but i think if an attack was imminent then Germany should off invaded A part of SU instead of going the full length to moscow. that way they would of needed less troops and resources to control The occupied Russia.
I totally agree. Therefore I recommended an improved eastern defense while being active against Great Britain. Yet as I said before, a russian attack was IMO unlikely, at least for the year 1941, if not at all. So we would have had all the time in the world to finish the western campaign and IF there would have been a russian offensive, we would have been able to hold them off for a while and maybe, depending on the situation, launch some small counterstrike.
I see just now that I have to explain something additonal:
It was tactical error to launch a two pronged assault for the germans
The double assault against east and west was not intented in the beginning. Actually Hitler thought that Great Britain would accept the new situation in 1939 after the invasion of Poland. He (and most of his generals) did make plans for a short campaign in the west until GB would accept things as they were and make peace with Germany.
When he and his advisors heard about the british declaration of war, they were just stunned.
The invasion of Russia/SU was always in his mind, it was one of his...well... "dreams". Yet he wanted to have good relations with Great Britain (not necessarily with the US and definitely not with France, in fact no one was worried when they heard about the french declaration of war. No offense to french readers intended here, its just plain fact!)
So the western campaign, especially the part against Britain, was rather an "accident" than a planned move.
i think german elite were (i apologize for this turin) obsessed with the fact that they were a superior race i think it was this propaganda that gave hitler the Unchallenged controll over his troops and country.
No apology necessary here! You hit the point with that. Remember that in 1940 we took down France within two months. That was simply incredible, especially when compared to the brutal fightings of WW I, when France combined with british and american troops proved to be a neverending nightmare to the imperial german forces.
Through this immense victory, achieved through Blitzkrieg-tactics of combined arms, Hitler received the undivided praise and trust of his generals, even the ones criticizing him before did not dare to say anything against him.
Additionally the Wehrmacht now was considered unstoppable. All these factors play a major role as well as the ones I mentioned in my other post before when Hitler and the german forces now thought about the attack against the Soviet Union.
So what was it about the eastern campaign? Very often I hear people comparing Napoleons operation and that of the Wehrmacht and saying that history repeated itself, yet there are some clear differences.
Napoleon, employing about half a million troops, marched in a straight line towards Moscow. He did not care for seizing territory except for securing his flanks and supplying his army. But his army shrinked more and more since he had to secure his rear as well with garrison troops. When he approached Moscow he met the russian winter as well, what proved to be disastrious. Also the russians fled the city reducing his victory to a shiny nothing. Since he was not able to seize the territory permanently, he had to retreat and his army, already heavily battered, simply decomposated.
From the beginning the german army had the task to secure the russian territory as well, not only reaching the capital ASAP. That means the division into three parts marching on a wide front into the SU. As one can see on every map, Russia gets wider and wider from west to east, so did the german front. Hitler personally pressed for the occupation of the northern russian territories around Leningrad as well as the Ukraine in the south and the Donesz area. The "Heeresgruppe Mitte" / "Army group Center" (one of the three army groups the forces where divided in) alone had a front line of about 1.000 km!
This stretched the lines of supply and when heavy rainfalls came around October, especially wheeled vehicles had incredible difficulties overcoming the muddy roads (nearly nothing paved there of course).
If the Wehrmacht would have gone for a direct assault on moscow, decapitating and decentralizig the russian command, I guess, we would have succeeded, at least in proposing a peace treaty comparable to that of Brest-Litowsk in 1917 and finishing this part of operations before the russian winter began. Yet there were considerable forces of the Red Army around and of course they needed to be destroyed if we wanted to prevent counter attacks from various directions. But that would have been not so much a problem if we created more compact army groups avoiding the risk of overstretching the front lines. I would have used the support of the baltic states (their people welcomed the german troops, when they arrived there!) in the north to secure some parts in this area, avoiding further advance beyond the line Leningrad-Moscow-Kharkov.
Yet that goes to far away from Hitlers thinking. He wanted to seize and destroy Stalingrad as a symbolical move, he wanted to get the caucasus, eventually drawing a line at the caspian sea...ridiculous.
Thats why Hitler certainly WASNT the great military leader he is sometimes referred to even today. He was a charismatic politician with a fantasy of ruling an empire way off (and of course his view of the world in terms of social darwinism was just insane). As long as he employed the advice of his generals, he won. When he took over military business, Germany began to lose.
PS: I am aware that this last part already goes off topic, so when responding to new comments, I will open a new thread based on then emerging topics.