The last manned fighter aircraft in the USAF

Militaryman

New Member
The last manned fighter aircraft in the USAF


Primary Function: Air dominance, multi-role fighter
Builder: Lockheed-Martin, Boeing
Power Plant: Two Pratt & Whitney F119-PW-100 turbofan engines with afterburners and two-dimensional thrust vectoring nozzles.
Thrust (each engine): 35,000-pound class.
Length: 62 feet, 1 inch (18.9 meters).
Height: 16 feet, 8 inches (5.1 meters).
Wingspan: 44 feet, 6 inches (13.6 meters).
Speed: Mach 2 class.
Ceiling: Above 50,000 feet (approximately 15 kilometers).
Empty Weight: 40,000-pound class (approximately 18,000 kilograms).
Armament: One M61A2 20-millimeter cannon with 480 rounds; side weapon bays can carry two AIM-9 infrared (heat seeking) air-to-air missiles and main weapon bays can carry (air-to-air loadout) six AIM-120 radar-guided air-to-air missiles or (air-to-ground loadout) two 1,000-pound GBU-32 JDAMs and two AIM-120 radar-guided air-to-air missiles.
Crew: One
Initial Operational Capability:
Inventory: Unavailable.
(source: USAF)

http://www.defencetalk.com/world_military_aircraft/fighters/f-22a_raptor_20060301.php

Are there any other similar aircraft under development around the world?
 
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rjmaz1

New Member
JSF - Joint Strike Fighter - F-35

That aircraft is in development now [Admin: text deleted. Play Nice!]

Put simply its a mini F-22 with a single engine.

The first test version should be flying in the next few weeks/months

However the US budget is being squeezed tight and the JSF may soon be canceled unless the test aircraft perform flawlessly.

If its canceled, then the F-22 will probably be the last manned aircraft.

Or the Boeing brings out a Super Duper Hornet for the navy.
 
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Miles

New Member
Just remember that when the Lightening was built in the 1950s for the RAF it was described as the last manned fighter...
 

LancerMc

New Member
Just like when the USAF said the day of the gun in air to air combat was dead too. It won't happen anytime soon. Manned aircraft will continue on for at least for the next 100 years. There are some tasks that a human needs to be in the control seat (I.E. nuclear weapons). The software that controls UAV's and UCAV's is still not sophiscated enough to handle every sitiuation like a clear air turbulence and other unknown factors.

So don't jump on the UCAV band wagon, but they haven't even been to war, yet alone even entered production.
 

rjmaz1

New Member
Actually the software and hardware for all situations is already here.

Im the next 10 years we will probabaly see the first true combat UCAV with software that can accept plugins for new missions. After a few years of service it will have every capability of a manned fighter with added plugins.

Once this milestone is reached the exterior of the UCAV will mature in performance, and the sensors that the software reads from will improve in accuracy. We will then see a variety of different aircraft using the same software backbone.

Current manned fighters take 20-30 years from paper to operational status, so i think in 30 years time UCAV will be everywhere so the F-22 or JSF will be the last manned fighter.
 

RubiconNZ

The Wanderer
Could anyone explain how the link between ground controller and UCAV works, eg what form of communication?

My concern is that the uplink be disrupted just imagine a proud squadron of UCAV's fly off to battle and oops the jamming switches on and they all plumet to the earth :shudder

This may be far fetched but feel free to enlighten me O knowledgeable ones.
 

Kurt Plummer

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
Could anyone explain how the link between ground controller and UCAV works, eg what form of communication?

My concern is that the uplink be disrupted just imagine a proud squadron of UCAV's fly off to battle and oops the jamming switches on and they all plumet to the earth :shudder

This may be far fetched but feel free to enlighten me O knowledgeable ones.
Robsta83,

Humans are more vulnerable to 'jamming' than electronics are, if only because voice is the most responsive of tactical communications formats but also the biggest band and transmission length hog of the ether.

