StephenBierce
New Member
Now that the F-22 is being deployed with first-line units in the USAF, how likely do you think it is that earlier F-15A/B and C/D model Eagles would get remanufactured for Air-to-Ground or Multirole Counterair?
Likelihood...USAF To Remanu Early F-15 to Multirole/Air-To-Ground?
- Thread starter StephenBierce
- Start date
One of the moderators over at Air Combat.org used to work out of Ogden I think it was and he was of the opinion that the F-15C is too worn out to accomodate much of the planned 'Golden Eagle' mods. Of particular interest to me was his statement that the nose gear was suffering severe fatigue in a couple spots (I have yet to find backing proof to this but ELP is not known to prevaricate).StephenBierce said:
A fact not likely to be helped much by the nature of modern AESAs which are a LOT heavier thanks to the higher duty cycles and need for a robust cooling loop. My recollection is that they had to add 300-400lbs in the back end of the jet to rebalance it for the APG-63V(2). It should also be noted that not all Albinos have the basic forward fuselage configuration compatible with the installation of this system. Something about frame station locations and cutouts for the array.
Once you reach this point and assuming you do up a fraction of the F-15E fleet as well (more than half of which are aerodynamic cripples with their own HDLD accelerated aging and particularly dash-220 engines), adding A2G modes becomes a function of collectivizing the parts and support pipe for both models shared software loads.
The driving power of scalar economics having already been proven when we switched back from the APG-70 configuration to the APG-63V(1) as the baseline MSIP model solution to some serious DMS problems back in the mid-90's.
The APG-70 was of course 'pretty new' then but nonetheless, development line is just about fully exhausted now and given you expect to keep it around as a major airframe (I would not), it again makes sense to commonize an upgrade across more than an otherwise prohibitively small fleet count.
OTOH, though the Echo has more or less qualified JDAM and could clear BRU-61/SDB to it's centerline station with a minimum of further flight test; it WILL mean more hassle for the C community because they will need to wire up with a 1760 databus interface. This means cracking the jet in a different area.
(Further modifications to displays and datalink are also likely, especially if you are working with ETAC/GFAC type coordinate feeds instead of prebriefed targets.).
My Big Problems:
1. The jets are OLD.
Even the cheapest ones now run between 10 and 12 grande an hour to fly vs. the 1,200-2,500 dollars per hour you could get from a UCAV and the 5-7 grande of an F-16. We need numbers of jets in the air IN THEATER as much as 'numbers of squadrons' eligible to deploy (able to relieve tired F-16 units). Though the Eagle has a vastly superior crash record, it is just not intended for the same kinds of day-in/day-out = wrung out flying. And this will further clock-on fatigue modifiers to MMH:FH and ops account costs whereever they go.
2. It would mean additional training hours.
This has both an economic and a tactical fallout in that the one thing which keeps F-15 pilots even /marginally/ competitive in an ARH + HOBS + Datalink driven world of 20 series SAMs and Gen-4 fighters is the utter A2A exclusiveness of the Albino training syllabus. You multirole them and all of a sudden, instead of getting the _minimum_ 20 hours a month to stay basically check-box competent in ONE mission, you now have to 'swing role' with 15-17 hours in A2A and 15-17 hours in A2G to the extent that each capability peak is achieved roughly half a month out of sequence with the other and NEITHER highpoint is as good as dedicated missionized squadron achieves.
3. The Eagle is not an FDOW/D1R1 aircraft. Even as a 'pure' Air Superiority aircraft. And certainly not on it's own. The frontal signatures are huge, the ALQ-135 (even with those few that have the full, front quarter, emitter coverage) is dated and there is no compatibility with HARM or towed decoy thanks to the jet's significance aeroacoustics and tail configuration issues.
Indeed, ever since the mid-90's when the theater CINC calls for jets to go over the fence into the bryar patch of possible SAM traps, he always calls for F-16CJs since they bring the EW, ELS, Datalink and a POWERED SUPPRESSION OPTION to do the job with.
While few air threats are a match for the combined 6+2 missiles that even an F-16 section will bring to the party.
Try changing this around and things get brutally ugly as now you have to get the bombs off the Eagle before it can fight and the fighters off the target before the main raid comes through. Always hoping and praying that nobody lights off a Mach 5 SAM which you can only counterengage with a Mach 1 gliding weapon.
That this is going to generate problems with SOJAM corridoring and package coordination is obvious. That it won't be worth the peacetime cost of capability upgrade is equally so.
CONCLUSION:
Having said all of the above, were I Moseley, I would retire every F-15 and F-117 in service (including the Beagles) to trade shutdown costs for collapsing support tails and thus make way for an 'urgent need' for about 300 more Raptors which can survivably do the same job in 90% of the role spectrum.
This because the advent of GBU-39 and a 50-60nm standoff gives you the ability to completely rethink how you are going to approach ALL forms of strike warfare. Specifically, a threat which has to come a hundred miles out from a nominally defended target to play tag with you (with sufficient margin of lead sweep/BARCAP breakthru and 'play time') is one which is terribly predictable and ultimately _defeatable_ to even a Viper + AWACS driven raid composite.
Once DEWS and Hunting Weapons come online, the need to send UCAVs forward on a dice-toss basis of 'flash of light' encounterment with random destruction is going to further degrade the nominal overhead Air Superiority requirement. Not least because the first such weapons (as ABL and AIM-160B) will be on OUR SIDE.
Thus it makes the most sense, economically and tactically, to have a rapid sortie generation capability inherent to a supercruise transit force able to go out to a 600-800nm radius in about 1.5hrs.
And a Day 2 or 222 'fill force' of UCAVs to drop on all the tactical targets which a ground force might encounter using enhanced loiter to offset increased numbers (and fewer tankers) over the battlespace.
As such, I would not waste a single red cent on F-15 improvements because they will not retain any significant edge (compared to other AESA + ram/ARH threats) after 2015. And the gen-after-next systems will effectively keep us from having a penetrating raid force regardless.
KPl.
While Remanufacture of F-15 undoable, what about F-16XL
You make some excellent points about remanufacture / retention of F-15 in the face of F/A-22 and F-35 deployment, what would you say about having Lockheed manufacture the field upgrade kits for changing the F-16A/B/C/D to the F-16XL "Scamp" configuration? This could extend the service life of the Falcon at minimal cost. Shall we call it the F-16XL "Super Falcon"?
You make some excellent points about remanufacture / retention of F-15 in the face of F/A-22 and F-35 deployment, what would you say about having Lockheed manufacture the field upgrade kits for changing the F-16A/B/C/D to the F-16XL "Scamp" configuration? This could extend the service life of the Falcon at minimal cost. Shall we call it the F-16XL "Super Falcon"?
The F-16XL was a one off prototype without any of the real stress testing or production tooling workups necessary to bring the fighter to service. Note that the generally similar (experimental) F-15B DRF took EIGHT MORE YEARS to develop fully into the production F-15E and that aircraft was only purchased in roughly half the numbers initially requested because the costs of an essentially new development airframe were more than we could accept.boldeagle said:You make some excellent points about remanufacture / retention of F-15 in the face of F/A-22 and F-35 deployment, what would you say about having Lockheed manufacture the field upgrade kits for changing the F-16A/B/C/D to the F-16XL "Scamp" configuration? This could extend the service life of the Falcon at minimal cost. Shall we call it the F-16XL "Super Falcon"?
Given that the new jet would be trading up to about 12-13,000lbs of fuel internally, with roughly a 125% increase in range with the same payload (say, 325nm vs. 650nm) it would still not solve for the five principal problems of modern day airpower:
1. Persistence.
In the target area /after/ achieving radius. Since 'nothing good' happens when you are transiting between target and homeplate and hour for hour, you need to spend more of your time looking for bad guys than transiting along in autopilot for home.
2. Basing Mode.
Ability to operate _as a single variant_ from all three principal U.S. basing modes: Small Carriers, Large Carriers and Air Bases. Thereby greatly reducing the bureacracy and mafia-like power base of the 'one nation, three kings' air services. This is also the principle failure of the JSF which is effectively three airplanes (with three times the development cost of one type) with a single name. And not a one able to support the others in a major war where the alternative basing options are unavailable, threatened or excessively tired.
3. Survivability.
Inherent to being able to persist in a given area without depleting one of two particularly limited resources: Fuel and Expendables. Effectively this means not being shot at, at all.
4. Cost + Coverage.
Obviously, a single asset covering a single corridor some 10X50nm is worthless in prosecuting an airwar, even over a podunk country only 100X200nm total border size. You need 10 X 10 so that you skirmish-line sweep an area 100nm across with another 10 jets only 5 minutes behind them. And you need to do this for 24:7 throughout the campaign and into the 'peace keeping' segment afterwards. Such being a condition almost entirely dictated by the cost per flying hour needed to operate and train a given force.
5. Netcentricity.
As a function of high definition sensors and _high rate_ communications links, all coordinated and separated through offboard airspace control platforms to provide network support and redundancy when attacked.
