The World Doesn't Have a Pakistan Nukes Problem ... It Has a David Albright Problem

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SABRE

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The World Doesn't Have a Pakistan Nukes Problem ...

It Has a David Albright Problem


By Peter Lee

May 20, 2009 "
Counterpunch" -- - As AFP tells us, the Institute for Science and International Security just published a report on Pakistan’s nuclear program that seems designed to pour gasoline on the “the Pakistani nuclear program is outta control” story.
And, when you look at the story, there isn’t a whole lot of there there.
The commercial [satellite] images reveal a major expansion of a chemical plant complex near Dera Ghazi Kahn that produces uranium hexalfuoride and uranium metal, materials used to produce nuclear weapons.
Big whoop, I must say. The Pakistanis love their nuclear weapons, and it’s not surprising—as a sovereign state outside the NPT—they might decide to make some more.
The only conceivable takeaway from this report is muddled alarmism, which ISIS obligingly provides.
Given turmoil in Pakistan with the army waging war against Taliban militants in the northwest, the ISIS said the "security of its nuclear assets remains in question."
"An expansion in nuclear weapons production capabilities needlessly complicates efforts to improve the security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets," it said.
I don’t get it. How are things suddenly more complicated by an expansion in capacity?


Washington, apparently believing that it doesn’t have enough on its plate with al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistan Taliban, is suddenly awash with dramatic plans to add a self-created problem to the mix: a quixotic effort to wrest Pakistan’s nuclear weapons out of the hands of the Army if the situation deteriorates.


And selling that idea seems to require fomenting an irrational panic concerning Pakistan’s nuclear program, as a metastasizing cancerous problem that’s getting BIGGER and BIGGER if we don’t DO SOMETHING.
You know what it smells like to me?


It smells like an effort by some to put a radical U.S. nuclear counterproliferation doctrine on the table now, so when it’s the end of the year and it’s time to deal with that other Muslim country with the destabilizing nuclear capability—you know, the one on the other side of Afghanistan, the one that the Israelis are so upset about—public opinion has been primed to accept the idea that some combination of air strikes, special ops, and insertion of U.S. forces is needed to save the world from an Islamic nuclear program that’s…outta control!


A crisis in Pakistan—and high-profile U.S. handwringing over those dangerous Muslim nukes—might be the best thing that happens to Benjamin Netanyahu this year.


We’ll see.


Anyway, I don’t think we have a Pakistan nukes problem.
We have a reckless and cynical fearmongering problem that should ring alarm bells for anybody who remembers the Iraq war.


In a small way, I think we also have a David Albright problem.


ISIS is run by David Albright.


Scott Ritter delivered a devastating rip job on Albright in Truthdig last year, entitled The Nuclear Expert Who Never Was.


He characterized Albright as a dilettante wannabe nuclear weapons guy, who has self-promoted himself, his honorary doctorate, and his institute using the flimsiest of pretexts.


More importantly, Ritter identifies Albright’s key credential as a willingness to offer up uninformed and tendentious alarmism when the situation demands it.
Ritter’s conclusion sums up his feelings about Albright’s role in the nuclear non-proliferation debate:
Albright, operating under the guise of his creation, ISIS, has a track record of inserting hype and speculation about matters of great sensitivity in a manner which skews the debate toward the worst-case scenario. Over time Albright often moderates his position, but the original sensationalism still remains, serving the purpose of imprinting a negative image in the psyche of public opinion. This must stop. It is high time the mainstream media began dealing with David Albright for what he is (a third-rate reporter and analyst), and what he isn’t (a former U.N. weapons inspector, doctor, nuclear physicist or nuclear expert). It is time for David Albright, the accidental inspector, to exit stage right. Issues pertaining to nuclear weapons and their potential proliferation are simply too serious to be handled by amateurs and dilettantes.
Amen to that.
Peter Lee is a business man who has spent thirty years observing, analyzing, and writing on Asian affairs. Lee can be reached at peterrlee-2000@yahoo.

http://www.counterpunch.org/lee05202009.html
 
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SABRE

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The Nuclear Expert Who Never Was

The Nuclear Expert Who Never Was
http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/20080626_the_nuclear_expert_who_never_was/

Posted on Jun 26, 2008


By Scott Ritter

Editor’s note: Frank von Hippel has written a response to this column in the comments below. Click here to read his rebuttal.

PART-1

I am a former U.N. weapons inspector. I started my work with the United Nations in September 1991, and between that date and my resignation in August 1998, I participated in over 30 inspections, 14 as chief inspector. The United Nations Special Commission, or UNSCOM, was the organization mandated by the Security Council with the implementation of its resolutions requiring Iraq to be disarmed of its weapons-of-mass-destruction capabilities. While UNSCOM oversaw the areas of chemical and biological weapons, and ballistic missiles, it shared the nuclear file with the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA. As such, UNSCOM, through a small cell of nuclear experts on loan from the various national weapons laboratories, would coordinate with the nuclear safeguards inspectors from the IAEA, organized into an “Action Team” dedicated to the Iraq nuclear disarmament problem. UNSCOM maintained political control of the process, insofar as its executive chairman was the only one authorized to approve a given inspection mission. At first, the IAEA and UNSCOM shared the technical oversight of the inspection process, but soon this was transferred completely to the IAEA’s Action Team, and UNSCOM’s nuclear staff assumed more of an advisory and liaison function.

In August 1992 I began cooperating closely with IAEA’s Action Team, traveling to Vienna, where the IAEA maintained its headquarters. The IAEA had in its possession a huge cache of documents seized from Iraq during a series of inspections in the summer of 1991 and, together with other U.N. inspectors, I was able to gain access to these documents for the purpose of extracting any information which might relate to UNSCOM’s non-nuclear mission. These documents proved to be very valuable in that regard, and a strong working relationship was developed. Over the coming years I frequently traveled to Vienna, where I came to know the members of the IAEA Action Team as friends and dedicated professionals. Whether poring over documents, examining bits and pieces of equipment (the IAEA kept a sample of an Iraqi nuclear centrifuge in its office) or ruminating about the difficult political situation that was Iraq over wine and cheese on a Friday afternoon, I became familiar with the core team of experts who composed the IAEA Action Team.

I bring up this history because during the entire time of my intense, somewhat intimate cooperation with the IAEA Action Team, one name that never entered into the mix was David Albright. Albright is the president of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS, an institute which he himself founded), and has for some time now dominated the news as the “go-to” guy for the U.S. mainstream media when they need “expert opinion” on news pertaining to nuclear issues. Most recently, Albright could be seen commenting on a report he authored, released by ISIS on June 16, in which he discusses the alleged existence of a computer owned by Swiss-based businessmen who were involved in the A.Q. Khan nuclear black market ring. According to Albright, this computer contained sensitive design drawings of a small, sophisticated nuclear warhead which, he speculates, could fit on a missile delivery system such as that possessed by Iran.

