Nuclear strategy/war between US and Russia?

[stewart]

Downsizing as we are today in the field of nuclear weapons, and roughly equal in numbers of strategic weapons makes the active and passive defense more relevent. Russia has an ABM system around Moscow, possible "dual use" SAMS (accordint to William T. Lee and his book "The ABM Treaty Charade; A study in Elite Illusion and delusion" in which nuclear armed SA-5 and SA-10s were in fact ABMs), as well as an extensive Civil Defense system (you can't even get any nuclear information from FEMA on the subject on their website). The US has no missile defense in any scale, yet anyway, no civil defense, and has dismantled its Nike Herculese SAM defenses around US contenintal cities by the mid 1970s.
Any thoughts? Do these differences matter, and will they matter at the significantly lower levels of strategic weapons outlined by SORT, START2, which describe respective forces of 1700 weapons each side will have by 2012?????
Thank you for any responses, any thoughts are welcome. This apparent asymetry has bothered me for some time.

 

[gf0012-aust]

I'd always wondered why the US abandoned future city defence after the withdrawal of the Nike Zeus batteries.

I guess it gets down to an issue of philosophy.

eg

• nuclear war is unwinnable
• nuclear war cannot be contained - so a nuclear war will escalate to its maximum conclusion and thus render the notion of defensive systems a moot point
• that the greatest threat were the russians. eg the current chinese footprint is literally one thirty thousandth of the soviet capability - so the expense is not seen as militarily "meritorious"
• that a nuclear war is seen as unlikely
• that sufficient sensor systems and response systems mean that the US can get off her shots before another nuke country could deliver most of her yield, and thus nuke retribution will be far more useful than defending CONUS
• that fundamental capabilities exist to move forward with ABM solutions anyway. eg patriot, thad, SLABM, Aegis/CEC postures etc...

Personally, I would have maintained an active ABM grid irrespective of the decline of the Soviets. The assumption is that major powers are "smart enough" to realise the "zero sum" game and thus use diplomacy before lethality - however that mentality never had to deal with the notion of rogue states, stateless conflict and the proliferation of nukes at an "ease of build" level.

I guess the other issue is that as an example, the US only has one side of the country that is currently within reach of a reasonable methodical strike - so that means that at a land based level, she still has second strike capability. she then has 2nd strike capability with the USN and she has a second strike capability with intercontinental bombers. Who else has intercontinental bombers of note? So the US has 3 levels of strike. the holy "troika" of nuclear response.

OTOH, the US can counter strike any country on the globe in under 13 minutes with 20+ SSBN's. So before one countries missiles even strike CONUS - the US has struck the other country before the nukes hit the 30% or 50% mark of the delivery curve.

as an example, just one USN SSBN has greater total yield than the entire chinese deliverable stockpile.

still, be that as it may, I'd still be investing in ABM's at a formal level.

 

[KGB]

Does the B2 bomber force constitute a real first strike capability? i mean, with the current levels of detection capability, isn't is plausible to assume that if the US sends the b2s into russia, they're not likely to be detected before the nukes detonate?

 

[stewart]

Does the B2 bomber force constitute a real first strike capability? i mean, with the current levels of detection capability, isn't is plausible to assume that if the US sends the b2s into russia, they're not likely to be detected before the nukes detonate?

Maybe the B2 could be used as such, but 20 bombers does not make a first strike force.

 

[stewart]

I'd always wondered why the US abandoned future city defence after the withdrawal of the Nike Zeus batteries.

I guess it gets down to an issue of philosophy.

eg

• nuclear war is unwinnable
• nuclear war cannot be contained - so a nuclear war will escalate to its maximum conclusion and thus render the notion of defensive systems a moot point
  
  
  still, be that as it may, I'd still be investing in ABM's at a formal level.

• 
  
  
  While I hope that it is unwinnable, what you or I think is immaterial. What matters in a strategy of deterence is what the Russians think, and they seem to be preparing for it. Yamantau Mountain is a good example (why?), along with the elaborate escape system for the Russian leadership which includes special subways, and deep undergound structures.

