Now that we are builiding up troops in Afganistan the war is going to turn bloody this spring and summer. It looks like we are repeating the same mistakes we made in Vietnam. What strategy can we use to defeat the taliban and al qaida? Also how many troops do you guys think we will have in Afganistan in two to three years? Do you guys also think if thing turn bad in Pakistan we would have to send troops in there? Pakistan has a strong military but they are unwilling to fight the taliban, so how can we win this war? Is Afganistan Vietnam and Pakistan is cambodia with nukes?
What strategy can we use to win in Afganistan?
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wtsimpson7
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What I believe we need to do is 3 important things. 1st, we need to do counterinsurgency right. Clear insurgents out, keep that area protected, and build the infrastructure/local relations. Next, we might need to talk to the Taliban. It doesn't hurt to have communication with the enemy. Finally; pressure Pakistan. They will be a huge advantage once we truly win them over. If we can do this, we might be able to win!!! (about how many troops we need, that might depend on Iraq's needs, etc. Since I.D.K 'bout that, I would leave that up to you guys.)
PatriotTurk
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It's impossible to win Guerilla troops with standard army. We have too much skill about that in our warfare in Southeastern Anatolia.
1. You should create militia troops with high training. (Like commado etc.)
2. You must reduce your troops in Afghanistan.
3. And you must establish high relationship with local people, not Taliban. (Respect their culture etc.)
If you do these factours. You'll win.
1. You should create militia troops with high training. (Like commado etc.)
2. You must reduce your troops in Afghanistan.
3. And you must establish high relationship with local people, not Taliban. (Respect their culture etc.)
If you do these factours. You'll win.
PatriotTurk
New Member
Hardly. Given the financing the whole thing could be prepared and executed in a couple of months.
PatriotTurk
New Member
Couple of months?? Why you didnt do this? Too many months has passed.
Destroy the opium fields and yes the talibs have lost their source of revenue, but so have the local farmers. All the local farmers see is a coalition soldier destroying his business in a place that does not have any form of social security (i.e. a deth sentence for his family). Do you think that will help?
If you intend doing that you need to make it worthwhile to grow another crop, that the talibs won't be able to sell at a profit. eg wheat that the coalition offers $1000 a tonne for. Totally unrealistic in market terms, but if that's what you need to do to keep the population happy and starve the talibs of funding...
Amidst all the talk of a new strategy, sanctuaries in Pakistan and extra troops for Afghanistan, an important point to consider is that a large number of the Pashtun population [not all of whom share the same religous views of the Taliban or have ties with Al Qaida] see the Taliban as a legitimate ressistance movement against a foreign occupation. At the moment the Talibs dominate large areas of the countryside and retain the support of a large part of the population, irrespective of how many are killed by coalition troops.
MrQuintus..., even assuming enough troops could be found to man the 1000 FOBs you mentioned, what effect would it have on on winning hearts and minds or the insurgency campaign against the Talibs. Instead of being seen, mixing with the population and dominating the countryside, troops would be confined to these FOBs and would serve no useful purpose.
For those interested in Afghanistan, I strongly recommend Ahmad Rashid's '' Descent Into Chaos'' and ''Taliban''.
MrQuintus..., even assuming enough troops could be found to man the 1000 FOBs you mentioned, what effect would it have on on winning hearts and minds or the insurgency campaign against the Talibs. Instead of being seen, mixing with the population and dominating the countryside, troops would be confined to these FOBs and would serve no useful purpose.
For those interested in Afghanistan, I strongly recommend Ahmad Rashid's '' Descent Into Chaos'' and ''Taliban''.
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1. Continue the drone strikes in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Decpatiation strikes on Taliban and Al-Qaeda destabilizes their ability to act cohesively in the region. This gives coalition troops the chance to take more effective action against insurgents in the area.
2. Get the Department of Agriculture busy. Find some kind of cash crop which will grow well in Afghanistan, but without the social problems drugs like opium create.
