Shipping needed to facilitate an unopposed landing of a light infantry brigade.

[Dodger67]

The latest draft of the current South African Defence Review has reitterated the requirement that the South African Navy needs the capability to deliver a brigade ashore unopposed. What type(s) of amphibious shipping would be necessary?
The initial requirement is to land a "battalion group" (I presume they mean a battalion plus a proportional share of brigade level support units) in a single landing and later expand to landing an entire brigade in multiple "waves".

The French have been trying to for several years sell them a pair of (or three) Mistrals.

BTW in the South African system a basic brigade has three battalions.

 

[kato]

Unopposed? A single regular civilian ferry should do. Add some Mexeflotes to drop off the ramp if you want some flexibility regarding infrastructure.

 

[Dodger67]

When the Americans came visiting recently in the HSV Swift, nobody in the local naval fraternity was impressed. Consensus was that it wouldn't last more than a year or two in the South Atlantic, its structure is simply too flimsy.

A civil type ferry would be practically useless without a working port. In sub-Saharan Africa one must asume zero shore infrastructure - so a landing capability on open beach is definitely needed.

Do you know any ferry designs that could travel from Cape Town to Somalia nonstop?

I think you seriously underestimate the requirement. Would a civil type ferry be able to deliver artillery, trucks, all the other supplies and equipment for a battalion and its support units in one load?

I believe helicopter facilities and a welldeck for reasonably substantial boats would have to be included.

Perhaps I didn't describe the parameters adequately in my first post.

 

[Anixtu]

What is an "unopposed" landing in this context? No-one plans for Normandy style opposed landings into the teeth of enemy fire, so even today's 'assault landings' are planned to be unopposed, conducted at a location where the enemy is not present in sufficient force to 'oppose'. Is the requirement to conduct a modern assault landing of forces formed and ready for manoeuvre to an objective, or is it for administrative landings in an entirely permissive environment?

For the first option you're looking at dock and helicopter type landing ships whereas for the second you can look at lower performance systems like LSLs and Mexeflotes or their equivalents. Docks and helicopters are not essential to conduct an administrative landing of a peacekeeping force.

For the capabilities of civilian shipping in the amphibious role, take a look at British efforts in 1982. Also MSC prepositioning/sealift and US JLOTS systems. If the requirement is for cost-effective administrative landings, that would be a good place to start.

Modestly sized civilian ferries and RORO cargo ships generally have much greater vehicle capacity than naval landing ships and in at least some cases can cover oceanic distances without refuelling.

 

[USAF77]

The Swift is a test vehicle. Nothing more. And its only about 1,700 tons displacement. Even if it was a landing ship it probably couldnt land a company with equipment.

To land a brigade, with all its firepower, is a huge requirement. Your talking 30,000 ton displacement range. Didnt the Chinese come out with this type of civvie/Military dual use ship?

 

[Dodger67]

I'm afraid my knowlege of naval matters is rather limited - the reason why I started this topic - apologies for being so vague.

I supose my main question really should be: Is the French Mistral (or similar) amphibious ship really suitable?

I understand that troops storming the beach under fire is not the way it's done these days - at the very least intel would be tasked to find a suitably quiet beach or the air force would be tasked to "create a clear beach" at least temporarily.

The "Sea-landed brigade" is intended to be part of the "Contingency Division" togther with a Paratroop Brigade and an "Air landed" (helicopter) Brigade. They are intended to be the leading elements of any "rapid deployment" combat intervention anywhere in Sub-Saharan Africa.

"Administrative landings" for peacekeeping (as opposed to combat) forces would more usually consist of mechanised or motorised infantry - the bulk of the troops arriving by civil airline - the vehicles, weapons and other materiel arriving by road, rail or ordinary cargo ships using a nearby functional and friendly port.

Whatever ship(s) they get are also required to provide facilities for the Brigade HQ for at least the initial stages of the deployment - until a suitable onshore location has been secured. The same applies to field hospital facilities. Once the troops have been landed the same ship(s) could also be tasked with evacuating non-combatants.

This is all stuff I'm reading in the latest draft of the current Defence Review process - which must necessarily talk in generalities with little specific detail.

 

[t68]

Have a read of this thread, very informative.

http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/n...marine-corps-amphibious-ops-discussion-10840/

 

[USAF77]

Yeah, I did remember something of this. Marines: China Goes RoRo

Looks like it would fit your needs nicely.

 

[swerve]

..."Administrative landings" for peacekeeping (as opposed to combat) forces would more usually consist of mechanised or motorised infantry - the bulk of the troops arriving by civil airline - the vehicles, weapons and other materiel arriving by road, rail or ordinary cargo ships using a nearby functional and friendly port....