Unfortunately, the principle variable keeping us from achieving these 5 key capabilities is MAN HIMSELF. We can buy enough tankers to send an F-16E 1,000nm if we want. And when it gets there, we can fit it with APG-80, AVEN engines and all the goodies to make it a match for the F-16XL. But we can't ditch the worthless mutant under glass that prevents it from achieving relevant (to todays strategic condition) theater objectives OVER TIME.
And so long as we ignore that fact, there will be no point in debating which fighter is 'best for the job' because 'fighter' comes with the word manned attached to it.
KPl.
What need is there for remanufacturing F-15's, the airforce needs an aircraft with loiter time like Mr. Plummer said. The US bomber fleet is able to employ 500lb JDAMs and soon the 250lb SDM's. Why would the USAF want a large fleet of small aircraft with limited range and payload when they can have a
small fleet fleet of more surviable aircraft that can loiter for long periods of time and have massive bomb payloads.
Just look at Afghanistan, we have seen B-1B's and B-52 in CAS roles. They have the ability to stand on station for long periods of time and drop large amounts of weapons over that time.
Any money spent on remanufacturing F-15's anytime in the future should be spent on enlarging the bomber fleet or at least improving F-22 and F-15E's squadrons.
small fleet fleet of more surviable aircraft that can loiter for long periods of time and have massive bomb payloads.
Just look at Afghanistan, we have seen B-1B's and B-52 in CAS roles. They have the ability to stand on station for long periods of time and drop large amounts of weapons over that time.
Any money spent on remanufacturing F-15's anytime in the future should be spent on enlarging the bomber fleet or at least improving F-22 and F-15E's squadrons.
Yep well said guys.
The US is seeing a large difference between its high tech and low tech conflict. For instance Afganistan requires old B-52's to provide CAS as there is minimal threat. This type of threat/conflict can be defeated easily with the older and cheaper F-16's and A-10's. An F-22 and JSF to a certain extent the Superhornet is NOT needed for the afgan war.
However a head to head conflict with North Korea, Iran or even China would require super high end aircraft, like the F-22. The super hornet and possibly even the JSF will have a hard time in a high tech conflict like this.
So basically the USAF needs a true high/low combat mix. With the JSF and F-22, this is a high/ultra high mix.
My answer is to retire the F-117, F-15 A-D models and cancel the JSF completely. That will free up an insane amount of money. This will allow more F-22's to be built to increase the strength of the N Korea, Iran, China conflict. Possibly even 600 F-22's could be built these will perform all strike and air dominance missions. Even if half of these aircraft were in theatre the firepower they could provide in all area's would be equal to the First Gulf War, and thats with just one type of aircraft.
Then money should be spend on the "low" option. Half of the F-16's upgraded to Block 60 standard. While leave the other half stock for training and National guard. Re-engine all A-10 aircraft this upgrade may not go ahead but i think its very important. The rest of the money can go into keeping the B-52's flying and for more C-130 gunships. So for the low end conflicts we have F-16's provide air superiority and strike missions, withe A-10's, B-52's and C130's providing close air support. A very good combat mix, no F-22's would even need to be called apon.
Then the High mix, would have Air force F-22's, B-2 bombers, and Superhornets from the carriers. With 500+ F-22's and 500+ Super hornets this will elimate any potential country.
The F-15 eagle, F-117 and the JSF do not fit into either the high or low conflicts. Keeping multople aircraft types bloats the maintenance cost of the overall air force. If the JSF goes ahead they will still have the A-10 so they will still have two aircraft types. They could just go with the A-10 and F-16 instead for a cheaper lower end option.
UCAV will be the next big break through. I dont see why they even need the JSF on the aircraft carriers as it will be used for strike only which a UCAV can do better. The Airforce could replace the B-52, B-1B and strike with a large UCAV for close air support and strike too. The JSF does not fit in, plus no one can afford it.
Definitely agree with this. The US is afraid of cutting back the overall number of aircraft. 50 more F-22's compared to 400 F-15 eagles. Thats a big reduction in numbers but in long term and in operating cost it is a much leaner fighting machine. You'd rather send in 10 "Rambo's" and take out the enemy compared to sending in 1,000 ground troops. Quantity dosen't mean much any more as even China and most other countries are going quality instead of quantity as well.Kurt Plummer said:
The US is seeing a large difference between its high tech and low tech conflict. For instance Afganistan requires old B-52's to provide CAS as there is minimal threat. This type of threat/conflict can be defeated easily with the older and cheaper F-16's and A-10's. An F-22 and JSF to a certain extent the Superhornet is NOT needed for the afgan war.
However a head to head conflict with North Korea, Iran or even China would require super high end aircraft, like the F-22. The super hornet and possibly even the JSF will have a hard time in a high tech conflict like this.
So basically the USAF needs a true high/low combat mix. With the JSF and F-22, this is a high/ultra high mix.
My answer is to retire the F-117, F-15 A-D models and cancel the JSF completely. That will free up an insane amount of money. This will allow more F-22's to be built to increase the strength of the N Korea, Iran, China conflict. Possibly even 600 F-22's could be built these will perform all strike and air dominance missions. Even if half of these aircraft were in theatre the firepower they could provide in all area's would be equal to the First Gulf War, and thats with just one type of aircraft.
Then money should be spend on the "low" option. Half of the F-16's upgraded to Block 60 standard. While leave the other half stock for training and National guard. Re-engine all A-10 aircraft this upgrade may not go ahead but i think its very important. The rest of the money can go into keeping the B-52's flying and for more C-130 gunships. So for the low end conflicts we have F-16's provide air superiority and strike missions, withe A-10's, B-52's and C130's providing close air support. A very good combat mix, no F-22's would even need to be called apon.
Then the High mix, would have Air force F-22's, B-2 bombers, and Superhornets from the carriers. With 500+ F-22's and 500+ Super hornets this will elimate any potential country.
The F-15 eagle, F-117 and the JSF do not fit into either the high or low conflicts. Keeping multople aircraft types bloats the maintenance cost of the overall air force. If the JSF goes ahead they will still have the A-10 so they will still have two aircraft types. They could just go with the A-10 and F-16 instead for a cheaper lower end option.
UCAV will be the next big break through. I dont see why they even need the JSF on the aircraft carriers as it will be used for strike only which a UCAV can do better. The Airforce could replace the B-52, B-1B and strike with a large UCAV for close air support and strike too. The JSF does not fit in, plus no one can afford it.
RJMaz,
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Definitely agree with this. The US is afraid of cutting back the overall number of aircraft. 50 more F-22's compared to 400 F-15 eagles. Thats a big reduction in numbers but in long term and in operating cost it is a much leaner fighting machine. You'd rather send in 10 "Rambo's" and take out the enemy compared to sending in 1,000 ground troops. Quantity dosen't mean much any more as even China and most other countries are going quality instead of quantity as well.
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The key problem is not just numbers (though that is the ultimate definition of power in the budgetary sense) but /applicability/ and _PR_. We saw this effect in ODS when USN strike aircraft, lacking a simple VCR type tape mechanism for displaying 'how smart they were' were not given the publicity and prestige which the USAF Nighthawks and F-111s and and and (F-15E and 16D when the LANTIRN finally arrived) received.
If you shift towards an all-UCAV fleet to replace 70% of the F-16 force (basically everything earlier than Blk.50) you will also lose votes inherent to 'cockpit air' and particularly the perception that a robot doesn't need to have the same funds thrown at it in the way of upgrade models to keep it safe.
That's why it has to be an all-encompassing multiservice effort so that USAF and USN strike airframes are effectively upgraded to a common robotic standard, simultaneously. Not only does the /vastly/ ease the rapid deployment and bulk-up issues of the USN (effectively making the USAF rather than the USMC into a RAG, via 1 'expeditionary squadron of _18-24 jets_ in every lubber wing). But it also removes the pride factor from the hands of the selfish snot nosed kids in uniform.
This nation DOES NOT NEED three independent air forces. The Marines DO NEED a jet-stovl CAS airframe in the 18-25,000lb class akin to what ASTOVL was originally intended to achieve. Because only with that _non LO, non expensive_ platform can they replace both skids and bumblebees in their 'detachment force' of typically 8-10 AH-1/AV-8B with a COMMON followon that has the legs and the speed to make STOM ops supportable with the giant V-22 force, 200 miles inland.
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The US is seeing a large difference between its high tech and low tech conflict. For instance Afganistan requires old B-52's to provide CAS as there is minimal threat. This type of threat/conflict can be defeated easily with the older and cheaper F-16's and A-10's. An F-22 and JSF to a certain extent the Superhornet is NOT needed for the afgan war.
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A B-52 is worth 70,000 dollars per flight hour. With on the order of 300,000lbs of internal fuel, it can suck a pair of tankers dry and STILL need a recovery mission airframe hanging over home plate if the distance is anything.
Now add to the fact that THIS-
.........................................................
.................................TGT1...............
................................B-52.................
.........................................................
Is what a BUFF sees in any given 100X100nm combat area in any 15 minutes of flight.
While THIS-
TGT1......UCAV...............................
......................TGT2..UCAV..TGT3..
......TGT4..........................................
........UCAV............TGT5....UCAV..
Is what a UCAV force can respond to on the same quantity of mission-transferred gas, in the same interval.
