So 4 bltns S-300PMU1, 1 btln Buk-M1, and 6 batteries of 2S6 Tunguska-M? No flyable air. Awfully shiny.
Just a point of correction here. It is four batteries of Tunguska, not six. Given the figures I am getting from the WAG Institute, the price estimate from this sort of configuration would be ~$700 - 900 mil. As mentioned previously, there would be aircraft included in the mix, but these would largely be limited to fixed and rotary-winged lift aircraft, with some CAS/ground attack as well. The 'pointy' end in terms of aircraft would likely be in the form of Mi-24 helicopters and Su-25. By way of example, look how the Iraqi airforce has been getting reconstituted since ~2003.
So they have no tac-SAMs, SPAAGs, or anything else besides MANPADS and optical-sight AAA in their motor-infantry, or armored units? Or are we disregarding an unspecified number of older systems used in those troops, because they are not linked to the IADS and essentially act independently as last-ditch protection for those forces?
There likely would be various manpads like Strela-2, FIM-43 Redeye, and Blowpipe, equipping some small unit formations, but these would be to provide the units they are attached to with a limited air defence capability. Similarly, there might be a few (surviving) examples of mobile SAM and/or SPAAG systems. Like any manpads in use, these would likely be of various types of autonomous ADS like Roland, Crotale, 9K35 Strela-10, and ZSU-23-4 Shilka. When such units are functional, they are able to provide the unit(s) they are attached to an organic ADS, but that are not capable of making any meaningful contribution to Turaqistan's IADS around the Emerald City.
EDIT: This is the defense of the capital. How big is the country? Assuming there are no real air-defense assets anywhere else, are there any other radars, even airport control radars? LPs/OPs, with a radio or a cell phone, that could call in an incoming strike package simply on audio-visual ID? Any info-sharing agreements with our neighbors? If we're in the CARs, we're likely a CSTO and certainly a CIS member state, which means data exchange at least with them. Maybe not firing solutions, but certainly a "Hey, 23487562387945629387465 hostile aircraft incoming"...
Also how well are the crews trained, and the whole system as a whole coordinated? Can all the SAMs remain cold, until the hostile aircraft are confidently inside the engagement envelope, and then simultaneously light up the SAMs that can engage them? Are the good at manouvering? An S-300 btln/battery can go from a marching column to a hot SAM site in ~5 mins, with proper training. A single Tunguska needs seconds. Are the operators trained well enough to pull this off? Are there multiple back-up positions set up for the SAMs? What about decoys and fake positions?
Also who's our potential adversary?
Sorry to bombard you with questions, but it seems the more realistic we can get this scenario, the better picture we can get for what the strength and weaknesses are, and in what circumstances GBAD can and can't be effective.
No problem with the questions, it is all background which can aide in the planning.
Turaqistan itself would be ~500,000 sq. km so roughly the size of Turkmenistan, population wise, Turaqistan has about 20 mil. people, comparable to Syria. Turaqistan itself is a land-locked Central/South Asian nation. It was not a member of the USSR and is therefore not a member of the CIS. It is a former member of the Non-Aligned Movement, and has in times past played the Eastern and Western blocs off against each other, and also been used as a proxy by both power blocs as well. Turaqistan has recently had a regime change, following an invasion by a non-bordering major power. By and large power had been handed back to Turaqistan, but there is still instability within the country, with some of the major cities having been devastated in the conflict, and still not under the control of troops affiliated with the central government. The bordering nations around Turaqistan have uneasy peace agreements with Turaqistan, with some being strongly suspected of aiding and supporting troops fighting against the central government. Some of the neighbouring nations have powerful air forces for the region, with upwards of 250 fast jet combat aircraft, a mixture of air superiority, multi-role and CAS/ground attack. Having said that though, the aircraft themselves are a mix of East and West, with F-4 Phantoms and F-5 Tigers, serving alongside MiG-21s, F-6 and F-7s, Mirage F1s, and the most modern aircraft being MiG-29B/UB's
In short, the IADS around Emerald City is to (attempt) to guard/defend against a surprise attack by an erstwhile 'friendly' neighbour. As such, there would be very little chance of a warning being provided by another nation, since nations which could do so are the ones most likely to be launching the attack. Unfortunately due to the heavy toll fighting has taken on some of the outer cities within Turaqistan, as well as the general decline Turaqistan has suffered following the end of the Cold War, there is a distinct lack of functioning infrastructure within Turaqistan. A celluar/mobile phone transceiver network exists within the Emerald City (being a post-invasion installation) and is tied into the Turaqistani phone switch and trunk. Other areas within Turaqistan are intermittently connected to the phone switch via hardlines. As such, most communications between different areas under the control of the central government is via military radio. Apart from the approaches to Emerald City, the most reliable sensor to detect aircraft is the Mk 1 Eyeball.
As for the positions of the SAM systems themselves:
The actual radar systems are stationary. Yes, I know they are on mobile vehicles, but for what Turaqistan is using them for, static positions so that the radar's LOS can be plotted is most appropriate, at least until permanent ground radar stations can be built. The other vehicles which compose the ADS units, TELs, reloading vehicles, etc are always nearby the radar systems to receive the necessary target detection and guidance information. Having said that, they are regularly moved from one location to another, both to ensure that the various moving parts of the vehicles and systems function properly, but also to make it more difficult for the command and launch vehicles to be targeted in an attack. Most of the time, the various vehicles are going to be 'parked' in prepared positions, of which there would be sufficient prepared positions to each vehicle to have its own position as well as secondary and tertiary prepared positions. The only time of the vehicles would not be sited at a prepared position is if there was a inspection, maintenance on the vehicle, or the vehicle in question was being relocated to another prepared position.
At present Turaqistan has not purchased any vehicle decoys.
Hello,
If I may weigh in a bit. When using history to access the effectiveness of GBAD systems. We need to consider the threat a given GBAD is designed to stop. For instance Iraq 1991. In no way was that IAD designed to stop a force like the one that attacked him that year. It was designed to take on Iran.
So we have to consider how skewed the balance of power is and who the IAD was designed to protect against when referencing history.
Regards,
DA
The above is absolutely true, the IADS I am envisioning for Turaqistan is something which might be used to repel an attack by an air arm of power comparable to that of Iran, or other similar regional powers.
Barring some serious mis-steps by the RuAF, I would not expect them to have any real trouble taking the IADS around the Emerald City apart.
-Cheers
