PAK-FA Revisited

[Pathfinder-X]

I've been spending last couple of days reading up on comments regardin the PAK-FA project. I want to thank gf0012-aust and Abe Gubler for providing useful comments in which I base my opinion upon. They are the experts here and I merely added my two-piece into my interpretation of their views. PAK-FA is short for "Future Air System - Frontline Aviation" or something similar. Compared to American JSF or ATF, I think the keyword "system" is of some interest, demonstrating its design focus.

The future of American and NATO air power is found within the concept of network centric warfare. Ground and air assets are integrated into a network system, using the advantages of the network to maximize the effectiveness of individual assets against the enemy. In short, one network system pitched against another.The theory came about as experiences from conflicts during the last 20 years. It is within this framework that F-35 was designed.

Since the break up of the USSR, Russia has declined considerably and is no longer able to match NATO in conventional arms race. For this reason they must work with what little they have in reality to satisfy the demands of future battlefield needs. Since F-35 will likely become the workhorse of NATO air forces in the next several decades, PAK-FA's primary design purpose would be logically geared towards such.

NATO forces flew against Soviet style air defence networks and emerged victorious, examplified by Desert Storm and 1999 Serbia air campaign. One of the biggest recipes for success for NATO is that they were able to destroy, disrupt and/or suppress enemies' sensors. Base on these experiences, it is not difficult to imagine that a great deal of emphasis will be placed on PAK-FA's survivability.

To improve situational awareness, T-50 utilized unique ways of sensor placement throughout its body. VLO targets are often optimized to counter X-band and C-band sensors, while less capable against S-band and L-band. T-50 installed L-band radar on front wing edge as search radar, while X-band AESA is placed in the nose and side of the aircraft. In this regard, it is intended to somewhat function as an anti-LO sensor platform on its own.

The design, IMO, shows a lack of faith in off-board sensors by the Russian military. Once engaged in a war with NATO, Russian ground radars and AWACS will be the primary targets. Therefore, improving the situation awareness of the plane with onboard sensors will be a big selling point. A highly agile platform with ability to supercruise will be much more survivable than a A-50 AWACS, though much less capable in providing said situational awareness.

A distinction between 4th and 5th generation fighters is low radar observability, yet T-50 does not seem to be too concerned in this area from its early images. Since it is acting like a mini-AWACS in place of off-board sensors, its radars must be turned on to search for targets, increasing the odds of being detected. Because of this design limitation, it is not difficult to understand why sacrifices were made in LO.

Compare to countries in Europe, Russia has the advantage of strategic depth because of its land mass. It can position its surface-to-air missiles, mobile radars and frontline airfields in overlaping layers as part of its IADS against VLO threats. Threats such as the F-35 and F-22 are not VLO in all aspects, mostly focused on their frontal aspect. Against NATO, T-50 will act as a mobile airborne sensor to compensate for radar coverage gaps created by destroyed ground sensors. Again because of Russia's huge land mass, supercruise and range are likely to be important design parameters.

As far as manoeuvrability goes, Sukhoid stuck to similar layouts as the Flanker with some new control surfaces (i.e LERX, all-moving-tails). The Flanker series have proven to be very agile, and drastic changes are not needed. The layout is low risk in design and cost-effective when taken into consideration the financial strains faced by Russian military.

In the near future, T-50, S-400 Triumph and other ground assets will likely form the basis of Russia's air defence. Because of its ability to function without network support, I think it may be more suitable for countries without the means or money to build a capable IADS. However, the T-50 is by and large, a platform designed for defensive purposes compared to other VLO 5th generation fighters.

Your thoughts and comments are appreciated.

 

[Feanor]

There is heavy emphasis being placed right now on working horizontal level datalinking into the Russian armed forces. ESU Sozvezdie is a good example of what they're trying to do. There is also a lot of playing around with UAVs (like the Strekoza on the new Dozor's) and integrating the recon data provided by such into a single manageable picture of the battle field. But they are indeed a long way from this.

