Future weapons/equipment and their impact on the structure of infantry units

[Chino]

The 50km fast march was a load trial, to see if we had overloaded the infantry section. That's a grunt's life and the 4th Singapore Infantry Regiment (4 SIR) are a infantry battalion comprised of normal conscripts.

Dang, they should've done the trial with reservists.

Because when we commit to war, majority of the troops would not be young 18yr olds.

For reservists it would probably be more like a 25km "reasonably brisk stroll".nfloorl:

My experience, by the time I was a 30yr old reservist was that, though still relatively fit ($200 IPPT award), I don't think I would've survived a 50km fast march even with just helmet/SBO/rifle.

And these days or in the near future, SAF would eventually introduce body armour as standard. Soldier's load is ever on the increase, which may mean foot infantry units in the traditional sense will soon no longer exist.

 

[Firn]

A long fast march with a lot of weight is a good way to test the endurance of the men, but not just after reading the ever increasing amount of skeletal/muscular injuries sustained by the US forces I always found the tendency to overload troublesome. By trying to hedge against all the risks the "light" infantry gets burdened by up to 130 pounds of "lightweight" equipment, making them unable to move with any degree of speed and agility in rough terrain.

That rate of fire is cyclic, not "sustainable" at all!
The full ammunition load for such a light machine gun would last only for about one minute of cyclic fire.
The barrel could only sustain twenty seconds, the spare barrel could sustain another twenty seconds. There's usually only one spare barrel being carried - if at all.

Actually my build let me sadly become a machinegunner of our Alpini section. La Maria Grazie (Blessed Mary, Thanks Mary) is heavy but the more so all verses she preaches. Any person with any degree of experience knows that 700-800 rounds are extremely heavy to carry and may have to last several hours of fighting.

By the way; it's more useful to discuss general infantry platoons than to discuss squads. Important support for the infantry firefight should be platoon-level, not squad-level.
Good assault tactics even promote the use of dissimilar squads (assault / fire support), thus rendering standard squad discussions irrelevant.

Yes I agree. The platoon is a better frame to discuss general infantry tactics and equipment. I started out with the squad to keep the discussion very focused but ended up including more.

 

[usgn]

Just wondering, after 50km of fast march, upon reaching FUP..can the soldiers still fight on? fatigue will set in....I have been an observer during one such scenario, 2 platoons of soldiers on 20km fast march with full loads with objective to over run the enemies occupying a particular sector...upon reaching, I would say more than 70% were clearly very very exhausted and were dragging their feets to charge up...The KIA rate on that day was very high....:shudder

 

[Firn]

Just wondering, after 50km of fast march, upon reaching FUP..can the soldiers still fight on? fatigue will set in....I have been an observer during one such scenario, 2 platoons of soldiers on 20km fast march with full loads with objective to over run the enemies occupying a particular sector...upon reaching, I would say more than 70% were clearly very very exhausted and were dragging their feets to charge up...The KIA rate on that day was very high....

Of course it depends on the condition and discipline of the soldiers but as a matter of fact the performance will be heavily influenced as you also witnessed.
I think it is a vicious circle that so heavy loads forces (realistically) more mounted movement to keep up the fighting capability and that more mounted movement induce heavier loads as shorter distances are marched. Also for example things like the Fresia (ATV) allow to shed burden but are often used to transport more stuff overall.

 

[FutureTank]

defining "infantry"

This is an interesting topic, and I happened to be discussing similar ideas on another forum. On thing we came to agree on is that "infantry" seems to mean different things to different people.

I would suggest that there are several distinct if not yet so recognised infantry roles that define the term as:

tactical foot infantry - this is either an area defence role (territorials) or specialist mountain troops

tactical mounted infantry - which is often the "heavy" IFV mounted grunts that can and do operated around tanks, and so usually tracked

operational mounted infantry - which are intended to be fast movers in conventional warfare, conducting mobile defence or exploiting "deep battle" situations and often wheeled, but also can come on helicopters and even tactical fixed wing aircraft.

strategic mounted infantry - these are grunts that go somewhere in style, usually transport aircraft or littoral assault vessels, and are often known as 'paratroops' or 'marines' although neither types of operations have been conducted for a long time, and they tend to either arrive close to their objectives or have some short range mobility