The Iraqi Insurgency almost certainly has a Ding Hao network of visual observers with cell phones.
The Taliban fighters probably operate on a COMINT monitoring traffic alert system.
As such, they attack over here, while threat air is over there and /even at jet speeds/ 'it's all over but the screamin'' by the time a jet can transit in.
Such are the principle shortcomings of bomber air inherent to localized OBAS. It works because it's never been done before and everbody is fascinated by the idea of using a sledgehammer to nail a gnat's a$$. But it is not the most efficent method.
Indeed, given the only really /useful/ role of such aircraft (outside of residual SIOP hostaging) is in a 'win hold win' scenario in which they launch ALCM from the far side of Japan while we send Tacair East to handle an ME or Euro blowup, the real question MUST be, IMO, why we think we need three types of bomber airframes at all. The B-1B is a maintenance nightmare with poor performance profile and SFC issues. The B-52 is a wobble knee'd geriatric with EIGHT ENGINES (4 more than necessary, 6 more than a followon airframe would require). The B-2 is a showboat platform with asset values approaching that of a carrier. Drop two, retire one to hangar queen status and throw money at a B-3 JASSM carrier based on COTS technologies as much as possible.
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However a head to head conflict with North Korea, Iran or even China would require super high end aircraft, like the F-22. The super hornet and possibly even the JSF will have a hard time in a high tech conflict like this.
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The Ultra Bug is a splat on the windshield of any truly sophisticated threatfor if it doesn't have massive improvements in weaponization. Specifically a longrange AAM in the 100-150nm category and a standoff munition of equal legs plus a high-density ARM (it may well be that an AAM could perform the same role). Yet for all this, my problem with the Super Horror is that there are simply not enough of them building or Lotted out (4 if not 5) to provide a level aged and uniformly capable squadron force. Right now, we are looking at Echoes being used as fighter tankers to drag along Charlies and so losing BOTH the baseline and the secondary force (only two pylons today) capabilities. And if/when the JSF comes aboard, that will mean THREE tails worth of nominally the same attack mission, NONE of which has the legs, signature or systems support to leverage each other over any From The Sea, Forward radii (400nm inland and beyond).
Now a part of this is using a 50 million dollar tacair platform like a CSA rather than /buying a new CSA/. Something which is also at the root cause of the EA-6B emergency mods and the E-2D upgrades (all in penny ante numbers).
But the fact remains that the USN needs to move towards a UCAV force and it needs to have a significant percentage of Lot II F/A-18F when they come aboard, not only because that will mean fewer total tails. But also because the missionized rear cockpit and APG-79 are both elemental to controlling UCAVs in high densities while hauling a three-tank configuraiton which limits own-loads and agility in trade for radius.
The JSF should have been a common airframe with the USAF model, period, dot. As such it could have served as a LO netcentric replacement FADF (4X AAAM class missiles) and a _limited_ (GBU-39) FDOW critical strike platform to up the DMPI count on Day 1, Raid 1.
Instead, they went the wrong direction and emphasized heavyweight JDAM and only 2 internal AMRAAM 'so that it wouldn't compete with the ATF and looked like it could replace the A-12'.
Yet to put that kind of weight behind the boat, they had to install an F-15 wing on an F-16 sized airframe which not only makes all three variants basically 'their own airplane' in terms of flight test and development costs. But utterly removes the notion of the JSF as being a single squadron replacement for the Tomcat (which makes sense) rather than an attempt to reincarnate the VAW Intruder mission.
Bluntly, this approach sucked buttermilk because John Lehman was dead on correct about ONE THING: It's better to have an all heavy attack wing (all long range, all multiple munitions carrier) than to try and divide between light and all weather attack and end up not having enough missions to cover all your basis at any but the shortest of (190nm/1:45 cycle time) ranges.
The UCAV could EASILY replace the F/A-18s AND the unfulfilled A-6/A-12 mission set. Which would mean the equivalent of 3, 20 plane, squadrons per boat and a return to the Roosevelt load in terms of sorties off the pointy end and sustainable airops with just a few squadrons, all of them fully deck crewed, in the overarching airwing composite structure.
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So basically the USAF needs a true high/low combat mix. With the JSF and F-22, this is a high/ultra high mix.
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The USAF needs to differentiate itself from the USN again. AFAICT, that can only happen via a TAV type skip bomber that has the legs of a conventional ICBM but the LO and targeting sophistication of a B-2.
Short of that, they need to realize that the best way forward _for the country_ is to amalgamize the combat air services much as they have the Training Command and the easiest way to get there, on raw dollar:dollar comparison is to either join the Super Bug community. Or share a _rapid_ (5 years, tops) development of a common UCAV. The latter, despite the diehard pilots-uber-alles communities near panic, actually has some good advantages for the blue suited monkeys.
Namely that while the USN has gained control of the airframe now that they USAF have foolishly dumped J-UCAS, it is _USAF_ netcentric command architecture which is most likely to be used via direct targeting (MQ-1), pseudolite relays (MQ-9) and overarching battlespace sorting and routing control (RQ-4 RTIP) if not a fully integrated BMC2 platform like the E-10 represented.
Under such a scenario /it doesn't matter where it comes from/ (so long as somebody is there with enough jets to do the job), so long as it plugs into the network with the best ISR and datapass (TTNT).
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My answer is to retire the F-117, F-15 A-D models and cancel the JSF completely. That will free up an insane amount of money. This will allow more F-22's to be built to increase the strength of the N Korea, Iran, China conflict. Possibly even 600 F-22's could be built these will perform all strike and air dominance missions. Even if half of these aircraft were in theatre the firepower they could provide in all area's would be equal to the First Gulf War, and thats with just one type of aircraft.
Then money should be spend on the "low" option. Half of the F-16's upgraded to Block 60 standard. While leave the other half stock for training and National guard. Re-engine all A-10 aircraft this upgrade may not go ahead but i think its very important. The rest of the money can go into keeping the B-52's flying and for more C-130 gunships. So for the low end conflicts we have F-16's provide air superiority and strike missions, withe A-10's, B-52's and C130's providing close air support. A very good combat mix, no F-22's would even need to be called apon.
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The F-16E is a new airframe under the skin, you might be able to purchase a bunch of them 'at FMS discount' from the UAE technology purchase but for purposes of continental AD, it would be a waste. I myself would stop CCIP and retire every Viper older than a 1993 tail number while 'settling for' new missiles (JCM, ADM-160B, AIM-160B, SDB) and targeting (APG-68V(10) and SNIPER all 'round) while doing my best to integrate something a little more advanced than IDM as the primary datalink. This alone should hold the line until UCAVs could start flowing in.
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Then the High mix, would have Air force F-22's, B-2 bombers, and Superhornets from the carriers. With 500+ F-22's and 500+ Super hornets this will elimate any potential country.
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Here my big question is sortie rates vs. exposure. An F-22 with decent tanking support can come from Guam or Oki and still make Korean landfall in reasonable time. A CVSF can only do the same if you either bring the decks in close (which may take days to transfer other decks into theater, even if their is no threat opposition inherent to Subs, mines, AShM and the littoral like...) or if you specifically configure them to support hose:drogue refueling.
At the same time, there is the question of threats. Inside 10 years, we WILL be seeing DEWS as hardkill systems in the U.S. Less than ten years after that, they will be globally proliferated. The question then becomes whether you want to send in truly invisible UCAVs to drop standoff munitions from 60nm away while Bugs _shoot through_ their formations.
Or if you want to do the whole 'lead sweep' nonsense with a mixed force of UCAV, F-22 and F/A-18F. Myself, we're getting to the point where we may _need_ to have very rapid response (aeroballistic cruise) options to suppress even transit/ingress threats. Which subsequently opens the door for UCAVs to come into the target area almost unopposed.
This would help resolve a lot of USN/USAF cooperative mission deficits in terms of sorties and roles (the F-22 cannot 'escort' UCAVs if it is performing a supercruise transit profile itself, it may also not be able to linger long in the combat area. Yet it's very invisibility may render it less than effective in reducing the threat air defenses, particularly if the UCAV force itself is assumed to be a followon-to-Predator force in putting a mosaic targeting (big picture made up of many small spotlight images, like shining a flashlight at your feet, along with a hundred friends) capability over the threat nation.
Obviously, 70% or more of the threats out there will not be able to deny the overhead tasking option. But in a /high intensity fight/ you can no longer guarantee that because the Chinese and Russians both are dazzling our satellites on every pass now. And particularly for a nuclear suppression mission into Norkia or Iran or PakIndi, you may not have TIME to build up a premission picture of what's out there.
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The F-15 eagle, F-117 and the JSF do not fit into either the high or low conflicts. Keeping multople aircraft types bloats the maintenance cost of the overall air force. If the JSF goes ahead they will still have the A-10 so they will still have two aircraft types. They could just go with the A-10 and F-16 instead for a cheaper lower end option.