One of the major changes they seem to be trying to effect is to diffuse the C4I from central nodes to individual platforms, when it comes to air defense (the opposite of what they're trying to do with the land forces). This is why the S-400 can act as a control center for Buk-M1/M2 units, and integrate a number of tactical GBAD (Pantsyr, Tunguska, Tor-M1/M2) into single complexes without requiring divisional or brigade level C2 assets (while they would still benefit from them). I think the same is being done with regards to the PAK-FA and its ability to act as a command and sensor asset for late 4th gen fighters which will make up a majority of the VVS for the next two decades, possibly even beyond that, when one considers the Su-34, Su-35, MiG-35, and Su-27SM/2 that are being purchased right now, or will be (MiG-35) purchased in the future.

 

[gf0012-aust]

One of the major changes they seem to be trying to effect is to diffuse the C4I from central nodes to individual platforms, when it comes to air defense (the opposite of what they're trying to do with the land forces).

I think the bigger issue here is the doctrine change, because the shift to sensor centric warfare means a fundamental military cultural change as the operator level.

 

[bruceb1959]

NATO forces flew against Soviet style air defence networks and emerged victorious, examplified by Desert Storm and 1999 Serbia air campaign. One of the biggest recipes for success for NATO is that they were able to destroy, disrupt and/or suppress enemies' sensors.

you are right in saying that in both the conflicts you mention, NATO/US airpower achieved victories against the installed soviet technology AD systems. The extent of the success was markedly less in Serbia however. The primary reason for the apparent abject failure of soviet equipment and doctrine in Destert Storm ( and in earlier middle eastern conflicts) was that the hardware was not deployed/used/relocated according to soviet tactical methodolgies. Mobile units were used as fixed, radar were not relocated etc. In Serbia, the tactics employed approximated more closely to the those that would have been employed by Soviet units, and consequently, the survival rates were much higher, the counter-air sortie to successful prosecution ratio was considerably lower.

I think it would be safe to assume that in any NATO/WARPAC conflict that may have occurred, or should there ever be the need for a NATO incursion into current day (future) Russian AD belts, the outcome would not be nearly so favourable.

 

[Feanor]

I think the bigger issue here is the doctrine change, because the shift to sensor centric warfare means a fundamental military cultural change as the operator level.

And it's a slow and painful one. The VDV are moving much faster in that regard then the rest of the land forces. In terms of the VVS the exercises involving off-board sensors providing data to the aircraft has increased tremendously in recent years. The A-50s are seeing much more activity then ever before, and there has been some experiments with using UAVs or recon birds to provide near real time info to Su-24M2, and Su-34s. I'm not sure if they managed to provide targetting data, or just located the targets.

They're also moving towards UAVs directing arty and missile strikes. Again, far from universal at this point, but that's the general trajectory.

To put it bluntly, I'm not saying they've done it. I'm saying they're trying.

 

[bruceb1959]

PAK FA revisted

To put it bluntly, I'm not saying they've done it. I'm saying they're trying

it has to be said that Doctrinal change with in the Soviet (now) Russian military was never something that happened overnight. The approach tending to be very painstaking and often incremental. That said the approach tends to be thorough. While the results/goals often differ or at least appear to differ from what may be considered western 'norms', they are designed meet the particular requirements of the relevant units/branch of service.

Often I feel, it is too easy to judge a particular 'tool-set' or how that tools-set is employed, by the those the west uses and how the west uses it; and to make the assumption that if it doesnt match or equate to how we do it, it cannot be as effective.

Whilst the russian miliatery has under gone serious and in many ways debilitating changes in recent years, you are right in sayin that they are regaining some of their former 'composure'. There are things that the russain miltary has done and still does well and we would be foolish to right them off, or forget just how brutally efficient it has proven to be in the past.

 

[SpudmanWP]

VLO targets are often optimized to counter C-band and S-band sensors, while less capable against X-band and L-band. T-50 installed L-band radar on front wing edge, while X-band AESA is placed in the nose and side of the aircraft. In this regard, it is intended to somewhat function as an anti-LO sensor platform on its own.

IIRC it is the other way around because VLO aircraft need to break the "kill chain". Since targeting radars (especially those mounted in fighters and missile warheads) are all in the X-band, VLO aircraft concentrate protection against those radars. As the wavelength gets longer (C to S to L to UHF to VHF) the protection lessens.

