Six Combatant Commands?

[gree0232]

History is rife with lessons. That seems like a fairly easy statement to write down, and its a statement often written down. Why? Because history may teach us many lessons, but it will only teach us lessons if study history and actively seek the lessons that history teaches us.

One such lesson was given to us by Rome, or, specifically, decisions made that hastened the end of the Roman Empire. One such perilous decision was the division of the Empire into separate command centers, one in Rome and one in Constantinople. However well intentioned, it would have dramatic effects in short order. The split was supposed to increase the response time for 'local' issues, but the division of expediency became one of political and logistical split as well. The fateful diversion of resources away from Rome would be one of the deciding factors in the collapse of the Roman West (even if the coordination of events in the Rump Byzantine Empire WERE better coordinated - one is left with the unmistakable realization that this was not the point).

I wish I could say that the US was facing a similar situation, but its actually much worse. We did not divide our assets into two, but six. We currently have six combatant commanders (plus Special Operations Command), competing for the force. The intent is the same as it was in Rome, to better coordinate regional issues in a timely manner. The resulting problems are legion.

FORSCOM and the Joint Staff are supposed to be the overall manager of forces. The FORSCOM Commander is the same rank as the Combatant Commanders and the Joint Chief of Staff (as well as the Service Chiefs of Staff). That equates to very collegiate form of consensus where personal deal making, rather than strategic direction, is what often leads to the assignment of forces.

This is particularly so as each of the Combatant Commanders can expertly articulate the issues in their assigned region. Its a problem that has become particularly acute as the availability of forces to assign is shrinking rapidly. Each of the Combatant Commanders is still articulating an entire series of requirements for ever increasing demands on the shrinking force.

The result is ... efficient but actively undermining readiness. There is little bench stock sitting and waiting to be employed. This is driving the pleas for more money to Congress, in what is already the most expensive military force on the planet (by a wide margin). We need more money because of all the contingencies, but we just cut 10 brigades, including rapidly deployable Stryker Brigades that just cost billions to field? We just cut the Marines (a highly expeditionary force) by thousands?

There is little doubt that the forces that remain are in high demand, but what is certainly debatable is whether or not these forces are accurately being aligned to the true strategic interests of the United States? In some cases, like Iraq, Afghanistan, or freedom of navigation issues in the Pacific, there is little doubt that the forces employed are being aligned to these interests. In other areas, such as regionally aligned brigades teaching basic courses to foreign militaries, that is perhaps not the case.

There is the potential problem of the self licking ice cream cone. As the regional Combatant Commands become better versed in the areas, the more issues they will find. The more issues they find, the more they will request forces to help solve those problems (and arguably, forces are not always the best solution). Rather than being efficient with the forces available, it quickly becomes bottomless pit of resource requirements. This is a problem that is all the worse when we note that the regional alignment of our military is not the same as that of our State Department (virtually guaranteeing bureaucratic issues).

What I think is fairly clear that the problem of Rome is being experienced by the US military today, and to a very much greater extent. There is, as with Byzantine, a far greater level of investment and application of forces in the various regions. There is also, like Rome itself, a drifting away of core strategic interests. We have an over committed force, and I think we would be hard pressed to justify that with the decline of activity in both Iraq and Afghanistan and the Naval and Air intensive Pacific Theater, that this hyper efficient employment of forces is our Nations interest.

George Kennan once famously presented US interest around the development and support of economic centers of power (Europe and Japan), and the US investment of resources in those clearly defined and resourced objectives are clear and historical success stories. Our current strategic thinking is far less clear, and the assignment of forces against those ill defined strategic interests is arguably not achieving much more than the rapid exhaustion of our forces.

Do we really need to carve up the globe to employ our forces? Or do we need a single headquarters that align forces and their employment with America's real strategic issues? I would argue that it is very much the later. Not only is it more effective in the long run, its also a LOT cheaper and a lot easier on the remaining force structure who could prepare to fight the next war rather than be endlessly assigned to a never ending list of requirements.

 

[Todjaeger]

Three immediate thoughts come to mind.

The first is a question: Have you ever heard of the term, "span of control"?

The second is that the split of the Roman Empire into the Eastern and Western Roman Empires, is not at all like the US system of regional combat commands.

The third is that the US does have a HQ, and chain of command, and the various combat commands and their respective commanders and command staff receive orders and overall strategy, as well as force/asset allocations, from the US HQ which is generally thought to be in a funny, pentagon-shaped building in Washington, D.C.