I have no objection to an academically based think tank capable of producing sound analysis about the myriad nuclear-based threats the world faces today. But David Albright has a track record of making half-baked analyses derived from questionable sources seem mainstream. He breathes false legitimacy into these factually challenged stories by cloaking himself in a résumé which is disingenuous in the extreme. Eventually, one must begin to question the motives of Albright and ISIS. No self-respecting think tank would allow itself to be used in such an egregious manner. The fact that ISIS is a creation of Albright himself, and as such operates as a mirror image of its founder and president, only underscores the concerns raised when an individual lacking in any demonstrable foundation of expertise has installed himself into the mainstream media in a manner that corrupts the public discourse and debate by propagating factually incorrect, illogical and misleading information.

In his résumé Albright prominently advertises himself as a “former U.N. weapons inspector.” Indeed, this is the first thing that is mentioned when he describes himself to the public. Witness an Op-Ed piece in The Washington Post which he jointly authored with Jacqueline Shire in January 2008, wherein he is described as such: “David Albright, a former U.N. weapons inspector, is president of the Institute for Science and International Security.” His erstwhile U.N. credentials appear before his actual job title. Now, this is not uncommon. I do the same thing when describing myself, noting that I was a former U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1998. I feel comfortable doing this, because it’s true and because my résumé is relevant to my writing. In his official ISIS biography, Albright details his “U.N. inspector” experience as such: “Albright cooperated actively with the IAEA Action Team from 1992 until 1997, focusing on analyses of Iraqi documents and past procurement activities. In June 1996, he was the first non-governmental inspector of the Iraqi nuclear program. On this inspection mission, Albright questioned members of Iraq’s former uranium enrichment programs about their statements in Iraq’s draft Full, Final, and Complete Declaration.”

Now, as I have explained previously, I cooperated actively between 1992 and 1998 with the IAEA Action team, covering the same ground that David Albright claims to have. I do not doubt his assertion that he was in contact with the IAEA during the period claimed; I just doubt the use of the word actively to describe this cooperation. Maybe Albright was part of a top-secret “shadow” inspection activity that I was unaware of. I strongly doubt this. In 1992, when Albright states he began his “active cooperation” with the IAEA, he was serving as a “Senior Staff Scientist” with the Federation of American Scientists. That same year Albright, in collaboration with Frans Berkhout of Sussex University and William Walker of the University of St. Andrews, published “World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium,” 1992 (SIPRI and Oxford University Press). From March 1991 until July 1992, Albright, together with Mark Hibbs, wrote a series of seven articles on the Iraqi nuclear weapons programs for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. The final three articles of this series, entitled “Iraq’s Bomb: Blueprints and Artifacts,” “Iraq: It’s all over at Al Atheer” and “Iraq’s shop-till-you-drop nuclear program,” were in part based upon information provided to Albright and Hibbs by the IAEA in response to questions posed by the two authors. So far as I can tell, this is the true nature of David Albright’s “active cooperation.” Far from being a subject-matter expert brought in by the IAEA to review Iraqi documents, Albright was simply an outsider with questions.

In the November/December 1995 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Albright wrote an article, co-authored with Robert Kelley, titled “Has Iraq come clean at last?” I know Bob Kelley. In August 1992, it was Kelley, then deputy to Action Team leader Maurizio Zifferero, who helped me and other UNSCOM inspectors gain access to the Iraqi documents under IAEA control. Kelley was, and is, a great safeguards inspector, and among his many accomplishments is his leading role in directing the IAEA’s investigation into South Africa’s unilaterally dismantled nuclear weapons program in the mid-1990s. Bob Kelley had served as David Albright’s “in” at the IAEA since 1992, when he started providing Albright with access to some of the IAEA’s information on Iraq’s nuclear program. The decision to jointly author an article on Iraq was a big step toward legitimizing what had been, up until that time, an informal relationship.

The joint article with Kelley gave Albright a legitimacy within the IAEA, to the extent that there were no objections when Kelley recommended inviting Albright to participate in a surge of inspections. It was during the aftermath of the defection of Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, Hussein Kamal, in August 1995, and the subsequent turning over of a massive quantity of previously hidden documents, including those pertaining to nuclear issues. These activities served as the framework around which Albright and Kelley wrote their article. The June 1996 inspection Albright participated in was his one and only foray into Iraq as a weapons inspector. He was not a chief inspector, nor a deputy chief inspector, nor an operations officer. He was a minor member of the team, Bob Kelley’s bag boy, who for the most part was there to observe. In a round-table discussion with Iraqi nuclear scientists, attended by all of the inspectors, Albright was able to ask a few questions, not from the standpoint of an IAEA expert, but more as an informed tourist.
 

SABRE

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PART-2

I was in Iraq at the time, spearheading the very controversial UNSCOM 150 inspection, which found our team barred from entering several sensitive sites in and around Baghdad. On the few occasions when I was able to spend some down time at the U.N. headquarters on Canal Street, I would catch up with the status of the other inspections taking place in Iraq at the same time, including the one Albright was attached to. From all accounts, his lone stint as an inspector was at best unremarkable. He was a dilettante in every sense of the word, a Walter Mitty-like character in a world of genuine U.N. inspectors. There was recognition among most involved that bringing an outsider such as David Albright into the inspection process was a mistake. Not only did he lack any experience in the nuclear weapons field (being an outsider with only secondhand insight into limited aspects of the Iraqi program), he had no credibility with the Iraqi nuclear scientists, and his questions, void of any connectivity with the considerable record of interaction between the IAEA and Iraq, were not taken seriously by either side. Albright left Iraq in June 1996, and was never again invited back.

This is the reality of the relationship between Albright and the IAEA, and the singular event in his life which he uses as the justification for prominently promoting himself as a “former U.N. inspector.” While not outright fraud, Albright’s self-promoted relationship with the IAEA, and his status as a “former U.N. inspector,” is at best disingenuous, all the more so since he exploits this misleading biographical data in his ongoing effort to insert himself into the public eye as a nuclear weapons expert, a title not supported by anything in his life experience.

I can’t say for certain when Albright became “Doctor” Albright. A self-described “physicist,” he allows the term to linger, as he does the title “former U.N. inspector,” in order to create the impression that he possesses a certain gravitas. David Albright holds a master of science degree in physics from Indiana University and a master of science in mathematics from Wright State University. I imagine that this résumé permits him to assign himself the title physicist, but not in the Robert Oppenheimer/Edward Teller sense of the word. Whatever physics work Albright may or may not have done in his life, one thing is certain: He has never worked as a nuclear physicist on any program dedicated to the design and/or manufacture of nuclear weapons. He has never designed nuclear weapons and never conducted mathematical calculations in support of testing nuclear weapons, nor has he ever worked in a facility or with an organization dedicated to either.