Given nobody has 'publically' created a system which can sample and emulate a given speech pattern within a short period window, there remains the viability of 'knowing your friend' by the sound of his voice.

But if you can't hear /anything/ you remain screwed.

Now, having said that, anything which lights off can be smoked. This includes jammers with sufficient output to threaten standard UHF comms. Indeed, it is vastly more common to have your own team saturate the useable bands than the enemy.

OTOH, if the spectrum goes completely white and you remain afraid of the ability of your UCAV force to sort sheep from goats*, there is still no reason you cannot use you skybots as recoverable cruise missiles, destroying static targets.

Wars are won by making it clear that your enemy cannot live if he continues. The easiest way to do that is to target FIXED infrastructure like power plants, oil refineries, water treatment sites and TV/Radio broadcast towers. Yes, even Yugo factories.

"It's all good" then being the operative tense because anything you do to a 'faceless enemy' which does not /quite/ take his life directly, is justifiable on the the notion of a demonizing propoganda in place against 'the system not the people'.

And unless your enemy can target overhead surveillance and NAVSTAR, he cannot prevent you from sending your bots in to pin-tail-on-donkey using predetermined radar or optical fixpoints to correlate own positioning with those of the satellite surveyed targets. Accurate within inches and typically passive so 'unjammable'.

Past this, you have to realize the Penlight vs. Search Light effect as well. Jamming being best applied when 'spot' targeted both by frequency and directional strobe location. If the threat is stealthy, stood off and operating pure-passive in what is called 'broadcast mode' (ala TV reception) you cannot direct anything directly at it.

OTOH, the majority of what is called the 'CDL' or Common Data Link architecture is oriented towards the X and Ka bands (moving away from UHF and even C band which are now garbaged up by civillian comms). X band is specifically that used by fighter radars and these units base power output and antenna gain levels are _very_ high.

Even as they are directional.

Given that any RF transmission will travel roughly four times as far as it will generate a return on, the ability of a 'jammer' to defeat a searchlight on the horizon with a penlight of equivalent power is very limited. Not simply by it's own ERPs level shortfall, but because the message RECEIVER can say "I will accept no transmissions from below this relative local horizon angle and azimuth bearing".

The question then becomes one of the UCAVs sending up their own "I am here." location to a satellite or pseudolite (HALE type UAV acting as an 'instant orbit' comms relay at 60-70,000ft). Which then is fed across a secure network to a CAOC or similar (ground or airborne) command asset that decides what modified action, if any, needs to be taken. This then is fed back up to an emitter (in secure airspace with a LOT of power) which talks to the drone because it /knows/ (from the satellite/GPS feed) where it is in the sky.

And 'talking' between aircraft using CDL type architecture is _very fast_. As fast or faster than a T1 connection over landline. 70MB worth of radar map in 2-3 seconds speedy.

Last but not least, there are a lot of anti-hack mods you can put into play.

1. Bury it in noise.
ISISOIRWRUIWROWI(F)()*(SF@#$FWFOWR@$@SDSAASFER@PPASLE)

Somewhere in there is a key phrase 'Apple'.

If you can find it, you know that the enemy has just told it's combat unit to 'do Apple'.

2. Single Use Go Codes.
Say Apple means go to waypoint X and hold there. Does it mean that for every UCAV out there? No. Will it mean that for THIS drone if you send the command again? No. Not for at least a million times. Such is the advantage of a digital memory able to store and annotate HUGE lists of 'do this' coded commands. It need never obey the same command again. Go to waypoint X and loiter might be 'Sea Breeze' next time.

And so, EVEN IF you (as an opfor 'bad guy') could sample the threat commo traffic linearized far above you and find the correct go code, it would be useless to you. Because it is already out of date and in any case will never work on the UCAV twenty miles away because _it's_ go codes for traveling to Waypoint X might be 'Cheerful' and 'Nougat'.

And as soon as the next mission comes round, these codes will be different for each airframe (via a new DTM mission tape) _again_.