 

[Pathfinder-X]

IIRC it is the other way around because VLO aircraft need to break the "kill chain". Since targeting radars (especially those mounted in fighters and missile warheads) are all in the X-band, VLO aircraft concentrate protection against those radars. As the wavelength gets longer (C to S to L to UHF to VHF) the protection lessens.

Heh I got the radar bands mixed up. It's actually X->C->S->L in terms of wavelength. I got it the other way around the first time. Correction has been made. Thank you for the heads up.

 

[Pathfinder-X]

I think the bigger issue here is the doctrine change, because the shift to sensor centric warfare means a fundamental military cultural change as the operator level.

Like I've mentioned in the article, I don't think the Russians will try to mimic network centric warfare. Their military planners would be fools not to take into consideration their declined resources and knowledge gap since 1991. Instead, PAK-FA, at least to me, seems to be their attempt to reach for an alternative counter to NCW, albeit a forced compromise IMO.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Like I've mentioned in the article, I don't think the Russians will try to mimic network centric warfare. Their military planners would be fools not to take into consideration their declined resources and knowledge gap since 1991. Instead, PAK-FA, at least to me, seems to be their attempt to reach for an alternative counter to NCW, albeit a forced compromise IMO.

But here is the irony. The RMA was originally a Russian concept which never took off to due local geo-political events.

The US was the first to develop a force structure and use that force in a real conflict (GW1)

The double irony is that Chinas rush to modernisation and force development shock treatment is a directly legacy of defining their own lessons learnt from the US experiences and shifts demonstrated in GW1 and GW2

IMO, this plane is a precursor to them going through their RMA in a considered fashion. You can see it already in a number of changes in force development, professionalism, reduction of "mass" which used to define capability (overwhelming mass + momentum = unstoppable force philosophy)

they're just developing the bits in isolation which is why it may appear to lack coherency.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

you are right in saying that in both the conflicts you mention, NATO/US airpower achieved victories against the installed soviet technology AD systems. The extent of the success was markedly less in Serbia however. The primary reason for the apparent abject failure of soviet equipment and doctrine in Destert Storm ( and in earlier middle eastern conflicts) was that the hardware was not deployed/used/relocated according to soviet tactical methodolgies. Mobile units were used as fixed, radar were not relocated etc. In Serbia, the tactics employed approximated more closely to the those that would have been employed by Soviet units, and consequently, the survival rates were much higher, the counter-air sortie to successful prosecution ratio was considerably lower.

I think it would be safe to assume that in any NATO/WARPAC conflict that may have occurred, or should there ever be the need for a NATO incursion into current day (future) Russian AD belts, the outcome would not be nearly so favourable.

Most people fundamentally misunderstand the success of the US lead air force against Iraq/Serbia and similar efforts by Israel in ’73 and ’82 against Egypt/Syria. In all these actions the primary battle was between Western aircraft and Soviet air defence systems. Air to air actions by the Soviet tech users were in SUPPORT of their air defence systems. In the case of the Syrians in ’82 a disastrous effort to relieve pressure on their missiles that saw them lose around 80 planes for no kills in a few days.

The Soviet systems were modern and did redeploy. To argue otherwise or that this was against Soviet tactics is just plain wrong. The actual reason the air defence systems were drubbed is an inherent disadvantage they have in fighting aircraft: gravity. It takes time for a missile to climb to altitude to engage a fighter or bomber which gives the later the capacity to set into effect countermeasures. Which makes such a battle one in the electronic domain. US and allied forces have since WWII maintained a significant lead in electronic warfare over the rest of the world. This is continued through to today and the level of technical compromising of the latest Soviet/Russia/Chinese air defence system (“double digit”) makes it hard to imagine they can effect much of a threat.

The key difference in the Serbian conflict is that they used their air defence systems more like the West than the Soviets. In that they used them as supporting assets aiming to ambush more than contest. The Serbians never formed defended zones or coverages which was fundamental to the Soviet primacy of air defences.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

The future of American and NATO air power is found within the concept of network centric warfare. Ground and air assets are integrated into a network system, using the advantages of the network to maximize the effectiveness of individual assets against the enemy. In short, one network system pitched against another.The theory came about as experiences from conflicts during the last 20 years. It is within this framework that F-35 was designed.