>>
The A-10 is the least capable of all choices for CAS. It has no radar. Even with the TF-34 upgrade it wallows above about 17,000ft (big curving, straight, airfoil). /Some/ have AAQ-28 but none have a munition to exploit it's capabilities and the initial DSMS does _not_ include the SADL fit to bend pipe down and up from a standardized ground forces datalink architecture (whatever follows on from EPLRS). The gun is worthless because it cannot be employed safely without taking the CEP circle up to roughly 70-100ft across (/with/ the IFFC mod). There is no combat tank to extend it's radius and with the crippling altitude shortfalls, you almost need to have separate Hog and Fighter tracks to keep a decent refueling efficiency going. Finally, the A-10 doesn't transit at much more than 300-320 knots and so it is /terribly/ slow to get from just a few, central, airbases out to the border firebases. And equally slow in coming home for a combat turn.
Insofar as it goes, the JSF is a superior bomb truck to the A-10. It has weather look through, four pylons and two bay stations compatible with 1760 standard databus weapons. It has almost a third again as much gas feeding just-the-one engine. And it's EOTS will likely match or exceed the capabilities of even late model LITENING while displaying multiple 'portals' (window in window) of overlapping troop, own, offboard CAS data on large format screens.
A UCAV would be better. But the Hog was a poor design from the outset and one whose day has long since come.
>>
UCAV will be the next big break through. I dont see why they even need the JSF on the aircraft carriers as it will be used for strike only which a UCAV can do better. The Airforce could replace the B-52, B-1B and strike with a large UCAV for close air support and strike too. The JSF does not fit in, plus no one can afford it.
>>
Once the asset value goes up beyond 200 million each and the platform weight exceeds a 250,000lbs, 'you might as well' add aircrew. Even on Global Reach type missions where you are looking at 30-40hr mission times. Humans CAN do somethings in the way of monitoring and compensating for mechanical reliability shortfalls that an autopilot interface cannot achieve. One is reminded of the RQ-4 which sent a potential fire-warning indication due to a failing avionics bay cooling loop, the jet was diverted and repairs made, only to FAIL TO CHECKLIST the flight plan which had a taxi-segment listed at 155 knots. The jet tried to fly, then tried to make a 90` turn onto the active and ended up sheering the nosegear and doing major damage to the wings and forward fuselage. Such idiocies don't happen when junior jet ranger is apt to personally bleed for his stupidities.
My big question then becomes this:
1. We will typically not risk a bomber asset unsupported in anything like a contested theater. This means that tacair, with all it's superior numbers for short radius sortie generation advantages is going to 'be there' anyway. And so stealing from their own mission options to support a bomber with 80 weapons onboard and perhaps 2hrs to expend them all doesn't make too much sense. Particularly if you are also shy on realtime targeting.
2. Without rapid response (Mach 2 or better supercruise) it's unlikely that a strategic asset is going to be able to deploy /rapidly/ enough to beat Tacair in terms of standing up a force in-theater vs. sending one from outside it (Diego) or CONUS.
3. Naval vessels are superior sources of CM, both on bought inventory. And on penny's per mile transit costs. As well as in total theater persistent presence from even relatively small (DDG or SSN type) assets.
WHAT THEN is the design mission of the bomber? Is it a secondary CM shooter to help support forces in theater or to act as a standin while the Navy gets there? If so, don't waste money trying to excessively militarize what is effectively a truck asset for a 600-800nm AGM-158B. Is it a penetrating FDOW bomber? If so, then don't size it to the point where it's asset value exceeds the capabilities that it can bring WITHOUT compromising other tacair systems. Is it a rapid reaction system to suppress nuclear threats on short notification without going to a fullup strategic response? If so then you had better settle for a 20 plane fleet of Mach 25 FOBS type aircraft and be ready to put _megabucks_ into exotic propulsion and fuels to match, never intending to come closer than half a hemisphere to your target before rod-from-god slinging variable warhead solutions at various deep and/or hardened targets.
>>
Definitely agree with this. The US is afraid of cutting back the overall number of aircraft. 50 more F-22's compared to 400 F-15 eagles. Thats a big reduction in numbers but in long term and in operating cost it is a much leaner fighting machine. You'd rather send in 10 "Rambo's" and take out the enemy compared to sending in 1,000 ground troops. Quantity dosen't mean much any more as even China and most other countries are going quality instead of quantity as well.
>>
The key problem is not just numbers (though that is the ultimate definition of power in the budgetary sense) but /applicability/ and _PR_. We saw this effect in ODS when USN strike aircraft, lacking a simple VCR type tape mechanism for displaying 'how smart they were' were not given the publicity and prestige which the USAF Nighthawks and F-111s and and and (F-15E and 16D when the LANTIRN finally arrived) received.
If you shift towards an all-UCAV fleet to replace 70% of the F-16 force (basically everything earlier than Blk.50) you will also lose votes inherent to 'cockpit air' and particularly the perception that a robot doesn't need to have the same funds thrown at it in the way of upgrade models to keep it safe.
That's why it has to be an all-encompassing multiservice effort so that USAF and USN strike airframes are effectively upgraded to a common robotic standard, simultaneously. Not only does the /vastly/ ease the rapid deployment and bulk-up issues of the USN (effectively making the USAF rather than the USMC into a RAG, via 1 'expeditionary squadron of _18-24 jets_ in every lubber wing). But it also removes the pride factor from the hands of the selfish snot nosed kids in uniform.
This nation DOES NOT NEED three independent air forces. The Marines DO NEED a jet-stovl CAS airframe in the 18-25,000lb class akin to what ASTOVL was originally intended to achieve. Because only with that _non LO, non expensive_ platform can they replace both skids and bumblebees in their 'detachment force' of typically 8-10 AH-1/AV-8B with a COMMON followon that has the legs and the speed to make STOM ops supportable with the giant V-22 force, 200 miles inland.
>>
The US is seeing a large difference between its high tech and low tech conflict. For instance Afganistan requires old B-52's to provide CAS as there is minimal threat. This type of threat/conflict can be defeated easily with the older and cheaper F-16's and A-10's. An F-22 and JSF to a certain extent the Superhornet is NOT needed for the afgan war.
>>
A B-52 is worth 70,000 dollars per flight hour. With on the order of 300,000lbs of internal fuel, it can suck a pair of tankers dry and STILL need a recovery mission airframe hanging over home plate if the distance is anything.
Now add to the fact that THIS-
.........................................................
.................................TGT1...............
................................B-52.................
.........................................................
Is what a BUFF sees in any given 100X100nm combat area in any 15 minutes of flight.
While THIS-
TGT1......UCAV...............................
......................TGT2..UCAV..TGT3..
......TGT4..........................................
........UCAV............TGT5....UCAV..
Is what a UCAV force can respond to on the same quantity of mission-transferred gas, in the same interval.
The Iraqi Insurgency almost certainly has a Ding Hao network of visual observers with cell phones.
The Taliban fighters probably operate on a COMINT monitoring traffic alert system.
As such, they attack over here, while threat air is over there and /even at jet speeds/ 'it's all over but the screamin'' by the time a jet can transit in.
Such are the principle shortcomings of bomber air inherent to localized OBAS. It works because it's never been done before and everbody is fascinated by the idea of using a sledgehammer to nail a gnat's a$$. But it is not the most efficent method.
Indeed, given the only really /useful/ role of such aircraft (outside of residual SIOP hostaging) is in a 'win hold win' scenario in which they launch ALCM from the far side of Japan while we send Tacair East to handle an ME or Euro blowup, the real question MUST be, IMO, why we think we need three types of bomber airframes at all. The B-1B is a maintenance nightmare with poor performance profile and SFC issues. The B-52 is a wobble knee'd geriatric with EIGHT ENGINES (4 more than necessary, 6 more than a followon airframe would require). The B-2 is a showboat platform with asset values approaching that of a carrier. Drop two, retire one to hangar queen status and throw money at a B-3 JASSM carrier based on COTS technologies as much as possible.
>>
However a head to head conflict with North Korea, Iran or even China would require super high end aircraft, like the F-22. The super hornet and possibly even the JSF will have a hard time in a high tech conflict like this.
>>
The Ultra Bug is a splat on the windshield of any truly sophisticated threatfor if it doesn't have massive improvements in weaponization. Specifically a longrange AAM in the 100-150nm category and a standoff munition of equal legs plus a high-density ARM (it may well be that an AAM could perform the same role). Yet for all this, my problem with the Super Horror is that there are simply not enough of them building or Lotted out (4 if not 5) to provide a level aged and uniformly capable squadron force. Right now, we are looking at Echoes being used as fighter tankers to drag along Charlies and so losing BOTH the baseline and the secondary force (only two pylons today) capabilities. And if/when the JSF comes aboard, that will mean THREE tails worth of nominally the same attack mission, NONE of which has the legs, signature or systems support to leverage each other over any From The Sea, Forward radii (400nm inland and beyond).
Now a part of this is using a 50 million dollar tacair platform like a CSA rather than /buying a new CSA/. Something which is also at the root cause of the EA-6B emergency mods and the E-2D upgrades (all in penny ante numbers).
But the fact remains that the USN needs to move towards a UCAV force and it needs to have a significant percentage of Lot II F/A-18F when they come aboard, not only because that will mean fewer total tails. But also because the missionized rear cockpit and APG-79 are both elemental to controlling UCAVs in high densities while hauling a three-tank configuraiton which limits own-loads and agility in trade for radius.