Some have proposed soybeans as a possible solution. They have less dollar value than poppies, but they do provide protein and they are a step in the right direction
For Afghans, a soy solution takes root - Los Angeles Times
3. Partner with Pakistan. They don't want the Taliban any more than we do, and driving them out of or hampering their presence in Pakistan will deprive them of a key base of operations
4. Build schools. People like Greg Mortensen have enjoyed success in this area, and it's greatly reduced the Taliban's sympathetic base in the population. having an educated population is going to be key if Afghanistan wants to grow economically and politically in the future.
5. Win over the people. Guys in full battle rattle aren't going to do this, it's going to take vets, agricultural specialists, and medics to help the people and gain their trust.
This is also going to require the coalition military to step up their efforts to protect the people. That means following the current ROEs, as restrictive as they are, to avoid civilian casualties, and to make an effective effort to protect the people.
6. Reduce troop footprint. Rumbling around in tanks lets you control the roads, but not the whole country. Ultra-mobile, unconventional or QRF forces need to be deployed to take the country and fight the Taliban in their own backyard.
It's what SOG did in 'Nam and Laos and it worked to a degree...now all we need are some Montagnards.
7. Get the Afghans up to speed. Tribal differences make things hard. Afghan isn't one homogenized group, it's a bunch of Pashtun tribal units and they are rivals. This hampers the efforts of the local Army and the ANP, and only in the Commando units have the tribal barriers been fully addressed and solved.
The average ANP soldier isn't ready to replace the average US Army soldier, they need intensive training, and they need something to be proud of.
It will be difficult, but it's what has to be done.
2. Get the Department of Agriculture busy. Find some kind of cash crop which will grow well in Afghanistan, but without the social problems drugs like opium create.
Some have proposed soybeans as a possible solution. They have less dollar value than poppies, but they do provide protein and they are a step in the right direction
For Afghans, a soy solution takes root - Los Angeles Times
3. Partner with Pakistan. They don't want the Taliban any more than we do, and driving them out of or hampering their presence in Pakistan will deprive them of a key base of operations
4. Build schools. People like Greg Mortensen have enjoyed success in this area, and it's greatly reduced the Taliban's sympathetic base in the population. having an educated population is going to be key if Afghanistan wants to grow economically and politically in the future.
5. Win over the people. Guys in full battle rattle aren't going to do this, it's going to take vets, agricultural specialists, and medics to help the people and gain their trust.
This is also going to require the coalition military to step up their efforts to protect the people. That means following the current ROEs, as restrictive as they are, to avoid civilian casualties, and to make an effective effort to protect the people.
6. Reduce troop footprint. Rumbling around in tanks lets you control the roads, but not the whole country. Ultra-mobile, unconventional or QRF forces need to be deployed to take the country and fight the Taliban in their own backyard.
It's what SOG did in 'Nam and Laos and it worked to a degree...now all we need are some Montagnards.
7. Get the Afghans up to speed. Tribal differences make things hard. Afghan isn't one homogenized group, it's a bunch of Pashtun tribal units and they are rivals. This hampers the efforts of the local Army and the ANP, and only in the Commando units have the tribal barriers been fully addressed and solved.
The average ANP soldier isn't ready to replace the average US Army soldier, they need intensive training, and they need something to be proud of.
It will be difficult, but it's what has to be done.
Win in Afganistan? As in installing a stable and democratic government and leave that place?
My best guess is that you need the same steps you will need to take, to enforce and maintain a complete weapon's ban to the population of Texas.
Disclaimer. This is not about a pro gun or not discussion . I sincerely think that victory in Afghanistan is like asking Texans to live under a weapons ban. You will need to take the same approach.
So, I'm asking you. What strategy can we use to enforce a weapon's ban in Texas?
PS. Again, I'm not saying that we should enforce a weapon's ban in Texas. If we had too, how would we do it?
My best guess is that you need the same steps you will need to take, to enforce and maintain a complete weapon's ban to the population of Texas.
Disclaimer. This is not about a pro gun or not discussion . I sincerely think that victory in Afghanistan is like asking Texans to live under a weapons ban. You will need to take the same approach.