3. Moating and Time/Spatial constraints.
If ALL contact is lost (say from damage detected during every 2-3 second diagnostic check) the UCAV can be told to go to a safe recovery area and either land or be ditched/range safed with a redundant emergency alternative (a laser code flashed through the MAWS/DAS apertures for instance).

If it does so, none of whatever death and destruction that it is carrying will be activated (as armed weapons) because such an event can ONLY happen if the skybot is 'across a certain line' called a Fence and 'in a certain opening', called a gate or time window. As to internal mission orders allow it to enable it's weapons. AT ALL OTHER TIMES the weapons system is deactivated. Indeed, it cannot even /send/ a firiing impulse to the ordnance because the circuit to do so is physically or electrically isolated.

CONCLUSION:
Netcentricity has reached the level where it has effectively removed the need for the human element from the pointy end of the killchain if for no other reason than that said human _cannot_ effectively warfight without full digital connectivity to his supporting missions. Digital text, images, video. All of which can be better seen and survivably interpreted OUTSIDE the cockpit than from within it.

Man is not necessary to drop a bomb on a static target, 'smartly'. Cruise missiles have been proving this since the late 60s.

With homing heads, hunting ARMs (ala Delilah) can reliably hit 'jammers', even if the ability to send the FIRE! command is itself blocked.

Man cannot hit a time critical (mobile) or micro-signature/collaterals buried targetsets that typify modern war without the aid of electronics and digital comms spreading out the ISR net to help find them. He will simply never detect them.

For 'other reasons' (signature survivability and political correctness in the face of loss) man is an impediment to combat aircraft design and useful warfighter doctrine.

It's time to pull man from the monkey-presses-button part of the equation and put the electronics in the pointy end where they will do better because they are cheaper, more effective and more numerous. While suffering no more and probably less ill effect from 'jamming' than we do.

Certainly, UCAVs will NOT 'fall out of the sky'. Because any weapon which could do that (HPM) could equally do it to a manned platform.


KPl.
 

rjmaz1

New Member
Well said Kurt

Every programming aspect that Kurt mentioned is currently in commericial use in some shape or form.

All the hardware and software is already here to make a UCAV a complete replacement for a human pilot sitting in the cockpit.

The code changing technique in a way is just like the Germans in WW2 with their Enigma code. However if the enemy ever got the code and an aircraft was captured, within 30 seconds the entire fleet could be reflashed with new code names. Unlike voice where all the new codes would have to be distributed to everyone on the ground taking a couple of days.

To remove any predictability of a UCAV they could also add a "mission planner plugin" that generates a unique flight path every mission. This prevents a mishap like the F-117 from occuring, as even the US itself wont know what route the UCAV take until it starts flying.

There is nothing stopping a UCAV from dog fighting either, providing the sensors are accurate enough and the software code is there. It will be able to outperform any pilot. UCAV's to eachother would be better than any wingman. They know exactly what they are doing and can organise tactics on the fly even if pulling 10g.

Take an AMRAAM missile for instance if it was slowed down to the same speed of the aircraft it was attacking, the AMRAAM would infact dog fight behind the enemy aircraft. So anyone who doubts a UCAV will be able to dogfight is mistaken.

Same with the HARM missile when a radar pops up it detects the radar and the pilot can then fire the missile. The same sensor would be located on the UCAV so when a radar pops up the UCAV can then decide what to do such as changing heading and altitude.

It can calculate if it has enough spare fuel to attack taking into account hundreds of variables and getting a figure within 1% accuracy, a pilot would struggle to get within 10% accuracy. It would take the distance of the flight path, average fuel consumption even wind direction. This will allow a UCAV to fly much further for its size as it does not need fuel reserves.

UCAV can then eitehr destroy the SAM site, or perform its mission and send the exact location into the UCAV network and 10 minutes later a nearby UCAV destroys it.

The expandability of the software is huge. Off the shelf comercial hardware can now be used.