The JSF should have been a common airframe with the USAF model, period, dot. As such it could have served as a LO netcentric replacement FADF (4X AAAM class missiles) and a _limited_ (GBU-39) FDOW critical strike platform to up the DMPI count on Day 1, Raid 1.
Instead, they went the wrong direction and emphasized heavyweight JDAM and only 2 internal AMRAAM 'so that it wouldn't compete with the ATF and looked like it could replace the A-12'.
Yet to put that kind of weight behind the boat, they had to install an F-15 wing on an F-16 sized airframe which not only makes all three variants basically 'their own airplane' in terms of flight test and development costs. But utterly removes the notion of the JSF as being a single squadron replacement for the Tomcat (which makes sense) rather than an attempt to reincarnate the VAW Intruder mission.
Bluntly, this approach sucked buttermilk because John Lehman was dead on correct about ONE THING: It's better to have an all heavy attack wing (all long range, all multiple munitions carrier) than to try and divide between light and all weather attack and end up not having enough missions to cover all your basis at any but the shortest of (190nm/1:45 cycle time) ranges.
The UCAV could EASILY replace the F/A-18s AND the unfulfilled A-6/A-12 mission set. Which would mean the equivalent of 3, 20 plane, squadrons per boat and a return to the Roosevelt load in terms of sorties off the pointy end and sustainable airops with just a few squadrons, all of them fully deck crewed, in the overarching airwing composite structure.
>>
So basically the USAF needs a true high/low combat mix. With the JSF and F-22, this is a high/ultra high mix.
>>
The USAF needs to differentiate itself from the USN again. AFAICT, that can only happen via a TAV type skip bomber that has the legs of a conventional ICBM but the LO and targeting sophistication of a B-2.
Short of that, they need to realize that the best way forward _for the country_ is to amalgamize the combat air services much as they have the Training Command and the easiest way to get there, on raw dollar:dollar comparison is to either join the Super Bug community. Or share a _rapid_ (5 years, tops) development of a common UCAV. The latter, despite the diehard pilots-uber-alles communities near panic, actually has some good advantages for the blue suited monkeys.
Namely that while the USN has gained control of the airframe now that they USAF have foolishly dumped J-UCAS, it is _USAF_ netcentric command architecture which is most likely to be used via direct targeting (MQ-1), pseudolite relays (MQ-9) and overarching battlespace sorting and routing control (RQ-4 RTIP) if not a fully integrated BMC2 platform like the E-10 represented.
Under such a scenario /it doesn't matter where it comes from/ (so long as somebody is there with enough jets to do the job), so long as it plugs into the network with the best ISR and datapass (TTNT).
>>
My answer is to retire the F-117, F-15 A-D models and cancel the JSF completely. That will free up an insane amount of money. This will allow more F-22's to be built to increase the strength of the N Korea, Iran, China conflict. Possibly even 600 F-22's could be built these will perform all strike and air dominance missions. Even if half of these aircraft were in theatre the firepower they could provide in all area's would be equal to the First Gulf War, and thats with just one type of aircraft.
Then money should be spend on the "low" option. Half of the F-16's upgraded to Block 60 standard. While leave the other half stock for training and National guard. Re-engine all A-10 aircraft this upgrade may not go ahead but i think its very important. The rest of the money can go into keeping the B-52's flying and for more C-130 gunships. So for the low end conflicts we have F-16's provide air superiority and strike missions, withe A-10's, B-52's and C130's providing close air support. A very good combat mix, no F-22's would even need to be called apon.
>>
The F-16E is a new airframe under the skin, you might be able to purchase a bunch of them 'at FMS discount' from the UAE technology purchase but for purposes of continental AD, it would be a waste. I myself would stop CCIP and retire every Viper older than a 1993 tail number while 'settling for' new missiles (JCM, ADM-160B, AIM-160B, SDB) and targeting (APG-68V(10) and SNIPER all 'round) while doing my best to integrate something a little more advanced than IDM as the primary datalink. This alone should hold the line until UCAVs could start flowing in.
>>
Then the High mix, would have Air force F-22's, B-2 bombers, and Superhornets from the carriers. With 500+ F-22's and 500+ Super hornets this will elimate any potential country.
>>
Here my big question is sortie rates vs. exposure. An F-22 with decent tanking support can come from Guam or Oki and still make Korean landfall in reasonable time. A CVSF can only do the same if you either bring the decks in close (which may take days to transfer other decks into theater, even if their is no threat opposition inherent to Subs, mines, AShM and the littoral like...) or if you specifically configure them to support hose:drogue refueling.
At the same time, there is the question of threats. Inside 10 years, we WILL be seeing DEWS as hardkill systems in the U.S. Less than ten years after that, they will be globally proliferated. The question then becomes whether you want to send in truly invisible UCAVs to drop standoff munitions from 60nm away while Bugs _shoot through_ their formations.
Or if you want to do the whole 'lead sweep' nonsense with a mixed force of UCAV, F-22 and F/A-18F. Myself, we're getting to the point where we may _need_ to have very rapid response (aeroballistic cruise) options to suppress even transit/ingress threats. Which subsequently opens the door for UCAVs to come into the target area almost unopposed.
This would help resolve a lot of USN/USAF cooperative mission deficits in terms of sorties and roles (the F-22 cannot 'escort' UCAVs if it is performing a supercruise transit profile itself, it may also not be able to linger long in the combat area. Yet it's very invisibility may render it less than effective in reducing the threat air defenses, particularly if the UCAV force itself is assumed to be a followon-to-Predator force in putting a mosaic targeting (big picture made up of many small spotlight images, like shining a flashlight at your feet, along with a hundred friends) capability over the threat nation.
Obviously, 70% or more of the threats out there will not be able to deny the overhead tasking option. But in a /high intensity fight/ you can no longer guarantee that because the Chinese and Russians both are dazzling our satellites on every pass now. And particularly for a nuclear suppression mission into Norkia or Iran or PakIndi, you may not have TIME to build up a premission picture of what's out there.
>>
The F-15 eagle, F-117 and the JSF do not fit into either the high or low conflicts. Keeping multople aircraft types bloats the maintenance cost of the overall air force. If the JSF goes ahead they will still have the A-10 so they will still have two aircraft types. They could just go with the A-10 and F-16 instead for a cheaper lower end option.
>>
The A-10 is the least capable of all choices for CAS. It has no radar. Even with the TF-34 upgrade it wallows above about 17,000ft (big curving, straight, airfoil). /Some/ have AAQ-28 but none have a munition to exploit it's capabilities and the initial DSMS does _not_ include the SADL fit to bend pipe down and up from a standardized ground forces datalink architecture (whatever follows on from EPLRS). The gun is worthless because it cannot be employed safely without taking the CEP circle up to roughly 70-100ft across (/with/ the IFFC mod). There is no combat tank to extend it's radius and with the crippling altitude shortfalls, you almost need to have separate Hog and Fighter tracks to keep a decent refueling efficiency going. Finally, the A-10 doesn't transit at much more than 300-320 knots and so it is /terribly/ slow to get from just a few, central, airbases out to the border firebases. And equally slow in coming home for a combat turn.
Insofar as it goes, the JSF is a superior bomb truck to the A-10. It has weather look through, four pylons and two bay stations compatible with 1760 standard databus weapons. It has almost a third again as much gas feeding just-the-one engine. And it's EOTS will likely match or exceed the capabilities of even late model LITENING while displaying multiple 'portals' (window in window) of overlapping troop, own, offboard CAS data on large format screens.
A UCAV would be better. But the Hog was a poor design from the outset and one whose day has long since come.
>>
UCAV will be the next big break through. I dont see why they even need the JSF on the aircraft carriers as it will be used for strike only which a UCAV can do better. The Airforce could replace the B-52, B-1B and strike with a large UCAV for close air support and strike too. The JSF does not fit in, plus no one can afford it.
>>
Once the asset value goes up beyond 200 million each and the platform weight exceeds a 250,000lbs, 'you might as well' add aircrew. Even on Global Reach type missions where you are looking at 30-40hr mission times. Humans CAN do somethings in the way of monitoring and compensating for mechanical reliability shortfalls that an autopilot interface cannot achieve. One is reminded of the RQ-4 which sent a potential fire-warning indication due to a failing avionics bay cooling loop, the jet was diverted and repairs made, only to FAIL TO CHECKLIST the flight plan which had a taxi-segment listed at 155 knots. The jet tried to fly, then tried to make a 90` turn onto the active and ended up sheering the nosegear and doing major damage to the wings and forward fuselage. Such idiocies don't happen when junior jet ranger is apt to personally bleed for his stupidities.
My big question then becomes this:
1. We will typically not risk a bomber asset unsupported in anything like a contested theater. This means that tacair, with all it's superior numbers for short radius sortie generation advantages is going to 'be there' anyway. And so stealing from their own mission options to support a bomber with 80 weapons onboard and perhaps 2hrs to expend them all doesn't make too much sense. Particularly if you are also shy on realtime targeting.
2. Without rapid response (Mach 2 or better supercruise) it's unlikely that a strategic asset is going to be able to deploy /rapidly/ enough to beat Tacair in terms of standing up a force in-theater vs. sending one from outside it (Diego) or CONUS.