From a historical perspective, the Western Roman Empire decayed and fell due to a number of reasons. High amongst them was the level of corruption and in-fighting amongst the leadership, which resulted in an inability for the Western Roman Empire to protect and sustain itself. Had the two empires remained merged together as a single political, social and military entity, it is possible that the cohesion of the Eastern Roman Empire would have been sufficient to protect and provide for the whole. It is also very possible that the resource drain to protect the portion which became the Western Roman Empire would have been too great, the entire, unified Roman Empire would have collapsed and fallen.

 

[Ranger25]

Three immediate thoughts come to mind.

The first is a question: Have you ever heard of the term, "span of control"?

The second is that the split of the Roman Empire into the Eastern and Western Roman Empires, is not at all like the US system of regional combat commands.

The third is that the US does have a HQ, and chain of command, and the various combat commands and their respective commanders and command staff receive orders and overall strategy, as well as force/asset allocations, from the US HQ which is generally thought to be in a funny, pentagon-shaped building in Washington, D.C.

From a historical perspective, the Western Roman Empire decayed and fell due to a number of reasons. High amongst them was the level of corruption and in-fighting amongst the leadership, which resulted in an inability for the Western Roman Empire to protect and sustain itself. Had the two empires remained merged together as a single political, social and military entity, it is possible that the cohesion of the Eastern Roman Empire would have been sufficient to protect and provide for the whole. It is also very possible that the resource drain to protect the portion which became the Western Roman Empire would have been too great, the entire, unified Roman Empire would have collapsed and fallen.

"he overall manager of forces. The FORSCOM Commander is the same rank as the Combatant Commanders and the Joint Chief of Staff (as well as the Service Chiefs of Staff). That equates to very collegiate form of consensus where personal deal making, rather than strategic direction, is what often leads to the assignment of forces."
I don't think this goes against unity of command. I like to think this further empowers it in the overall COC with regional commands having a better focus inside their region. With the Modern C3I the Pentagon has a far greater advantage over the Legions lines of communication.
Although I completely agree it's a growing problem the U.S. military is facing such large cuts with OPTEMPO is growing at an unsustainable pace. Stryker and Light Infantry units are relatively inexpensive in terms of Pentagon budgets and they're the units being downsized. It doesn't make much sense to me given their abi,it's to rapidly deploy for various overseas contingencies.


"The Western Roman Empire decayed and fell due to a number of reasons. High amongst them was the level of corruption and in-fighting amongst the leadership, which resulted in an inability for the Western Roman Empire to protect and sustain itself"
Sounds like the current state of affairs in American Polotics to me. I perceive the general lack of U.S. Involvement around the globe is leading to many of the current geopolitical challenges. Lack of US support in Europe is emboldening Putin, same can potentially be said of the PLA in the Spratleys. Traditional American Allies are rearming and traditional adversaries are threatening them, all with little or no real deterrence from America

 

[gree0232]

Three immediate thoughts come to mind.

The first is a question: Have you ever heard of the term, "span of control"?

The second is that the split of the Roman Empire into the Eastern and Western Roman Empires, is not at all like the US system of regional combat commands.

The third is that the US does have a HQ, and chain of command, and the various combat commands and their respective commanders and command staff receive orders and overall strategy, as well as force/asset allocations, from the US HQ which is generally thought to be in a funny, pentagon-shaped building in Washington, D.C.

From a historical perspective, the Western Roman Empire decayed and fell due to a number of reasons. High amongst them was the level of corruption and in-fighting amongst the leadership, which resulted in an inability for the Western Roman Empire to protect and sustain itself. Had the two empires remained merged together as a single political, social and military entity, it is possible that the cohesion of the Eastern Roman Empire would have been sufficient to protect and provide for the whole. It is also very possible that the resource drain to protect the portion which became the Western Roman Empire would have been too great, the entire, unified Roman Empire would have collapsed and fallen.

#1 - Span of control applies the region commands as well. The problem is that they are involved in more operations then they can effectively control, and the number of issues they are involved in is ... immense. We have entire systems just to track the Theater Security Cooperation Events/Exercises (GTCMIS), and, with six Commands pitching stuff into the mix, the reality is that the Pentagon has no idea what we are doing.

Span of control? More money equates to more operations, and as we add more operations/events, we need more money to sustain them and respond to 'new' issues that arise. The question of span of control verses effective management is a good one to ask, because the typical 3-5 is drawled by operations numbering the hundreds per year for each combatant command. The overall Joint Staff? The ability of the President/SECDEF/SECSTATE to understand, much less coordinate, these disparate events is effectively impossible.

