SPRING 1966 LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROL (LRRP) by RANGER Jerry Conners (Chinese Bandit 13)
A Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol was formed from members of the 1st
Bn (ABN) 8th Cav Recon platoon and attached to division headquarters
in the spring of 1966 as directed by the Department of Defense where
seven LRRP teams from the US Army Special Forces, US Marine Corps,
Navy and other Army units were established to conduct simultaneous
patrols within the Republic of Vietnam.
The Chinese Bandit six man team members were SSG Robert Grimes
(Acting Platoon Leader of the Recon Platoon), SGT Jerry Conners,
Keijo Hyvonen, Frank Bishop, Louis Tyler, and Terry Stevens. The
first long range patrol was conducted along a 75 mile route adjacent
to the Cambodian and Laotian borders for a period of twelve days and
was performed while the other DOD directed teams performed LRRP
patrols in other portions of Vietnam. The major objective of the
patrol was to locate North Vietnamese positions that had been
reported along the border and to obtain specific essential elements
of information that included descriptions of the enemy's uniforms,
weapons, communication and other equipment and the presence of any
Caucasian personnel.
We wore a mixture of uniforms including standard issue jungle
fatigues, WWII vintage M42 jungle camouflage fatigues and 'tiger
fatigues'. All members wore patrol caps, LBE with two canteens, two
ammo pouches containing four magazines each, one butt pack and
carried M-16 rifles (taped with slings removed) with bayonets. Two
members of the patrol also wore NVA captured rucksacks. Only one 35mm
camera and two sets of binoculars and one small IR device were
carried. The first LRRP rations were issued and each member carried
six after removing the outer package and discarding everything except
the main dehydrated meal. We intended to only eat one meal every
other day and our diet was supplemented by a variety of foods
including `jungle chocolate candy bars'. Only one PRC-25 radio was
carried; however, a vertical half-rhombic antenna was assembled in
addition to the two other standard antennas. Only one SOI was carried
and used to prepare the coded daily reports what were transmitted. No
fragmentation grenades were carried and only two smoke grenades, one
by both Grimes and myself. I carried the only signal mirror and a
single VS17 air panel to assist in any emergency extraction. Several
of us wore the 101st Recondo School taped soap dish containing
sutures, morphine and other emergency medical items secured to our
LBE harness. All members of the patrol had a wound piece of `550
chord' secured to our harness with a 2000 pound tensile strength snap
link.
SSG Grimes and I drove a jeep to Division G-2 where captured NVA
equipment was stacked in front of the entrance. We were given a
briefing that included descriptions of the area we were to patrol and
the locations of suspected NVA regimental CPs. We were instructed to
recommend and plot our routes and request for pre-arranged fire
support after Grimes completed his low aerial reconnaissance of the
area in an OH-13. Grimes and I returned to the Battalion area and
tentatively selected the routes and observation points from the
supplied topographic maps and aerial photographs. We gave the LRRP
patrol members a warning order prior to Grimes performing the
reconnaissance flight. Upon his return we discussed what he had
observed and updated our information on the area but did not alter
our intended routes. The entire patrol participated in the
preparation of the operations order that was later given by SSG
Grimes. There were no rehearsals performed and the time prior to
departure was spent studying maps and checking equipment.
We were inserted about two hours before nightfall using one UH-1 that
made only one descent and hover for unloading located near an active
and believed to be safe farming area located about 2.5 km east of the
area where we would be operating. The actual LZ was located north of
the area at coordinates 48PYA554597 and this area had been evaluated
for enemy activity during Grimes' observation flight and by the low
level photo reconnnaissance performed by the Air Force. No enemy
contact was anticipated and none were encountered. We moved rapidly
into the tree-covered mountains at the southern limit of the patrol
area and proceeded northward along the border and through the night
to our first observation and study area (hilltop 847) and arrived
prior to BMAT. We had previously conducted numerous three day
patrols, including those along the Cambodia border, where we had
located and cleared a NVA Regimental CP and hospital; however the
terrain had not been as steep but our navigation skills and physical
conditioning enabled us to move quickly.
