South Africa's Armed Forces situation?

[Generalissimo]

I think that the Rhodesians gave up the fight against African rule because they saw it as a lost cause; the world had turned against them and every year they killed thousands of African guerillas yet they never stopped coming. The whites realized that as they became increasingly isolated, it was hopeless for them to try to hold on because no matter what they did they would still be 10% of the population trying to rule over 90%.

The things I have read here make me realize why South Africa doesn't participate more in peacekeeping operations in Africa. They would be a natural leader in places like Sudan and the Congo yet they have failed to do much. I suppose that its a combination of bureaucratic inertia and lack of capability.

And one more thing. When someone buying SK-105 Kurassiers scares you, you're in trouble.

 

[Waylander]

In the end balance often enough means that one wants to have superior capabilities compared to the neighbours...

And Leclercs would defenitely fit into that role. If they have the will to keep them running a Leclerc should be a superior track compared to everything south of Egypt's Abrams.
I expect that every Leclerc shipped from France to SA would get the whole Tropicaine upgrade (excluding the MTU engine/lengthened hull) and therefore be fully operational when facing the special environment of SA.

 

[Tempest]

One the world of the blind, the one eyed man in king. I have never and don't think much of South Africa by international standards. They gave up Namibia and the country to ANC after facing 50,000 Cuban thousands of miles from home.

It is all "relative" as Waylander puts it. If you really get down to the gun performance, missile and radar performance, what South Africa has/had did not put it ahead of its neighbours in the 80s.

 

[Chino]

Were there Cubans in the ANC?

Did SA lose the armed fight against the ANC or did they, too, just got tired of fighting?

 

[Tempest]

Were there Cubans in the ANC?

Did SA lose the armed fight against the ANC or did they, too, just got tired of fighting?

I don't know if there were ANC fighters with the Cubans - I know they were fighting a common enemy and a common cause.

They did not lose the war they just got tired? ... ... Getting tired of defending "your country", women and children, your way of life and values? The "dignified ways" used to try to disguise South Africa's defeat never cease to amaze me.

 

[Tempest]

Below comments on the talks of when South Africa was "tired" of fighting, "The South Africans arrived with high hopes: Foreign Minister Pik Botha expected that Resolution 435 would be modified; Defence Minister Malan and President PW Botha asserted that South Africa would withdraw from Angola only "if Russia and its proxies did the same." They did not mention withdrawing from Namibia. On March 16 1988, Business Day reported that Pretoria was "offering to withdraw into Namibia – not from Namibia -- in return for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. The implication is that South Africa has no real intention of giving up the territory any time soon."

But the Cubans had reversed the situation on the ground, and when Pik Botha voiced the South African demands, Jorge Risquet, who headed the Cuban delegation, fell on him like a ton of bricks: "The time for your military adventures, for the acts of aggression that you have pursued with impunity, for your massacres of refugees ... is over." South Africa, he said, was acting as though it was "a victorious army, rather than what it really is: a defeated aggressor that is withdrawing ... South Africa must face the fact that it will not obtain at the negotiating table what it could not achieve on the battlefield."[4] As the talks ended, Crocker cabled

Secretary of State George Shultz that they had taken place "against the backdrop of increasing military tension surrounding the large build-up of heavily armed Cuban troops in south-west Angola in close proximity to the Namibian border ... The Cuban build-up in southwest Angola has created an unpredictable military dynamic."[5] The burning question was: Would the Cubans stop at the border? To answer this question, Crocker sought out Risquet: "Does Cuba intend to halt its troops at the border between Namibia and Angola?" Risquet replied, "If I told you that the troops will not stop, it would be a threat. If I told you that they will stop, I would be giving you a Meprobamato [a Cuban tranquilliser]. ... and I want to neither threaten nor reassure you ... What I can say is that the only way to guarantee [that our troops stop at the border] would be to reach an agreement [on Namibia's independence]."[6] The next day, June 27 1988, Cuban MIGs attacked SADF positions near the Calueque dam, 11km north of the Namibian border.