3. Naval vessels are superior sources of CM, both on bought inventory. And on penny's per mile transit costs. As well as in total theater persistent presence from even relatively small (DDG or SSN type) assets.
WHAT THEN is the design mission of the bomber? Is it a secondary CM shooter to help support forces in theater or to act as a standin while the Navy gets there? If so, don't waste money trying to excessively militarize what is effectively a truck asset for a 600-800nm AGM-158B. Is it a penetrating FDOW bomber? If so, then don't size it to the point where it's asset value exceeds the capabilities that it can bring WITHOUT compromising other tacair systems. Is it a rapid reaction system to suppress nuclear threats on short notification without going to a fullup strategic response? If so then you had better settle for a 20 plane fleet of Mach 25 FOBS type aircraft and be ready to put _megabucks_ into exotic propulsion and fuels to match, never intending to come closer than half a hemisphere to your target before rod-from-god slinging variable warhead solutions at various deep and/or hardened targets.
RJMaz,
>>
Definitely agree with this. The US is afraid of cutting back the overall number of aircraft. 50 more F-22's compared to 400 F-15 eagles. Thats a big reduction in numbers but in long term and in operating cost it is a much leaner fighting machine. You'd rather send in 10 "Rambo's" and take out the enemy compared to sending in 1,000 ground troops. Quantity dosen't mean much any more as even China and most other countries are going quality instead of quantity as well.
>>
The key problem is not just numbers (though that is the ultimate definition of power in the budgetary sense) but /applicability/ and _PR_. We saw this effect in ODS when USN strike aircraft, lacking a simple VCR type tape mechanism for displaying 'how smart they were' were not given the publicity and prestige which the USAF Nighthawks and F-111s and and and (F-15E and 16D when the LANTIRN finally arrived) received.
If you shift towards an all-UCAV fleet to replace 70% of the F-16 force (basically everything earlier than Blk.50) you will also lose votes inherent to 'cockpit air' and particularly the perception that a robot doesn't need to have the same funds thrown at it in the way of upgrade models to keep it safe.
That's why it has to be an all-encompassing multiservice effort so that USAF and USN strike airframes are effectively upgraded to a common robotic standard, simultaneously. Not only does the /vastly/ ease the rapid deployment and bulk-up issues of the USN (effectively making the USAF rather than the USMC into a RAG, via 1 'expeditionary squadron of _18-24 jets_ in every lubber wing). But it also removes the pride factor from the hands of the selfish snot nosed kids in uniform.
This nation DOES NOT NEED three independent air forces. The Marines DO NEED a jet-stovl CAS airframe in the 18-25,000lb class akin to what ASTOVL was originally intended to achieve. Because only with that _non LO, non expensive_ platform can they replace both skids and bumblebees in their 'detachment force' of typically 8-10 AH-1/AV-8B with a COMMON followon that has the legs and the speed to make STOM ops supportable with the giant V-22 force, 200 miles inland.
>>
The US is seeing a large difference between its high tech and low tech conflict. For instance Afganistan requires old B-52's to provide CAS as there is minimal threat. This type of threat/conflict can be defeated easily with the older and cheaper F-16's and A-10's. An F-22 and JSF to a certain extent the Superhornet is NOT needed for the afgan war.
>>
A B-52 is worth 70,000 dollars per flight hour. With on the order of 300,000lbs of internal fuel, it can suck a pair of tankers dry and STILL need a recovery mission airframe hanging over home plate if the distance is anything.
Now add to the fact that THIS-
.........................................................
.................................TGT1...............
................................B-52.................
.........................................................
Is what a BUFF sees in any given 100X100nm combat area in any 15 minutes of flight.
While THIS-
TGT1......UCAV...............................
......................TGT2..UCAV..TGT3..
......TGT4..........................................
........UCAV............TGT5....UCAV..
Is what a UCAV force can respond to on the same quantity of mission-transferred gas, in the same interval.
The Iraqi Insurgency almost certainly has a Ding Hao network of visual observers with cell phones.
The Taliban fighters probably operate on a COMINT monitoring traffic alert system.
As such, they attack over here, while threat air is over there and /even at jet speeds/ 'it's all over but the screamin'' by the time a jet can transit in.
Such are the principle shortcomings of bomber air inherent to localized OBAS. It works because it's never been done before and everbody is fascinated by the idea of using a sledgehammer to nail a gnat's a$$. But it is not the most efficent method.
Indeed, given the only really /useful/ role of such aircraft (outside of residual SIOP hostaging) is in a 'win hold win' scenario in which they launch ALCM from the far side of Japan while we send Tacair East to handle an ME or Euro blowup, the real question MUST be, IMO, why we think we need three types of bomber airframes at all. The B-1B is a maintenance nightmare with poor performance profile and SFC issues. The B-52 is a wobble knee'd geriatric with EIGHT ENGINES (4 more than necessary, 6 more than a followon airframe would require). The B-2 is a showboat platform with asset values approaching that of a carrier. Drop two, retire one to hangar queen status and throw money at a B-3 JASSM carrier based on COTS technologies as much as possible.
>>
However a head to head conflict with North Korea, Iran or even China would require super high end aircraft, like the F-22. The super hornet and possibly even the JSF will have a hard time in a high tech conflict like this.
>>
The Ultra Bug is a splat on the windshield of any truly sophisticated threatfor if it doesn't have massive improvements in weaponization. Specifically a longrange AAM in the 100-150nm category and a standoff munition of equal legs plus a high-density ARM (it may well be that an AAM could perform the same role). Yet for all this, my problem with the Super Horror is that there are simply not enough of them building or Lotted out (4 if not 5) to provide a level aged and uniformly capable squadron force. Right now, we are looking at Echoes being used as fighter tankers to drag along Charlies and so losing BOTH the baseline and the secondary force (only two pylons today) capabilities. And if/when the JSF comes aboard, that will mean THREE tails worth of nominally the same attack mission, NONE of which has the legs, signature or systems support to leverage each other over any From The Sea, Forward radii (400nm inland and beyond).
Now a part of this is using a 50 million dollar tacair platform like a CSA rather than /buying a new CSA/. Something which is also at the root cause of the EA-6B emergency mods and the E-2D upgrades (all in penny ante numbers).
But the fact remains that the USN needs to move towards a UCAV force and it needs to have a significant percentage of Lot II F/A-18F when they come aboard, not only because that will mean fewer total tails. But also because the missionized rear cockpit and APG-79 are both elemental to controlling UCAVs in high densities while hauling a three-tank configuraiton which limits own-loads and agility in trade for radius.
The JSF should have been a common airframe with the USAF model, period, dot. As such it could have served as a LO netcentric replacement FADF (4X AAAM class missiles) and a _limited_ (GBU-39) FDOW critical strike platform to up the DMPI count on Day 1, Raid 1.
Instead, they went the wrong direction and emphasized heavyweight JDAM and only 2 internal AMRAAM 'so that it wouldn't compete with the ATF and looked like it could replace the A-12'.
Yet to put that kind of weight behind the boat, they had to install an F-15 wing on an F-16 sized airframe which not only makes all three variants basically 'their own airplane' in terms of flight test and development costs. But utterly removes the notion of the JSF as being a single squadron replacement for the Tomcat (which makes sense) rather than an attempt to reincarnate the VAW Intruder mission.
Bluntly, this approach sucked buttermilk because John Lehman was dead on correct about ONE THING: It's better to have an all heavy attack wing (all long range, all multiple munitions carrier) than to try and divide between light and all weather attack and end up not having enough missions to cover all your basis at any but the shortest of (190nm/1:45 cycle time) ranges.
The UCAV could EASILY replace the F/A-18s AND the unfulfilled A-6/A-12 mission set. Which would mean the equivalent of 3, 20 plane, squadrons per boat and a return to the Roosevelt load in terms of sorties off the pointy end and sustainable airops with just a few squadrons, all of them fully deck crewed, in the overarching airwing composite structure.
>>
So basically the USAF needs a true high/low combat mix. With the JSF and F-22, this is a high/ultra high mix.
>>
The USAF needs to differentiate itself from the USN again. AFAICT, that can only happen via a TAV type skip bomber that has the legs of a conventional ICBM but the LO and targeting sophistication of a B-2.
Short of that, they need to realize that the best way forward _for the country_ is to amalgamize the combat air services much as they have the Training Command and the easiest way to get there, on raw dollar:dollar comparison is to either join the Super Bug community. Or share a _rapid_ (5 years, tops) development of a common UCAV. The latter, despite the diehard pilots-uber-alles communities near panic, actually has some good advantages for the blue suited monkeys.
Namely that while the USN has gained control of the airframe now that they USAF have foolishly dumped J-UCAS, it is _USAF_ netcentric command architecture which is most likely to be used via direct targeting (MQ-1), pseudolite relays (MQ-9) and overarching battlespace sorting and routing control (RQ-4 RTIP) if not a fully integrated BMC2 platform like the E-10 represented.
Under such a scenario /it doesn't matter where it comes from/ (so long as somebody is there with enough jets to do the job), so long as it plugs into the network with the best ISR and datapass (TTNT).