Movement, consisting of rapidly walking (routinely 3 km/hour)point to
point routes for approximately 18 hours, was intended to be limited
to late evening and night navigation with daily situation reports
made in the early morning to airborne Air Force aircraft from
positions selected on mountain tops that afforded the opportunity to
observe long distances. Rising smoke from what was believed to be
cooking fires was plotted on the topographic maps that we carried;
however, the planned patrol route was not altered and these sightings
were not evaluated from close range. We remained on well-worn and
narrow trails during most of the movements between observation
points. We did not expect the enemy to establish ambush sites or set
out mines and booby traps in these areas that were believed to be
only occupied by NVA troops. On several occasions we discovered enemy
boot prints at stream and trail junctions but not along the trail
routes that we were following. We wore issued jungle boots and
altered our routes to avoid trails having damp and soft surfaces
where our boots would have made an impression in the soil. This was
difficult to achieve during night movement but when I checked our
trail when doubling back during temporary halts, we managed to do
well at leaving no signs of our passing.
After about a week of patrolling, an emergency extraction was
necessary when Tyler became unconscious with a malaria fever. At the
risk of compromising our location, we requested a single UH-1 to a
small tree lined hilltop where we used a rope hoist secured to
Tyler's snap link to lift him from a large rock outcropping to the
skids of the hovering helicopter where the crew were able to grab and
lift him onboard. After the aircraft departed, we moved quickly along
a narrow trail down to a valley and up to another mountain ridge
where we `lay-dogged' until nightfall and then resumed our patrol as
planned.
We were able to zig-sag along our planned routes and complete the
daily observation reports from the pre-selected observation points.
Close enemy observation was only made on the last day of the patrol
where we were to be extracted by two UH-1s from an area located in
the northern limits of the patrol area. Eight NVA were found
gathering firewood with their rifles leaning against one tree. That
encounter will be described in a separate writing.
We were extracted by two UH-1s from a LZ that we had occupied for
the entire morning. The areas and trails leading into the LZ were
reconned by different team members and we were certain that no enemy
troops were within several miles of the LZ. The UH-1s arrived mid-day
and on time and we dove aboard the helicopters and returned to base
camp where we requested and were given ice cream, milk and different
meals while we prepared our combined de-briefing report that was
given by Grimes to G-2 and other division staff late that afternoon.
No other LRRP members accompanied him. When he returned, he informed
us that everyone was surprised that we had not become lost since the
other six teams had more difficulty navigating. When he and I were
alone, he asked, "Would you like to dye your skin brown, put on black
pajamas and parachute into North Vietnam?" "We have a chance to be
the first `Sting-Ray' team.
Ranger Jerry Conners
Master Parachutist, Special Forces Weapons Expert, 101st Recondo
Chinese Bandit 13
A Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol was formed from members of the 1st
Bn (ABN) 8th Cav Recon platoon and attached to division headquarters
in the spring of 1966 as directed by the Department of Defense where
seven LRRP teams from the US Army Special Forces, US Marine Corps,
Navy and other Army units were established to conduct simultaneous
patrols within the Republic of Vietnam.
The Chinese Bandit six man team members were SSG Robert Grimes
(Acting Platoon Leader of the Recon Platoon), SGT Jerry Conners,
Keijo Hyvonen, Frank Bishop, Louis Tyler, and Terry Stevens. The
first long range patrol was conducted along a 75 mile route adjacent
to the Cambodian and Laotian borders for a period of twelve days and
was performed while the other DOD directed teams performed LRRP
patrols in other portions of Vietnam. The major objective of the
patrol was to locate North Vietnamese positions that had been
reported along the border and to obtain specific essential elements
of information that included descriptions of the enemy's uniforms,
weapons, communication and other equipment and the presence of any
Caucasian personnel.
We wore a mixture of uniforms including standard issue jungle
fatigues, WWII vintage M42 jungle camouflage fatigues and 'tiger
fatigues'. All members wore patrol caps, LBE with two canteens, two
ammo pouches containing four magazines each, one butt pack and
carried M-16 rifles (taped with slings removed) with bayonets. Two
members of the patrol also wore NVA captured rucksacks. Only one 35mm
camera and two sets of binoculars and one small IR device were
carried. The first LRRP rations were issued and each member carried
six after removing the outer package and discarding everything except
the main dehydrated meal. We intended to only eat one meal every
other day and our diet was supplemented by a variety of foods
including `jungle chocolate candy bars'. Only one PRC-25 radio was
carried; however, a vertical half-rhombic antenna was assembled in
addition to the two other standard antennas. Only one SOI was carried
and used to prepare the coded daily reports what were transmitted. No
fragmentation grenades were carried and only two smoke grenades, one
by both Grimes and myself. I carried the only signal mirror and a
single VS17 air panel to assist in any emergency extraction. Several
of us wore the 101st Recondo School taped soap dish containing
sutures, morphine and other emergency medical items secured to our
LBE harness. All members of the patrol had a wound piece of `550
chord' secured to our harness with a 2000 pound tensile strength snap
link.