At best, Albright is an observer of things nuclear. But to associate his sub-par physics pedigree with genuine nuclear weapons-related work is, like his self-promotion as a “former U.N. weapons inspector,” disingenuous in the extreme. His lack of any advanced educational training as a nuclear physicist, combined with his dearth of practical experience with things nuclear, is further exacerbated by his astounding assumption of the title Doctor. In 2007 Albright received an honorary doctorate of humane letters from Wright State University. This honorary award is a recognition that should never be belittled, but it in no way elevates Albright to the status of one who has undergone the formal educational training and has actually earned a doctorate, especially in the demanding field of nuclear physics. While I cannot find any evidence of Albright promoting his honorary title in a manner that indicates direct fraud on his part (i.e., falsely claiming to be a Ph.D. in physics), there are far too many instances where he is referred to by those who interview him as being both “Dr. Albright” and a “physicist” that the uninformed reader might be misled into believing that the two were somehow connected.

Albright has spent the past decade building a solid reputation as an analyst of nuclear issues. One only need look at the impressive work he and ISIS have done on the issue of North Korea to understand the potential he brings to the table as an outside observer on nuclear matters. Informed interest, combined with sustained access to critical personalities on both sides of an issue, makes for insights and opinions that contribute in a positive manner to the overall public discourse. No one who is interested in facilitating informed debate, discussion and dialogue about issues such as those facing us in North Korea, Iran and elsewhere can deny the value Albright brings to the table. That his insight into these matters should be shared with members of the media is likewise something that should be encouraged.

But an analyst must be viewed in the proper perspective, and this begins by correctly defining who and what one is. David Albright is not a former U.N. weapons inspector, but rather an accidental tourist. To call oneself a weapons inspector suggests that one participated in the totality of the inspection process, and as such can converse readily, based on firsthand experience, about the total spectrum of issues that entails. Albright, based on his flimsy résumé in this regard, is not capable of such, and therefore should stop referring to himself in this manner, and encourage the media to do the same. Likewise, all reference to Albright as “Dr. Albright” should be eliminated, as should any reference which places the words physicist and nuclear in proximity. Let his work be judged on its own merit, and not camouflaged behind misleading perceptions created through false advertising.

In that he never has designed or worked in a nuclear reactor, never has designed or worked on nuclear weapons, in fact never has done anything of a practical, hands-on nature in the nuclear field, to call Albright an expert is a disservice to the term and, again, misleading in the extreme. It is not a sin to merely be informed, or to possess a specialty. But informed specialists are a dime a dozen. There is a reason mainstream media do not turn to bloggers when seeking out expert opinion. And yet, when they turn to “Dr. Albright, former U.N. weapons inspector,” they are getting little more than a well-funded, well-connected blogger. If one takes a closer look at the ISIS Report published by Albright on June 16 and widely quoted in the press since then, one will realize that there simply isn’t any substance to the allegations. Albright’s sole source seems to be a single, unnamed IAEA official, bringing to mind Bob Kelley and his role in facilitating Albright’s “access” to the IAEA in the 1990s. The remainder of the report comprises information already available to the general public, or sheer speculation.

This is, of course, the problem when someone who is not an expert on a given subject attempts to portray himself as just that. Lacking in the foundation of knowledge and experience which generally is expected of a genuine expert, the false “expert” commits error after error, not only of the factual sort but also in judgment. Had Albright in fact been a true nuclear expert, especially one fortified with firsthand experience as a former U.N. weapons inspector, he would not have had any association with Khidir Hamza, the disgraced Iraqi defector who claimed to have firsthand knowledge of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear program. A true nuclear expert would have recognized the technical impossibilities and inconsistencies in Hamza’s fabrications. And a genuine former U.N. weapons inspector would have known that Hamza had been fingered as a fraud by the IAEA and UNSCOM. David Albright instead employed Hamza as an analyst with ISIS from 1997 until 1999.

Albright likewise facilitated the story of former Iraqi nuclear scientist Mahdi Obeidi being told to the world. As a “former U.N. weapons inspector,” Albright had a passing knowledge of Obeidi; the Iraqi was among the scientists that the IAEA team Albright served on questioned in June 1996 (Albright himself claims to have personally questioned Obeidi). Albright helped sell Obeidi’s story about buried uranium centrifuge parts to the media, even though a true nuclear expert would have known that what Obeidi claims to have hidden possessed absolutely no value in the field of nuclear enrichment, and any former U.N. weapons inspector worth his or her salt would have recognized the inconsistencies and improbabilities in the Obeidi story.

David Albright has a history of being used by those who seek to gain media attention for their respective claims. In addition to the Hamza and Obeidi fiascos, Albright and his organization, ISIS, have served as the conduit for other agencies gaining publicity about the alleged Iranian nuclear weapons program, the alleged Syrian nuclear reactor, and most recently the alleged Swiss computer containing sensitive nuclear design information. On each occasion, Albright is fed sensitive information from a third party, and then packages it in a manner that is consumable by the media. The media, engrossed with Albright’s misleading résumé (“former U.N. weapons inspector,” “Doctor,” “physicist” and “nuclear expert”), give Albright a full hearing, during which time the particulars the third-party source wanted made public are broadcast or printed for all the world to see. More often than not, it turns out that the core of the story pushed by Albright is, in fact, wrong.

While Iran did indeed possess uranium enrichment capability at Natanz and a heavy water plant (under construction) at Arak (as reported by Albright thanks to information provided by the Iranian opposition group MEK, most probably with the help of Israeli intelligence), Albright’s wild speculation about weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium proved to be wrong. There was indeed a building in Syria that was bombed by Israel. But Albright’s expert opinion, derived from his interpretation of photographs, consists of nothing more than simplistic observation (“The tall building in the image may house a reactor under construction and the pump station along the river may have been intended to supply cooling water to the reactor”) combined with unfocused questions that assumed much, but were in fact based on little (“How far along was the reactor construction project when it was bombed? What was the extent of nuclear assistance from North Korea? Which reactor components did Syria obtain from North Korea or elsewhere, and where are they now?”). And, most recently, we have Albright commenting about the contents of a computer he hasn’t even laid eyes on, though he feels confident enough to raise the specter of global nuclear catastrophe (“How will authorities learn if Iran, North Korea, or even terrorists bought these designs?” Albright asks when referring to the contents of the Swiss computer).