 

[gf0012-aust]

While I hope that it is unwinnable, what you or I think is immaterial. What matters in a strategy of deterence is what the Russians think, and they seem to be preparing for it. Yamantau Mountain is a good example (why?), along with the elaborate escape system for the Russian leadership which includes special subways, and deep undergound structures.

I gather you've factored in the GBMD fielding EKV's in arkansas and california? That is also an expanding system - so its not as if CONUS is completely naked.

 

[stewart]

I gather you've factored in the GBMD fielding EKV's in arkansas and california? That is also an expanding system - so its not as if CONUS is completely naked.

I am no expert, please inform me of these please! "GBMD"s in Arkansas?? I thought it was Ft. Greeley in Alaska, and Edwards in California, but this is still a small defense force, not capable of a Russian attack. (like under 40 missiles last I heard, not including navy NTW system)

 

[Rich]

Hello to the group. The more nuclear war appears "un-winnable" to either side the happier I'll be. I spent four years around doomsday back "in the day" when each side flattered itself on being able to win.

In my day we had hundreds of B-52 bombers on quick start, hundreds of Titan and Minuteman ready to go, and the Navy had Polaris and was getting ready to deploy Trident. Heck, I remember doing "duck and cover" drills as a kid and even remember the Cuban crisis.

I think we still have a credible deterrant even tho weve mostly spent money keeping older weapons "credible". Were upgrading Minuteman again, the B-2 and B-52 are still credible with the CALCM, were converting our 4 eldest Ohio class SSBNs to conventional SLCM carriers. But, the remaining 14 will all be armed with Trident D5 missile. This SSBN carries 24 such missiles which are long range, very accurate, and each individual missile can deliver up to 8 MIRV'ed warheads, each blowing at 450 kt. An enemy would have to be a lunatic to make this boat launch against them. The bottom line is even with 20 to 50 year technology still being used the American triad is still the most capable in the world.

Strange isnt it that we might end up wishing for the Cold War again? There might be 15+ members of "the club" in the next 20 years, along with the spectre of terrorism. In many ways things were simpler in the 70's, at least you knew who your enemy was.

Again......hello to the group.

 

[gf0012-aust]

I am no expert, please inform me of these please! "GBMD"s in Arkansas?? I thought it was Ft. Greeley in Alaska, and Edwards in California, but this is still a small defense force, not capable of a Russian attack. (like under 40 missiles last I heard, not including navy NTW system)

My bad, I didn't check my ref properly and thought that Ak was Arkansas.

JED has a series of articles coming up on BMD for the US (Jan and Feb this year) . It might be worth getting if you're that interested.

 

[Ths]

The strategy seems to be different today. Gf-0012

I think the reason for giving up the defece of the US cities is that it probably wouldn't have worked once the Soviets started MIRV the Missiles.

The Strategy today is as far as I can see:

Kill the russian missiles and planes BEFORE they get within range to do damage:

1. The bombers will not stand a chance of reaching the CONUS - and haven't had that chance for a long time.
One of the Air-air tasks of the F-22 is to pick out the Bears and Backfires before they reach CANADA. The F-22 has the speed and range to do that - and a bomber isn't that maneuvrable a target. so they will be picked out of the air as soon as they leave their own fighter cover. The F-15 ca´n do that as well; but that takes a presense on Iceland. Now they have stood down Keflavik, which indicates that the other methods are deemed more than sufficient.

2. The Russian boomers will probably imitate Kursk: According to Russian complaints, the russian submarine crews cannot hear themselves think for all the pinging the LA-class is doing just outside their doorstep.
Secondly - if I'm not wrong - there are tracking devises on the polar seabed - not just a line that will register the passage of a sub; which will then get a LA glued to it. No we are talking a system that will allow attack subs to be directed pretty much like an air defence fighter. The extend of that problem is indicated by the construction of only 3 Seawolf class: They have the speed and depth needed for that mission as interceptors - typically Jimmy Carter has been put on kitchen patrol.
The connection between the oceans is probably cut, which explains the Russian emphasis on seagoing minesweepers - and the upgrading of Chilean and other nations frigates. A minefield has to be defended to be effective.