So, I'm asking you. What strategy can we use to enforce a weapon's ban in Texas?
PS. Again, I'm not saying that we should enforce a weapon's ban in Texas. If we had too, how would we do it?
One of the problems with the drone attacks in Pakistan is that is has led to some degree of resentment by Pakistanis who feel that it infringes on Pakistani sovereignty. Another problem is though Pakistani cooperation is crucial to success in Afghanistan, the current government is deeply unpopular amongst many Pakistanis who view their government as having as sold itself off to the U.S.
On the contrary, there are many 'jihadist' elements in the Pakistan military and public who are pro Taliban. That ones of the reasons the U'S. is so worried about the Pakistani nukes in event of Pakistan falling totally into the hands of the jihadists.
What about the Tajiks, Hazaras and Turkmens? Despite reduced Northern participation in the Kazai government, many Pashtuns still see Kazai's government as one that is dominated by non-Pashtuns and one that is nothing but a puppet pulled by U.S. strings.
It seems to be a mix, but I'm not sure of the ratios of Pashtun to other tribes.
There was an ANA commando unit that was in the news about a year as sort of the poster-child for successfult tribal integration in one elite Afghan Army unit.
The Herald-Sun - Afghan commandos look beyond the tribe
Guys, I would like to recommend that you read what four articles on two areas, the ANA and the ANP, which set the background for Stratfor's 'The Meaning of Marjah'. The Stratfor article is written by Kamran Bokhari, Peter Zeihan and Nathan Hughes and a portion of it is quoted below. I have put in bold and in blue some text for emphasis:
(i) Col (Rtd) Jeff Haynes* writes on 'Reforming the Afghan National Army (ANA)' in November 2009. NPS also has a 'Summary on the ANA'. This piece is longer but necessary to set the stage to critique the ANA. which provides the background for Jeff Haynes.
(ii) Robert A. Wehrle writing for Washington Times on February 21, 2010 says that 'Afghan mess bigger than we thought'. This article is mercifully short and concise on the conceptual problems with the current approach, in particular, the weak link called the ANP. There's also a companion piece called 'Reforming the ANP', which is longer and more detailed than the piece by Robert A. Wehrle.
In reality all these articles quoted above are external view points and I find that we are really lacking articles written by the Afghans themselves. Therefore I've included a link to an article (to a 17 page pdf) written by Ali A. Jalali. He was the Interior Minister of Afghanistan from January 2003 to September 2005. His expressed view sees the situation as more complex and has a focus beyond the immediate problems of the ANA and ANP.
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*Note: Jeff Haynes recently retired as a Colonel from the United States Marine Corps after 24 years of service. During 2008, he commanded Regional Corps Advisory Command-Central where he advised the Afghan National Army’s 201st Corps Commanding General and staff. Concurrently, Colonel Haynes commanded 23 Embedded Training Teams consisting of over 600 advisors and support personnel from all US services and 5 contributing nations distributed throughout central and eastern Afghanistan.
Two areas of concern - the ANA and the ANP - the problems and recommendations:Stratfor said:
(i) Col (Rtd) Jeff Haynes* writes on 'Reforming the Afghan National Army (ANA)' in November 2009. NPS also has a 'Summary on the ANA'. This piece is longer but necessary to set the stage to critique the ANA. which provides the background for Jeff Haynes.
(ii) Robert A. Wehrle writing for Washington Times on February 21, 2010 says that 'Afghan mess bigger than we thought'. This article is mercifully short and concise on the conceptual problems with the current approach, in particular, the weak link called the ANP. There's also a companion piece called 'Reforming the ANP', which is longer and more detailed than the piece by Robert A. Wehrle.
In reality all these articles quoted above are external view points and I find that we are really lacking articles written by the Afghans themselves. Therefore I've included a link to an article (to a 17 page pdf) written by Ali A. Jalali. He was the Interior Minister of Afghanistan from January 2003 to September 2005. His expressed view sees the situation as more complex and has a focus beyond the immediate problems of the ANA and ANP.
