organise a get together where all manner of squeaky wheels can complain how unappreciated and neglected they are. Supply drinks and buckets for spleen venting. Provide sympathetic nannies to rub backs and reassure frightened thumb-suckers. Hand out night lights.
* Telling the locals when, where, what and how you do things. I suggest newspaper advertisements in advance.
* Promote the commanding officer of FBW. That should do it.

 

[ADMk2]

Post moved to RAAF thread.

 

[donuteater]

As for using our LHDs to operate a small number of F-35Bs, it is very unlikely that our ships could even be modified, at this late stage of construction, to do any more than be a platform for deck operation, take off and landing training. They do not have the fuel bunkerage or magazine capacity to operate fixed wing combat aircraft, they do not have the workshops, tool/supply/spares stores to support these aircraft. It is as simple as that.

Aircraft carriers can be used as LPHs because they are more sophisticated and more capable (in terms of operating aircraft) than they need to be to carry out the role. It doesn’t work the other way around, and LPH/LHD lacks the minimum sophistication and capability required to operate fixed wing combat aircraft. The USN Wasp class are an exception to this but they are 33% larger than our LHDs and specifically designed to do so.

The Canberra class is an enlarged versipn of the Spains Juon Carlos 1 which do operate harriers and may obtain F-35B's.

 

[SASWanabe]

The Canberra class is an enlarged versipn of the Spains Juon Carlos 1 which do operate harriers and may obtain F-35B's.

no theyre not its an exact copy only difference is the internal fitout.

 

[Bonza]

The Canberra class is an enlarged versipn of the Spains Juon Carlos 1 which do operate harriers and may obtain F-35B's.

Please do us all the courtesy of going back through the multiple threads (including this one) on these forums dedicated to the topic of operating F-35Bs from the Canberra class and the realities/limitations thereof. As you've been told repeatedly it's been done to death and I think we'd all appreciate it if you were to look at those discussions before bringing up the same points again. I know it's a lot of reading but I think you'll find a lot of your points have already been answered, and as you're interested in the topic you'll no doubt find it worthwhile.

Thanks mate.

 

[Volkodav]

The Canberra class is an enlarged versipn of the Spains Juon Carlos 1 which do operate harriers and may obtain F-35B's.

No, the Principe de Austurias operates AV-8B+ and may operate F-35B in the future, Juon Carlos is an amphibious assault ship that has been designed conduct limited air operations (primarily to maintain currency) for short periods of time while their real carrier is unavailable. The RAN has no requirement to operate Harriers or Lightnings and as such has not specified that their ships be capable of even the limited capacity of the Spanish ship.

 

[Volkodav]

Interesting point on NZ looking at acquiring a carrier post WWII, I haddn't heard that before but it does make sence and would have been a better investment than the three Bellonias they operated post war.

On Australia looking at a carrier between the wars, I did know Jellicoe had recommend we do so as part of doubling the RAN to two Fleet Units (I believe Unit is the correct terminology) from the original one that formed the pre WWI RAN, to counter the threat posed by Japan. I didn't know the idea was still around when Albatross was planned.

A bit of speculation on my part but the carrier the UK designed for service in the far east was Ark Royal, therefore, in my twisted logic, had we revived the carrier plan in the late 30's as part of our prewar modernisation, the ship acquired would or should have been a repeat Ark Royal.

 

[SASWanabe]

Jellicoe recommended alot of things, pity none of them were ever implemented.

off the top of my head it was something like

1 Fleet carrier
2 battleships/cruisers
8 light cruisers
10-12 destroyers
8 subs

makes you wonder how some of the surface actions of WW2 would of ended like savo island, imagine 2 Nelsons instead of 2 Countys.

also raises the question, which carrier? maybe buy a renown and convert her?

 

[Volkodav]

Jellicoe recommended alot of things, pity none of them were ever implemented.

off the top of my head it was something like

1 Fleet carrier
2 battleships/cruisers
8 light cruisers
10-12 destroyers
8 subs

makes you wonder how some of the surface actions of WW2 would of ended like savo island, imagine 2 Nelsons instead of 2 Countys.

also raises the question, which carrier? maybe buy a renown and convert her?

If you look at the numbers this proposed force is basically twice the RAN pre war fforce with a carrier and exxtra submarines added. The prewar force was, I believe refered to as a Fleet Unit, so the plan was basically to give us a fleet of twos instead of ones. Capping off the plan was a third Fleet Unit being provided by the RN likely to be based in Singapore.