The CIA reported that "Cuba's successful use of air power and the apparent weakness of Pretoria's air defences" highlighted the fact that Havana had achieved air superiority in southern Angola and northern Namibia. A few hours after the Cubans' successful strike, the SADF destroyed a nearby bridge over the Cunene river. They did so, the CIA surmised, "to deny Cuban and Angolan ground forces easy passage to the Namibia border and to reduce the number of positions they must defend." [7] "

 

[swerve]

Yes the new SA government defenitely feels solidarity with Mugabe. They were brothers in the 'freedom struggle'. They would never do anything to betray him. Fact.....

While I suspect that's true of Mbeki, it's obviously not true of all elements in the ANC, including Zuma. The left wing of the ANC & its allies (e.g. COSATU) greatly prefer the MDC & Tsvangirai to Mugabe. Some analysts suggest that Mbekis refusal to ditch Mugabe owes a lot to his fear that doing so would strengthen his internal opposition within the ANC.

 

[neil]

One the world of the blind, the one eyed man in king. I have never and don't think much of South Africa by international standards. They gave up Namibia and the country to ANC after facing 50,000 Cuban thousands of miles from home.

It is all "relative" as Waylander puts it. If you really get down to the gun performance, missile and radar performance, what South Africa has/had did not put it ahead of its neighbours in the 80s.

To be able to understand the South African situation properly you need to have at least lived here for a couple of years.

Have you ever lived in a country that was under severe UN sanctions? An international outcast? Five million whites in the southern tip of Africa against the world.. not just against 50 000 Cubans. Thats how it was back then.

The SADF was more than a match for the Cubans. However the Cubans did bring the conflict to a new level. They had numbers and superior technology. The Cubans brought with them all aspect air to air missiles wich, South Africa, at the time did not posses. A South African Mirage F1CZ was damaged in air to air combat by a Mig 23, using one of these missiles. However to state that the Cubans had gained air superiority is not correct. The South African Mirages flew strike missions with impunity, under and through the cover of Angolan and Cuban Migs.(many of them piloted by Russians)

To adequately fend the Cubans off, South Africa would have to have mobilised much more reserve troops and up the defence budget even more. People were growing weary of their sons coming home in body bags.(remind you of American opposition to the war in Iraq?) The country was already spending 3% of GDP on defence and the economy was not good. The country was heavily in debt.

Anyway I'm not trying to defend the actions of FW de Klerk who handed over power to the ANC. All I'm trying to say is, every story has two sides. You are however, entitled to your opinion...

 

[neil]

South Africa did originally tag an order for new main battle tanks onto the multi billion Rand arms deal signed in 1998, but it was deffered to keep costs down.

The army still plans to purchase new tanks after 2010 though. The SA army has recently begun a restructuring process that will see it centred around a mechanized division, equipped with new main battle tanks and Patria AMV's.

The Patria programme has already been signed but the tank programme is far from completion however.

 

[Tempest]

To be able to understand the South African situation properly you need to have at least lived here for a couple of years.

Have you ever lived in a country that was under severe UN sanctions? An international outcast? Five million whites in the southern tip of Africa against the world.. not just against 50 000 Cubans. Thats how it was back then.

The SADF was more than a match for the Cubans. However the Cubans did bring the conflict to a new level. They had numbers and superior technology. The Cubans brought with them all aspect air to air missiles wich, South Africa, at the time did not posses. A South African Mirage F1CZ was damaged in air to air combat by a Mig 23, using one of these missiles. However to state that the Cubans had gained air superiority is not correct. The South African Mirages flew strike missions with impunity, under and through the cover of Angolan and Cuban Migs.(many of them piloted by Russians)

To adequately fend the Cubans off, South Africa would have to have mobilised much more reserve troops and up the defence budget even more. People were growing weary of their sons coming home in body bags.(remind you of American opposition to the war in Iraq?) The country was already spending 3% of GDP on defence and the economy was not good. The country was heavily in debt.

Anyway I'm not trying to defend the actions of FW de Klerk who handed over power to the ANC. All I'm trying to say is, every story has two sides. You are however, entitled to your opinion...

War is about exploiting your enemy’s weaknesses. Sanctions work very well and there are part of the tools in war. Exactly why countries like Iraq, Zimbabwe, North Korea, Iran are under sanctions = make it easy when you eventually go in.