--------------------------------
*Note: Jeff Haynes recently retired as a Colonel from the United States Marine Corps after 24 years of service. During 2008, he commanded Regional Corps Advisory Command-Central where he advised the Afghan National Army’s 201st Corps Commanding General and staff. Concurrently, Colonel Haynes commanded 23 Embedded Training Teams consisting of over 600 advisors and support personnel from all US services and 5 contributing nations distributed throughout central and eastern Afghanistan.
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AfghanAmbush
New Member
I don't have time right now to explain every detail of this war but here is some insight.
The only way to beat the insurgency in Afghanistan is to stay there for about five more years but i don't think thats going to happen and at the end of the day the insurgents still have power. The Taliban are simply going to outlast the forces. For all of you who think that Opium brings them most of their money, your wrong. The insurgency does get some money off it but not at the extent that most people think, at one point the taliban almost eradicated opium from Afghanistan. The western intelligence and DEA have good control of the drug trade. The Taliban will not be bribed and part of the population support them, with resources and men (mostly pashtuns) but also some in the north. I've spoken with people recently from Kabul, they tell me that the U.S is not helping at all and even people in Kabul distrust the Americans. They do like the Germans, Japanese and the Indians who actually help the population and do it for free. You have to understand that the ISI is also connected to the Taliban, hence the recent attack that targets the guest houses (mostly Indians). The recent capture of the taliban commander is also not that surprising for most there because he was actually taking to the government (peace talks) and he might have had a little to much power. My guess is that the ISI gave him up before he did talk to the west or became too powerful. This war is not going to end pretty specially with the amount of civilians killed recently. From what I hear from Kabul, ordinary people who dislike the Taliban also dislike the Americans involvement and tactics and this is probably the worst news I've herd.
The only way to beat the insurgency in Afghanistan is to stay there for about five more years but i don't think thats going to happen and at the end of the day the insurgents still have power. The Taliban are simply going to outlast the forces. For all of you who think that Opium brings them most of their money, your wrong. The insurgency does get some money off it but not at the extent that most people think, at one point the taliban almost eradicated opium from Afghanistan. The western intelligence and DEA have good control of the drug trade. The Taliban will not be bribed and part of the population support them, with resources and men (mostly pashtuns) but also some in the north. I've spoken with people recently from Kabul, they tell me that the U.S is not helping at all and even people in Kabul distrust the Americans. They do like the Germans, Japanese and the Indians who actually help the population and do it for free. You have to understand that the ISI is also connected to the Taliban, hence the recent attack that targets the guest houses (mostly Indians). The recent capture of the taliban commander is also not that surprising for most there because he was actually taking to the government (peace talks) and he might have had a little to much power. My guess is that the ISI gave him up before he did talk to the west or became too powerful. This war is not going to end pretty specially with the amount of civilians killed recently. From what I hear from Kabul, ordinary people who dislike the Taliban also dislike the Americans involvement and tactics and this is probably the worst news I've herd.
AfghanAmbush, I'm sure you could speak on this more accurately than myself, but isn't opium, even without Taliban links, harmful to the long-term stability of Afghanistan both regionally and nationally?
I say that because opium, while it does generate a livelihood for farmers, also creates severe addictions to the drug, resulting in severe poverty and destitution which could hold Afghanistan back or could become a factor in provoking rebellion or dissent several years down the road.
Have any official figures been released about the number of Afghan civilians killed by mistake since 2001 by coalition airstrikes/artillery?
Some Afghanistan videos:
[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OWsmJIwe9Q4"]YouTube- Conversations With History - Ahmed Rashid[/ame]
[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dymGck_j8BY"]YouTube- Paki Ahmad Rashid Exclusive; "Taliban Willing To Talk"[/ame]
[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iT847FtAWQw"]YouTube- Interview with Peter Jouvenal[/ame]
[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yo6WI9nnlOs"]YouTube- Riz Khan - General Stanley McChrystal - 9 Dec 09 - Part 1[/ame]
[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EvYglyjbHkI"]YouTube- Massoud's Last Stand - Afghanistan[/ame]
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