As you know F, I was part of that project.
Although there are some statements of fact in the paper - I do believe that she's actually missed the vital early internal problems which impacted upon and actually were fundamental in turning it into a political football.
Without wanting to appear unkind - it's a pure academic treatise which has some significant holes as far as factual presentation.
The other thing is that it leaves out (and I suspect that she was compartmentalised from the info) the critical tech transfer (acoustic management and Mk/Block 7 ADCAP) thats currently in place. ie its an issue of reciprocity which Govt and RAN was keen to maximise so that it wouldn't be seen as a one sided cavalry assist.
It also leaves out the small but not insignificant detail that the reason why the project was costed in its initial model was based on the grief that the USN had suffered with their own builds. ie even though they had basically transited to a declared cost plus profit model - they fixed the price into an unsupportable model. That was a political decision that was soley the province of Govt accountants and had little bearing on how fluid the pricing was going to be - especially when the combat systems were being developed initially on what was 386 architecture - and we were already cutting software geared for RISC 960's and Intel 486's.
There are also the issues of the quality of the Prescott Report - which if anyine has read is an exercise in cobbling together disparate summaries from various researchers and ghosted as a single source report. JFK looks like a Pulitzer Prize winner in comparison.
As an addit - I've had some persistent discussions in the past with diff people from EB/NG about them wanting to build conventionals - and wanting to build blue water subs based on Collins. At one stage a country that will remain un-named tried a backdoor approach to get a Collins clone rather than the Barbels being offered. That was also through a US intermediary and was around about the time that we offered the USN and RN access to our sig management technology. The USN wasn't too keen on seeing us sell that to anyone outside "the club".
Its a good students paper - its not a good historical document.
(there are a number of errors in this doc as well, so I'm assuming that it wasn't the final draft)
just as a further aside, the consultant mentioned in the combat system assessment is someone who is involved with the sig management system that provided to the USN. He's also an ex Ewarfare specialist - and the bloke who owns the company that developed the tech is an ex nuke driver. This is also the same system that the Swedes contracted us for to fix the NVH probs on Visby. In a twist of irony, we're selling the acoustic management solutions to the swedes to fix a boat that they brag is acoustically quiet.
The irony of it all.
Also - if you note the references to the perceived probs with the Mk48 ADCAP - you'll note soon after that DSTO/RAN/USN/NAVSEA joined up to develop the Mk/Blk7 to address the probs with Australian sourced performance data.