 

[Tasman]

If you look at the numbers this proposed force is basically twice the RAN pre war fforce with a carrier and exxtra submarines added. The prewar force was, I believe refered to as a Fleet Unit, so the plan was basically to give us a fleet of twos instead of ones. Capping off the plan was a third Fleet Unit being provided by the RN likely to be based in Singapore.

Jellicoe's recomendations were killed off initially by lack of money (the RAN couldn't even keep its existing battlecruiser "Australia" in commission) and then by the Washington treaty which prevented new capital ship construction for some time except that the RN was allowed to build 2 new battleships. The carrier would have been an earlier design than "Ark Royal' - for example the RN proposed to build four 30 knot 17,000 ton carriers in 1926 to replace older ships like Argus which were regarded as experimental. This idea, like many others, was scuttled by lack of funds.

 

[RubiconNZ]

For those that haven't read it yet a nice wee summary of the ADF activities and planning strategies that MinDef presented yesterday at the Seapower Conference and Posturing recommendations.

Paper presented to the Sea Power Conference

I think there are some very strong statements in this speech, a confirmation that Australia really plans to step it in up in the Maritime domain with Military influence and interoperability.

Everyone sees the rise of China but the rise of India is still under-appreciated, as is the rise of the ASEAN economies combined.

The positive engagement of India is very much a strong principle of this speech, I am very interested in seeing how this relationship works out.

 

[ngatimozart]

Jellicoe's recomendations were killed off initially by lack of money (the RAN couldn't even keep its existing battlecruiser "Australia" in commission) and then by the Washington treaty which prevented new capital ship construction for some time except that the RN was allowed to build 2 new battleships. The carrier would have been an earlier design than "Ark Royal' - for example the RN proposed to build four 30 knot 17,000 ton carriers in 1926 to replace older ships like Argus which were regarded as experimental. This idea, like many others, was scuttled by lack of funds.

Yes but Australia, since it was basically starting from zero, would have been able to build up to the Treaty limits because the RAN was a separate navy. Shame it wasn't able to afford it.

 

[Todjaeger]

Yes but Australia, since it was basically starting from zero, would have been able to build up to the Treaty limits because the RAN was a separate navy. Shame it wasn't able to afford it.

Yes and no. Had Australia chosen to assert itself as completely independent from the UK, then Australia could have opted to keep the battlecruiser HMAS Australia, but that would have required the UK to then drop another vessel(s) from RN service to make up for HMAS Australia.

Given that the RAN could not afford to keep HMAS Australia in commission, and the degree of integration and overall reliance on the RN, having the Commonwealth naval vessels fall under the UK umbrella in the Washington Treaty as happened historically makes sense.

-Cheers

 

[ASSAIL]

I'm surprised no one has mentioned the Force Posture Review progress report, or is everyone still mulling some of the implications and recommendations and nodding or shaking their heads intelligently?

.

RAN highlights:
* No need for a FBNW in the Pilbara, but that the ADF should arrange for greater access to commercial ports in the NW. Which is what has been said here.
It is a misconception that Commercial ports in the NW can be easily accessed. Most are owned by the resource companies and they are almost always at capacity.
Let me summarise;
Exmouth - Not suitable for frigate size ship but MWV's could access the marina and store and bunker
Karratha/Port Hedland - Despite continuing redevelopments of both ports there is no spare capacity and there are always 50+ bulkers anchore off awaiting loading berths' think Newcastle and Hay Point.
Broome - No capacity for warships. The single wharf is at max utilisation with Offshore support ships.
Derby - Tidal berth with dangerous transit through King Sound.
Darwin - The defence funded RORO facility at Fort Hill Wharf has not been maintained by either defence or the Darwin Port Corp and as it was srplus to DPC's requirements it has been sold late last year. This was the same facility used by defence to load HMAS JERVIS BAY during INTERFET.


* Expand the bases in Darwin and Cairns to accommodate the larger OCVs and LCH replacements.
* Amphibious mounting facilities for the LHDs are on track in Townsville.
* There are no such facilities in Brisbane (and seemingly not planned) and that in Darwin is inadequate. It seems that the plan to load the LHDs in Darwin include loading and embarkation conducted by watercraft (WTF???) and no roll-on roll-off capability planned. So that discussion that took place some months back about the East Arm Wharf was a bit off.

The Darwin Port is certainly capable of berthing larger naval vessels as it does not suffer from the over utilization cf the privately owned ports however, as you say, the lack of a RORO is a disgrace as this could have been prevented only 3 months ago if someone in defence had been on the ball.