While all are 'infantry', their roles and how they function to fulfil them seems to me to largely dictate their squad level equipment, training and tactics

On the subject of west vs east, it seems to me that there is a significant degree of convergence going on, at least in Europe. There is also some degree of 'throw-back' also taking place. Because since the end of the Cold War 'infantry' , east or west, have been more often found to be fighting in small independent unit actions (section/platoon/company) of the insurgency campaigns rather than conventional engagements with a FEBA and clear unit sectors, there has been explicit or implicit sanctioning of lower-echelon heavy support weapons integration than before. This s only an impression though, so I could be wrong.

cheers

 

[OPSSG]

@Firn, I replied via PM on your earlier question.

I agree that things like the Fresia (ATV) allow some shedding of the burden, especially for the support arms, as they tend to be the first to get spinal or leg injuries. I was also thinking of the British purchase of the heli-portable Vikings / Warthogs (or Broncos as they are called in Singapore). These are also potential burden shedding vehicles. I wonder how the Royal Marine Commandos will use them in Afghanistan (and I not familiar with their usage)?

Further, what would happen if the hill is too steep or if the load bearing breaks down or is unable to tackle the incline (once it is part of the orbat)? I remember almost crawling up some of the near fire bases for the support weapons to be in position before the main assault (on our overseas training trips).

Dang, they should've done the trial with reservists... For reservists it would probably be more like a 25km "reasonably brisk stroll".nfloorl:

Agreed and I remember my last reservist 10 km conditioning road march (about a decade or so ago)... We were not well conditioned and we were glad for the physical exercise, which better prepared us for our battalion proficiency test later.

Just wondering, after 50km of fast march, upon reaching FUP..can the soldiers still fight on? fatigue will set in....I have been an observer during one such scenario, 2 platoons of soldiers on 20km fast march with full loads with objective to over run the enemies occupying a particular sector...upon reaching, I would say more than 70% were clearly very very exhausted and were dragging their feets to charge up...The KIA rate on that day was very high....

Thankfully, there was no charging up the hill to taken an objective after that march. It was a pure combat load trial (i.e. it was a test of the degree of discomfort with the new combat load) and not part of a training mission. nfloorl:

Actually my build let me sadly become a machinegunner of our Alpini section. La Maria Grazie (Blessed Mary, Thanks Mary) is heavy but the more so all verses she preaches. Any person with any degree of experience knows that 700-800 rounds are extremely heavy to carry and may have to last several hours of fighting.

Oh my goodness... that is heavy and in your terrain. I can't imagine what you did as I only had to walk up and down relatively small hills and never up and down a mountain range. Thankfully, I only had to carry GPMGs and 84mm RRs during my leadership training.

 

[Firn]

Further, what would happen if the hill is too steep or if the load bearing breaks down or is unable to tackle the incline (once it is part of the orbat)? I remember almost crawling up some of the near fire bases for the support weapons to be in position before the main assault (on our overseas training trips).

[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BrX_ciZGIRo&feature=related"]Here[/ame] is a small video about the Fresia. Sadly it is not so widespread, even if in the picture you can see that it is handled by an Alpini. Of course it can break down, but I personally think that it would enhances the capabilities of an infantry platoon in our regions by a large factor. You can use a great deal of mountain paths with it.

In our regions we use thinks like this Transporter, sometimes with winches. This are some impressions from relative "low"-alpine Switzerland. Here alpine views with some information on the war in the mountains. War in the Mountains.

As far as I know the Viking is used as mainly as a) troopcarrie, b) supplycarrier and c) firesupport. Medevac is mostly done by Helicopter.

Oh my goodness... that is heavy and in your terrain. I can't imagine what you did as I only had to walk up and down relatively small hills and never up and down a mountain range. Thankfully, I only had to carry GPMGs and 84mm RRs during my leadership training.

As a matter of fact there was a world of difference between people used to walking/training in the mountains and excercise and people unused to it. Traditionally mountain troops were regionally based because they were hardened and trained from childhood onwards - at least they came from the small villages. They were also more prone to skiing/climbing. The rather large amount of hunters and poachers in the Alps was also be helpful in war - at least so the theory . I at least was a not so good shot. Now the Alpini are mostly from southern Italy. But even at my time the physical condition of many was far from good.