Weight reduction and increases in fuel effeciency will allow an F-16 size UCAV to have greater range and payload than a manned aircraft twice its size.
 

Kurt Plummer

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
RJMaz,
>>
Well said Kurt
>>

Thank You.

>>
All the hardware and software is already here to make a UCAV a complete replacement for a human pilot sitting in the cockpit.
>>

I just want to make clear here that the UCAV, while 'uninhabitted' is NOT necessarily going to be 'unmanned'. Indeed, as much an advocate of the potential inherent to these new machines as I am, I would be the first to tell you that for a couple generations we will need to have the 'MITL Touch' of Man In The Loop control override.

>>
The code changing technique in a way is just like the Germans in WW2 with their Enigma code.
>>

This however is wrong. Because Enigma relied on a substitution cypher that operated through a series of 5-9 rotors as such, given enough daily message traffic, it was mathematically possible for a computer to predict the mechanical interface of A=D=E=S=T between input desired letter and output coded one.
My system is different because the go codes are 'multievent' linked to an isolated memory within both the command console on an E-2/3/8. And the UCAV memory itself. Thus 'Apple = Do X' only where you can observe the UCAV /doing X/ can you gain a sample of what Apple means ONE TIME.
After which the entire command phrase meaning changes.
Obviously, observation is not going to be easy if you can't see the UCAV to begin with and here the combination of Stealth and Standoff (GBU-39 or similar winged IAM/ALCM) makes detecting the airframe virtually impossible if release ranges on the order of 60nm from 40,000ft are used.
The nice thing here being that UCAV acknowledgement of GC command phrases can be equally squirt-short (making signal backtrack hard) and the duration of any one sortie is sufficiently low as to be able to bring the receiver and sender into close enough proximity /between/ missions that there is never any need to transmit a new code sequence (over the air as an alternative to courier as was often done with Enigma).
As such, the only way to gain insight to the cypher process is if the ENTIRE 'vocabulary' of go code random word generation is itself analyzable for inherent pattern faults in choosing the words. Something which would require a massive espionage effort to gain insight to if the computer was itself back in CONUS or even at the theater CAOC (which typically generates the daily ATO).

>>
However if the enemy ever got the code and an aircraft was captured, within 30 seconds the entire fleet could be reflashed with new code names.
>>

Again, I disagree with the notion of transmitting anything which equates to a base-cypher sample over the air. The Germans thought Enigma was so secure that they got to the point where they were saying 'days settings are wheels A/B/C/D' etc. And once we knew that there WERE wheels of said types, project Ultra could start to statistically break down the cypher by groups.
The one thing you might want to be able to 'reset' is inherent to the notion that X and Y miss their secure-synch a couple times so that Y /doesn't know/ that X has moved on down the go-code command list.
In this case, you want to be able to send a 'Synch at Line ##' go-code which is itself one of say five possible reset repeats in that mission. So that a LIMITED total number of 'interrogated' resynchs (maybe friend, maybe enemy) could be done before the UCAV simply says "_No_, I'm coming home, we can talk about this when I'm back on the ramp."
Again, these too would change, mission to mission.
In any case the 'Resynch' code would itself be inherent only to each machines _internal_ awareness of what 'Line ##' was about. Neither the console operator nor the machine autopilot would know what the crypto was doing, only what commands going into or coming out of the secure comms module.

>>
Unlike voice where all the new codes would have to be distributed to everyone on the ground taking a couple of days.
>>

Redistribution of authenticates is not that big a deal, IFF systems for instance all operate on a 24 to 48 hour crypto cycle, after which you need to upload from a common set of base codes. As long as you have a DTM and secure lines/satellite LINK between bases it's something the crew chief can do after the end of the flying day.
The problem is when you have to make the cypher:cypher linkup (like the tumblers on a lock) happen in real time in front of God and everybody. Even highly directional systems like fighter radars will have secondary sidelobe/sideband 'leakage' which a sophisticated ELINT system can monitor if it's looking in the right part of the sky.
In this case, rather than try and make an unreadable cypher inherent to the PHYSICAL security of the hopping/spread spectrum signal synchup (PRF and channel step with imbedded bitrate codes buried in PRN), I'm saying "Go ahead! See what good 'Apple' does you!"
ONE TIME.
And relying on the power of massive AESA apertures, no longer acting solely as sensors, to push past the jamming effects, given the receivers are all LO protected from being Jx strobed as individual airframe targets.