There is discussion of the logistics of supplying the northern air bases during high tempo operations, and I wonder whether expanding the capabilities of the ports near to the bases might help. All the bases except Tindal (but especially Darwin, Townsville, and Learmonth and to a lesser extent Curtin and Scherger) are close to either a port or to the sea.

The only way to get bulk fuel to Curtain is by road. Tankers don't use Derby

I'm not sure of the current state of the Harold E Holt jetty in Exmouth Gulf but it is a weather restricted berth. The USN used to deliver fuel there but commercial tankers certainly won't use the berth as it is too dangerous.

In my view, the best way to support a naval force in the NW away from Darwin, in times of heightened activity, would be to take a leaf out of the WWII defence arrangements and make use of Yampi Sound. This is a protected anchorage and a cyclone haven. It is a deep water port, it is close to Curtain and could easily provide a FOB for SSG's and surface combatants. There is quite a large amount of infrastructure on Koolan Is and it is only about 100 nms from deep water off the shelf.

My apologies members, have yet to figure how to quote individual bits of posts!

 

[Abraham Gubler]

There is no rational need to defend the north west shelf (NWS) area because there is no threat. There is a need to enhance policing of the NWS and the ADF has a role in this. But planning to base fighters and offensive assets to engage in nearby combat in the NWS is as ridiculous as is basing such assets in Darwin to refight WWII. The Army Presence In the North (APIN) is a huge cost in monies and efficiency to the ADF for no strategic gain. It does however boost the NT economy by 25% and one can imagine the same $$$ are in the eyes of politicians in relation to the NWS. However using the ADF as their own private regional pioneer corps by the Government is extremely bad defence policy.

The latest argument that regional basing of forces aides in disaster response is just as misguided. Facilities and lines of communication assist in disaster response; a nearby permanent base is usually a drain on these capabilities not a boost. Nor do these facilities require the base to exist.

While moving half of the submarine fleet back to the east is a good idea that Brisbane is being proposed just shows this whole thing is motivated by vote buying. Brisbane was a great submarine base in WWII but would be a disastrous submarine base in the 21st century. Because submarines have changed and in WWII they rarely submerged and now they rarely sail on the surface and the half day surfaced transit to get out to sea from Ports of Brisbane before you can dive would not be a good idea.

 

[Boatteacher]

Jellicoe recommended alot of things, pity none of them were ever implemented.

off the top of my head it was something like

1 Fleet carrier
2 battleships/cruisers
8 light cruisers
10-12 destroyers
8 subs

makes you wonder how some of the surface actions of WW2 would of ended like savo island, imagine 2 Nelsons instead of 2 Countys.

also raises the question, which carrier? maybe buy a renown and convert her?

While entirely hypothetical, I suspect the difference to the earlier surface actions if the additional units had been present would have been not much or maybe simply higher casualties. The tactics adopted by the allies were woefully wasteful and completely underestimated the Japanese threat (or worse still understood it and simply incurred the losses as the necessary cost of saving face by being seen to do something).

I cringe to think of the possibility of an Australian Nelson accompaning the Prince Of Wales sortie or additional cruisers or a battleship being included in the ABDA fleet

Unless the Nelson was equiped with the latest radar and knew how to use it, it would have been unlikely to have changed the outcome of Salvo Island either (especially if it had a US destroyer out on its starboard side . At that stage the communication between US and Australian/ British units was a major limitation in combined operations and the threat posed by the long lance torpedo was not understood. Iron Bottom sound was a dangerous place for battleships, as both the Japanses and Americans discovered (although the latter at least managed to avoid adding one of theirs to the collection of their ships actually sunk there).

And the UK carrier Hermes had a short life once the combined fleet discovered her.

A decent Australian fleet might have complicated Japanese planning at the outset of the war, in so far as once the US fleet had been neutralised they may have had to concentrate their forces a little more to ensure the Australian Fleet could not catch and destroy in detail a smaller Japanese force; but it would have been a very minor irritation and delay.

Had we managed to preserve the fleet through the initial stages, it might have made a significant contribution to later battles.

It does strike me that the Indoneasian archipelago presents Australia with a difficult strategic choice at the start of any major Pacific conflict. If we put naval forces North of the Islands at the start of any conflict, they are in danger of being trapped there and sunk if events develop faster than expected. If we hold them South of the Islands, its difficult for them to make any useful contribution, except as a fleet in being.