Nowhere in his résumé does Albright cite any formal training as a photographic interpreter; in any case, one would have to have an intimate knowledge of nuclear facilities in order to know what one was looking at when examining an aerial image. A genuine nuclear weapons expert would have been able to discern the technical faults in the logic of the stories being peddled by Albright. And a genuine former U.N. weapons inspector, well versed in preparing airtight investigations based upon verified intelligence information, would have balked at the shabby nature of the evidence provided. Again, because Albright is neither, he and ISIS play the role of patsy, the middleman peddling misinformation to a media too lazy to conduct their own due diligence before running with a story.

Albright, operating under the guise of his creation, ISIS, has a track record of inserting hype and speculation about matters of great sensitivity in a manner which skews the debate toward the worst-case scenario. Over time Albright often moderates his position, but the original sensationalism still remains, serving the purpose of imprinting a negative image in the psyche of public opinion. This must stop. It is high time the mainstream media began dealing with David Albright for what he is (a third-rate reporter and analyst), and what he isn’t (a former U.N. weapons inspector, doctor, nuclear physicist or nuclear expert). It is time for David Albright, the accidental inspector, to exit stage right. Issues pertaining to nuclear weapons and their potential proliferation are simply too serious to be handled by amateurs and dilettantes.

Scott Ritter was a U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1998.
 

SABRE

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newKarala

newKarala's (Indian Source) comments on David Albright citing Scott Ritter.
New Delhi, Sep 18: Who is David Albright? And why has he again dug some dirt on India allegedly selling sensitive nuclear blueprints for as little as USD 10?



The Washington Post has published a report titled "'06 Blueprint Leak Intensifies Concerns Over US-India Deal" based solely on an interview with Albright, who is described in the article as "a former UN weapons inspector" - on the day the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations met to review the implementing 123 agreement to fast-track its approval by US Congress.

Albright is the founder and president of the non-governmental Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) and the author of several books on proliferation of atomic weapons.

But those who wish to dig deeper into Albright's background should listen to what John Ritter, chief UN weapons inspector in the crucial 1991-1998 period, says about Albright, a darling of the press in Washington. Ritter is not the kind to indulge in frivolous polemics as he was the who played the iconoclast and argued that Iraq possessed no significant weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) just before the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003.

Ritter, in an article on his blog entitled "The Weapons Inspector Who Never Was", says of Albright: "In that he never has designed or worked in a nuclear reactor, never has designed or worked on nuclear weapons, in fact never has done anything of a practical, hands-on nature in the nuclear field, to call Albright an expert is a disservice to the term and, again, misleading in the extreme."

"David Albright has a history of being used by those who seek to gain media attention for their respective claims. Albright and his organization, ISIS, have served as the conduit for other agencies gaining publicity about the alleged Iranian nuclear weapons program, the alleged Syrian nuclear reactor, and most recently the alleged Swiss computer containing sensitive nuclear design information."

"On each occasion, Albright is fed sensitive information from a third party, and then packages it in a manner that is consumable by the media," says Ritter, while describing Albright as "little more than a well-funded, well-connected blogger".

"The media, engrossed with Albright's misleading résumé ('former U.N. weapons inspector', 'Doctor', 'physicist' and 'nuclear expert'), give Albright a full hearing, during which time the particulars the third-party source wanted made public are broadcast or printed for all the world to see."

"More often than not, it turns out that the core of the story pushed by Albright is, in fact, wrong," says Ritter.

--- IANS
 

veracity

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Albright has surely made a fortune out of Pakistan's nuclear waepon program... Showing the outdated imageries of Pakistan's nuclear sites, he is bent on assuring the world of the expansion of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal...I wonder if somebody can come up with, when was he a UN inspector and for how long.
 

powerslavenegi

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Don't know about Albright but Khan and his network surely have made lotsa cash.Tthere are zillions of articles from credible and irrefutable sources highlighting the clandestine ops carried out by AQ Khan and his cartel.

Here for a start from 'americanprogress'

A Report Half Empty: Iran Needs to Level with the IAEA

By Joseph Cirincione, Andrew J. Grotto | November 16, 2007


The IAEA report also says that Iran has finally handed over a controversial 15-page document on how to convert UF6 to uranium metal and casting it into hemispheres—a process used to form the cores of nuclear weapons, but one that has no civilian use. The report explicitly tags Pakistan as the source of the document, provided to Iran by nuclear black marketeer A.Q. Khan.
 

powerslavenegi

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More...AQKhan confesses about proliferating N-tech to North Korea... :D

A.Q. Khan: N. Korea received centrifuges from Pakistan with Musharraf's consent

North Korea received centrifuges from Pakistan in a 2000 shipment supervised by the army during the rule of President Pervez Musharraf, disgraced nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan said Friday.

Khan told The Associated Press in a telephone interview that the uranium enrichment equipment was sent from Pakistan in a North Korean plane that was loaded under the supervision of Pakistani security officials.

His claims contradict his 2004 confession that he was solely responsible for spreading nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya — and Pakistan's repeated denials its army or government knew about Khan's nuclear proliferation activities.

Khan said the army had "complete knowledge" of the shipment of used P-1 centrifuges to North Korea and that it must have been sent with the consent of Musharraf, the then-army chief who took power in a 1999 coup.

"It was a North Korean plane, and the army had complete knowledge about it and the equipment," Khan said. "It must have gone with his (Musharraf's) consent."
So its not just Khan network but Govt of Pakistan too seems to be involved in this.So Albright's and NPA fears are legitimate and there for a reason. :p:
 

powerslavenegi

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I wonder what this thread wishes to achieve in first in first place ? Albrights' credentials notwithstanding there are umpteen articles and resources declassified by IAEA and the US government which clearly highlight the AQ Khan and his involvement in nuclear proliferation.

Infact what better than the accused himslef confessing to his crimes before the whole world.

Here from carnegieendowment a complete history of Khan's deeds.

A. Q. Khan Nuclear Chronology

And here from TIME magazine

The Man Who Sold the Bomb
Nirvavana eh...:)

For more than a decade, Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, masterminded a vast, clandestine and hugely profitable enterprise whose mission boiled down to this: selling to a rogues' gallery of nations the technology and equipment to make nuclear weapons. Among Khan's customers were Iran and North Korea--two countries identified by Bush as members of the "axis of evil," whose nuclear ambitions present the U.S. with two of its biggest foreign policy quandaries. At a moment when the international community is focused on a potential showdown with Iran, a TIME investigation has revealed that Khan's network played a bigger role in helping Tehran and Pyongyang than had been previously disclosed. U.S. intelligence officials believe Khan sold North Korea much of the material needed to build a bomb, including high-speed centrifuges used to enrich uranium and the equipment required to manufacture more of them. Officials are worried--but have not yet seen proof--that Khan gave those countries rudimentary but effective designs for nuclear warheads. Officials in Washington and at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna say they suspect that Iran may have bought the same set of goods--centrifuges and possibly weapons designs--from Khan in the mid-1990s. Although the IAEA says so far it has not found definitive proof that Iran has a weapons program, its investigators told TIME that Tehran has privately confirmed at least 13 meetings from 1994 to 1999 with representatives of Khan's network.
 