It’s not the future its contemporary practice. Eg: AEGIS ships have been sharing radar measurements since the 1990s. NCW is also built upon the experience of the past 60 years. USAF was building NCW systems in the 1950s: the first digital computers came from their SAGE program.

A distinction between 4th and 5th generation fighters is low radar observability, yet T-50 does not seem to be too concerned in this area from its early images. Since it is acting like a mini-AWACS in place of off-board sensors, its radars must be turned on to search for targets, increasing the odds of being detected. Because of this design limitation, it is not difficult to understand why sacrifices were made in LO.

I think you significantly overestimate the sensor reach of the T-50 and in particular the “anti-LO” L band wing radars. These are going to be very small antenna by L-Band standards and unlikely to detect a fighter size target at ranges above 20 NM. I see these sensors as self defence not situational awareness systems.

Compare to countries in Europe, Russia has the advantage of strategic depth because of its land mass. It can position its surface-to-air missiles, mobile radars and frontline airfields in overlaping layers as part of its IADS against VLO threats. Threats such as the F-35 and F-22 are not VLO in all aspects, mostly focused on their frontal aspect. Against NATO, T-50 will act as a mobile airborne sensor to compensate for radar coverage gaps created by destroyed ground sensors. Again because of Russia's huge land mass, supercruise and range are likely to be important design parameters.

Not really. I doubt the Russians are planning any 2,000 km withdrawals from their border to the Urals to provide strategic depth. All of their conflict zones are over similar distances as the West. There is no strategic depth around Vladivostok, St. Petersburg, Crimea, the Caucus and so on. Moscow is only 300 NM from Russia’s western border these days. Also to be effective in counter stealth multiple networked radars need to be pretty close together like a radius of 20 NM or so. No depth in that. Plus even the Soviet Union lacked the systems to provide depth across the size of Russia. They just had border defences and then target defences.

The T-50 (and the J-20) looks to me like a response to 5G fighters based on a limited set of technological options. With limited LO and very limited counter stealth sensors they have gone for speed and agility. This appears to be an attempt to close as rapidly as possible and when in close respond as quickly as possible to rapidly emerging threats. I very much doubt its worth the effort against a 5G fighter but it will enable them to monster it over 4G fighters.

 

[Aussie Digger]

you are right in saying that in both the conflicts you mention, NATO/US airpower achieved victories against the installed soviet technology AD systems. The extent of the success was markedly less in Serbia however. The primary reason for the apparent abject failure of soviet equipment and doctrine in Destert Storm ( and in earlier middle eastern conflicts) was that the hardware was not deployed/used/relocated according to soviet tactical methodolgies. Mobile units were used as fixed, radar were not relocated etc. In Serbia, the tactics employed approximated more closely to the those that would have been employed by Soviet units, and consequently, the survival rates were much higher, the counter-air sortie to successful prosecution ratio was considerably lower.

I think it would be safe to assume that in any NATO/WARPAC conflict that may have occurred, or should there ever be the need for a NATO incursion into current day (future) Russian AD belts, the outcome would not be nearly so favourable.

If you define success by the ability to not be destroyed, then the Serbian air defences achieved some measure of success.

If you define success by their impact on the operations of the opposing force, then they failed utterly.

The fact is that Western air superiority has become so great that success is now measured by an opponents ability (or otherwise) to destroy a single fighter platform. It is a tacit acknowledgement when one single platform is destroyed and trumpeted by the opponent loudly (most notably in the case of the F-117) that they possessed absolutely no ability to influence the outcome whatsoever.

It is akin to being proud of taking a pawn in chess and trumpeting this fact whilst your opponent is systematically and inexorably removing your rooks, knights, Bishops, Queen and is closing in or already has closed on your king.

While you trumpet your achievement, the war is already lost...

 

[Feanor]

But here is the irony. The RMA was originally a Russian concept which never took off to due local geo-political events.