>>
My answer is to retire the F-117, F-15 A-D models and cancel the JSF completely. That will free up an insane amount of money. This will allow more F-22's to be built to increase the strength of the N Korea, Iran, China conflict. Possibly even 600 F-22's could be built these will perform all strike and air dominance missions. Even if half of these aircraft were in theatre the firepower they could provide in all area's would be equal to the First Gulf War, and thats with just one type of aircraft.
Then money should be spend on the "low" option. Half of the F-16's upgraded to Block 60 standard. While leave the other half stock for training and National guard. Re-engine all A-10 aircraft this upgrade may not go ahead but i think its very important. The rest of the money can go into keeping the B-52's flying and for more C-130 gunships. So for the low end conflicts we have F-16's provide air superiority and strike missions, withe A-10's, B-52's and C130's providing close air support. A very good combat mix, no F-22's would even need to be called apon.
>>
The F-16E is a new airframe under the skin, you might be able to purchase a bunch of them 'at FMS discount' from the UAE technology purchase but for purposes of continental AD, it would be a waste. I myself would stop CCIP and retire every Viper older than a 1993 tail number while 'settling for' new missiles (JCM, ADM-160B, AIM-160B, SDB) and targeting (APG-68V(10) and SNIPER all 'round) while doing my best to integrate something a little more advanced than IDM as the primary datalink. This alone should hold the line until UCAVs could start flowing in.
>>
Then the High mix, would have Air force F-22's, B-2 bombers, and Superhornets from the carriers. With 500+ F-22's and 500+ Super hornets this will elimate any potential country.
>>
Here my big question is sortie rates vs. exposure. An F-22 with decent tanking support can come from Guam or Oki and still make Korean landfall in reasonable time. A CVSF can only do the same if you either bring the decks in close (which may take days to transfer other decks into theater, even if their is no threat opposition inherent to Subs, mines, AShM and the littoral like...) or if you specifically configure them to support hose:drogue refueling.
At the same time, there is the question of threats. Inside 10 years, we WILL be seeing DEWS as hardkill systems in the U.S. Less than ten years after that, they will be globally proliferated. The question then becomes whether you want to send in truly invisible UCAVs to drop standoff munitions from 60nm away while Bugs _shoot through_ their formations.
Or if you want to do the whole 'lead sweep' nonsense with a mixed force of UCAV, F-22 and F/A-18F. Myself, we're getting to the point where we may _need_ to have very rapid response (aeroballistic cruise) options to suppress even transit/ingress threats. Which subsequently opens the door for UCAVs to come into the target area almost unopposed.
This would help resolve a lot of USN/USAF cooperative mission deficits in terms of sorties and roles (the F-22 cannot 'escort' UCAVs if it is performing a supercruise transit profile itself, it may also not be able to linger long in the combat area. Yet it's very invisibility may render it less than effective in reducing the threat air defenses, particularly if the UCAV force itself is assumed to be a followon-to-Predator force in putting a mosaic targeting (big picture made up of many small spotlight images, like shining a flashlight at your feet, along with a hundred friends) capability over the threat nation.
Obviously, 70% or more of the threats out there will not be able to deny the overhead tasking option. But in a /high intensity fight/ you can no longer guarantee that because the Chinese and Russians both are dazzling our satellites on every pass now. And particularly for a nuclear suppression mission into Norkia or Iran or PakIndi, you may not have TIME to build up a premission picture of what's out there.
>>
The F-15 eagle, F-117 and the JSF do not fit into either the high or low conflicts. Keeping multople aircraft types bloats the maintenance cost of the overall air force. If the JSF goes ahead they will still have the A-10 so they will still have two aircraft types. They could just go with the A-10 and F-16 instead for a cheaper lower end option.
>>
The A-10 is the least capable of all choices for CAS. It has no radar. Even with the TF-34 upgrade it wallows above about 17,000ft (big curving, straight, airfoil). /Some/ have AAQ-28 but none have a munition to exploit it's capabilities and the initial DSMS does _not_ include the SADL fit to bend pipe down and up from a standardized ground forces datalink architecture (whatever follows on from EPLRS). The gun is worthless because it cannot be employed safely without taking the CEP circle up to roughly 70-100ft across (/with/ the IFFC mod). There is no combat tank to extend it's radius and with the crippling altitude shortfalls, you almost need to have separate Hog and Fighter tracks to keep a decent refueling efficiency going. Finally, the A-10 doesn't transit at much more than 300-320 knots and so it is /terribly/ slow to get from just a few, central, airbases out to the border firebases. And equally slow in coming home for a combat turn.
Insofar as it goes, the JSF is a superior bomb truck to the A-10. It has weather look through, four pylons and two bay stations compatible with 1760 standard databus weapons. It has almost a third again as much gas feeding just-the-one engine. And it's EOTS will likely match or exceed the capabilities of even late model LITENING while displaying multiple 'portals' (window in window) of overlapping troop, own, offboard CAS data on large format screens.
A UCAV would be better. But the Hog was a poor design from the outset and one whose day has long since come.
>>
UCAV will be the next big break through. I dont see why they even need the JSF on the aircraft carriers as it will be used for strike only which a UCAV can do better. The Airforce could replace the B-52, B-1B and strike with a large UCAV for close air support and strike too. The JSF does not fit in, plus no one can afford it.
>>
Once the asset value goes up beyond 200 million each and the platform weight exceeds a 250,000lbs, 'you might as well' add aircrew. Even on Global Reach type missions where you are looking at 30-40hr mission times. Humans CAN do somethings in the way of monitoring and compensating for mechanical reliability shortfalls that an autopilot interface cannot achieve. One is reminded of the RQ-4 which sent a potential fire-warning indication due to a failing avionics bay cooling loop, the jet was diverted and repairs made, only to FAIL TO CHECKLIST the flight plan which had a taxi-segment listed at 155 knots. The jet tried to fly, then tried to make a 90` turn onto the active and ended up sheering the nosegear and doing major damage to the wings and forward fuselage. Such idiocies don't happen when junior jet ranger is apt to personally bleed for his stupidities.
>>
Definitely agree with this. The US is afraid of cutting back the overall number of aircraft. 50 more F-22's compared to 400 F-15 eagles. Thats a big reduction in numbers but in long term and in operating cost it is a much leaner fighting machine. You'd rather send in 10 "Rambo's" and take out the enemy compared to sending in 1,000 ground troops. Quantity dosen't mean much any more as even China and most other countries are going quality instead of quantity as well.
>>
The key problem is not just numbers (though that is the ultimate definition of power in the budgetary sense) but /applicability/ and _PR_. We saw this effect in ODS when USN strike aircraft, lacking a simple VCR type tape mechanism for displaying 'how smart they were' were not given the publicity and prestige which the USAF Nighthawks and F-111s and and and (F-15E and 16D when the LANTIRN finally arrived) received.
If you shift towards an all-UCAV fleet to replace 70% of the F-16 force (basically everything earlier than Blk.50) you will also lose votes inherent to 'cockpit air' and particularly the perception that a robot doesn't need to have the same funds thrown at it in the way of upgrade models to keep it safe.
That's why it has to be an all-encompassing multiservice effort so that USAF and USN strike airframes are effectively upgraded to a common robotic standard, simultaneously. Not only does the /vastly/ ease the rapid deployment and bulk-up issues of the USN (effectively making the USAF rather than the USMC into a RAG, via 1 'expeditionary squadron of _18-24 jets_ in every lubber wing). But it also removes the pride factor from the hands of the selfish snot nosed kids in uniform.
This nation DOES NOT NEED three independent air forces. The Marines DO NEED a jet-stovl CAS airframe in the 18-25,000lb class akin to what ASTOVL was originally intended to achieve. Because only with that _non LO, non expensive_ platform can they replace both skids and bumblebees in their 'detachment force' of typically 8-10 AH-1/AV-8B with a COMMON followon that has the legs and the speed to make STOM ops supportable with the giant V-22 force, 200 miles inland.
>>
The US is seeing a large difference between its high tech and low tech conflict. For instance Afganistan requires old B-52's to provide CAS as there is minimal threat. This type of threat/conflict can be defeated easily with the older and cheaper F-16's and A-10's. An F-22 and JSF to a certain extent the Superhornet is NOT needed for the afgan war.
>>
A B-52 is worth 70,000 dollars per flight hour. With on the order of 300,000lbs of internal fuel, it can suck a pair of tankers dry and STILL need a recovery mission airframe hanging over home plate if the distance is anything.
Now add to the fact that THIS-
.........................................................
.................................TGT1...............
................................B-52.................
.........................................................
Is what a BUFF sees in any given 100X100nm combat area in any 15 minutes of flight.
While THIS-
TGT1......UCAV...............................
......................TGT2..UCAV..TGT3..
......TGT4..........................................
........UCAV............TGT5....UCAV..
Is what a UCAV force can respond to on the same quantity of mission-transferred gas, in the same interval.
The Iraqi Insurgency almost certainly has a Ding Hao network of visual observers with cell phones.
The Taliban fighters probably operate on a COMINT monitoring traffic alert system.