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mysterious

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User 'powerslavenegi', it seems that you have completely missed the point behind the thread in your endless bickering that is derived from your prejudice of anything Pakistani. Your antics are well-known in other forums as well.

Whether Pakistan transferred nuclear blueprints to Iran and Libya or not is a moot point since all major powers have proliferated their nuclear know-how strategically to 'allies'. Even the world's 'largest democracy' has half a dozen nuclear-tech related firms on American blacklist for their dealings with Iran.

Point of the thread is to show that the hype created by so-called 'experts' of the day about Pakistani nuclear weapons falling in to non-state actors' hands, is ludicrously over-stated.
 

powerslavenegi

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User 'powerslavenegi', it seems that you have completely missed the point behind the thread in your endless bickering that is derived from your prejudice of anything Pakistani. Your antics are well-known in other forums as well.
I have posted hard facts from credible sources which source info from individuals who do this thing for a living ; your point about me being prejudiced does not hold any ground for my prejudices don't matter what matters is the truth on ground.

Whether Pakistan transferred nuclear blueprints to Iran and Libya or not is a moot point since all major powers have proliferated their nuclear know-how strategically to 'allies'. Even the world's 'largest democracy' has half a dozen nuclear-tech related firms on American blacklist for their dealings with Iran.
Two wrongs do not make a RIGHT or do they ? And your analogy is flawed there is difference between STATE sponsored proliferation to rogue states and sale of dual use equipment by private entities who might be oblivious to the end user/use of the equipment in question.
The US entities fall under the latter category while the former is the case of AQ Khan network and this has been accepted by the AQ Khan in his interview with the BBC.

Point of the thread is to show that the hype created by so-called 'experts' of the day about Pakistani nuclear weapons falling in to non-state actors' hands, is ludicrously over-stated.
Well that is the point of view of the individual who started the thread and he/she might have his own prejudices/bias while doing so and I am fine with that . But then when I post facts which prove otherwise deal with them instead of crying foul about bias etc etc.

I am yet to see a single document or artifact from a credible source from you that substantiates your point of view ; your individual opinion on this matter means nothing.

Here again to quote Pakistan's father of nuclear bomb AQ Khan

"It was a North Korean plane, and the army had complete knowledge about it and the equipment," Khan said. "It must have gone with his (Musharraf's) consent."


And this pretty much explains the recent tests which NoKo conducted ; are we to assume that these are harmless and for peaceful purposes only ?
 

mysterious

New Member
I have posted hard facts from credible sources which source info from individuals who do this thing for a living ; your point about me being prejudiced does not hold any ground for my prejudices don't matter what matters is the truth on ground.
And I wouldn't be surprised to learn that you visit various forums all day long to hunt Pakistan-related threads to rant about as a means of living.


Two wrongs do not make a RIGHT or do they ? And your analogy is flawed there is difference between STATE sponsored proliferation to rogue states and sale of dual use equipment by private entities who might be oblivious to the end user/use of the equipment in question.
The US entities fall under the latter category while the former is the case of AQ Khan network and this has been accepted by the AQ Khan in his interview with the BBC.
Yes, two wrongs do not make a right. There is nothing in my post to suggest that I was referring to sale of dual-use equipment. Proliferation is proliferation - no matter how many shades of gray you'd like to assign to the issue to satisfy your whims.

Well that is the point of view of the individual who started the thread and he/she might have his own prejudices/bias while doing so and I am fine with that . But then when I post facts which prove otherwise deal with them instead of crying foul about bias etc etc.

I am yet to see a single document or artifact from a credible source from you that substantiates your point of view ; your individual opinion on this matter means nothing.

Here again to quote Pakistan's father of nuclear bomb AQ Khan

"It was a North Korean plane, and the army had complete knowledge about it and the equipment," Khan said. "It must have gone with his (Musharraf's) consent."


And this pretty much explains the recent tests which NoKo conducted ; are we to assume that these are harmless and for peaceful purposes only ?
While this thread is meant to debate the possibility of Pakistan's nuclear weapons falling in to the hands of non-state actors through sabotage, collusion, etc; you are stuck on A. Q. Khan since your first post. You 'presume' that people in here are somehow denying that Pakistan's nuclear tech ended up in Iran or elsewhere. That is not the case.

Case in point then, to use your own theory of different 'types' of proliferation, would be that A. Q. Khan's dealings were with 'states'; he did not provide any nuclear know-how or tech to any non-state actors to begin with. Hence the threat of Pakistan's nuclear-tech falling in to wrong hands [read, Non-State Actors] is blown out of proportions by pseudo-experts trying to make a name for themselves and newbies trying to carve out careers - much as was the case during Cold War when idiots became 'advisers' in influential places for predicting that the Soviet Union would stay on forever as the 'red devil'.

David Albright is the same person who claimed that blue-prints for nuclear-related tech were available in India for as little as $10; for which Indians lashed out at him vehemently. Now if you want to assign 'credibility' to David Albright simply because this time its Pakistan that is being criticized, that is your prerogative.

This is how ignorance and sensationalism combine to form a deadly combustive mix:
Have Pakistani Nuclear Facilities Already Been Attacked? - The Lede Blog - NYTimes.com

A little known report prepared by a British 'expert' Shaun Gregory, in the Sentinel was quickly snapped up by Indian media to paint the Pakistani nuclear bogeyman. That resulted in New York Times [the one American media outlet that cannot get folks to visit its website without publishing sensational Pakistan stories] doing a 'blog analysis' - only for its claims to be shot down by American intelligence officials and later by Mr Gregory himself.
 

powerslavenegi

New Member
And I wouldn't be surprised to learn that you visit various forums all day long to hunt Pakistan-related threads to rant about as a means of living.
You needn't worry about my means of making a living and yes stop speculating on my whereabouts; it would be better if you stick to the topic at hand .It seems you are taking this topic too personally for what ever reasons. :vamp


Yes, two wrongs do not make a right. There is nothing in my post to suggest that I was referring to sale of dual-use equipment. Proliferation is proliferation - no matter how many shades of gray you'd like to assign to the issue to satisfy your whims.
No you are wrong again.