BTW: The realities of war can be seen here. The photos are sometimes disturbing and remind me how fortunate we were that no war broke out when we served.

 

[Crunchy]

With today's latest gizmos/gadgets I think somekind of lightweight & extremely high capacity electricity source has still to be developed to make all those devices real useful in a convential war.
You can return to base to pick up new batteries and then head back to fight those Tangos,but I don't think that the hostile & proberly-equipped army will allow you to do that in a real battle. (OK they might also want to head back to their base for some new batteries too...)

But till then I''m not going to sell my shares of battery producer....

 

[HKSDU]

With today's latest gizmos/gadgets I think somekind of lightweight & extremely high capacity electricity source has still to be developed to make all those devices real useful in a convential war.
You can return to base to pick up new batteries and then head back to fight those Tangos,but I don't think that the hostile & proberly-equipped army will allow you to do that in a real battle. (OK they might also want to head back to their base for some new batteries too...)

But till then I''m not going to sell my shares of battery producer....

well what happens when your in water or it starts to rain, you kill yourself and your whole squad nearby. Using electrical device as weapons have extreme limits in environment of operation. The rifle it hurts it works, so why change the weapon to something else.

 

[Firn]

On more serious note I think that the granade launcher of the Daewoo K11 will be a valuable addition for a squad, especially in the terrain of Southkorea. With such a broken, mountainous country and extended urbanized areas and a combination of both it bring a good deal of arguments on the table. I wonder just how effective the air-burst will be. Anyway it seems that the 40mm UGL will stay, as it should IMHO.

The day and infrared night sight combined with the ballistic computer could be, especially when with a decent variable magnification a great rasset for the whole squad. Should help quite a bit to detect&identify targets and to engage them speedily.

Seems that they will give 1-2 K11 to a squad of 10 men. Sounds about right, even if I don't know how exactly the squads and platoons are organized.

 

[OPSSG]

Singapore, 8 June 2009 - ST Engineering today announced that its electronics arm, ST Electronics, has been awarded a contract to provide the Advanced Combat Man System (ACMS) to the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). The project which is worth over S$100m will commence immediately and is expected to be completed by 2012...

The ACMS is a 3rd Generation Networked Warrior system fully equipped with advanced C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence) and network capabilities. The ACMS is a joint development effort that started in 1998 among the Defence Science and Technology Agency, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and ST Electronics with the support of Singapore Technologies Kinetics Ltd (ST Kinetics) in the area of weapon sub-system. It features innovations from ST Electronics and ST Kinetics. For this contract, ST Kinetics is a subcontractor to ST Electronics...

Let me just begin by saying that I'm not a fan of some aspects of the SAF's Advanced Combat Man System (ACMS) due to size and weight issues. I'm for the idea of enhancing the situational awareness, especially in urban warfare - I'm just not a fan of the current form factor and the need for separate batteries for each device.

However, the ST Electronics press release indicates that it is going into production (after the earlier trials) and I should share the news and enclose some basic links on the ACMS.

ACMS Components

Pix of the ACMS and a video of the ACMS used in Urban Warfare Training

In a seven-man section, the two team leaders and section commander will be equipped with the ACMS. The components of the ACMS are:

Personal Radio. The radio enables soldiers to share information, in the form of data and voice, with other soldiers. It has a built-in Global Positioning System (GPS) that helps the soldier's command headquarters to track his location and that of friendly forces.

Communication Keypad. This portable keypad, designed for easy data input, also has hotkey buttons such "On-Contact" and "Call-For-Medic" to enable quick updates of the team's status to the command headquarters, and request assistance from nearby forces at the push of a button.

Portable Computer. The brain of the ACMS, the portable computer processes data collected by sensors, GPS, other ACMSs and user input to provide real-time information updates on the battlefield.

Head-mounted display (HMD). The HMD can switch its displays from a digital map to satellite images of the terrain to videos captured by the various sensors. Through the HMD, soldiers can see locations of targets and friendly forces which are plotted on the digital map.

