Tanker Controversy: Questions the AF must answer

tankerboss

New Member
It is now three months since the Air Force shocked the world by awarding the contract for its next-generation aerial-refueling tanker to Northrop Grumman and the European parent of Airbus.

Throughout that time, service officials have insisted that the process by which the winner was chosen was transparent and fair. But the service has failed to answer even the most basic questions about how the decision was made to deny the contract to Boeing, the widely favored incumbent. The Government Accountability Office is expected to issue a ruling on Boeing's protest of the outcome in mid-June.

Whatever it finds, the Air Force has some explaining to do...

1. The Air Force says it would cost roughly the same amount to develop, manufacture and operate 179 next-generation tankers, regardless of whether they are based on the Boeing 767 or the Airbus A330. But the Airbus plane is 27% heavier than the Boeing plane, and burns over a ton more fuel per flight hour. With fuel prices headed for the upper stratosphere, how can both planes cost the same amount to build and operate over their lifetimes?

2. The Air Force says it would be equally risky to develop the Boeing tanker or the Airbus tanker -- after forcing Boeing to substantially increase the time and money required to develop its version. But Boeing proposed to build its tanker on the same assembly line where it has already constructed hundreds of the same airframe, whereas Airbus proposes to build its tanker at a plant and with a workforce that don't yet exist in Alabama. How can the risks be equal?

3. The Air Force says that a computerized simulation of how the competing tankers would function in an actual wartime scenario strongly favored the larger Airbus plane. But the simulation assumed longer runways, stronger asphalt and more parking space than actually exists at forward bases, and failed to consider the consequences of losing bases in wartime. How can such unrealistic assumptions be relevant to the selection of a next-generation tanker?

4. The Air Force says the Northrop-Airbus team received higher ratings on past performance than the Boeing team, based on a review of programs deemed similar to the future tanker. But Boeing built all 600 of the tankers in the current Air Force fleet, whereas Northrop and Airbus have never delivered a single tanker equipped with the refueling boom the Air Force requires. How can Northrop and Airbus have superior past performance?

I could go on. The Air Force refused to consider Boeing cost data based on 10,000,000 hours of operating the commercial version of the 767, substituting instead repair costs based on the 50-year-old KC-135 tanker. It said it would not award extra points for exceeding key performance objectives, and then proceeded to award extra points. It said it wanted to acquire a "medium" tanker to replace its cold war refueling planes, and ended up picking a plane twice as big.

Whatever else this process may have been, it definitely was not transparent. Even now, neither of the competing teams really understands why the competition turned out the way it did.

It would be nice to hear from the Air Force about how key tradeoffs were made, because at present it looks like a double standard prevailed in the evaluation of the planes offered by the two teams.
I don't know about the rest of you, but this piece symbolizes what I've known since the shock of the Airbus award became public. There is MUCH MORE we have yet to hear about this contract award process, despite the media. Kudos to Defense-Aerospace for actually posting an article NOT attacking Boeing.
Someone needs to explain why Boeing went with a twenty year old design, the 767, when the newer 777, a plane more comparable to the A330, could have been substituted. I think the Air Force got this one right: they picked the plane better suited to their mission, which is delivering lots of fuel to their jets. Boeing was punished for 1) cheating in the first round (funny this article doesn't mention that) and for 2) being cocky. They should stop crying and start working on the next round of the competition.

[Mod edit]
It would be appreciated if you would add some input of your own, and some prompts for debate. It's appropriate in a discussion forum, as this is. Also, I think we may already have a thread on this particular topic.

The rules can be found here - http://defencetalk.com/forums/rules.php

PJI
[/Mod edit]
 
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guppy

New Member
Some pointers to consider Tankerboss,


1. Fuel prices change all the time. For modeling, the assumptions need to be fixed at a certain time. Simulations can be rerun to provide insights on the price elasticity of both solutions.

2. The discussions in the variations in fuel capacity, aircraft AUW, and fuel consumption are meaningless if we don't know what is the actual amount of fuel each tanker is able to provide to their receivers.

3. Weapon systems development and production risks can be assessed in many areas. From the design and development perspective, Northrop-Airbus appears to be much further ahead as Boeing's tanker is only a paper version. This is the same for the flight testing risks. From the production perspective, Boeing would have an edge, but Northrop may be able to counter by producing major parts in existing factories (in Europe) and doing only assembly work in US.

4. What are the minimum runway lengths required for both platforms? What are the other assumptions used in the modeling? Modeling is extremely reiterative and complicated. Without knowing the exact methodologies and assumptions, it is very difficult to say that the study was not "realistic"enough. It only attempts to provide indicators, and the results should be taken as what it is, an attempt to simulate the real world, as not as a sacred prophecy.

5. Tankers operate in very different operating conditions than airliners. Consideration should be given though to Boeing's actual cost and maintenance data.

6. It is difficult to believe that the USAF would dork up this selection. Firstly, they desperately need new tankers. Secondly, they face a lot of congressional scrutiny and pressure as it might concern the loss of jobs. Thirdly, even an idiot knows that he cannot afford to dork up the same job twice.

Cheers

guppy
 

IrishHitman

New Member
What is this, a bash Europe thread?

The Airforce have their reasons, if you want to question them, bring more data.
 

thorpete1

New Member
If i remember correctly, Boeings performance on delivering the KC-767 to japan and italy have been less hten satisfactory, with many problems (the japanese variant was delayed for two years due to numerous problems). This is not a good past performance.

Goverments tend to get a annoyed if you try and pull the wool over their eyes. boeings coruption problems in 2003 proberly lowered their past performance.

US allies are starting to choose the KC-30B/A330 MRTT as their tanker of choice (Australia, UK, UAE Saudi Arabia). The tanker has had few problems and the KC-45 is almost the same as the KC-30B/A330 MRTT, i think.

cheers
 
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swerve

Super Moderator
I think the Japanese KC-767 version had certification problems. Now in service, but as you say, a couple of years late. The Italian version has had technical issues to do with the underwing hose & drogue units & their effect on the wings. IIRC the Japanese version is boom only.

Airbus don't have any booms operational in air forces, but their boom development programme seems to have been fairly problem-free. Airbus have been very happily releasing results from the flight tests. It's been refuelling fighters with no problems, or at least none that have been made public. They've not had any problems with their hose & drogue units, which have been operational for years on A310s. The A330 has a built-in advantage in adapting to wing-mounted hose units, because it puts them where the extra engines are on the A340.
 
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