3. The ICBM's are located with idiotic precision, and You can be pretty shure they are all found and accounted for: You don't build concrete construction of that magnitude without revealing yourself on a satelite photo.
There is the real mission of the B-2: Take out the siloes before those birds fly!
Just look at the bunkerbuster bombs they carry. Here is also the offensive mission of the F-22: They are to perform fighter sweeps to clear the path for the B-2 for hostile fighters and radars. The problem is not the flying time of the missiles, it is the time to prepare them for launch. These siloes are to be taken out during the process of preparing the missiles for launch.

No system is 100% foolproof, so there has to be a backup in case a couple of missiles to take of - either from an overlooked sub or a from a silo, that escapes destruction. This is what the missile defence system is for: The system is probably to small for handling a full scale attack on its own; the trick is that it will never need that. The task is to polish off the leftovers from the other methodes of capability reduction - and with this mission it seems well worth while.

 

[Grand Danois]

The Russian Northern Fleet won't have meaningful numbers of SSN/SSBN for the foreseeable decades. Further, the Russian aren't able to steamroll Central Europe the way the Soviets were until the early '80s. The latter makes REFORGER redundant and the lack of assets to the Russians makes a challenge to REFORGER a pointless exercise.

The Russian SSBN don't need to get past the G-I-UK gap in order to reach CONUS. They lurk around in the Barents Sea and Arctic Sea. The Northern Fleet was primarily tasked with keeping these areas a safe haven for the SSBN whilst being mercilessly decimated by NATO and, of course, preventing REFORGER with its SSN.

As the mission has disappeared, there is no need for extensive and expensive surveillance systems defending the G-I-UK gap. The USAF are leaving Keflavik. SOSUS is, at least officially, left to deteriorate slowly. Denmark is scaling back the surveillance station in Mjyrkadalur (sort of a mini-NORAD in the Faroes). The only ones maintaining their posture are the Norwegians. But they also have the Russian subs very close.

You also see that the USN is transfering CVN's and SSN's to the Pacific and to - with the lack of a blue water challenge - the littorals.

Because the Russians have so few SSN/SSBN they can be observed by means not configured for an all out war in the North Atlantic. So they're still being tagged.

Re Russian MIRV. Midcourse intercepts are pre MIRV deployment of the ICBM.

 

[Ths]

Grand Danois: Precisely!

The chain of surveillance is - as far as I can tell - swinging northwards with Tromsø in Norway as the fulcrum on the right side. At presently I would not be surprised if it lay North- East Greenland (I'm talking much more north than Jameson Land and Mestersvig - Bear Island - Jan Mayen - Tromsø. that is the line the new Fridtjov Nansen Class is to inforce on the east side and the Thetis class on the west side (note where the ice is melting). This has meant a shortening of the Danish front, which means a Thetis class is occationally supernumerary. As Thetis herself has been rebuild - again - as a command ship, my guess is that she'll be the coordinating vessel with the norwegeans.

I if should hazard a guess: (and I will dispite your protests) the ambition is to cut the Russians ability to shift from the White Sea to the Pacific along the Russian coast by making the Lomonosov ridge under the Pole the dividing line - and I just think it is possible. SOSUS is outdated and placed far to southerly.

Of course the russian sub are being tagged: Every personal detail on the captains toilet habits are known.

 

[Grand Danois]

With the sea ice gone it would be virtually impossible to prevent the Russians from shifting their fleets from Murmansk to Vladivostok and vice versa. There really isn't anything to funnel them.