The US was the first to develop a force structure and use that force in a real conflict (GW1)

The double irony is that Chinas rush to modernisation and force development shock treatment is a directly legacy of defining their own lessons learnt from the US experiences and shifts demonstrated in GW1 and GW2

IMO, this plane is a precursor to them going through their RMA in a considered fashion. You can see it already in a number of changes in force development, professionalism, reduction of "mass" which used to define capability (overwhelming mass + momentum = unstoppable force philosophy)

they're just developing the bits in isolation which is why it may appear to lack coherency.

The RMA has already started. It's just going to take a while (to put it mildly).

Another thing, they're actually increasing mass (if anything) by consolidating the cadre units. What was recently discovered was that with this new force org they have enough excess enlisted personnel to form ~10 more brigades. Right now they're in the process of forming those units, and of recruiting ~70 000 more officers (this is after just recently retiring tens of thousands).

The end result of this reform (probably in 1-2 years) will be the ability to respond to most crises' with ~5-6 MRBde/TBde's in a matter of 1-3 days. Technically the stated time from peace time to war time mobilization for a new type bde is 2 hours, but realistically (and to coordinate the actions of several of them) 1-3 days is the practical out come. It will certainly be an improvement on the war in Georgia, where the first units on the scene were individual btlns and even companies. And mind you the 58th Army was one of the best (if not the best) in the land forces, before the reforms.

 

[Mindstorm]

Most people fundamentally misunderstand the success of the US lead air force against Iraq/Serbia and similar efforts by Israel in ’73 and ’82 against Egypt/Syria.......
The Soviet systems were modern and did redeploy. To argue otherwise or that this was against Soviet tactics is just plain wrong.

Abraham Gubler you surely must have your area of competence but, from the assertion up reported , appear absolutely clear that it is certainly not Air Defence Systems and even less Soviet military doctrine in Cold War and military force composition in URSS in those years .

Talking of Bekaa Valley 1982 we have that not only the SAM systems present in the area - SA-2 , SA-3 and some SA-6 (19 batteries of 4 launchers each of which only 14 operational at the time of the operation ; very rarely cited is that ,of those operative SA-6, a lot was located in South on Beeka Valley and were attacked and destroyed by Israeli Army Artillery from Awwaly River and "Ze'ev " ground launched missiles and not by IAF like well explained by Gen. Wilbur Creech ,Gen. Rafael Eitan ,Col. Dubrov and B.S. Lambeth in their surveys of the event ) - was all greatly outdated first versions, badly mantained and ,above all ,strongly downgraded export models ,in observance to classical Soviet disinformation and information-denial habit ....and i image that you remember very well the jaw-dropping differences in performances experimentally proved by original Soviet specimen of T-72A/Bs in the extensive tests conducted by M. Held, before, and L.Ness after in '90 years against almost the whole panoply of NATO anti-tanks weapons of the time - [ see"Russian tanks immune to attack says German expert "Jane's International Review vol 29 n. 7 July 1996 and Impenetrable Russian tank armor stands up to examination " Jane's International Defence Review Vol. 30,No. 7] , or the similar horrible surprises coming out from the DACT exercices conducted NATO against first version but original MIG-29 with original radars ,IRST, ECM systems and weaponry, always after Germany reunification [ see “Mig-29 downs F-16 in Mock Dogfight” Jane’s Defence Weekly November 10 1990 or “Mig-29 is better than F-15C “Joris Janssen ,Jane’s Defence Weekly April 6 1991].....but ,at the exact contrary of what you have asserted , the Syrians used all those SAM as '50 fixed AA gun ,even the SA-6 !!!, without any significative relocation and total absence of any defensive ambush tactics ,concealement , capitalization of terrain advantage or even only low altitude coverage for the lower engagement threshold of SA-6 ; all in total opposition to historic Soviet principles of employement for those old SAM .