In case of a private entity selling dual use equipment (say chips; timing switches/triggers etc) they don't know how are they gonna be used ; just like the one's which IRAN imported from SA firm 'ostensibly' for medical instrumentation.

However this is not the case with Pakistan's case where the Government itself has facilitated the trade i.e. in this case A.Q Khan and his network's dealings were overseen by the Government of Pakistan which the former has testified to .

There is a difference between rogue elements or third party private entities doing this for money when compared to a well run and disguised cartel being operated under a Government of a country.

While this thread is meant to debate the possibility of Pakistan's nuclear weapons falling in to the hands of non-state actors through sabotage, collusion, etc; you are stuck on A. Q. Khan since your first post. You 'presume' that people in here are somehow denying that Pakistan's nuclear tech ended up in Iran or elsewhere. That is not the case.
And your whole argument is based on trying to prove credibility of Mr. Albright where as I have posted information from other credible sources which rest of the civilized world deems as substantial evidence.

Re-read my posts I have no where qualified Mr. Albright's credibility I am highlighting the issue via articles from institutes which are credible.

And yes regarding denying Pakistan's role well unfortunately/fortunately no one can do it any more now that the father of Pakistan's nukes himself has testified so question of you or anyone on this fora or elsewhere refuting it does not even arise.

Lastly how hard is it for anyone on board or any other informed netizen to realize the seriousness of the situation when the entity which is responsible for security of Pakistan's nukes i.e. Government (civillian/military) itself has been guilty of facilitating nuclear proliferation
. I don't think we can attribute such reckless decision making to any individual's financial ambitions .

Case in point then, to use your own theory of different 'types' of proliferation, would be that A. Q. Khan's dealings were with 'states'; he did not provide any nuclear know-how or tech to any non-state actors to begin with.
Whoa what tripe; AQ Khan and his ilk knew what exactly they were doing and to whom they were proliferating to . This assumes greater significance in the light of reports of NoKo and Pakistan indulging in nuclear barter where the former provided latter with longer range liquid fuelled missiles in exchange of the nukes .

Here again unlike you I have credible sources to substantiate my point.

ref: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/30781.pdf
ref: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/pdf/npp/Pakistan and North Korea.pdf

Hence the threat of Pakistan's nuclear-tech falling in to wrong hands [read, Non-State Actors] is blown out of proportions by pseudo-experts trying to make a name for themselves and newbies trying to carve out careers - much as was the case during Cold War when idiots became 'advisers' in influential places for predicting that the Soviet Union would stay on forever as the 'red devil'.
Well it might not be for you , but it definitely is serious for any responsible netizen to know that a
government of country has proliferated nukes to rogue states left , right and center ; what is the guarantee that these won't be passed into hands of a 'non state actor' (now that we have a new strawman to hide behind :D) ?


David Albright is the same person who claimed that blue-prints for nuclear-related tech were available in India for as little as $10; for which Indians lashed out at him vehemently. Now if you want to assign 'credibility' to David Albright simply because this time its Pakistan that is being criticized, that is your prerogative.
First show me the paper/artcile in question where he states what you allege .

Secondly in what context ? lastly there is a hell lotta difference between 'available' and 'actually proliferated' and again we are talking about Government's involvement not leaks by individuals which mind you have even taken place in institutes likes Los-Alamos. And where does India come into all this :eek:nfloorl: ? ; but then since you have made an allegation can you provide a 'SINGLE' credible source to back your allegations ?

And why nit pick on Albright only (shooting the messenger eh ?) what about dozens of other articles being published and some directly under the federal Govt. of US ?
 
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dragonfire

New Member
Mysterious's Post -
Case in point then, to use your own theory of different 'types' of proliferation, would be that A. Q. Khan's dealings were with 'states'; he did not provide any nuclear know-how or tech to any non-state actors to begin with. Hence the threat of Pakistan's nuclear-tech falling in to wrong hands [read, Non-State Actors] is blown out of proportions
Well it might not be for you , but it definitely is serious for any responsible netizen to know that a
government of country has proliferated nukes to rogue states left , right and center ; what is the guarantee that these won't be passed into hands of a 'non state actor'
@ Mysterious

If i may interject, the fear of Pakistani nukes falling into the hands of 'non state actors' is also because there are very complex and close relations between the establishment and the various defence agencies with various non state actors who have been declared as terrorist outfits. Am sure such outfits would never mind getting and using such a weapon if the opportunity presented itself. These same outfits have been nurtured and supported in doing activities which were strategicaly important to the agencies mentioned above.

While at the same time one hopes that the Pakistani defence establishment is run by professionals and therefore the chance of the 'non state actors' being granted access is negligible under current circumstances, there is always going to be speculations about the future when circumstances are different ?
 

webmaster

Troll Hunter
Staff member
Here again unlike you I have credible sources to substantiate my point.

ref: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/30781.pdf
What is credible? It seems these days only credible piece of information is the one we want to believe or see as vehicle that can carry our argument forward. There is State Department publishing the above report in 2004 and then we have countless news reports of US government officials saying something else... so, what is credible? Five year old reports or what has been coming out of the US DoD, US State Department since 2001?

I think it is bit childish to keep focusing on AQ Khan when that guy has been humiliated and ruined and shut down, has been for past few years. His "network" did not consist of him only, or few Pakistanis, it was the whole black market that operates AROUND the world. The list includes European countries, North America, companies that profit from black market trade and so on... so mentioning AQ Khan as if he is the bogey man that we ought to be fearing only brings out our biases and shifts the focus from the real issues. While we focus on AQ Khan, the black market where AQ Khan operated still provides business to those who need it.

While we focus on dying AQ Khan and make him another bogeyman, countries around the world keep misplacing, losing and accidentally mishandle their Weapons of Mass Destruction:

Radioactive Indian items found in Sweden: nuclear agency


Australian government downplays nuclear accident


Deadly Russian Sub Accident Recalls Kursk Disaster


British, French nuclear subs collide in Atlantic: officials


Russian Nuclear Submarine Springs Radioactive Water Leak


Top Air Force Leaders Resign Following Nuclear Component


And we all have been hearing about missing Russian nukes since Soviet Union broke up, more so after 911!!! Just search the INTERNET for these and more stories... now are you going to bash these countries for acting irresponsibly with their nuclear weapons or is this about taking Pakistan down while she busy saving our asses down there in western Afghanistan-Eastern Pakistan border as we enjoy a moment to read and write this post?
 
