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@SniperSquad, the current definition of tactics in FM 3-90 is “the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain, and the enemy to translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements,” whose definition, I am pretty sure you cannot understand. Tactics are generally very specific, like:
Tactics for Small Wars (go read this 1st link first).
1. To understand tactics, there is a greater context called doctrine, which is enabled by the equipment and training of the deployed force. For example, doctrinally, it is suicidal to deploy only light infantry to open desert terrain or flat rolling grounds. If you have hundreds of kilometres of open terrain, you would want to deploy armoured forces (eg. MBTs with armoured infantry, supported by self propelled artillery).
2. Every service has its own doctrine, as distilled wisdom to guide the conduct of operations. For example, there is doctrine for proper armour deployment in urban terrain (and the culture of allowing autonomy to ground units) or doctrine for amphibious operations. US Marine Corps success during
Operation Catchpole in Feb 1944, has been distilled into amphibious doctrine that we still use today (this 2nd link explains how NGFS and tanks were used for amphibious operations).
(a) As a military term, US Army doctrine is defined as the fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. But doctrine is more than just principles. It is a body of thought on how the US Army forces intend to operate as part of a joint force and a statement of how the US Army intends to fight. It establishes a common frame of reference including intellectual tools that US Army leaders use to solve military problems. It is supposed to focus on how to think—not what to think. May I suggest you read this 3rd link from the school of US Army doctrine? —
What is US Army Doctrine? — Modern War Institute
(c) The Apr 2003 thunder run demonstrated that US armored forces could penetrate Baghdad while suffering minimal casualties. During the movement, TF 1-64 AR sustained one destroyed Abrams tank, one heavily damaged Bradley, 1 KIA and 4 WIA. Schwartz’s task force killed at least 1,000 Iraqi and Syrian fighters, destroyed 30 to 40 BMP IFVs and other vehicles, destroyed one T-72 MBT and eliminated countless roadside bunkers. The task force discovered that the enemy preferred to mass fires from overpasses. Perkins observed that the bridges provided the enemy cover and concealment and afforded “avenues of approach in the flank.”
(d) V Corps Commander LTG William S. Wallace had no concrete intelligence about the capability and intent of the Iraqi forces protecting Baghdad, prior to the Thunder Run. To collect intelligence about the conventional and paramilitary units inside the city, they planned an armored reconnaissance in force on 5 Apr 2003 via a thunder run. They envisioned it as a prelude to additional armored missions in and out of the city that would disrupt Baghdad’s defenses with the paramount goal of regime collapse.
(e) Late on 5 Apr 2003, Wallace ordered a 2nd thunder run on 7 Apr 2003. MG Buford Blount of the 3d Infantry Division assigned the task to 2d Brigade.
(f) Let me share a final 5th link on a Singaporean doctrinal discussion on armour employment in urban warfare:
“THUNDER RUNS”: PANACEA FOR URBAN OPERATION? Here we are thinking of a 350 km thunder run to KL, using Singapore Armoured Brigades (operating platforms like the Leopard 2SG, Hunter IFVs and Bronco ATTCs) to provide the armoured fist to punch our enemy on the throat.
3. Once you read the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th links shared, you can start to understand TTPs. Further, FM 3-0 defines tactics as “the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other (CJCSI 5120.02A),” which will start to make sense if you read the 5 links provided.
Strategy in Military Terms
Strategy is working out where to fight the Enemy, what forces you are going to deploy to the Battle, what goal you are trying to achieve in this battle.
Tactics
Are the methods you are going to use in that battle, when and where you may deploy your Armour or Infantry or Artillery and the methods those Soldiers use in fighting that Battle.
Operations
The Battle itself
4. Thanks for the precise reply. IMO, good strategy often means to win even without the need to fight — rather than define these terms, let me just apply it to illustrate.
5. Poor strategy (domino theory) can lead to defeat even if you win the tactical battles. The US military won many battles in Vietnam (but was widely seen as defeated by the insurgents). But as my fellow Moderators have pointed out — planning to defeat the enemy through guerilla resistance is like planning to lose.
(a) Except for Pakistan and Afghanistan, I don’t know any country in Asia that is planning to win a war by only taking horrific damage to their own country's infrastructure and population.
...That's because from a National Defense point of view planning to defeat the enemy through guerilla resistance is like planning to lose, or planning to win by taking horrific damage to your own country's infrastructure and population. Consider Vietnam. Arguably North Vietnam won against the US, but the human and economic cost is so high that it's a Pyrrhic victory at best, not dissimilar to the Mujahadeen "victory" in Afghanistan over Soviet forces, at the end of which Afghanistan turned into essentially a failed state and remains one to this day.
Planning for that kind of war is a questionable strategy at best, and downright idiotic at worst. Which brings me to the real point. In the modern world cases where another country successfully invades and annexes part of another state are relatively rare since WWII ended.
(b) As Feanor said, consider Vietnam. Arguably North Vietnam won against the US, but the human and economic cost is so high that it's a Pyrrhic victory at best, for a military tactics discussion.
Even on my Staff College the staff couldn't agree what the operational level was!