"It would be risky to generalize overarching "lessons" fro this experience (and the Israelis themselves have expressely cautioned against trying ) because several circumstances that rendered the Lebanese air war unique .For one thing ,the operation was severely limited in scope, intensity , objectives and number of participants . Second the Syrian SAM threat consisted largely of fixed SA-6 whose positions was well know by the IAF. This poised considerably less than a challenge than the USAF would face against integrated Soviet Air Defence in Central Europe (or even only the IAF itself would confront in a major Air War over the Golan Height). Finally, the IAF commanded unprecedented numerical superiority over the enemy and mantained a tactical initiative at all times . Neither circumstance would be likely to favor Isreal in a full-fledged war against a coalition of Syria, Jordan , Iraq . They certainly could not be expected to favor the Unites States and NATO in a conventional war in Europe against Warsaw Pact " Maj. Gen . Perry M. Smith in " Menachem Begin America" cited by Benjamin S. Lambeth " Moscow Lesson from the 1982's Lebanon Air War" pag 10 -11

“The Syrians used mobile missiles in a fixed configuration; they put the radars in the valley instead of the hills because they didn't want to dig latrines--seriously."
Lt Gen Leonard Perroots, "The Soviet Air Force View of the Bekaa Valley Debacle,"


"the SAM present at the time in the area was outdated stripped-down models designed for export ......time of redeployement of the AD elements by part of Syrians was ,on the average, two month and half " Antony H. Cordesman .


For allow you to have a pale picture of what we talk : when the whole IAF ,after months of preparation and mapping ,with an enormous operation , requiring seven months of aimed training ,confronted few batteries of greatly downgraded export model of first version of SA-2 and SA-6 employed in an almost comical way, in URSS was already present ....S-300P (28 sites with 12 launchers and 6 reloader each at March 1982 ) a true alien for the time , "Buk" medium range SAM , Tunguska short range , and litterally countless S-200D ,SA-6 , SA-8 , SA-9 , SA-13 - all original not downgraded specimens- with multiexit redeploying tunnels with silo-like underground fire positions , false batteries , chaff/flare aerosol ground based dispensers ,mobile decoys, radar/IR dispersing camo-net, highly specialized ELS, monstrous ground-based ECM systems like SPN-2/4 ,SPN-30 and Pelena-1 etc...all integrated in an unique organic architecture with multiple node-redundancy, linked with strategic level radars and all employed by operators several dozen of times more proficient than Syrians...... that leaving out the whole Soviet Air Force and Ground Forces


Not in 1982 but in 2000 Gen. John P. Jumper, commander, US Air Forces in Europe declared , after Kosovo war at an Eaker Institute Symposium :

" I was scared that somehow, Mr. Milosevic would find a way to float an SA-10 or SA-12 up the Danube River, put it together, and bring it to bear as a part of this conflict. If that had happened, it would have profoundly changed the balance of the threat and our ability to maintain air superiority."

We talk here of a single battery of an already largely outdated version of a SAM system outside any IAD structure !

Reality is that simply Air Forces ,even when opposing largely inferior enemies enjoying crushing numerical , economical, tactical and professional advantages and using any corollary assets at theirs disposition must confront ,in order to survive, AD systems at least 2-3 generations older then theirs aircraft ; often even only a single element out of this equation (like the,at the time, relatively new SA-6 ,even if only the usual export version, provided to Egypt before Yom Kippur War, when Israeli Army of Sharon was forced at save the situation.... ) conduct to horrible losses by part of Air Forces.

Pasted operations of SEAD/DEAD have always observed this essential principle also in consideration of the fact that a nation operating an extensive up-to-date IAD has likely also the means to render even only the preparations for similar operations an authenticate suicide (URSS committing a minuscle part of its conventional offensive potential would have been capable to obliterate from a large stand off range all the Israeli airfields and the aircraft here operated with theatre ballistic missiles and air delivered supersonic "monsters" like Kh-22M /Kh-15 ,still without western corrispectives today, in a matter of minutes without any contact with opposing CAP and without even rely upon its crushing superiority on the ground... ).


"Most people fundamentally misunderstand the success of the US lead air force against Iraq/Serbia and similar efforts by Israel in ’73 and ’82 against Egypt/Syria" ....oh yes , but for the insiders and knowledgeable people ,in the meaning exactly opposite to your.

 

[Feanor]

Notably absent from the above discussion, in regards to WarPac IADS in Eastern Europe, is the density question. The density of GBAD was absolutely monstrous (literally in the tens of thousands of operational individual systems as each Soviet division had dozens of SAM-SPAAG units).