Which gets to heart of the issue. Is we WANT strategic effects, then we need to be able to define them, manage them, effectively resource them ... which requires a span of control.

Letting the combat commands 'control' the ever increasing demand signal is not the solution.

#2 - The initial division of Roman Empire was nothing more than a regional diversion. It was not initially a 'split', but the effects of dividing resources and their management effectively, defacto, lead inexorably to the political split that would follow.

We see the exact same thing with the competition for resources between PACOM and CENTCOM, for example. Each of these Combatant Commands has, undoubtedly, strategic necessities - but who is assigning the forces? Prioritizing the events? Arguably, its no one, because the Military is going back to Congress, hat and hand, asking for more money ... even as it is cutting the number of ships, planes, tanks, and Service Members to fill this ever increasing demand.

#3 - Who is in charge of the US military? The JCS? He's more of an adviser. The SECDEF? Haven't seen that office reign in the Combatant Commands. FORSCOM? They manage the forces to meet the demands of the combatant commanders. The Combatant Commanders? Who puts the appetite suppressant on their requests and requirements? And therein lies the rub. All these guys are effectively the same rank, and the collegiate peer process isn't really something that anyone is in charge of.

On paper its the President, but he isn't exactly involved in the nitty gritty of assigning force structure to meet the Combat Commander's needs. Nor indeed is there anyone forcing say ... State and Defense to align their regional areas for better coordination. It begs the question, who is in charge?

There is a massive bureaucracy, and the assignment of forces process is as much an art as a science. Navigating it is about massaging forces for your boss. What it very often lacks is sound strategic direction and the management of forces. People are told no, but its only when the literal bottom of the barrel has been reached.

The effects on the Brigades, for example? They are everywhere. The Regionally Aligned Brigades, or those assigned to Europe, thanks to the Ukraine situation, are all over the place. The same with our fleet of combat aircraft. Ideas like mass, concentration, that make these units effective in combat are being lost as we piecemeal our shrinking forces away from their training base.

We say we need these HQ? But the reality is we had effectively two Combatant Commands in WWII, with a MUCH larger force, arrayed against much more formidable enemies. There was enough competition for forces between those two theaters. I cannot imagine how much more difficult the fight would have been if you had other five star generals reminding us how important communist fifth columns were in South America, and gumming up the system to to divert forces from real wars - and that is precisely what is happening in Afghanistan for example.

Dividing the world into six is just sucking up resources, and it I think we would be sorely pressed to demonstrate any real strategic effect for the hyper utilization of our forces that are being pulled into this process.

 

[gree0232]

"he overall manager of forces. The FORSCOM Commander is the same rank as the Combatant Commanders and the Joint Chief of Staff (as well as the Service Chiefs of Staff). That equates to very collegiate form of consensus where personal deal making, rather than strategic direction, is what often leads to the assignment of forces."
I don't think this goes against unity of command. I like to think this further empowers it in the overall COC with regional commands having a better focus inside their region. With the Modern C3I the Pentagon has a far greater advantage over the Legions lines of communication.
Although I completely agree it's a growing problem the U.S. military is facing such large cuts with OPTEMPO is growing at an unsustainable pace. Stryker and Light Infantry units are relatively inexpensive in terms of Pentagon budgets and they're the units being downsized. It doesn't make much sense to me given their abi,it's to rapidly deploy for various overseas contingencies.


"The Western Roman Empire decayed and fell due to a number of reasons. High amongst them was the level of corruption and in-fighting amongst the leadership, which resulted in an inability for the Western Roman Empire to protect and sustain itself"
Sounds like the current state of affairs in American Polotics to me. I perceive the general lack of U.S. Involvement around the globe is leading to many of the current geopolitical challenges. Lack of US support in Europe is emboldening Putin, same can potentially be said of the PLA in the Spratleys. Traditional American Allies are rearming and traditional adversaries are threatening them, all with little or no real deterrence from America

Allright, its not that I disagree with the 'better focus on the region', but that is kind of the point. What are America's strategic interests?

George Kennan, after WWII, spelled this out essentially as protecting vital economic nodes, Western Europe and Japan ... with anything beyond that being essentially a fool's errand. Vietnam would seem to have completely validated his vision.

It begs the question today: What is our vital interest? Secondly, does having six regionally focused commands really answer the mail on those vital strategic interests? Or are we simply throwing good money after regional issues that really have no interest to us?

1. We obviously need to be involved in Iraq/Syria and indeed the wider Middle East. Yet the biggest threat there is one of corruption and stability, and effort that is only partially military.

2. Afghanistan. Not going away. Whether its an actual strategic interest is debatable. They call it the graveyard of empires for a reason.

3. Pacific region. Again commitment to Japan/Korea, and freedom of navigation issues.

4. Countering Russian Aggression. Again, this is only partially military, and a lot of this is about getting neighboring countries to step up to the plate on their own.

5. Managing India/Pakistan (which is curiously split by CENTCOM/PACOM) as India rises and integrates into the global economy.

I can guarantee you that there are hundreds of projects that have absolutely nothing to do with that baseline. In fact, our current strategic guidance is ... noticeably vague.

ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/NewsArticleView/tabid/7849/Article/577531/jfq-74-defense-strategic-guidance-thoughtful-choices-and-security-cooperation.aspx]JFQ 74 | Defense Strategic Guidance: Thoughtful Choices and Security Cooperation > National Defense University Press > News Article View

We delayed a destroyer to Cameroon to teach a few guys how to shoot pistols? OK. That is the problem. That is an action that is low skill level, perishable, and does absolutely nothing to pull Cameroon into regional anti-smuggling operations. Nice photo op though.

That is, in a nutshell, the issue.

 

[Todjaeger]

From what seems to have been articulated so far, the OP seems to feel that the US seems to have little or no strategic direction.

Also with respect to having a half-dozen Combatant Commands, there is little or no control over them and that they are operating independently/outside of the US change of command.

Would the above be an accurate summation?

 

[gree0232]

From what seems to have been articulated so far, the OP seems to feel that the US seems to have little or no strategic direction.

Also with respect to having a half-dozen Combatant Commands, there is little or no control over them and that they are operating independently/outside of the US change of command.

Would the above be an accurate summation?

The first is accurate. Each of the six Combatant Commands has a priority list, and the system is geared toward filling those requests to the maximum extent possible. This is creating several issues:

#1 - What if we create a 7th Combatant Command? We still have the same number of resources to assign, but now ... we are spreading it out over 7 Commands. You can see this effect very clearly on our Brigades and divisions, who are being inundated with tasks and operations - a tempo that is literally ripping them apart.

Is that tempo because the world is suddenly so much more dangerous? Or is it because we have too many headquarters producing too many requests for forces to track down on too many problems - many of which the military is not the best suited to answer IMHO.

#2 - As we have increased these HQ's, we have, in every category, slashed the number of units available to assign to these HQ's. We have fewer Brigades, the Marines have fewer Regiments, the Navy has fewer ships, the Air Force has fewer planes. Yet we have six Combatant Commands competing for those resources, and the stress and strain is very clear on the force.

It is precisely this demand signal that is driving the Service Chiefs to head back to Congress and plead for more money to meet this demand signal. Yet it begs the question, the proverbial chicken or egg: Is the demand signal really this great? Or has the creation of the so many headquarters itself the creation of the demand signal?

#3 - As we examine the demand signal, I will tell you plainly that there are many things we do that have no strategic effect whatsoever. Its pretty clear, in a sense, that we have some strategic priorities. Iraq/Syria, Afghanistan, Pacific Stability.

The issue? The bulk of our forces are not arrayed or utilized against those strategic priorities. The attempt to manage the depth to keep those priorities while filling the Combatant Commander's requests is producing an inordinate amount of strain.

In short, by having so many headquarters, we are signing up our forces for far more than they can reasonably be expected to achieve.

The Second is slightly inaccurate. There is a Chain of Command, but its flat. Everyone at that level is a four star general. Which one is in charge? Technically, this flows from the President, but the President is not doing FORSCOM's job for it. He is not assigning a Division or a JTF to something. There are 38 4-star Generals in our military, six of which are Combatant Commanders. The Competition for dwindling resources requires a certain amount of consensus to move forward (which is why relationships with General Officers are so important), and a LOT of the assignment of forces process comes out of collegiate peer relationships.

There is, effectively, no Chain of Command. There is no one HQ to make and assign priorities that the Combatant Commanders will fall in line with (except the President himself). Its quite the other way around in practice, with the pentagon and FORSCOM attempting to fill the requirements of the Combatant Commander's, rather than the Combatant Commanders being DIRECTED by the National Command Authority (though, obviously, there is some of that too - like, go take care of Ebola in Liberia please).

Of note: I will tell you that these contingencies are problematic in the current system. With the forces assigned at a hyper-efficient level, there is no spare capacity. So when a contingency pops up, one of the combatant commanders is going to lose forces ... which means something that is a high enough priority to require the assignment of forces just fell off the to do list. Was it really that important? Or, in moving the force to a contingency, are we taking a strategic risk?

In practice we have strategic documents that direct, but if you read them and then look at the alignment of forces you will very quickly discover some major discrepancies between the priorities and the assignment of forces. You will also discover that much of the strategic guidance is quite vague. As provided above, what exactly does, "Look for parters," mean in effect? What are the key players and why? (A far cry, for example, from case made by George Kennan at the beginning of the Cold War whose articulation of Europe and Japan allowed for the clear assignment of US forces, even as they went through a massive drawdown).

To sum the problem up, what happens if we free up a BCT? Which of the six Combatant Commands should it go to? Africa can use it train forces against Boko Harem and other regional threats. The Pacific Region can assign it to Pacific Pathways. It could be used to provide an Advise and Assist Brigade to the Middle East. We could send it to Europe to bolster NATO and counter Russian Aggression. We could retain it as a strategic reserve for contingencies. Where would it do the most good?

The problem? Each of the Combatant Commands has a list of priorities that can justify the use of that Brigade. Effectively, the availability of forces just moves the cut line lower on their list. That, in effect, means that the demand signal, the signal that is being used to justify our budget to Congress, will never be filled.

What is clearly lacking is strategic direction. Of looking at the dwindling resources and saying, "These are our priorities, and these will get the forces for these reasons." There is instead a element of the self licking ice cream cone. We created six HQ's, which has created enormous demands, and, because we have so many demands, we need more forces!"

As simply as I can state this, we don't have enough forces to fill the requirements of six commands, so why do we have six commands? Better regional coordination? What about strategic direction?

 

[Todjaeger]

As simply as I can state this, we don't have enough forces to fill the requirements of six commands, so why do we have six commands? Better regional coordination? What about strategic direction?

From my POV, you have demonstrated a complete lack of understanding of the term, "span of control", as well as numerous components and layers of the US command structure.

I also happen to disagree with commentary you have made regarding the situation and strategy behind US taskings.

Take for instance the assignment of tasks and operations. Whether there are two, six, seven, or some other number of 'regional' command centres, if a task or operation needs to be conducted in a given area, then orders will be issued by whoever/whatever authority is responsible for that given area, to whomever/whatever units they have to cover their (the regional command centre's/regional commander's) area of responsibility.

The only time or only way the taskings and/or operations assignments would increase, by having more command centres, would be if a decision was made that unless there was a command centre for a given area, the US would not be involved in/assign tasks or conduct operations in that given area.

As for the whole 'demand signal' as posted, that is driven again not by the command centres, but by the tasking and operational requirements. If due to the world security situation, the US felt it needed to have six heavy divisions and associated additional/support forces with each placed in a different region in the world, that would have the same demand for troops and resources whether the heavy divisions and support units each reported to a regional Combatant Command, or they all reported directly to the Pentagon.

As for there being a US strategic direction, IMO it should be fairly clear that it does exist, whether or not people do, or even should, agree with it is another matter. It does exist, and like many/most strategic plans or documents, it is for the most part going to be rather vague. A strategic 'view' is looking at the overall, big picture. It is not focusing on a specific event, situation, or threat. Doing so would result in other portions of the overall picture or situation being missed, overlooked, or just outright ignored.

 

[gree0232]

From my POV, you have demonstrated a complete lack of understanding of the term, "span of control", as well as numerous components and layers of the US command structure.

I also happen to disagree with commentary you have made regarding the situation and strategy behind US taskings.

Take for instance the assignment of tasks and operations. Whether there are two, six, seven, or some other number of 'regional' command centres, if a task or operation needs to be conducted in a given area, then orders will be issued by whoever/whatever authority is responsible for that given area, to whomever/whatever units they have to cover their (the regional command centre's/regional commander's) area of responsibility.

The only time or only way the taskings and/or operations assignments would increase, by having more command centres, would be if a decision was made that unless there was a command centre for a given area, the US would not be involved in/assign tasks or conduct operations in that given area.

As for the whole 'demand signal' as posted, that is driven again not by the command centres, but by the tasking and operational requirements. If due to the world security situation, the US felt it needed to have six heavy divisions and associated additional/support forces with each placed in a different region in the world, that would have the same demand for troops and resources whether the heavy divisions and support units each reported to a regional Combatant Command, or they all reported directly to the Pentagon.

As for there being a US strategic direction, IMO it should be fairly clear that it does exist, whether or not people do, or even should, agree with it is another matter. It does exist, and like many/most strategic plans or documents, it is for the most part going to be rather vague. A strategic 'view' is looking at the overall, big picture. It is not focusing on a specific event, situation, or threat. Doing so would result in other portions of the overall picture or situation being missed, overlooked, or just outright ignored.

Tod, you are free to disagree, but you might try making a case.

Span of control is a doctrinal military term, its taught to privates all the way on up to generals, so if you case rests upon it not being 'understood' ... that is going to require some explanation. It appears that you do not understand how plans and operations work at the Combatant Command level.

The is ONE control center in the combatant commands, with the relevant components providing their portion if the COP. Each has hundreds of the projects inside the Command, and the services, even within the combatant commands, do a poor job of even understanding what the other services are doing - often leading to service fratricide - when they schedule dueling event at the same time for the same 'effect', oblivious to the fact that they are doing so. That would be precisely because the various commands have no idea what they are doing.

The system to tack this, GTCSMIS, is not disciplined, with service adherence spotty at best, which only exacerbates the problem.

Who do the combatant commander's assign those orders to? The ONLY forces assigned to the CC's are done so through FORSCOM. Ergo, we draw up a lot of orders for operations ... and many of them wind up coming out of hide rather than being assigned to another HQ. In fact, with only two brigades in Europe (both fully employed at the moment, and two combatant commands (EUCOM and AFRICOM), exactly how many operations can those two brigades fill? Yet the HQ's keep churning out orders.

I'm in Italy, and will tell you plainly that the 173rd is exhausted. They are being beaten into the ground trying to fill the requirements of TWO of these HQ's, and the rest of the Army is in similar shape.

Finally, you are saying that we have strategic direction, but this appears to be more of a general desire than anything else.

What is strategic importance? Are our assets being aligned with those priorities properly? Are we maintaining a strategic depth of forces (a ready bench if you will)? Or are we robbing peter to pay paul when something arises?

Where is the Long Telegram that sums up this strategic direction? And where is the verification of forces assigned to meet these goals - to prioritize them against our NECESSITIES.

When you see 'operations' taking place in Mongolia, a country completely surrounded by two strategic rivals, one has to ask why that would happen at a time when we are beating down ISIS, still fighting in Afghanistan, and cutting the force?

ww.army.mil/article/150688/Alaska_service_members_depart_for_peacekeeping_exercise_in_Mongolia/]Alaska[/url] service members depart for peacekeeping exercise in Mongolia | Article | The United States Army

I will tell you it is because this gets pushed in the HQ, and because we have no real asset control if you will, that these things slip through the crack (in large numbers) and to the severe strain on the system. Mongolia is not a strategic priority. At all.

 

[Todjaeger]

Tod, you are free to disagree, but you might try making a case.

This thread was opened with what very much appears to be the assertion that the US having six Combatant Commanders plus Special Operations, is similar to, and similarly bad like the division of the Roman Empire into the Eastern and Western Roman Empires.

Instead of there being what IMO would be information to support such assertions, there has been incorrect and/or contradictory information provided (which I will show examples of), assertions that the combatant commands are not working well (but not in any way special/different for a command centre), and what appear to be opinions that the US either has no overall strategy, or the US has the wrong strategy.

There has been no discussion of the circumstances behind why the Roman Empire split, how the two divisions were managed prior to the split and how they were managed after, or how the management of the halves of the Roman Empire relates to how the US and US forces are run.

When someone makes an assertion, the onus is on them to make a case for what they are stating or claiming, unless the assertion is something which is very obviously, blindly apparent, i.e. "water is wet..."

Span of control is a doctrinal military term, its taught to privates all the way on up to generals, so if you case rests upon it not being 'understood' ... that is going to require some explanation. It appears that you do not understand how plans and operations work at the Combatant Command level.

"Span of control" is a term also used with essentially the same mean, outside of the military. Incidentally, "span of control," is scalable in terms of how it is supposed to function when it is being done correctly, with some details being potentially different based off what 'level' one it looking at. This also happens to be one of the areas where IMO incorrect/contradictory statements have been made, note the text I bold.

There is, effectively, no Chain of Command. There is no one HQ to make and assign priorities that the Combatant Commanders will fall in line with (except the President himself). Its quite the other way around in practice, with the pentagon and FORSCOM attempting to fill the requirements of the Combatant Commander's, rather than the Combatant Commanders being DIRECTED by the National Command Authority (though, obviously, there is some of that too - like, go take care of Ebola in Liberia please).

The above quoted piece, and especially the bolded portion, completely ignores the role of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Department and various secretaries, the various service departments and their respective secretaries, the roles of the personnel (civilian and military) assigned to or working at the Pentagon, and other entire layers involved in enabling the Combatant Commands to be able to function at all, in any kind of capacity.

In order to more specifically illustrate this I will list some yes/know questions and use AFRICOM as an example:

Does AFRICOM get to decide how much of the US defence budget it gets allocated?

Does AFRICOM get to decide how many troops it has assigned to it?

Does AFRICOM get to decide what it's overall Area of Responsibility is?

Does AFRICOM get to feed, clothe and equip its troops however it sees fit?

Does AFRICOM get to decide how, and how much, it's troops will be paid?

Does AFRICOM have the authority to raise a new unit?

Does AFRICOM have the ability to raise a new unit/unit type?

Is AFRICOM self-sustaining in terms of personnel, logistics, technology, or does it need to request additional resources to sustain ongoing operations from year to year?

The is ONE control center in the combatant commands, with the relevant components providing their portion if the COP. Each has hundreds of the projects inside the Command, and the services, even within the combatant commands, do a poor job of even understanding what the other services are doing - often leading to service fratricide - when they schedule dueling event at the same time for the same 'effect', oblivious to the fact that they are doing so. That would be precisely because the various commands have no idea what they are doing.

The system to tack this, GTCSMIS, is not disciplined, with service adherence spotty at best, which only exacerbates the problem.

Who do the combatant commander's assign those orders to? The ONLY forces assigned to the CC's are done so through FORSCOM. Ergo, we draw up a lot of orders for operations ... and many of them wind up coming out of hide rather than being assigned to another HQ. In fact, with only two brigades in Europe (both fully employed at the moment, and two combatant commands (EUCOM and AFRICOM), exactly how many operations can those two brigades fill? Yet the HQ's keep churning out orders.

From my POV, this speaks to a "span of control" issue and lack of communications within a unified command. This has SFA with being a Combatant Command (apart from all NINE Combatant Commands are Unified commands, since this sort of situation can occur at any level of command, whether the command is a unified command or single service branch command.

Finally, you are saying that we have strategic direction, but this appears to be more of a general desire than anything else.

What is strategic importance? Are our assets being aligned with those priorities properly? Are we maintaining a strategic depth of forces (a ready bench if you will)? Or are we robbing peter to pay paul when something arises?

Where is the Long Telegram that sums up this strategic direction? And where is the verification of forces assigned to meet these goals - to prioritize them against our NECESSITIES.

When you see 'operations' taking place in Mongolia, a country completely surrounded by two strategic rivals, one has to ask why that would happen at a time when we are beating down ISIS, still fighting in Afghanistan, and cutting the force?

ww.army.mil/article/150688/Alaska_service_members_depart_for_peacekeeping_exercise_in_Mongolia/]Alaska[/url] service members depart for peacekeeping exercise in Mongolia | Article | The United States Army

I will tell you it is because this gets pushed in the HQ, and because we have no real asset control if you will, that these things slip through the crack (in large numbers) and to the severe strain on the system. Mongolia is not a strategic priority. At all.

Considering that the US has a Unified Command Plan which is updated annually at the least, and that is proof IMO that there is a strategy. I do not claim to know what it is, or whether or not the strategy is correct or working, but it does exist. From a defence perspective, the US is not doing a, "let us make this up as we go along," type of response.

I am not even going into some of the problematic statements about past history and oversimplification. If need be, I can do so later but at present it remains to be seen whether discussion in this thread will anywhere productive.

 

[gree0232]

“Against an adversary like Russia, we can’t take the kind of air dominance we’ve had in conflicts since 9/11 for granted,” a second defense official explained. “Any conflict of significant magnitude against an adversary like Russia means we’d need to commit airmen and resources that are now operating in other parts of the world at a rate that minimizes their ability to train for that kind of fight.”

The official added, “We may very well be able to provide the airpower that would allow us and our allies to prevail in a high-end fight, but the current state of our air forces definitely doesn’t make that a sure bet.”


ww.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/14/pentagon-fears-it-s-not-ready-for-a-war-with-putin.html

That about sums up the issue. We cannot prepare for the fights we believe are strategically important because our forces are 'operating in other parts of the world'.