Anyway, fond as I am of the Thetis Class, they are not first ratings. Alright, they can be kitted out with Harpoon, ESSM and MU-90 in a matter of hours. They can defend themselves, but they lack the speed, sensors and manning to be in the first line. They add little value there. Patrol of the hinterland in a warfighting situation is much better.

Though I find the idea of of the Norwegian and Danish navies facing down Kuznetzov with friends interesting, it can and will only be done with just a little bit of help from RN and USN.

Perhaps we will get away with the Lomonosov Ridge as basis for the North Pole EEZ. That would take your idea somewhat further.

 

[Ths]

Why do You think President Clinton was in Denmark - when in office and just a few weeks ago?

 

[Ths]

As to the melting of the ice: Well it isn't going to go away overnight. And I have seen Seawolf is visiting Guam.

 

[Grand Danois]

Why do You think President Clinton was in Denmark - when in office and just a few weeks ago?

Clinton had or has no influence on this.

As to the melting of the ice: Well it isn't going to go away overnight. And I have seen Seawolf is visiting Guam.

Give it, say, two decades and the sea ice will be less than half the area it is now. That is unless the thermohaline flow diminishes drastically. Then the situation may reverse.

But interesting prospects with an opening of the NW passage etc. That's change sea transport and SLOC big time. It should be worth considering now how to patrol and administer these areas.

What has Guam to do with anything in this?

 

[Ths]

Well when president Clinton was in Denmark - in office - there was concern as the Gorshkow would put to sea. That would dramatically alter the balance of power in the arctic - as You so correctly pointed out. Strangely enough there are rumours that she might get underway again - now.
Clinton might be an ex; but he is still privy to the knowledge about the situation then - and if I'm not wrong - now. It is a common US practice to let former president do errands for the sitting administration - especially in cases where there is no partisan agendas: Both Clinton and Bush get along splendidly with Denmark. There are agreements in place - only needing the mutual consent to put them into order.

But more significantly: The US is keeping high oil-prices at the moment to force China into line - among other things over North Korea: Notice how Japan is performing a major exercise at the moment: That is one thing China does not like - renewed japanese strength at their shores.
The pressure applied has a downside to the USA: Russia is making money hand over fist, as they are really exporting oil. This means there will be money for breathing new life into the russian navy: Shining up old hulks and building new - so I would be a bit cautious if I had oil futures.

The resurgence of the Russian Fleet is liable to be shortlived - partly because they to all intends and purposes have lost the Baltic: Getting out from Krohnstadt and Königsberg in anything approaching war conditions - well it hasn't been done.

The question is when China and North Korea caves in.


As to arctic patrolling: Have You looked at the replacements for the Adlek-class - build at the illustrious Karstensens Skibsværft A/S in Skagen?

 

[Grand Danois]

Well when president Clinton was in Denmark - in office - there was concern as the Gorshkow would put to sea. That would dramatically alter the balance of power in the arctic - as You so correctly pointed out. Strangely enough there are rumours that she might get underway again - now.

I think Gorshkov has been sold to India.

As to arctic patrolling: Have You looked at the replacements for the Adlek-class - build at the illustrious Karstensens Skibsværft A/S in Skagen?

Built in Poland, will be fitted out at Karstensens (Yes I have.).

 

[Ths]

I think You are right - I don't know how that got into my head; there is ample reason for Clinton to visit (and the WASP) by the closing down of Keflavik.

What I dont understand about the new patrollers is a 70 cm icereinforcement - can that figure be right? And it is correct the hull has been build in Poland - by the way: Have You seen that Karstensen is getting a new drydock?

 

[Grand Danois]

I think You are right - I don't know how that got into my head; there is ample reason for Clinton to visit (and the WASP) by the closing down of Keflavik.

What I dont understand about the new patrollers is a 70 cm icereinforcement - can that figure be right? And it is correct the hull has been build in Poland - by the way: Have You seen that Karstensen is getting a new drydock?

They can break 70 cm of ice. I'm thinking it is because they need to open up passages to some small villages in the far north.

Haven't heard anything about any dry docks at Karstensens.