Weapon Interactor. The section commander will also have an additional camera attached to his SAR 21, so that he can capture and send back images to the command headquarters through the quick buttons on the handguard. The sensor also allows him to survey and fire around corners without exposing himself.

In addition to the ACMS, soldiers are equipped with remote sensors such as a surveillance ball, a remote-control surveillance car and a key-hole sensor.

A Networked Force

With the ACMS and remote sensors, soldiers can track the positions of friendly and hostile forces, effectively engage their targets and concentrate efforts at critical locations. Such information sharing allows the soldiers to navigate accurately through the terrain and avoid known danger areas.

By feeding images back to the command headquarters, soldiers are not only fighters, but also sensors on the ground. They enable commanders to deploy firepower effectively at hostile locations and enhance battlefield coordination. Section commanders are also empowered to call for fire support and for the command headquarters to utilise higher command resources such as artillery, air assets and sensors, to enhance the lethality and situation awareness of their units.

With the integrated information flow, the seven-man section in the battlefield can now tap into the wider resources of the battalion. This significantly increases the lethality, situational awareness and survivability of the individual soldier.

h/t to weasel1962 for posting it elsewhere first.

 

[Chino]

Let me just begin by saying that I'm not a fan of some aspects of the SAF's Advanced Combat Man System (ACMS) due to size and weight issues.

I can see the advantage of giving every rifleman a radio as shouted commands CANNOT be heard amidst gunfire. So that's a definite plus.

But can anyone elaborate on how such a comms net would be set up?

For example during my time it was very rudimentary.


[edit]


So in the case of every squaddie having a radio, what net would they be on? Is it their own section's net?

Are there any armies that already issue radios to every single riflemen?

As for all the other stuff like keypad, helmet mounted sight, personal computer etc I don't know what to make of them. Probably useful when you are not fighting. When you are fighting, those things will be a fcuking nuisance.


Will these head-mounted display, keypad and other situational awareness gadgets, actually enhance or degrade situational awareness?

 

[OPSSG]

I can see the advantage of giving every rifleman a radio as shouted commands CANNOT be heard amidst gunfire. So that's a definite plus.

1. The 'radio' enables non-voice communications - i.e. via the sending of text messages (like SMS on a handphone - with more short cut keys). I'm not willing to further elaborate on the features, some of which are explained in the video below:

[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Aqs2SBacwhA]Urban Warfare - ACMS[/ame]

But can anyone elaborate on how such a comms net would be set up?

For example during my time it was very rudimentary.

2. I am not comfortable discussing anything relating to signals and comms net on a forum due to security concerns.

Are there any armies that already issue radios to every single riflemen?

3. Even with ACMS it's only the group leaders that have an extra load to carry - so it is not everyone in the section.

As for all the other stuff like keypad, helmet mounted sight, personal computer etc I don't know what to make of them. Probably useful when you are not fighting. When you are fighting, those things will be a fcuking nuisance.

Will these head-mounted display, keypad and other situational awareness gadgets, actually enhance or degrade situational awareness?

4. An ACMS user can just flip up the head-mounted display when it is not in use. The head-mounted display enables the ACMS user to see maps / air photos and other sensor inputs (which includes the Surveillance Ball and other UAV inputs).

5. Having a keypad is no different from having a handphone (it should not distract you). Further, the section commander's SAR-21 has a TV camera to enable him to see round corners without exposing his body.

 

[OPSSG]

What the Singapore army needs with the ACMS is the HULC exoskeleton so that our soldiers do not feel like they are over loaded. And if there is a thunderstorm, the ACMS solider can become a great lightning conductor.

[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DqQloLvpWFA]HULC exoskeleton[/ame]

To simplify logistics, we need 'D" batteries for the hip torsion devices, and the shoulder, elbow and back actuators will use the DC 9-volt batteries and 2 x PRC-77 batteries for the reminder of the exoskeleton's systems - on top of the 4 other types of batteries for the ACMS (which would also include a laptop battery or two ).