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powerslavenegi

New Member
This is hilarious :eek:nfloorl: so nuclear proliferation cartel being run by AQ Khan and his ilk is being equated with nuclear accidents across civilian reactors and submarines . And that link of yours about radioactive material from India in sweden takes the cake.:D (it does not work either)

We are talking about FISSILE radioactive materials and other stuff which are under the purview of NPT and not any radio isotope or contaminated dump .

And it is nice to see you quoting YAHOO news as a counter argument. Ok lets take it as a evidence for now; let me quote some excerpts.




"Yesterday was another reminder that extremists ... are increasingly threatening the authority of the state," Clinton said at a press conference with British Foreign Secretary David Miliband.
So the perceived threat from militants has INCREASED as per the Vice President.

"But we see no evidence that they (the militants) are going to take over the state," the chief US diplomat said following around 90 minutes of talks that dealt extensively with Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Of course there cannot be any evidence for a event that has not taken place .

"We have confidence in the Pakistani government and the military's control over nuclear weapons," Clinton added.
And do they have a choice ? Specially after pumping in billions of dollars of aid in the war torn region.

I think its high time people on this board appreciate the difference between FACTS and OPINION .

The increasing terrorist activity and attacks on military headquarter is a FACT and there for everyone to see.

Whether the threat to nukes or other strategic weapons exists or not is an OPINION which obviously has to be based on FACTS.

I rest my case .
 

webmaster

Troll Hunter
Staff member
The point is the SAFTY and SECURITY of the nuclear weapons and material. If fissile material from India or US ends up 10k miles away, does that mean world shouldn't be concerned with its and rest of the material's safety and security? Since, its not Pakistan that is cause of those accidents and "mishaps" the world should just turn a blind eye?

AQ Khan is long gone, his network is no more, he is no longer part of the Pakistani nuclear program, the network he participated in, the black market, still operates with blessing of the western companies and businessmen. If you are really worried about nuclear weapons and their security, ask Russians about the missing briefcase nukes?

Every country has either proliferated nuclear technology to it self or to another country... and as far as FACTS are concerned, nuclear weapons technology and weapons of mass destruction should not have been proliferated INTO South Asia, back in 1974.
 

powerslavenegi

New Member
The point is the SAFTY and SECURITY of the nuclear weapons and material. If fissile material from India or US ends up 10k miles away, does that mean world shouldn't be concerned with its and rest of the material's safety and security?
I believe you realize that you are aware of the seriousness of the allegations you are making.
Show me the proof that 'FISSILE" material from Indian agencies has been found any where outside India.And please post links that work.

You seem to be totally ignorant about what does 'FISSILE' mean ; I am amused at such comments from a webmaster. :)

I hope you are aware that radioactive waste is not same as 'FISSILE' material. The former can be found behind even in any big hospital's backyard .

Since, its not Pakistan that is cause of those accidents and "mishaps" the world should just turn a blind eye?
No where else in the world the state Government itself has been found to have been involved with proliferation of 'nuclear bomb making' technology (enrichment process with centrifuges required for HEU) to 'ROGUE' states (Libya,North Korea and even IRAN).

AQ Khan is long gone, his network is no more, he is no longer part of the Pakistani nuclear program, the network he participated in, the black market, still operates with blessing of the western companies and businessmen.
AQ Khan named President Musharraf in his interview the business men from the WEST would not have been able to pull such a huge clandestine op without the support of a State Government and its machinery.AQ Khan and his team visited North Korea on board Pakistan's airforce aircrafts (again as per AQ Khan's interview).

If you are really worried about nuclear weapons and their security, ask Russians about the missing briefcase nukes?
First things first there is no such thing as a briefcase bomb in Russian inventory the smallest RU nuke RA-115s (equivalent of American tactical nuke W 54) is large enough to not fit inside a suitcase.Above is an URBAN legend which has been laughed off even by the CIA .
All in all your attempts in justifying Pakistan's proliferation track record have failed miserably.

Every country has either proliferated nuclear technology to it self or to another country... and as far as FACTS are concerned, nuclear weapons technology and weapons of mass destruction should not have been proliferated INTO South Asia, back in 1974.
Again a FALSE and a LIBELOUS statement without any PROOF.

Post some credible sources to back your allegations .
 

webmaster

Troll Hunter
Staff member
Again a FALSE and a LIBELOUS statement without any PROOF.

Post some credible sources to back your allegations .
Allegations? So, Nepal introduced nuclear weapons in South Asia in 1974? What credible evidence do you need to accept that? Or did the British leave nuclear weapons when they left India and Indians just discovered them in 1974? :rolleyes: Someone proliferated that nuclear weapons technology TO India... no? there are 7 proliferation cases ahead of Pakistan, so lets get those out of the way before we hammer AQ Khan and whatever he did and try to malign Pakistan as if it proliferates and spreads nuclear weapons while other nuclear powers continue to display recklessness with nuclear submarine accidents, nuclear reactor accidents, missing briefcase nukes, radioactive (good for dirty bombs) in steel and foreign export products!

Radioactive Indian items found in Sweden: nuclear agency


It may not concern you but that shows not only Indian radioactive material NOT safe, the non-nuclear products that are shipped out of the country may also be contaminated with radioactive material... thats of course, healthy for the world? Maybe ISI had something to do with that?

AQ Khan did what he did, he paid the price. He was part of the network that the world discovered, who else is in it, the companies that participated in it are home free. As far as him giving information to rogue states; does Iran have nuclear weapons? No. Does Libya have nuclear weapons? AQ Khan must be very bad at giving information and worst proliferator if they still can't make a bomb? Prior to AQ Khan, "reports" were that Pakistan acquired its nuclear technology from NKorea and now its AQ Khan who gave it to them... what is one to believe these days?

While AQ Khan is a good subject, it keeps Pakistan in bad lime light, hammers on ISI - we could have Al-Qaeda busy making use of those missing briefcase nukes and loose nuclear waste from former soviet states, or could be making a dirty bomb from that loose radioactive material found behind hospitals. :D

If you were to TRY to look beyond blame game politics and "must make sure I make Pakistan and ISI look bad" then maybe you will see that nuclear weapons be in it Pakistan or India or Israel or USA, is a BAD idea and it should be dealt with as such. If you introduce something in the region and 30 years later your opponent acquires the same weapons because they are THREATENED by you, then you should have the balls to at least accept that yes we introduced the weapons in South Asia and now we are sorry.

It is not just in South Asia, US vs Soviet Union had the same case: One was threatened by the other so both acquired bigger, better weapons. If Soviet Union had acquired it first, USA would certainly have followed through - thats how it works and all countries have the right to protect their national interests and do everything they can to ensure their national security.
 

mysterious

New Member
As usual, user 'powerslavenegi' has plently of time to engage in rhetorical polemic and semantics. It is clear from his endless rants that the world should only be concerned about nuclear material as long as its Pakistan that is under question - while all others get a free-pass.