>>
To remove any predictability of a UCAV they could also add a "mission planner plugin" that generates a unique flight path every mission. This prevents a mishap like the F-117 from occuring, as even the US itself wont know what route the UCAV take until it starts flying.
>>

Uhhh, no. Generally, I want all my MP work to come out of the same laptop and be as strictly adhered to as possible so that, like a highway, everybody is going the same direction and the same speed with the same TOT values. It not only makes it infinitely easier to see the wolves among the sheep, it also allows support missions to remain constant so that a Jam Corridor provided by an EA-6B or EA-18G doesn't remain on or shift to new targets too long or too quickly respectively (i.e. with friendly aircraft still transiting the threatened airspace).
Stealth works on the basis not of 'no see'em' but rather 'no see'em too good'. If you put a pencil up in the air at twenty feet someone with good eyes may see it. If you put a pencil up at twenty feet and put a search light behind it, nobody is gonna see nothin'.
The same applies to fighter sweeps and cruise missile impacts and and and.
There will be SOME gains in moving the ingress paths around so that the raid track and ultimate target are not themselves predictable. Especially when you are talking about MEADS or PAMS or SA-21 etc. Where a single site can theoretically threaten an entire package. BUT. Even this works better when done on the notion of 'a wide skirmish line is still a common rate of advance'. As well as given the notion of SOF and Overhead physical confirmation of what your EOB mapping team says is the lay of the land.

>>
There is nothing stopping a UCAV from dog fighting either, providing the sensors are accurate enough and the software code is there. It will be able to outperform any pilot. UCAV's to eachother would be better than any wingman. They know exactly what they are doing and can organise tactics on the fly even if pulling 10g.
>>

Let's just say that I'm willing to let the babies-on-board effect continue for 'just one more generation!'. Because while I truly believe that fighter UCAVs will change the way we think about 'DACM' (probably as Turbo-SAMs) the reality remains that the day of the DEW is so close that we will likely be in a situation where even large numeric deficits (10 vs. 60) can be swept-from-sky dealt with by single airframes with high efficiency diode or FO lasers instead of COIL.
Indeed, it is ALWAYS better to throw huntin' dawgs out ahead of the horsemen because both the value of (even a UCAV) 'horse' vs. that of a sweeping AIM-160 or equivalent missile is still going to be 75:1 or more (say 200,000 dollars in mass production vs. 15 million). Even as the ability to use vanguard tactics equates to the ability not only to preattrite the enemy while he is marshalling up. But also to evaluate whether or not you want to continue into the frackus at all.
Such is an important consideration. Both because the most range/loiter efficient UCAVs are going to be subsonic with low T/Wrs. And because the F-22 supercruise approach may itself not be wise once longrange missiles are tied to effectively LINK'd EO seekers.
For all these reasons, I see it as infinitely more likely that the 'fighter' role will remain the (shrinking) territory of manned mutant-under-glass skyknights, simply because the A2A mission itself is growing ever smaller.
The only question then being how much UCAV combat controller missioning we think we can give to single seat airframes vs. their exposure to generally more capable defenses (inherent to 'escorting' throwaway UCAVs). Particularly when the 'best fighter is a 747' capability exists to destroy reach out and touch slow moving, high altitude, aircraft targets with systems like the ABL, almost to the line of sight.