Anyone remember the USMC landing on a beach in Somalia as if they were expecting to have to storm it, & continuing to act that way in the middle of the crowd of reporters, TV film crews, etc who were waiting for them on the beach?

 

[Dodger67]

Anyone remember the USMC landing on a beach in Somalia as if they were expecting to have to storm it, & continuing to act that way in the middle of the crowd of reporters, TV film crews, etc who were waiting for them on the beach?

I do remember - it made a rather entertaining prime time news story - a real pity that the closing chapter was such a disaster!

BTW if anyone is interested in the latest draft of the South African Defence Review (which prompted my starting this topic) I have posted a link to it in the http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/g...frican-defense-discussion-11817-3/#post252117 topic.

 

[Marc 1]

Anyone remember the USMC landing on a beach in Somalia as if they were expecting to have to storm it, & continuing to act that way in the middle of the crowd of reporters, TV film crews, etc who were waiting for them on the beach?

Also remember the Royal Marines putting on a show for the media during GW 2(?) coming ashore in their rubber duckies and ending up floundering around in waist deep mud. PR disaster.

Correction - probably Telic and not rubber duckies: [nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qcTCVSJ5DcM"]Royal Marines Landing - YouTube[/nomedia]

 

[ASSAIL]

Also remember the Royal Marines putting on a show for the media during GW 2(?) coming ashore in their rubber duckies and ending up floundering around in waist deep mud. PR disaster.

Correction - probably Telic and not rubber duckies: Royal Marines Landing - YouTube

Fan bloody tastic, I wet myself laughing over that one.
Obviously SBS squadron didn't do a beach recce.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

BTW in the South African system a basic brigade has three battalions.

The level of troops and vehicles and stores needs to be set down in quite comprehensive detail before you can work out what kind of shipping you need. For example the Australian Amphibious Deployment and Sustainment (ADAS) system is designed to deploy a reinforced battalion group of 1,200 men with an 800 strong force support group and sustain them for two weeks getting there and two weeks in operations. This group includes a squadron of NH 90 helos, Tiger ARH, tanks, IFVs, etc. All of this was determined and then working backwards a requirement for two LHD type ships. Which has been meet by Spanish Juan Carlos class ships but two of the French Mistral class could have done the job as well.

For South Africa the requirement may not be so stringent because for one you have a more benign operating area. The east or west coasts of Africa aren’t exactly benign but they are less troublesome than South East Asia during the Monsoon season. Also a much lower likelihood of facing medium level defences like enemy strike aircraft and guided anti-ship missiles. Also the maximum range is probably about one week of sailing (Cape to Horn at 20 knots) and less ashore thanks to less threat allowing for easier resupply.

But how many ships you need and how big they have to be is determined by the size of the force needed to be moved. As for the type of ship a number of designers/shipyards offer scaled LPD/LHD type ships like the Dutch Enforcer and Spanish Althas. It would just be a matter of sizing the requirement and picking the best tender offer. Though the latter is no doubt a very fraught process with South African tender-entrepreneurs at the moment.

 

[Massive]

For example the Australian Amphibious Deployment and Sustainment (ADAS) system is designed to deploy a reinforced battalion group of 1,200 men with an 800 strong force support group and sustain them for two weeks getting there and two weeks in operations. This group includes a squadron of NH 90 helos, Tiger ARH, tanks, IFVs, etc. All of this was determined and then working backwards a requirement for two LHD type ships. Which has been meet by Spanish Juan Carlos class ships but two of the French Mistral class could have done the job as well.

Thanks for this Abe.

The question this raises is how to sustain this force past that initial two weeks?

Sustainment looks to be a big issue for the RAN with only HMAS Choules available given the LCH are now being withdrawn from service.

Sustainment would be a big issue for South Africa as well I imagine (he adds to avoid accusations of complete thread hijack).

Regards,

Massive

Ps. You wouldn't want one of the LHD's to be in refit or under repair - three are probably required to be able to provide a genuinely trapid response.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

The question this raises is how to sustain this force past that initial two weeks?

This is why the ADAS also included a sealift ship. A capability concept that was based on the Bay class LSD and is now in service via HMAS Choules and planned to be replaced at the end of its life by an Australian built equivilant. Baically the LSD/Sealift Ship would arrive after the initial two weeks and offload to the LHDs a new stock of consumables to keep the battlegroup sustained.

Ps. You wouldn't one of the LHD's to be in refit or under repair - three are probably required to be able to provide a genuinely trapid response.

The plan is to have one LHD undergo a couple of months maintenance every year and in its place have the LSD/Sealift Ship/Choules provide part of the capability of the second LHD. Obviously this is a very high risk option and a third LHD would enable a much better assurance of capability. But even after the current maintenance disaster it takes some time for lessons to be learnt.

 

[Massive]

Thanks for your reply Abe.

