I provide my ratings of 2 more serious books on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest and some comments on these 2 books:
(1) Six Days Of War: June 1967 & the Making Of the Modern Middle East by Michael Oren
Michael Oren is a Jew but tries to put together a comprehensive and reasonably impartial history of the June 1967 Middle East War, or "Six-Day War". This book is heavy reading but is very well written.
I rate it
5 out of 5. There is already an excellent
review of this book (with detailed
outline notes) by Greg Goebel on the web, so I shall not duplicate it here.
(2) Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore by Tim Huxley and published in 2000
Last month, I finally found time to finish this book, which offers a detailed look at the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) from its origins to the year 2000. It brings up issues that are almost never discussed -- including sensitive questions of war plans with Singapore's neighbors. It details how
Singapore drew on Israeli and other foreign experts to mold a technologically sophisticated and large military that is capable of striking far from the island state (see the 2007 Straits Times story on the "Mexicans" - for the role of the Israeli military advisors). It is a study of what an intelligent, determined people can do to forge an effective military in unfavorable circumstances, especially given Singapore's absence of natural resources and lack of strategic depth.
Tim Huxley chronicles the evolution of Singapore's strategy. In the early years, Singapore used the analogy of a '
poisonous shrimp' (
small but indigestible by predators) to define its military strategy. The idea was that any aggressor would find that the costs of attempting to invade and occupy Singapore outweighed any conceivable benefits. By the 1990s, the emphasis it grew from a 'poisonous shrimp' to enabling the SAF to achieve a '
swift and decisive victory' over aggressors, though in official statements Singapore has never referred to the SAF's offensive strategy. This was because the 'poisonous shrimp' strategy was deficient in that it merely offered Singapore a choice of 'suicide or surrender'.
According to Tim Huxley, "the key to understanding Singapore's strategy, is that the
SAF's clear capability to inflict severe damage on Malaysia (by implication creating serious political and economic repercussions for Singapore)
is not intended to be used. The capability is a deterrent - a sort of regional 'doomsday machine' intended to manipulate Singapore's regional threat environment by forcing neigbouring states to treat the city state with a degree of respect and caution which might otherwise be absent."
This book has been cited unfairly by Malaysian tabloids to propose the notion that the SAF is planning to lay waste to Malaysia's Army and infrastructure in the event of war (as a justification for greater arms purchase and to encourage extreme expressions of nationalism for political purpose). This proposition by Malaysian tabloids is not a fair reflection of what is written.
Tim Huxley's research skills is first rate, given Singapore government's discretion on security matters.
According to Tim Huxley (at pages 75 & 126), Singapore established, in 1984, a Special Operations Force (SOF) (a elite counter-terrorist force) whose existence remained secret until it was publicized in 1997. In his analysis, SAF's use of operational analysis (OA) (a quantitative management technique to generate detailed plans for military responses to a wide variety of security contingencies), enabled the SOF to successfully storm a hijacked Singapore airline aircraft in 1991, killing 4 hijackers and rescuing all the passengers unharmed.
Also according to Tim Huxley (at page 131), "in 1975, the SAF purchased 63 Centurion MBTs from India and a second batch from Israel in 1993-94 bringing the total to at least 80... [and] are known as Tempests... Apparently for fear of provoking controversy with Singapore's neigbours, Mindef has never admitted that the SAF operates MBTs."
Tim Huxley’s study is the most complete review of the SAF's capabilities to date and draws heavily from government sources and press reports, providing the reader with a relatively balanced view of matters. This book also details how Singapore, through the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA), developed a strong domestic acquisition capability, beginning with hardware sales and technology transfer arrangements made in cooperation with Israel, UK, Australia, and the US.
Many Singaporeans will tell you that this book is a must read and is listed a book of interest by the
Defense Acquisition History Project. I on the other hand will rate it
4 out of 5.