>>
Take an AMRAAM missile for instance if it was slowed down to the same speed of the aircraft it was attacking, the AMRAAM would infact dog fight behind the enemy aircraft. So anyone who doubts a UCAV will be able to dogfight is mistaken.
>>

The problem with the AMRAAM is not simply it's size disparity, 'wing area to wing area' it's that even the long-burn variants like the ERAAM/D and the RamAAM Meteor all have specifically limited impulse thresholds past which the stall margin and reenergization curve just never separate to let them make a _second pass_.
All AAMs are essentially kamikazes. And without effective terminal defenses, a fighter can only rely on the size of its gas tank and burner can to 'duck the issue' of who is better. EXCM and even ECM may help generate leaderror in the missile but what really costs you is the certainty that 'one toss of the dice later' you are back at you start point, looking at a full TOF or time of flight before your /next/ shot can have a chance. And all the while you are both getting closer and closer to the RNE point where you are mired in a telephone booth fight each swinging diamond studded platinum halberds.
A turbosam, based on any of a range of decoys, target or recce drones could change ALL of this. Because while a decent wing area might require a single axis loading 'just like a fighter' (no more skids and flips into target bearing) the FIRST break of the fighter which causes it's massive size to bleed some 100-150 knots, is going to only be about 50-70 on the missile. And while the fighter will have to deal with the inertia effects of all that sloshing gas as it struggles to get back up to fighting speed, the missile will likely be at 1:1 or better T/Wr and this, combined with it's incredibly low frontal area and overall superior mass:inertia factoring will ensure that it takes only seconds to reenergize based on the same LIQUID fuel that lets it achieve a range of perhaps 200-300nm overall. Or maneuvering combat of 5-7 minutes/10-20 passes.
Now throw in a dozen other pack hunters and the airframe has no chance because the first attack will be the 'tap' (on your right shoulder) and the second, which the pilot may well never see and certainly not have the energy to evade, will be the BOUNCE of a followup kill.
Now. ALL of this could change tomorrow. If the ATL can indeed be fitted to the F-35 and the DAS system's function as a global SAIRST enables it to roll the airframe and target separate hemispheres of multiple targets. BUT. The JSF will cost 112 million apiece. And there is NOTHING which says it would not behoove you to invest a /tenth/ the resulting 276 BILLION-WITH-A-B dollars on crafting a larger-turbine, weaponless but laser-turreted, 'escort UCAV'.

>>
Same with the HARM missile when a radar pops up it detects the radar and the pilot can then fire the missile. The same sensor would be located on the UCAV so when a radar pops up the UCAV can then decide what to do such as changing heading and altitude.
>>
HARM's best use derives from the fact that it is now a powered IAM with 'optional' (may not be necessary) MMW secondary seeker. All thanks to the Blk.VI mod which incorporates a new any-1760 interface (rather than STARM restrictive) capability and the IMU/GPS modified autopilot. As such, my question is why use HARM -as is- at all? Because HARM is difficult to encapsulate or fit to a bay and has relatively slow response out to its 70nm max-effective loft footprint. Why not stick with a rocket propulsion system (ramjet isn't needed, provided the target doesn't move) but remove the literal front-end cost of the seeker and squirt adopt a multi-target system along the lines of the old FRSW concept? If the 'constellation effect' of a UCAV force can replace or at least greatly augment the RC-135s long-baseline ELS functions (even against 60-100nm ranged missiles) then you are basically down to providing a TLE sufficient to put the weapon on a ground coordinate rather than 'down the back/side lobe'. Indeed, I _want_ the enemy to come up.
Where that TLE is itself 'linkable' via SAR or EO secondary targeting, what happens is that a stream of bearing cutlines is sent back to the console operator. And he/she in turn commands the patch map or optical graze'n'lase and with a 1m error, you shoot the sucker where he sits. SPEED then becomes essential. Since the radar or launch vehicle which detects that it is being illuminated by any airborne source is itself either going to up and displace. Or raise a terminal defense that may itself include (laser) hardkill options.
IMO, the ultimate answer, at least for aircraft which have sufficient LO and flight performance to manage it, is going to be dual-mode AMRAAM for the 'self defense' role. A UCAV could equally benefit from this if say 1 in 5 weapons hardpoints inside the bay was dedicated to a 'universal' missile. Leaving the rest free for bombs or decoys or closeup targeting drones like Finder or Silent Eyes.