 

[Firn]

Seems to be a very interesting system. Personally I feel if well implemented it will greatly increase the performances of the combined arms team. The video shows how the group leaders are the communication nodes and are able to take over part of the "scout" tasks I envisioned. He carries seemingly a laser ranger and a digital compass to geolocate the position with help from his GPS.

The ability to call speedily and accurately heavy firepower at such a low level is a huge step forward. And this ability should be greatly enhanced by the increased knowledge where your men, supporting assets and your enemies are. This too allows to greatly increase the sensors capability and narrow the sensor-shooter link.

For the backs of the infantry I hope that some load can be shifted away by "outsourcing" a good deal of the firepower. Even if I'm not too optimistic about that

 

[OPSSG]

Seems to be a very interesting system. Personally I feel if well implemented it will greatly increase the performances of the combined arms team.

Very much a dial 1800-call-a-bomb system. With ACMS, the individual section operating in a Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) environment can call upon greater support resources of the SAF combined arms team. These combined arms resources include air strike (F-15SG, F-16Ds & Apaches), indirect fire support (76mm naval gun fire, 120mm mortar, 155mm artillery & HIMARS), even company direct fire weapons and our own counter sniper support to dominate all roof tops and exposed areas.

The video shows how the group leaders are the communication nodes and are able to take over part of the "scout" tasks I envisioned. He carries seemingly a laser ranger and a digital compass to geolocate the position with help from his GPS.

Geo-location is important for blue force tracking. With ACMS, every section can send information (even pictures) up to higher HQ (or other sections pinned down by enemy fire - to enable these sections to collaboratively ID hidden enemy shooters), if necessary.

The ability to call speedily and accurately heavy firepower at such a low level is a huge step forward. And this ability should be greatly enhanced by the increased knowledge where your men, supporting assets and your enemies are. This too allows to greatly increase the sensors capability and narrow the sensor-shooter link.

SAF's UAVs will provide real time ISAR that will enable a persistent ability to observe - aiding the ACMS equipped section as they conduct MOUT. ACMS can also be configured to receive information from a ST manufactured 40mm SPARCS camera (Soldier Parachute Aerial Reconnaissance Camera System) aka 40mm Spy Grenade or other relevant sensors.

 

[OPSSG]

Singapore's new urban warfare training facility and ACMS acquisition represents a commitment to improve the SAF's infantry training syllabus, with a particular focus on combined arms in MOUT operations. The ACMS investment also restores an emphasis on the infantry's role in high intensity conflict, with an understanding of the informational/intelligence needs of a conscript based infantry section.

If you are interested, there is a SAF urban warfare video with trial versions of the ACMS (based on PDAs). This old video focuses on the sensors used for urban warfare.

IMHO, nothing very unique about ACMS in concept, as compared to the Land Warrior being developed for the US Army. Popular Mechanics has a 2007 article on why US soldiers don't like it. BTW, I quite amused, there's even a Malaysian defence blog with comments on the ACMS.

 

[Firn]

Your take on the issue is much appreciated. I will comment later.

Here is a documentary about the employment of the Land Warrior in Iraq.

The Ares Blog addresses also the issue.

The Army Times on it

 

[Firn]

I will comment first on the Land Warrior.

The video is worthwhile to watch even if even it has a slight "happy end" touch, with everything seemingly fitting too well into the narrative. I hope that the perception of the Land Warrior really underwent such a positive turn. Anyway it is well made and comes up with very interesting points, with a lot of thought and talk by soldiers of all ranks. It fits also well into my assumptions, even if I was surprised just how highly they rated the ability to "solve" navigation. Perhaps it is due to the urban maze, difficult environment and the pressure of war.

From the Army Times:

Instead, he pulled down a tiny helmet-mounted display screen and gazed into a satellite image of the battlefield terrain. Tidwell tapped into the computerized ensemble that quickly showed him the exact distance to the grove of palm trees where the enemy was holed up: 819 meters away on an azimuth of 186 degrees.

The mortar section leader then grabbed his 60mm mortar in the hand-held mode, sighted in on the target, and “started dropping HE rounds.”

“I got three rounds out of the tube and on their position before they had time to react to it,” Tidwell said of the high explosives.