A. Q. Khan was just one piece of the puzzle that constitutes the 'nuclear blackmarket'. It would be of interest for user 'powerslavenegi' to research on the dozens of Europeans nationals tried/convicted or in the process; that formed the supply chain of the black-market.

I will post a detailed response when I have the time.
 

powerslavenegi

New Member
Allegations? So, Nepal introduced nuclear weapons in South Asia in 1974? What credible evidence do you need to accept that? Or did the British leave nuclear weapons when they left India and Indians just discovered them in 1974? :rolleyes: Someone proliferated that nuclear weapons technology TO India... no? there are 7 proliferation cases ahead of Pakistan, so lets get those out of the way before we hammer AQ Khan and whatever he did and try to malign Pakistan as if it proliferates and spreads nuclear weapons while other nuclear powers continue to display recklessness with nuclear submarine accidents, nuclear reactor accidents, missing briefcase nukes, radioactive (good for dirty bombs) in steel and foreign export products!
Utter TRIPE .

Nuclear proliferation refers proliferation of technology and materials related to making nukes.India never acquired or clandestinely procured any such technology from any country.There is no evidence to back your claim , I asked for a link or a credible source and all you did is banged some keys on your keyboard. :rolleyes:

Radioactive Indian items found in Sweden: nuclear agency
It may not concern you but that shows not only Indian radioactive material NOT safe, the non-nuclear products that are shipped out of the country may also be contaminated with radioactive material... thats of course, healthy for the world? Maybe ISI had something to do with that?
Thats is why I asked you to be clear about the term 'NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION' and 'FISSILE' material.

Cobalt-60 is radioactive waste and not a fissile material and does not qualify as a proliferation risk but then I never expected you to understand such nitty gritty for obvious reasons.

AND FOR THE UNIFORMED YOU CANNOT MAKE A BOMB FROM RADIOACTIVE COBALT-60 or any NON-FISSILE MATERIAL

Anyways even in this story you seem to have googled up some random link and threw up on the keyboard.

Here read the complete story:

domain-b.com : Indian company supplies radioactive elevator buttons to Otis in France


Investigations conducted by the Indian Atomic Energy Regulatory Board at the request of the French embassy, had named Bunts, Laxmi, SKM Steels, Vipras Castings, and Pradeep Metals as suppliers of products contaminated with cobalt 60 to many countries.

The investigation found out that Bunts and Laxmi Electronics, who had sold the buttons to Mafelec, had sourced the steel from SKM Steels, which in turn had obtained the raw material containing radioactive material from a foundry called Vipras Casting, which has its factory in Khopoli, the outskirts of Mumbai.

Vipras Casting recycles scrap, purchased from dealers who import steel scraps from Europe and the US and sells it to various steel companies in India.

As it had sold 10 tonnes of steel to SKM Steels, which was used it to manufacture the elevator buttons, it was unable to tell at the moment where this lot of scarp came from.


The 20 workers at Malafec who were exposed to radioactive radiation have not reported any sickness but have been hospitalised for tests.

Mafelec Gilles Heinrich, the chief executive of Mafelec underplayed the incident, saying there was nothing toxic and there was no need to panic and added that many companies do receive such parts but do not detect them.

The French arm of the US elevator maker Otis said that it would replace all buttons in 500-600 elevators repaired between August and October throughout the country.

The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board and labour ministry is now trying to identify Indian workers who could have been exposed to the radioactive material right from the source of the raw material to the finished product.

In India, factories that handle imported steel scraps are not required to install radiation detectors to check scrap, but the government has a programme to put radiation monitors at ports to check cargo. Vipras, shaken by the incident, has installed radiation monitors to check radioactive emission on the steel scraps that enter its premises.

Experts believe that the cobalt 60 could have come from different countries, which supply scrap metal to Indian firms for recycling.

These included parts from decommissioned nuclear reactors, hospital radiation equipment, foreign ships sent to Indian ports for dismantling or the hulls of foreign nuclear submarines.

One commentator said that some western countries have been dumping their toxic wastes in India, with the Indian government having turned a blind eye. This time, the material has gone back to the western country.


India does not have strict enforcement to check radioactive hazardous waste from entering the scrap market and also lacks facilities for the decontamination of scrap.

Basically that radioactive buttons which ended up in Sweden and France were made from steel which was recovered from SCRAP which WEST had dumped in Indian Scrapyards.

And again to re-iterate in case you do not get it it is RADIOACTIVE and not FISSILE.


Prior to AQ Khan, "reports" were that Pakistan acquired its nuclear technology from NKorea and now its AQ Khan who gave it to them... what is one to believe these days?
Again do not cook up stuff ; it is a known fact that Pakistan's designs are nothing but the Chinese CHIC-4 design and this has been well documented and published information.

Unlike you again I can provide more links to substantiate.

1. China's Nuclear Exports and Assistance to Pakistan

And this from US congress itself:

http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RL34248.pdf

Islamabad gained technology from many sources. This extensive assistance is reported to have included, among other things, uranium enrichment technology from Europe, blueprints for a small nuclear weapon from China, and missile technology from China.
Clearly states China supplied the complete blueprints for a 25Kt fission device (CHIC-4) to Pakistan in 1983 .

we could have Al-Qaeda busy making use of those missing briefcase nukes and loose nuclear waste from former soviet states, or could be making a dirty bomb from that loose radioactive material found behind hospitals. :D
This is a keeper you really don't get it do you ?. No one can make a nuke from Radioactive element unless it is FISSILE and you don't get FISSILE material behind hospitals. :mad:

And coming to Al-Qaeda why do they need to depend on Soviet suitcase bomb (which itself is an urban legend). When yet another Pakistan's nuclear scientist is ready to oblige.

Here again:

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4602

Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, former director general of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), formed the Ummah Tamir-e-Nau (UTN, or Reconstruction of the Muslim Ummah) in March 2000 after his resignation from PAEC in 1999. The UTN is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and the UN. :eek:In October 2001 both Mahmood and his associate Abdul Majeed were arrested in Pakistan for their links to al-Qaeda. The UTN was floated at the behest of bin Laden for “development projects” in Afghanistan and U.S. and British intelligence agencies have confirmed that it was directly linked to al-Qaeda. Mahmood's team was trying to develop nuclear technology for bin Laden by smuggling nuclear materials from Russia and Central Asia. Mahmood and Majeed met al-Qaeda leaders twice in 2000 and in 2001 in connection with a nuclear program (Newsline, January 2002).
So it is not just AQ Khan there are more like him. :rolleyes:
 
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