>>
It can calculate if it has enough spare fuel to attack taking into account hundreds of variables and getting a figure within 1% accuracy, a pilot would struggle to get within 10% accuracy. It would take the distance of the flight path, average fuel consumption even wind direction. This will allow a UCAV to fly much further for its size as it does not need fuel reserves.
>>

This isn't that big a deal, either way. Where effective use of TIME is the keynote to operational efficiency of airpower, every military aircraft autopilot has very sophisticated linked functionality with the AHRS/INS calculations of distance vs. rate. The key here is that a pilot is _operating_ on autopilot, 90% of the mission. Because it is better able to maintain heading/altitude/airspeed within minor 'burbles' of displacement. Allowing him to concentrate on systems monitoring and mission performance through his apertures. Especially single seat, there is no real choice.

>>
UCAV can then eitehr destroy the SAM site, or perform its mission and send the exact location into the UCAV network and 10 minutes later a nearby UCAV destroys it.
>>

Agreed. The key to understanding this capability however is the 'mosaic effect'. You see a UAV like the Global Hawk may be able to strip-map a given impressive square area of terrain. 40,000nm and/or 1,900 individual patch maps comes to mind. But this is _useless_ if those maps are restricted by the singular presence of the high demand/low density in the theater. Because only the very top levels of the kill chain (the star-on-shoulder C2 element) will be able to command the flight path and area of interest dwell/refresh period.
And if the threat isn't there, it just isn't there. It could be 2nm away. It could be 200nm away.
OTOH, the Mosaic approach to ISR says: "Okay, I've got 50 assets in the air. They can only service an area 25nm around the airframe with EO and 40nm with radar, where do you want them?"
And even though the (RTIP AESA'd) RQ-4 may be able to map at twice the distance, the combination of threats and uncertainty factor will keep in so predictably 'centered' over the most readily services areas that you cannot track threats skirting around the edges.
And that is how you catch people like Osama. As they skirt around the edges. Leave 1 day or 10 minutes before the area becomes an objective.
In particular, it is how you WIN a 4th Generation War. Not by stopping every attack. But making sure you _back track_ (historical video) all cars moving away from the sniping or mortar or IED point. And back to a regeneration/safe house area.

>>
The expandability of the software is huge. Off the shelf comercial hardware can now be used.
>>

Agreed but you do need to avoid another of the 'shock, surprise, dismay' elements of JSF design. Namely that cheap = weight growth. Functionally optimized parts can shed as much as 20% of their weight just by designing the component to the volume rather than vice versa. And that means cost. Of course here the 'big deal' is that 1,500 UCAVs could be Air Force one day and Navy the next. So long as the basic structural hardening, gear strength and JPALS (as AAR) capability is integral to ONE variant of airframe, there is no need for 'cousining' of parts inherent to the lie that is 'one name, three designs' as the JSF.

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Weight reduction and increases in fuel effeciency will allow an F-16 size UCAV to have greater range and payload than a manned aircraft twice its size.[/quote]
>>
So does putting more bite into the bullets than the rifle. VSM and other efforts to continue the process of miniaturization in the munition, along with multimode seekers and standardized bus/autopilot/strongback-hardpointinterface system will GREATLY increase the effectiveness of UCAVs. So that staying on station for 10-15hours at 200nm starts to make sense, not only in terms of size of force and dollars per manhour. But also what the airframe can do with it's 'gun cabinet' approach to specific targets and munitions tailoring. In this, not all targets will be threats which require hardkill. But many will need close-up 'verification' for either later engagement or discrimination as sheep-from-goats decoys/collaterals.

KPl.
 
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