This was no small feat — Tidwell was shooting in direct lay mode, a quick suppression style of mortar fire using range estimation that’s less effective on targets beyond 500 meters.

“It would have taken me six to seven rounds to get on target,” he said. “I shot 17 rounds in two and a half minutes. It blew up their vehicle.” Tidwell said three insurgents were reported killed.

Here we see some of the great advantages of the system. He gets thanks to the system, possibly helped by a digital chemlight set by a fellow soldier at once a accurate firing solution and a bird's eye view of the location and the position of his mates. This greatly increases the effect of the fire.

Eliminating confusion

B Company leaders came to depend on this feature on time-sensitive target missions that involved sending small units by helicopter to capture individuals identified as enemy leaders.

Landing by helicopter at night in unfamiliar terrain, 4-9 soldiers said they were able to move without hesitation because the target house’s location had been marked on everyone’s Land Warrior system.

“Every time we hit the ground, there was no waiting to get your bearings. We just took off running toward the objective,” Tidwell said. “We were hitting houses literally before these guys could wake up and get their guns.”

Few things can slow a mission’s momentum like last-minute confusion over which house in a darkened compound is the target building, said Capt. Johann Hindert, first platoon leader in B Company.

He said that without Land Warrior, “You might knock [down] three different doors before you get to the right one.”

Here we see how it can speed every thing up and reduce the collateral damage of searches in a COIN environment. As surprise is the only real advantage of the attacking force this increase in speed and operational tempo should be an immense advantage. See also

Sergeants and officers in 4-9 — as well as Army Land Warrior program officials — have told the Army’s senior leadership that Land Warrior is ready for the battlefield; that it gives units a clearer view of their tactical environment and empowers them to move with more certainty than ever before.

“They are going to be faster, more lethal and more agile,” said B Company commander Capt. Jack Moore. “The Army would be foolish to lose this system.”

Between July and August, B Company captured 36 high-value targets identified on Multi-National Division North, Tidwell said.

“We were always able to catch them with their pants down because, as soon as we got on the ground, it was 45 seconds to the objective,” he said. “It’s almost too easy. It’s almost like cheating.”

This is the type of lesson that can’t be simulated or recreated in training, Land Warrior program officials maintain.

“They have taken the system into areas we never thought we would go,” said Lt. Col. Ken Sweat, TraDoc Capabilities manager for Land Warrior out of Fort Benning, Ga., talking about 4-9’s deployment with the system. “The value out of this is incredible.”

Thoughts:

I really liked the Clausewitzian summary by one of the platoon? leaders that by taking care of much of the science of war the Land Warrior allows to concentrate on the art of it.

The Land Warrior should be the core unit in which other technologies and systems plug in. Take for example the wearable sniper detection system or geo-locating assets. Both allow to fix the enemy on the digital map for everybody to see and to engage and allows for a very easy and accurate transfer of data by an SMS even in region where the connection is bad. Add an request and it will get engaged by heavier assets in no time.

All in all I feel that such systems are a way to transmit nonverbal signals and gestures over radio. Something like pointing "there" over your guys a lot of corners away.

 

[Chino]

5. Having a keypad is no different from having a handphone (it should not distract you).

Talking on the handphone while driving is supposed to cause accidents. So I can't see how so much gadgets is gonna help during an intense firefight.

Anyway, I can see the advantages of these Christmas tree gadgets. But let's hope we don't go overboard and end up with our soldiers becoming clumsy robots.

In all the training missions that I can recall, reservists - the bulk of SAF - were tired even without all these fancy gear and body armour. It was often chaotic, and messy and the last hing you want is people trying to access computer equipment.

We are not SWAT.

I would start with a small radio for every man, but beyond that, all the fancy gear, could be information overload.

Like I said, nice before the shooting start. But a nuisance during actual combat. Unlike other countries, we do still have tropical forests where these things are quite useless and make movements difficult as they will snare branches, cannot cross rivers etc. If such a heavily-equipped meets a lightly equipped and highly-agile force in the forest, the outcome is predictably not in out favour.

I wonder what would happen if such a well-equipped person is captured by the enemy? Will they be able to use these gadgets against us? For example by pressing on the keypad, can he lure the rest of the troops into a trap etc?