Eurofighter Question

[Palnatoke]

Not entirely true, following the battle of Jutland the German surface fleet never left harbour again in force. The Kaiser was too worried about losing his Grand Fleet to a greatly superior RN force. Fisher's idea of overwhelming sea power may not of deterred war, but it worked partially by restricting any strategic impact the German Grand Fleet had on the outcome of the war by keeping it bottled up in harbour.

It's a shame Hitler didn't learn from that and divert time and money spent building white elephant pocket battleships and instead increase submarine production. If you look at the cost, time, steel use and crew numbers needed to build and man pocket battleships and convert that into submarine hulls/crews the war in the Atlantic would have been an Allied loss.

My point was that the idea that you can secure peace by building an army/weapons is, imho, fundamentally wrong, and history is riddled with examples (Though I am not saying that it's necessarely a bad idea to arm yourself!).

Incidentially your "White elephants" of WW2 and I add Fischer's "Scheme" and the fleet armament that takes place the first decade of the 20th century, shows mechanismens that renders a percived stable situation, instable. Both are examples of weaker navies challenging the otherwise completely dominating navy, that are forced to enter a new arms race to keep it's dominating position.

The millitary superiority of one power is always challenged by the weaker, that ofcourse can not tollerate being the weaker, the endangered.
Therefore arming yourself to safeguard peace, only leads to those, that you are arming yourself against, also starts to arm themselves.

Imo, what seems to work in safeguarding peace, is simply to render the war "unprofittable" for both sides. The MAD doctrine of the cold war is an example of that, In the words of De Gaulle, speaking on the french nuclear program; "I cannot think that any nation would attack 60 million or so french, knowing that the french would kill 60 million or so in retaliation"

In our time, the closely integrated global economy would likely also render most (edit: Large) wars "unprofittable".

 

[Grand Danois]

At the time leading up to the entente cordiale the RN was adhering to the two power standard, and as such basically at an arms with the combined two largest navies of United States, Japan, France, Germany, Russia. Thus not in an arms race with Germany per se. All of these navies were expanding.

British perceptions were shifting at the beginning of the 20th century, a point partially driven home by the Boer War that Britain needed allies, preferably continental, to offset the pressure on the economy from the military expenditure.

The diplomatic communications of the time reveals that up to 1904 the British and Germany saw each other as the best possible partner to team up with. However, random events then landed the British in the French camp in 1904 (agreement on land forces support, iirc) leading to the entente cordiale (1906).

Thus, it was quite late in the game that either saw each others as direct adversaries. The British and Germans arming themselves was driven by other agendas.

Hey, by memory, wrote an assignment on the topic once.

 

[Palnatoke]

At the time leading up to the entente cordiale the RN was adhering to the two power standard, and as such basically at an arms with the combined two largest navies of United States, Japan, France, Germany, Russia. Thus not in an arms race with Germany per se.

British perceptions were shifting at the beginning of the 20th century, a point partially driven home by the Boer War that Britain needed allies, preferably continental, to offset the pressure on the economy from the military expenditure.

The diplomatic communications of the time reveals that up to 1904 the British and Germans saw each other as the best possible partner to team up with. However, random events then landed the British in the French camp in 1904 (agreement on land forces support, iirc) leading to the entente cordiale (1906).

Thus, it was quite late in the game that either saw each others as adversaries. The British and Germans arming themselves were driven by other agendas.

Hey, by memory, wrote an assignment on the topic once.

WARNING OFF TOPIC.

Well, very much agree. Though I don't think that the events that lead to britain's participation in the war were that random.
France and Britain interfered in Austria's punishment of Serbian state sponsored terrorismn as well as interfering in a traditional austrian-Ottoman sphere of influence, and got russia, lead by one of its less brilliant czars, involved as well.
Things looked good; A sinking Habsburg empire, possibly, a sinking Ottoman empire and then maybe Germany. Though with Russia on their side, that eventuality should be covered. Infact the only thing the french and british hadn't quite got right was the brilliance and power of the german army, an army that went in motion as Germany stod by it's only important ally, in that ally's hour of need.

After the war they ofcourse blamed everything on Germany and Austria-hungary. As it is said, the victor writes the history.

 

[Grand Danois]

Well, very much agree. Though I don't think that the events that lead to britain's participation in the war were that random.
France and Britain interfered in Austria's punishment of Serbian state sponsored terrorismn as well as interfering in a traditional austrian-Ottoman sphere of influence, and got russia, lead by one of its less brilliant czars, involved as well.
Things looked good; A sinking Habsburg empire, possibly, a sinking Ottoman empire and then maybe Germany. Though with Russia on their side, that eventuality should be covered. Infact the only thing the french and british hadn't quite got right was the brilliance and power of the german army, an army that went in motion as Germany stod by it's only important ally, in that ally's hour of need.

After the war they ofcourse blamed everything on Germany and Austria-hungary. As it is said, the victor writes the history.

Well, I was addressing the run-up to the entente cordiale in 1906 and not the subsequent events. Btw, the reason I call them random is because I don't remember the specifics; they are more the nature of actions creating unintended perceptions at the other party and events not of the two parties (the British and Germans).

 

[Palnatoke]

Well, I was addressing the run-up to the entente cordiale in 1906 and not the subsequent events. Btw, the reason I call them random is because I don't remember the specifics; they are more the nature of actions creating unintended perceptions at the other party and events not of the two parties (the British and Germans).

OK, misread you.

 

[Grand Danois]

OK, misread you.

Oh, my memory fails me misreably. The entente cordiale was signed in 1904 not 1906 - the other (clandestine) agreement is c. 2 years prior IF my memory serves me right.

 

[Palnatoke]

Well, I was addressing the run-up to the entente cordiale in 1906 and not the subsequent events. Btw, the reason I call them random is because I don't remember the specifics; they are more the nature of actions creating unintended perceptions at the other party and events not of the two parties (the British and Germans).

Though, as I remember it, the french-british understanding was about germany, and germany's rise to power. Germany expands it's industry significantly after the unification and by the end of the 1890s german industrial output in serveral key industries was comparable to (or even greater than) british industrial output.
And with industry come millitary power.
That ofcourse was something that Britain couldn't ignore, and we know the agenda of France which was revanchistic.

The entente cordiale was, to my knowledge, a formalised cooperation and understanding to avoid conflicts (like the one who had threathen during the russo-japaneese war, where france was allied with russia and britain with Japan), but I would say that the underlying reason is a need to contain rising german power.

 

[Grand Danois]

Though, as I remember it, the french-british understanding was about germany, and germany's rise to power. Germany expands it's industry significantly after the unification and by the end of the 1890s german industrial output in serveral key industries was comparable to (or even greater than) british industrial output.
And with industry come millitary power.
That ofcourse was something that Britain couldn't ignore, and we know the agenda of France which was revanchistic.

The entente cordiale was, to my knowledge, a formalised cooperation and understanding to avoid conflicts (like the one who had threathen during the russo-japaneese war, where france was allied with russia and britain with Japan), but I would say that the underlying reason is a need to contain rising german power.

Except that Britain was quite unconcerned with German industrialization at the time, it's a hindsight argument. British position shfited with events like the moroccan crisis.

Its is a slow shift for the anglo-german antagonism, it pivots as late as 1905 imv, perhaps bounded by the Boer War (German sympaties for the Boer) and the second moroccan crisis.

Btw, fun to remember stuff long forgotten, but this is an eurofighter thread. (sorry for the pollution)