... the LSD/Sealift Ship would arrive after the initial two weeks and offload to the LHDs a new stock of consumables to keep the battlegroup sustained.....

.... The plan is to have one LHD undergo a couple of months maintenance every year and in its place have the LSD/Sealift Ship/Choules provide part of the capability of the second LHD. Obviously this is a very high risk option and a third LHD would enable a much better assurance of capability. But even after the current maintenance disaster it takes some time for lessons to be learnt.

Could a Lewis and Clarke (T-AKE) class fulfill the Sealift Ship role as described here? Not as flexible in some ways but more so in others?

Hypothetical of 3 LHD and 3 Lewis and Clarke could be very attractive if this was the case.

Regards,

Massive

 

[StingrayOZ]

3 Canberras and 3 L&C would be ideal. However no many navies have that sort of capabilities.. (USN/USMC? UK and France would be almost there). Surely a noble dream for Australia or South Africa to have that level of capability. I would say if you had to compromise, get the 3 full sized LHD, and get 3 sealift of some sort.

3 large LHD's are really required. The LHD are pretty critical to the process so if you want to ensure you have deployable capability year round you really need 3. LHD have the unique aviation and dock facilities you need to ensure a rapid landing (ie hours instead of days). The sealift can be more flexible, (perhaps even leased commercial ships or agreement) but the LHD's are central to the whole operation. (maintaining, training and sustaining). There aren't many LHD's that can be called on to assist (where as sealift is nearly a dime a dozen). With 2 you have to cut back on training, you are less available and you can't sustain your deployment.

The Oz requirement needed both ships loaded to the eyeballs.

It will be obvious to your opponent that this is the case, so will just have to prolong the conflict or initiate it at your weakest point in your cycle. That doesn't have to involve a high intensity conflict, it could be a large policing or aid mission. Then you have your pants down. Throw in bad luck, other commitments, system upgrades etc and with 2 ships you may rarely see them operating together as intended.

 

[Massive]

3 Canberras and 3 L&C would be ideal. However no many navies have that sort of capabilities.. (USN/USMC? UK and France would be almost there). Surely a noble dream for Australia ...

Thanks for your reply Stingray.

2 of the L&C could replace Sirius and Success (which needs to happen anyway).

While completely fanciful given current defence budget shenanigans 3 LHDs and 3 L&C should be possible even with a sensible (though still modest) defence budget.

Regards,

Massive

 

[STURM]

Anyone remember the USMC landing on a beach in Somalia as if they were expecting to have to storm it, & continuing to act that way in the middle of the crowd of reporters, TV film crews, etc who were waiting for them on the beach?

It was similar to the landing at Da Nang in 1965. Troops in full battle gear waded ashore from landing craft, expecting to be fired upon by Victor Charlie and were met by smiling locals and reporters.

 

[Dodger67]

Now we're getting into the real meat & potatoes of the question! :dance

The SA Defence Review document naturally does not go into much detail so learning from Aussie looks to be quite useful. What the document does say in addition to the landing capability is to call for a second replenishment ship to be acquired and later replacement of the current (mid-1980s vintage) one.

By pulling together the various points the review makes around future naval capability it looks like they are aiming to have a "two coast" navy in the medium to long term based on a "blue water" mix of frigates, subs and OPVs with the amphibious capability being allocated to the Atlantc or Indian ocean components as required.

Getting back to the mechanics of delivering a brigade to the beach in battalion-sized chunks - without having access to the TOE of the South African Army's Sea-landed battalion or brigade setup - we would have to look at how others do it.

The USMC's MEU looks to be substantially "heavier" in terms of equipment - particularly aviation - but in terms of boots on the ground they seem to be quite light compared to a more traditional infantry unit of that size.

References:
Defence Review 2012 (2nd Draft) Chapter 12 "The Defence Force"

Section: "Army Migration Priorities"
Paragraph 48: "In the short-term the South African Navy with the SA Army must be able to sealift a battalion group in one wave. In the longer term, the South African Navy must be able to sealift a Brigade in multi-waves."

Section: "Maritime Defence Capability"
Paragraph 69 h: "Strategic Force Projection Capability. A strategic force projection capability at battalion level is required to deter threats, project strategic influence, promote regional and continental security and respond to disasters and humanitarian crises through both combat service support to the fleet and combat support to land forces. This capability will further provide for sea-based joint command and control and hospital services. This capability will be vested in a combination of combat support ships and landing platforms."

Section: "Navy Migration Priorities"
Paragraph 70 b:"Inter-theatre and intra-theatre lift in support of landward deployments, with specific attention to the maritime capabilities required for rapid reaction and Special Force operations. In the short-term the South African Navy must be able to sealift a battalion group in one wave. In the longer term, the South African Navy must be able to sealift a Brigade in multi-waves."