An LO platform reduces the effective detection, tracking, and engagement envelopes. But it doesn't eliminate them entirely. If the density is high enough, and networking is fairly effective, the level of reduction may not be significant on the operational level. The difference between being in the engagement envelope of 100+ systems, vs 10-15 systems wouldn't be all that great.

EDIT: Needless to say, with the exception of the Moscow air defense, modern day Russia does not enjoy this advantage.

 

[Mindstorm]

Notably absent from the above discussion, in regards to WarPac IADS in Eastern Europe, is the density question. The density of GBAD was absolutely monstrous (literally in the tens of thousands of operational individual systems as each Soviet division had dozens of SAM-SPAAG units).

An LO platform reduces the effective detection, tracking, and engagement envelopes. But it doesn't eliminate them entirely. If the density is high enough, and networking is fairly effective, the level of reduction may not be significant on the operational level. The difference between being in the engagement envelope of 100+ systems, vs 10-15 systems wouldn't be all that great.

EDIT: Needless to say, with the exception of the Moscow air defense, modern day Russia does not enjoy this advantage.

Your observation on the density of AD elements ,Feanor, is totally sound (it is well know that efficiency's function of an IAD follow the variable of the concentration of its elements in a non-linear way ) but i find even more surprising that the most notable absent in the typical low-level discussions on those subjects is the chance openend for the side protected by an strong IAD to selectively attack with overwhelming forces of different nature (from ground -based theatre ballistic missiles , to air delivered cruise missiles , from airborne deep attack to multifront ground offensives ) a single segment of the opposing force strructure before even the basis of the immense and very slow logistical effort required to even only hope to confront the IAD would be prepared .

To confront KARI , the french IAD defending Iraq designed ,as well explained in GWAP Vol-II , to protect Iraq from much smaller Air Force's menaces coming out mostly from Eastern and Western sectors -Israel and Iran- and litterally dozen of times more weak when attacked from South as happened with NATO Coalition Air Campaign and composed by export version of SAM systems 15-35 years old, required over six months of special in theatre preparations ,a very slow and immensely costly logistical chain , the compliance of an host nation (Saudi Arabia providing its airfields and ports for the operations ) and an huge financiary support by part of the other Arabic nation.

All of that , would have terminated in a matter of minutes, before even the start of Phase I build-up !, with Al Jubay and Dhahran port (for not cite the internal airfields completely defensless at the time to any attack ..) where majority of the essential equipment was collected 24/h ,7/7 , reduced litterally to a sprawl of smoking craters with truly incalculable human and material losses (and naturally the impossibility for the Coalition to establish even the guise of an operative presence in the area ) if instead of 12 operative outdated export medium bombers (mostly Tu-16 and derivative ) devoid of any serious weaponry , Iraq would have owned even only a pair of squadron of TU-22M3 with Kh-22M and Kh-15 ,or even worse a pair of brigade of OTR-23 (with penetrating-HE / Thermobaric or Submunition dispersing conventional warheads) .

Attack an IAD, even one several dozen of times more weak than the weakest node of URSS's IAD of those years ,require a so high ,totally disproportionate, commitment and coordination of forces and time of realization that ,for any comparable opponent ,would become very easy to litterally "dismember" selectively each segment of the opponent's crucial assets with overwhelming forces coming from positions , conversely, not exposed at similar operations by part of the enemy .
This principle was very present and leading in Soviet Doctrine in plain Cold War (see General Valentin Larionov “Voennaia Strategiia” ).

About low observability is important to remember that in phisical reality ,the RCS figures associated also to VLO aircraft (in particular for angle of inception interested in tracking by part of IAD) are several order of magniutude greater than the usual commonly cited and refered to purely academic perfect head-on aspect .

A. Davidenko (coming from the same Institute in which educated themselves the generation of scientists which developed the same basis and "allowing" theoretical architecture of modern "stealth" including the American one.... ) provide an effective area of diffraction for an F-22 in the order of 0,3 - 0,4 square meters .
Naturally without even consider that for new generation of AESA VHF radars any difference between a legacy and a LO/VLO airframe become almost irrilevant.


Best regards .