SSG Grimes and I drove a jeep to Division G-2 where captured NVA
equipment was stacked in front of the entrance. We were given a
briefing that included descriptions of the area we were to patrol and
the locations of suspected NVA regimental CPs. We were instructed to
recommend and plot our routes and request for pre-arranged fire
support after Grimes completed his low aerial reconnaissance of the
area in an OH-13. Grimes and I returned to the Battalion area and
tentatively selected the routes and observation points from the
supplied topographic maps and aerial photographs. We gave the LRRP
patrol members a warning order prior to Grimes performing the
reconnaissance flight. Upon his return we discussed what he had
observed and updated our information on the area but did not alter
our intended routes. The entire patrol participated in the
preparation of the operations order that was later given by SSG
Grimes. There were no rehearsals performed and the time prior to
departure was spent studying maps and checking equipment.
We were inserted about two hours before nightfall using one UH-1 that
made only one descent and hover for unloading located near an active
and believed to be safe farming area located about 2.5 km east of the
area where we would be operating. The actual LZ was located north of
the area at coordinates 48PYA554597 and this area had been evaluated
for enemy activity during Grimes' observation flight and by the low
level photo reconnnaissance performed by the Air Force. No enemy
contact was anticipated and none were encountered. We moved rapidly
into the tree-covered mountains at the southern limit of the patrol
area and proceeded northward along the border and through the night
to our first observation and study area (hilltop 847) and arrived
prior to BMAT. We had previously conducted numerous three day
patrols, including those along the Cambodia border, where we had
located and cleared a NVA Regimental CP and hospital; however the
terrain had not been as steep but our navigation skills and physical
conditioning enabled us to move quickly.
Movement, consisting of rapidly walking (routinely 3 km/hour)point to
point routes for approximately 18 hours, was intended to be limited
to late evening and night navigation with daily situation reports
made in the early morning to airborne Air Force aircraft from
positions selected on mountain tops that afforded the opportunity to
observe long distances. Rising smoke from what was believed to be
cooking fires was plotted on the topographic maps that we carried;
however, the planned patrol route was not altered and these sightings
were not evaluated from close range. We remained on well-worn and
narrow trails during most of the movements between observation
points. We did not expect the enemy to establish ambush sites or set
out mines and booby traps in these areas that were believed to be
only occupied by NVA troops. On several occasions we discovered enemy
boot prints at stream and trail junctions but not along the trail
routes that we were following. We wore issued jungle boots and
altered our routes to avoid trails having damp and soft surfaces
where our boots would have made an impression in the soil. This was
difficult to achieve during night movement but when I checked our
trail when doubling back during temporary halts, we managed to do
well at leaving no signs of our passing.
After about a week of patrolling, an emergency extraction was
necessary when Tyler became unconscious with a malaria fever. At the
risk of compromising our location, we requested a single UH-1 to a
small tree lined hilltop where we used a rope hoist secured to
Tyler's snap link to lift him from a large rock outcropping to the
skids of the hovering helicopter where the crew were able to grab and
lift him onboard. After the aircraft departed, we moved quickly along
a narrow trail down to a valley and up to another mountain ridge
where we `lay-dogged' until nightfall and then resumed our patrol as
planned.
We were able to zig-sag along our planned routes and complete the
daily observation reports from the pre-selected observation points.
Close enemy observation was only made on the last day of the patrol
where we were to be extracted by two UH-1s from an area located in
the northern limits of the patrol area. Eight NVA were found
gathering firewood with their rifles leaning against one tree. That
encounter will be described in a separate writing.
We were extracted by two UH-1s from a LZ that we had occupied for
the entire morning. The areas and trails leading into the LZ were
reconned by different team members and we were certain that no enemy
troops were within several miles of the LZ. The UH-1s arrived mid-day
and on time and we dove aboard the helicopters and returned to base
camp where we requested and were given ice cream, milk and different
meals while we prepared our combined de-briefing report that was
given by Grimes to G-2 and other division staff late that afternoon.
No other LRRP members accompanied him. When he returned, he informed
us that everyone was surprised that we had not become lost since the
other six teams had more difficulty navigating. When he and I were
alone, he asked, "Would you like to dye your skin brown, put on black
pajamas and parachute into North Vietnam?" "We have a chance to be
the first `Sting-Ray' team.
Ranger Jerry Conners
Master Parachutist, Special Forces Weapons Expert, 101st Recondo
Chinese Bandit 13
Last edited: