Sinking of the Belgrano

Musashi_kenshin

Well-Known Member
Sorry if this isn't the right place for it, but I thought you might find this interesting.

Times review of new work on the Falklands

Although widely lauded at the time for her principled stand against the Argentine invasion of the islands, Margaret Thatcher endured years of criticism for allowing the attack on a warship outside the British-imposed exclusion zone around the islands. It now appears that she did not know the full story. On May 1, 1982, Admiral Juan Lombardo ordered all Argentine naval units to seek out the British task force around the Falklands and launch a “massive attack†the following day. The Belgrano, which was outside the exclusion zone to the north, was ordered south.

Lombardo’s signal was intercepted by British Intelligence. As a result Mrs Thatcher and her War Cabinet, meeting at Chequers the following day, agreed to a request from Admiral Sir Terence Lewin, the Chief of the Defence Staff, to alter the rules of engagement and allow an attack on the Belgrano outside the exclusion zone. It was a controversial decision which led to allegations that the enemy cruiser had been attacked to scupper a late peace plan proposed by the President of Peru.

Other intercepted signals told the British that the Argentinians had been ordered to turn back at the moment and resume their previous positions, because they had been spotted by a Royal Navy Sea Harrier. But the contents of these later signals “were not distributed on the British side until the next day and had no influence on the day’s eventsâ€, the official history says.

Commander Christopher Wreford-Brown, the commanding officer of HMS Conqueror, had sent a signal four hours before he fired his torpedoes at the Belgrano, saying that the Argentine cruiser had changed course. His signal was received in Britain by Vice-Admiral Peter Herbert, Flag Officer Submarines, but it was not passed on to the MoD or to Rear-Admiral Sandy Woodward, who was commander of the task force in the South Atlantic.


So she got all that flak for nothing? Shame.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Musashi_kenshin said:
Sorry if this isn't the right place for it, but I thought you might find this interesting.

Times review of new work on the Falklands

Although widely lauded at the time for her principled stand against the Argentine invasion of the islands, Margaret Thatcher endured years of criticism for allowing the attack on a warship outside the British-imposed exclusion zone around the islands. It now appears that she did not know the full story. On May 1, 1982, Admiral Juan Lombardo ordered all Argentine naval units to seek out the British task force around the Falklands and launch a “massive attack†the following day. The Belgrano, which was outside the exclusion zone to the north, was ordered south.

Lombardo’s signal was intercepted by British Intelligence. As a result Mrs Thatcher and her War Cabinet, meeting at Chequers the following day, agreed to a request from Admiral Sir Terence Lewin, the Chief of the Defence Staff, to alter the rules of engagement and allow an attack on the Belgrano outside the exclusion zone. It was a controversial decision which led to allegations that the enemy cruiser had been attacked to scupper a late peace plan proposed by the President of Peru.

Other intercepted signals told the British that the Argentinians had been ordered to turn back at the moment and resume their previous positions, because they had been spotted by a Royal Navy Sea Harrier. But the contents of these later signals “were not distributed on the British side until the next day and had no influence on the day’s eventsâ€, the official history says.

Commander Christopher Wreford-Brown, the commanding officer of HMS Conqueror, had sent a signal four hours before he fired his torpedoes at the Belgrano, saying that the Argentine cruiser had changed course. His signal was received in Britain by Vice-Admiral Peter Herbert, Flag Officer Submarines, but it was not passed on to the MoD or to Rear-Admiral Sandy Woodward, who was commander of the task force in the South Atlantic.

So she got all that flak for nothing? Shame.
but like all good troopers she would have "worn it" anyway... ;)
 

Supe

New Member
ROE. What a joke. If you're involved in a shooting match, then anything of military value or that which poses a threat to your forces should be deemed as a legitimate target. Exclusion zones...

"I say old chap, I can tip you on the shoulder here, but you shan't be able to touch me when I'm over the line there; let's call it a time out zone so we can all grab breathers wot"

It sounds so ludicrous to have these arbitrary zones where (much like that child's game) you can't be 'tipped'.
 

alexsa

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/newspaper/0,,170-1670775,00.html

I would be careful not to ascribe too much to what is printed in news papers about who know what in war. I suspect more was know than the newspaper wa aware of and decsion were taken on the basis of minimising the threat.

I have to agree that the exclusion zone was largely a nonsense an served more to keep other players (merchant ships and interested onlookers) out of the way than as an effective limit to where action could be taken. It should be noted that the Brits did not just land on those islands taken by the Argentines but on a few other spots as well and those were well outside the exclusion zone. I doubt if the RN had seen an Argentine subamrine on the surface between St Helena and the Falklans they wouel have hesitated for one minute to try and sink it.

The sinking had an immedaite effect on the Argentine Navy ....... it went home and stayed there. I think it was a pretty calculted an shrewd decision and should be seen as such.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
alexsa said:
I would be careful not to ascribe too much to what is printed in news papers about who know what in war. I suspect more was know than the newspaper wa aware of and decsion were taken on the basis of minimising the threat.
I agree. I've been reading "The Sinking of the Belgrano" by Rice and Glasson. It uses govt documents from the UK, US, Chile, Argentina and Peru and is pretty clear in establishing from their perspective that it was a conscious decision


alexsa said:
I have to agree that the exclusion zone was largely a nonsense an served more to keep other players (merchant ships and interested onlookers) out of the way than as an effective limit to where action could be taken. It should be noted that the Brits did not just land on those islands taken by the Argentines but on a few other spots as well and those were well outside the exclusion zone. I doubt if the RN had seen an Argentine subamrine on the surface between St Helena and the Falklans they wouel have hesitated for one minute to try and sink it.
Brit intelligence had alerted that Sante Fe was out hunting and near the battle group. Conqueror was diverted to hunt and kill it. That was Apr 24

alexsa said:
The sinking had an immedaite effect on the Argentine Navy ....... it went home and stayed there. I think it was a pretty calculted an shrewd decision and should be seen as such.
The Belgrano, Piedra Buena and Hipolito Bouchard were also kept close to home as the Argentinians suspected that the Chilean Navy might come in on the side of the RN. As we all know, Pinochet and Thatcher were very "tight" - and the UK has always had a strong relationship with Chile. Thats why with the recent sale of the surplus RN vessels, the "smart money" was always on Chile getting those guided missile destroyers over any other bidder/country.
 
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Musashi_kenshin

Well-Known Member
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alexsa said:
I would be careful not to ascribe too much to what is printed in news papers about who know what in war. I suspect more was know than the newspaper wa aware of and decsion were taken on the basis of minimising the threat.
I thought the one reason this was newsworthy was that this research had been carried out by an historian, rather than just a journalist. Of course that doesn't mean Freedman wasn't wrong either.
 
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