While I understand your reasons on GDP, mobilising lots of troops and public support for the war, that does not meant South Africa won. Wars are lost for different reasons. War startegies are built on understanding your enemy's limitations and make the most of those and not feel sorry for them. At some point Malan and Botha had to chose war or sign the country over to the enemy. They signed the countries (Angola, Namibia and South Africa) over to the enemy. I don't call that a win by any standard.

Did the Cubans build two airbases in Southern Angola close to Namibia in region where Angola had never controlled for years? … … Are those the same areas you are saying “The South African Mirages flew strike missions with impunity”? … … Where were they when two air bases were built a few minutes from their border? Could it be because they could not strike at the enemy? SAAF still flew some missions, yes but I would not say “with impunity”. SAAF lost control of the skies.

This guy here http://sentinel.projects.googlepages.com/sanuc.htm writes:

“During the middle and later half of 1988 the Cuban 50th Division were systematically skirmishing their way south down the western part of Angola, finally encamping just north of the border. A comprehensive air defense network that included MiG 23 fighter and MiG 27 ground attack aircraft protected this force. During the later part of 1988 the Cubans built an air base at Xangongo, 60km from the Namibian border capable of operating both MiG 23 and MiG 27 aircraft. Cuban aircraft launched from this base could be over the border (forward area of battle) in a matter of minutes, long before SAAF aircraft operating from Ondangua or Grootfontein could get there.
There was a very real possibility that this Cuban force would invade Namibia. From personal experience the author knows that if this had happened not a lot could have been done to prevent the Cubans from penetrating the northern parts of Namibia. On several nights the author and his troops slept on the helicopter landing zone of his base in northern Namibia, waiting for the Cubans to attack, armed with nothing bigger than two 81mm mortars, several Claymore mines and a few 40mm grenade launchers. If the Cuban force had crossed the border, and at times their main troop concentrations were no more than three kilometers north of the border, … …”

Other people who were there I have spoken to agree that South Africa could not stop a full offensive from the Cubans and from reading Cuban documents, Castro meant business. The whole idea of building two airbases close to the Namibian border was in preparation to really engage the SADF.

 

[Chino]

So how is the army organized?

For example in the infantry, do they throw all the races into the same platoon? Would you for example have a black officer and white NCOs etc?

In Singapore we are mixed with my last reservist platoon having Sikhs, Indians, Malays and Chinese riflemen and NCOs. Chinese are in the majority but there are no open racial problems even if the NCO or officer is non-Chinese. Of course, there is odd racial jibe every now and then but nothing serious.

 

[blok]

Back in the day

South Africa had some of the best soldiers in the world, even now some of them are working for private security companies in the middle east and in other places around the world. If the defence force was as potent today as it was back in the day, i would join now.

 

[neil]

War is about exploiting your enemy’s weaknesses. Sanctions work very well and there are part of the tools in war. Exactly why countries like Iraq, Zimbabwe, North Korea, Iran are under sanctions = make it easy when you eventually go in.

While I understand your reasons on GDP, mobilising lots of troops and public support for the war, that does not meant South Africa won. Wars are lost for different reasons. War startegies are built on understanding your enemy's limitations and make the most of those and not feel sorry for them. At some point Malan and Botha had to chose war or sign the country over to the enemy. They signed the countries (Angola, Namibia and South Africa) over to the enemy. I don't call that a win by any standard.

Did the Cubans build two airbases in Southern Angola close to Namibia in region where Angola had never controlled for years? … … Are those the same areas you are saying “The South African Mirages flew strike missions with impunity”? … … Where were they when two air bases were built a few minutes from their border? Could it be because they could not strike at the enemy? SAAF still flew some missions, yes but I would not say “with impunity”. SAAF lost control of the skies.

This guy here http://sentinel.projects.googlepages.com/sanuc.htm writes:

“During the middle and later half of 1988 the Cuban 50th Division were systematically skirmishing their way south down the western part of Angola, finally encamping just north of the border. A comprehensive air defense network that included MiG 23 fighter and MiG 27 ground attack aircraft protected this force. During the later part of 1988 the Cubans built an air base at Xangongo, 60km from the Namibian border capable of operating both MiG 23 and MiG 27 aircraft. Cuban aircraft launched from this base could be over the border (forward area of battle) in a matter of minutes, long before SAAF aircraft operating from Ondangua or Grootfontein could get there.
There was a very real possibility that this Cuban force would invade Namibia. From personal experience the author knows that if this had happened not a lot could have been done to prevent the Cubans from penetrating the northern parts of Namibia. On several nights the author and his troops slept on the helicopter landing zone of his base in northern Namibia, waiting for the Cubans to attack, armed with nothing bigger than two 81mm mortars, several Claymore mines and a few 40mm grenade launchers. If the Cuban force had crossed the border, and at times their main troop concentrations were no more than three kilometers north of the border, … …”

Other people who were there I have spoken to agree that South Africa could not stop a full offensive from the Cubans and from reading Cuban documents, Castro meant business. The whole idea of building two airbases close to the Namibian border was in preparation to really engage the SADF.

Yes you are right. I never said South Africa won the war. It is my belief that there were no winners. Only losers. Although it was a political victory for the FAPLA\ANC and the Cubans.

But I also believe had South Africa decided to face the Cubans we would have mopped the floor with them.(Using the full strength of the SADF at the time.) The Russians were supporting the Cubans, yes, but the USA was supporting us, although they would never admit to it. Do you really think the USA would have allowed the Cape sea route to fall into hands of the communists? (We would have suffered much higher casualty rates, yes.) Remember, the SADF never deployed in full strength. Have you looked up the SADF tank regiment's record in the war? I'll try to find it. Well South Africa only used 14 or so tanks(old Centurions) and did extremely well with them. At that point we had a lot more than 14, with highly trained crews I might add. The Rooikat was also just coming on line and if I remember correctly we never used more than one or two batteries of our excellent G5 howitzers.

As far as the Cuban Migs go. These guys were better than the Angolans at ground attack, but they still pretty much sucked. The SAAF Mirage squadron were experts at low level ground atttack. They penetrated the Angolan air defence network time and time again. This network was called more thorough than the one the Communists deployed in Vietnam by some commentators. South Africa had just deployed the first 'smart weapon' in the region, destroying a bridge from high level. South Africa was on the verge of deploying the Cheetah with better missiles and avionics. In every dogfight our pilots came up against the Migs we outmanuevered them in close in combat, except for the afore mentioned time when a head on shot was taken against the F1CZ. Remember the final air to air tally was 2-0 in South Africa's favour.

Now you might call into doubt what I said here, for lack of references. That is why I generally shy away from tit for tat converstations like this one. However I have read on this war extensively and I believe my comments to be accurate.

 

[Chino]

I have no doubts SA would cream the Cubans if they committed to the fight.

Who else supported SA besides the alleged covert US support? If you ask me the western world is crazy not to have supported SA against Communist movements supported directly by Cuban troops.

 

[Tempest]

I have no doubts SA would cream the Cubans if they committed to the fight.

Who else supported SA besides the alleged covert US support? If you ask me the western world is crazy not to have supported SA against Communist movements supported directly by Cuban troops.

If you ask me "communism" in South Africa today is 10 times better than under apartheid. Lets not turn this into a political debate. They were people fighting for their freedom. And as a country South Africa has been doing better now than with apartheid: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/nft/2006/soafrica/eng/pasoafr/sach2.pdf .

The South African generals, with a bigger picture view on the situation than the foot foot soldiers, with the US sitting at the table advising with CIA intelligence, understanding what they were up against better than anybody on this forum, agreed to the terms of Angola, Cuba and SWAPO.

Some more reading here from New York Time, 12th July 1988: South Africa's Strategy on Angola Falls Short

 

[neil]

So how is the army organized?

For example in the infantry, do they throw all the races into the same platoon? Would you for example have a black officer and white NCOs etc?

In Singapore we are mixed with my last reservist platoon having Sikhs, Indians, Malays and Chinese riflemen and NCOs. Chinese are in the majority but there are no open racial problems even if the NCO or officer is non-Chinese. Of course, there is odd racial jibe every now and then but nothing serious.

The infantry isn't organised according to race, so you might see a white officer with black troops, or the other way around. Everyone is mixed together, although the whites only make up about 25% of the current total.

Also, the whites mostly serve as middle ranking officers, with only a few hundred white riflemen.

The official racial make up that they strive for is:
65% black
10% coloured and indian
25% white

This is now accross the board through all ranks. So they are trying to get rid of the white captains to generals, while attracting more white riflemen. They are struggling to attract white riflemen in all four services though.

 

[Generalissimo]

The SADF had a chance to win the war early on, before Cuban/Soviet intervention rose to such high levels and before the MPLA secured most of the country. In 1975 they launched a large invasion of Angola that was largely covert and heavily supported by the US, known as Operation Savannah. It was the first time the SADF made a major incursion into the freshly-independent nation of Angola. The MPLA was already in control of Luanda. The SADF moved quickly, with Battlegroup Zulu under Colonel Jan Breytenbach covering 3000 miles in 30 days. They were within striking distance of Luanda when the US withdrew its support and the forces were withdrawn back to Namibia.

This was South Africa's biggest blunder in the whole war. They didn't go in for the kill. They could have taken Luanda.

The SADF withdrawal (not defeat) was based on political reasons and it frustrated the SADF military commanders in the field who believed Luanda was within their reach. (See Col Jan Breytenbach's book: Buffalo Soldiers.). Even to this day, both sides claim victory, though there was never a decisive military showdown.

Should Luanda be taken or not? The military objectives of Ops Savannah were continiuosly changed by the politicians and it can be said that the objectives were largely "made up on the way" as the situation changed

That's from an SA website on Op Savannah. Granted, the South Africans only had 3000 troops available but more could have been brought up. More importantly they had the enemy on the run. The failure to take Luanda and finish off the MPLA before the Angolan Civil War really began in earnest was a terrible blunder.

 

[Tempest]

The SADF had a chance to win the war early on, before Cuban/Soviet intervention rose to such high levels and before the MPLA secured most of the country. In 1975 they launched a large invasion of Angola that was largely covert and heavily supported by the US, known as Operation Savannah. It was the first time the SADF made a major incursion into the freshly-independent nation of Angola. The MPLA was already in control of Luanda. The SADF moved quickly, with Battlegroup Zulu under Colonel Jan Breytenbach covering 3000 miles in 30 days. They were within striking distance of Luanda when the US withdrew its support and the forces were withdrawn back to Namibia.

This was South Africa's biggest blunder in the whole war. They didn't go in for the kill. They could have taken Luanda.





That's from an SA website on Op Savannah. Granted, the South Africans only had 3000 troops available but more could have been brought up. More importantly they had the enemy on the run. The failure to take Luanda and finish off the MPLA before the Angolan Civil War really began in earnest was a terrible blunder.

There are always regrets and "if only we had done x or y" in any war or battle. All the maimed and dead souls also go through their own "if only". Nazis still sit with a 20/20 hind site and hypothesize how they could have won the war had they maximized a gain, a strength or exploited a weakness.

I too believe South Africa could have defeated MPLA in the 70s. I don't believe this would have been the case in the 80s - South Africa was weakening ralative to its neighbours. (note that I an not saying it was weaker). As much as hardcore advocates of the old South Africa criticise the current state of affairs, I believe had the old goverment been in place, convetional South Africa would be in a worse situation against its neighbours.

It is about 600 miles from the Namibia border to Luanda and 700 miles for Namibia border to the DRC border. SADF covering 3000 miles in 30 days is fantasy/fiction/exaggeration like a lot of the South African military capabilities the world is told.

 

[Chino]

When you are battling a rebellion or insurgency, it is often a battle of wills as much of arms.

What I remember thinking at that time that SA was weakening in resolve. It was always militarily stronger or at least as capable.

 

[Generalissimo]

It is about 600 miles from the Namibia border to Luanda and 700 miles for Namibia border to the DRC border. SADF covering 3000 miles in 30 days is fantasy/fiction/exaggeration like a lot of the South African military capabilities the world is told.

I suppose I should have payed better attention to the distances on Google Earth :unknown. Well the fact remains that they were in a position to give UNITA an excellent upper hand early on. In the end apartheid was doomed to failure. A system that artifical will fall eventually. The white South Africans realized that and that is why the stopped fighting; so they could get good terms while they still had some power, rather than fighting to the bitter end facing elimination.