Under the current system, they will ALWAYS be operating in some other part of the world, and, what exercises are revealing, that is putting our long term security and ability to respond to legitimate strategic threats at risk.

 

[bdique]

OP might want to read this to better understand how the US tackles the issue of developing command structures suitable for a range of scenarios and threats.

Document: Pentagon's Joint Concept of Rapid Aggregation - USNI News

The fact that the JCRA exists shows that there are ways to address and mitigate a wide range of scenarios that needs the Pentagon's attention.

 

[gree0232]

OP might want to read this to better understand how the US tackles the issue of developing command structures suitable for a range of scenarios and threats.

ews.usni.org/20]2012 REPORT TO CONGRESS of the U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION - USNI

The fact that the JCRA exists shows that there are ways to address and mitigate a wide range of scenarios that needs the Pentagon's attention.

This completely misses the point. Plans, and plans about planning, are not actual strategic guidance. Having worked in several of these HQ's, there are a lot of planners, planning long hours into the night. There are SAMS/SAASS graduates that plug away. This problem is made worse by our PCS policy that rotates planners and Commander's every two to three years, created massive upheaval in even in the regional commands, to say nothing of FORSCOM's priorities.

The problem? We have six HQ's (plus the JCS and Service Chiefs) plugging away at all manner of contingent plans - and the number one assumption to ALL these plans is one that we should call into question (especially with a downsizing force): That in the event of a contingency operation, FORSCOM will have the forces available to met that contingency.

As we see above, we a looming and very probable contingency with Russia (strategic deterrence) ANY forces sent to reinforce efforts there will have to be taken from another Combatant Command's efforts.

Its a grave concern to ALL the service chiefs who are running, hat in hand, to Congress and asking for more money for more forces ... even as they cut forces.

What good is a well though out doctrine if:

a. You don't train staffs to follow it? (Our efforts here are vastly short of what is needed).

b. You don't have the forces to execute whatever these planning staffs come up with?

Instead of consolidating our planning actions around the reality that we have dwindling military resources, that we are loosing the competitive economic advantages that has allowed us to sustain military spending at such a high level, and formulating and rigorously enforcing strategic priorities ... we are allowing Combatant Commands to largely direct themselves.

If this division by six were such a great idea, why is no other military force following our lead?

The answer? It's horribly expensive, and the frittering of strategic assets on the priorities of six emperors is extraordinarily wasteful.

Publishing a book doesn't change the fundamentals of a budget or the number of forces available (or their over commitment).

 

[gree0232]

Syria.

This episode provides the perfect example of what is wrong with our six combatant commands and their hyper utilization of our forces.

Russia, does not have six combatant commands. The result? They have troops that are literally sitting around waiting to be employed ... when opportunity strikes - they go. Whether you agree or disagree, in just about every border state tat Russia has seized territory from its been no contest. In Ukraine, they doubled down on forces and have carved out a salient and taken Crimea. They are now sending forces forward into Syria.

We might not like what they are doing, but the Russians are clearly able to size up strategic situations and deploy their forces effectively to achieve those objectives. They do not, for example, have to worry about pulling forces out of SOUTHCOM in order to reason them to CENTCOM - one HQ manages it all.

In sharp contrast, with our attention everywhere, we are, once again, caught flat footed by Russia's action. And what can we do? Are we going to set up a FOB in Israel? In Northern Syria with the ... er, slightly less radical factions? Even better? The Russian forces are coming out of what is EUCOM's AOR, and are landing in CENTCOM's AOR. Are we going to try to attack this problem at the source or delivery end? Or both? OK, who is in charge?

With both the Brigades in Europe hyper employed in scaring the Russians, even if we wanted to make a similar move against Russia ... we can't.

Syria/ISIS/Iraq is one of our main strategic concerns, the Russians just flew in a bunch of equipment, with more to follow, in order to stabilize a pillar that is a strategic pillar we want knocked down. Despite two Combatant Commands looking at both ends of this issue, neither saw it coming ... and neither has any idea what to do about it. Even if we had a plan, where would the forces come from?

I fail etirely to see what benefit having six Combatant Commands is doing for us.

 

[marla]

Under the current system, they will ALWAYS be operating in some other part of the world, and, what exercises are revealing, that is putting our long term security and ability to respond to legitimate strategic threats at risk.