LancerMc,
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The idea behind this thread is gain a good idea on what different members believe are the best CURRENT aircraft and weapons systems operated by today's airforces.
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You would be better off being honest and saying that "If you couldn't build the USAF all over again..."
With a fixed quantity of money. A fixed period of time. And a DEFINED threat or opportunity. Using a short list of airframes based on an agreed if not certain cost threshold target for each airframe _as available_. Lastly, you should put restrictors in place which more or less amount to 'non-aligned' (U.S. threats not to integrate a Rafale into the Korean IADS/BMC2 network for instance) nations still being excluded from the arms deal table based on "If you have an Su-30, you don't get AIM-120C7" ARMAMENT restrictions.
As an Example: I don't think the B-2 is replaceable anymore so it's nominal 2 billion dollar unit price doesn't matter. I don't think penetrating airpower is a requirement with cruise missiles. I don't think a fast mover (or indeed jet powered performance at all) is a mandate if you can come up with a CABS type system with JASSM or S2/SCALP equivalents out the back of a C-130.
My Reasonings:
1. Consolidated Purchase for Logistics and Budgetary Cycle Considerations.
2. Better Bullets Win.
3. Rapid Update to Weapon Source/Object Codes (EW and ECCM) Critical.
4. Fight Missions On A Sortie Basis.
5. Fight Wars On A Time Scale Escalatory One.
INVENTORY:
ONE AIR DEFENSE/COMBAT CONTROLLER.
With a 2-3:1 manning ratio and a shared training/spares pipe between basing mode service variants. If there is a naval requirement, there can really only be one choice: the Rafale B @ 80 million. If not, the JAS-39C/D (42 million, last I heard) is equal or superior to the F-16C.50+ (27 million) in almost all areas of avionics if not payload:radius. If the threat is LO you have no real choice but to go-U.S. in terms of traded inventory for ghost-hunting-ghost security from sniping.
Probably 20 airframes with an 'option' for about 10 more at the 10th year of service _IF_ an equivalent order was possible for an appropriate UCAV matchup.
ONE LIFT.
With equivalent cockpit avionics and rangeless-secure MODELED sensor performance. Here things are more iffy. The MAKO and GE would be my choice because I don't believe in staged (stepup) performance training 'just to land fast' but rather in early immersion with high quality simulation followed by the real deal. Unfortunately, price and schedule on these supersonic fighters is not well known.
Probably 20-50 airframes of various standards (ab initio doesn't need the combat emulator crap) with the proviso that a 25 million dollar cost cap include integration of an IRST pod and MICA or AMRAAM weapons on a dumb shooter, smart illuminator basis with the above ADF for 1/3 the total fleet as a GTW fill force. Along with 2-3 pod-mod aircraft able to serve as escort or standoff jammers as needed (2-seats without the fuss of reconfiguring and cluttering up a fighter).
It should be noted that these would also serve as principal currency trainers for the active squadrons to preserve 'cherry' GTW airframes and fatigue.
ONE BOMBER.
With Loiter and Payload Appropriate to a standoff CAS mission or a ranged Interdiction one. (C-130J with X60 SDB/AASM or X16 JASSM/S2). Obviously there would be minimal penetration performance required but a strapon SAR similar to the Coast Guard BAMS system with the Elta 2060 I think it is would be nice if the aircraft is to have significant overwater missioning against low-midrange threats. Alternatively, bizjet or UAV support (Mariner) would be required to fulfill the ASST role with the equivalent of AMSTE support for IAM. Probably enough airframes for 'one mission force, 2 orbits' continuous 24:7 coverage with 1 reserve. Land only that's probably 7-10 aircraft. Land + Sea and you're talking about 18 or more.
Obviously peacetime use as federal transports would be a necessity so all mods would need to be plug and play.
ONE INTERCEPTOR.
With the demise of MALI, probably a converted target drone. Able to achieve LRAAM pole matchups OR hunt lolo/VLO (cruise etc.) targets over a local horizon with the help of a Mountain Top type cuer (Aerostat for a choice, P-99 or Wedgetail as an option). If the threat was seriously supersonic, this would probably have to be backed by a terminal system based on MICA or AMRAAM as much as ERINT. DEWS if available. If the threat has a serious (high performance/VLO) penetrating OCA capability, longer range S2A systems may still be required or adjustments made in the number of HVA escort capable fighters that protect forward assets like the CABS bomber.
200-300 rounds @ 1.5 million each. Plus an optional 50-100 missiles with hunting logic and the ability to perform SEAD.
ONE SCAR/WEAPONS CABINET.
As a robotic utility platform with maximum LO for penetration and probably a mix of mission systems centered around ELS, EO and SAR payloads.
If I had secure basing, this would be a 10-20,000lb UCAV. If MOB serviceability or the need to respond to distant borders with limited sector fields were a concern, it would probably be a 5,000-10,000lb A-UAV.
There is no functional use, IMO, for dedicated high-dollar surveillance platforms on the order of the E-8 or even the ASTOR/AGS. They simply run too much to package up and can cover too little area for the risk implied to standoff surveillance systems in the S-400/Aster age. At the same time, for COIN ops and in support of a fluid conventional battlefield, it is better to maintain a corporate intel factor that is persistent in it's doubled-up LO and Sensor packaging. Attack being a function of standoff IAM and prewar targeting or FAC-A/ETAC tasking then becomes fairly simple actually.
Given sufficient LO and/or a sacrificial mindset, the potential also exists (in the larger classes particularly) to provide a deep OCA-ambush potential to disrupt threat air activities via endurant, cellular, CAP orbits whose lane coverage is defined by deceptive maneuver by conventional fighters. And again, shooter-illuminator (midcourse guidance anyway) handoff to fighters on the edge of WEZ or mission fuel tolerances.
Probably 50 airframes at ca. 30 million each and again with a guarantee of combatibility with whatever network control platform they were tasked with supporting (i.e. The pipe had better be pretty wide and unbent).
ONE ACP/TANKER.
At some point (usually depth of radius in a longer ranged strike warfare environment) it no longer pays to add tanks or standoff munitions to a limited/mixed fighter force's ability to conduct coordinated attacks. Similarly, even in defensive wars, there may well be instances where endurant BMC2 makes all the difference in terms of talking directly to forces with a 'mobile air staff' of console operators instead of relying on landline and microwave links which may well be pretargeted by commando or discrete air attack. This is particularly true where you can in fact _operate out of country_ to secure your basing mode and provide for easy station changes while 'looking back' at the local threat picture over a challenged air dominance and/or maneuver force campaign. Obviously, there will be further considerations that have to be made relative to tanker airspeed and escort. As well as added considerations for ROBE type performance and specific mission fits (probably permanent, possibly trailing-wire incompatible with the AAR mission). But particularly if the system can be combined with the CABS purchase, the gains are typically worth the effort on recovery of otherwise certain fuel casualties and the ability to maintain a less cyclical (intensity dependent) 'swing' of airpower through the use of dedicated refueling and C2 aircraft.
Again, given one mission spare and depending on the depth over neutral/hostile airspace required as a function of raids-per-day, probably a 3-5 airframe buy. This may in fact be one of the harder systems to acquire however as AAR is typically considered an implement of 'implied hostile intent' which those whose deep-assets are now hostaged resent.
VARIABLES:
Where available, surface launch cruise systems are preferrable to air launch because they remove the bus-intermediate vulnerabilities and operating costs.
Where the threat is nuclear armed, I will need a secure retaliatory capability and would nominally want to shift this to a sea basing mode for maximum deployment security (and would need ensure this with TACAMO and MPA/ASW screening platforms specific to that mission).
Hypersonics will largely replace the need for penetrating air and cruise carriers in the offensive mode but a large COIN requirement will still mandate a heavy loitering presence that will have to be met by systems capable of defending themselves in daylight against typical 'guerilla S2A'.
CONCLUSION:
One significant factor that is often missed in these little naming exercises is the need for alliance and supplementary military construction. Obviously, an association with the U.S. brings not only a fairly good guarantee that you will not be allowed to sink if you behave well. But also MFN status as part of any offset deal on purchases. But there is no reason to assume that similar efforts might not be possilbe with the EU, China or Russia or indeed that -any of the the above- might be seen as an implied insult on policy basis with other nations in the area. If you don't want war (especially tradewar or covert sabotage), /sometimes/ it's better to prepare for a neutral peace. OTOH, if war is certain, you need to create an opplan which takes into account the _surety_ by which you can survive for X-days as a 'fearless warrior' while knowing that help is on the way. It adjust everything you do in terms of munitions use and sortie rate logistics in particular.
Similarly, in a TBM dominated world, it is impossible to defend airfields except by multiplication and dispersal. I would rather have 20 aircraft whose 50 crews got a minimum 60-70 hours per year in the one jet I paid them to be familiar with, sitting in 100 full-cover HAS. Than 100 aircraft of 3 different flavors crewed by 90 pilots who got 20hrs a year, on open revetments.
This continues right on down through the total network ADGE/training/services pipe so that the more you support a given weapons system hardening in it's 'easiest to find' (logistically chained) mode, the less you will lose BEFORE it takes off. And the more innovative and risky the operations that aircrews will be willing to take in-air, knowing that they can return to a fortress airfield which will not be bombed from under them as a result of overwhelming numeric superiority and/or chase back.
KPl.