As such, they attack over here, while threat air is over there and /even at jet speeds/ 'it's all over but the screamin'' by the time a jet can transit in.
Such are the principle shortcomings of bomber air inherent to localized OBAS. It works because it's never been done before and everbody is fascinated by the idea of using a sledgehammer to nail a gnat's a$$. But it is not the most efficent method.
Indeed, given the only really /useful/ role of such aircraft (outside of residual SIOP hostaging) is in a 'win hold win' scenario in which they launch ALCM from the far side of Japan while we send Tacair East to handle an ME or Euro blowup, the real question MUST be, IMO, why we think we need three types of bomber airframes at all. The B-1B is a maintenance nightmare with poor performance profile and SFC issues. The B-52 is a wobble knee'd geriatric with EIGHT ENGINES (4 more than necessary, 6 more than a followon airframe would require). The B-2 is a showboat platform with asset values approaching that of a carrier. Drop two, retire one to hangar queen status and throw money at a B-3 JASSM carrier based on COTS technologies as much as possible.
>>
However a head to head conflict with North Korea, Iran or even China would require super high end aircraft, like the F-22. The super hornet and possibly even the JSF will have a hard time in a high tech conflict like this.
>>
The Ultra Bug is a splat on the windshield of any truly sophisticated threatfor if it doesn't have massive improvements in weaponization. Specifically a longrange AAM in the 100-150nm category and a standoff munition of equal legs plus a high-density ARM (it may well be that an AAM could perform the same role). Yet for all this, my problem with the Super Horror is that there are simply not enough of them building or Lotted out (4 if not 5) to provide a level aged and uniformly capable squadron force. Right now, we are looking at Echoes being used as fighter tankers to drag along Charlies and so losing BOTH the baseline and the secondary force (only two pylons today) capabilities. And if/when the JSF comes aboard, that will mean THREE tails worth of nominally the same attack mission, NONE of which has the legs, signature or systems support to leverage each other over any From The Sea, Forward radii (400nm inland and beyond).
Now a part of this is using a 50 million dollar tacair platform like a CSA rather than /buying a new CSA/. Something which is also at the root cause of the EA-6B emergency mods and the E-2D upgrades (all in penny ante numbers).
But the fact remains that the USN needs to move towards a UCAV force and it needs to have a significant percentage of Lot II F/A-18F when they come aboard, not only because that will mean fewer total tails. But also because the missionized rear cockpit and APG-79 are both elemental to controlling UCAVs in high densities while hauling a three-tank configuraiton which limits own-loads and agility in trade for radius.
The JSF should have been a common airframe with the USAF model, period, dot. As such it could have served as a LO netcentric replacement FADF (4X AAAM class missiles) and a _limited_ (GBU-39) FDOW critical strike platform to up the DMPI count on Day 1, Raid 1.
Instead, they went the wrong direction and emphasized heavyweight JDAM and only 2 internal AMRAAM 'so that it wouldn't compete with the ATF and looked like it could replace the A-12'.
Yet to put that kind of weight behind the boat, they had to install an F-15 wing on an F-16 sized airframe which not only makes all three variants basically 'their own airplane' in terms of flight test and development costs. But utterly removes the notion of the JSF as being a single squadron replacement for the Tomcat (which makes sense) rather than an attempt to reincarnate the VAW Intruder mission.
Bluntly, this approach sucked buttermilk because John Lehman was dead on correct about ONE THING: It's better to have an all heavy attack wing (all long range, all multiple munitions carrier) than to try and divide between light and all weather attack and end up not having enough missions to cover all your basis at any but the shortest of (190nm/1:45 cycle time) ranges.
The UCAV could EASILY replace the F/A-18s AND the unfulfilled A-6/A-12 mission set. Which would mean the equivalent of 3, 20 plane, squadrons per boat and a return to the Roosevelt load in terms of sorties off the pointy end and sustainable airops with just a few squadrons, all of them fully deck crewed, in the overarching airwing composite structure.
>>
So basically the USAF needs a true high/low combat mix. With the JSF and F-22, this is a high/ultra high mix.
>>
The USAF needs to differentiate itself from the USN again. AFAICT, that can only happen via a TAV type skip bomber that has the legs of a conventional ICBM but the LO and targeting sophistication of a B-2.
Short of that, they need to realize that the best way forward _for the country_ is to amalgamize the combat air services much as they have the Training Command and the easiest way to get there, on raw dollar:dollar comparison is to either join the Super Bug community. Or share a _rapid_ (5 years, tops) development of a common UCAV. The latter, despite the diehard pilots-uber-alles communities near panic, actually has some good advantages for the blue suited monkeys.
Namely that while the USN has gained control of the airframe now that they USAF have foolishly dumped J-UCAS, it is _USAF_ netcentric command architecture which is most likely to be used via direct targeting (MQ-1), pseudolite relays (MQ-9) and overarching battlespace sorting and routing control (RQ-4 RTIP) if not a fully integrated BMC2 platform like the E-10 represented.
Under such a scenario /it doesn't matter where it comes from/ (so long as somebody is there with enough jets to do the job), so long as it plugs into the network with the best ISR and datapass (TTNT).
>>
My answer is to retire the F-117, F-15 A-D models and cancel the JSF completely. That will free up an insane amount of money. This will allow more F-22's to be built to increase the strength of the N Korea, Iran, China conflict. Possibly even 600 F-22's could be built these will perform all strike and air dominance missions. Even if half of these aircraft were in theatre the firepower they could provide in all area's would be equal to the First Gulf War, and thats with just one type of aircraft.
Then money should be spend on the "low" option. Half of the F-16's upgraded to Block 60 standard. While leave the other half stock for training and National guard. Re-engine all A-10 aircraft this upgrade may not go ahead but i think its very important. The rest of the money can go into keeping the B-52's flying and for more C-130 gunships. So for the low end conflicts we have F-16's provide air superiority and strike missions, withe A-10's, B-52's and C130's providing close air support. A very good combat mix, no F-22's would even need to be called apon.
>>
The F-16E is a new airframe under the skin, you might be able to purchase a bunch of them 'at FMS discount' from the UAE technology purchase but for purposes of continental AD, it would be a waste. I myself would stop CCIP and retire every Viper older than a 1993 tail number while 'settling for' new missiles (JCM, ADM-160B, AIM-160B, SDB) and targeting (APG-68V(10) and SNIPER all 'round) while doing my best to integrate something a little more advanced than IDM as the primary datalink. This alone should hold the line until UCAVs could start flowing in.
>>
Then the High mix, would have Air force F-22's, B-2 bombers, and Superhornets from the carriers. With 500+ F-22's and 500+ Super hornets this will elimate any potential country.
>>
Here my big question is sortie rates vs. exposure. An F-22 with decent tanking support can come from Guam or Oki and still make Korean landfall in reasonable time. A CVSF can only do the same if you either bring the decks in close (which may take days to transfer other decks into theater, even if their is no threat opposition inherent to Subs, mines, AShM and the littoral like...) or if you specifically configure them to support hose:drogue refueling.
At the same time, there is the question of threats. Inside 10 years, we WILL be seeing DEWS as hardkill systems in the U.S. Less than ten years after that, they will be globally proliferated. The question then becomes whether you want to send in truly invisible UCAVs to drop standoff munitions from 60nm away while Bugs _shoot through_ their formations.
Or if you want to do the whole 'lead sweep' nonsense with a mixed force of UCAV, F-22 and F/A-18F. Myself, we're getting to the point where we may _need_ to have very rapid response (aeroballistic cruise) options to suppress even transit/ingress threats. Which subsequently opens the door for UCAVs to come into the target area almost unopposed.
This would help resolve a lot of USN/USAF cooperative mission deficits in terms of sorties and roles (the F-22 cannot 'escort' UCAVs if it is performing a supercruise transit profile itself, it may also not be able to linger long in the combat area. Yet it's very invisibility may render it less than effective in reducing the threat air defenses, particularly if the UCAV force itself is assumed to be a followon-to-Predator force in putting a mosaic targeting (big picture made up of many small spotlight images, like shining a flashlight at your feet, along with a hundred friends) capability over the threat nation.
Obviously, 70% or more of the threats out there will not be able to deny the overhead tasking option. But in a /high intensity fight/ you can no longer guarantee that because the Chinese and Russians both are dazzling our satellites on every pass now. And particularly for a nuclear suppression mission into Norkia or Iran or PakIndi, you may not have TIME to build up a premission picture of what's out there.
>>
The F-15 eagle, F-117 and the JSF do not fit into either the high or low conflicts. Keeping multople aircraft types bloats the maintenance cost of the overall air force. If the JSF goes ahead they will still have the A-10 so they will still have two aircraft types. They could just go with the A-10 and F-16 instead for a cheaper lower end option.
>>
The A-10 is the least capable of all choices for CAS. It has no radar. Even with the TF-34 upgrade it wallows above about 17,000ft (big curving, straight, airfoil). /Some/ have AAQ-28 but none have a munition to exploit it's capabilities and the initial DSMS does _not_ include the SADL fit to bend pipe down and up from a standardized ground forces datalink architecture (whatever follows on from EPLRS). The gun is worthless because it cannot be employed safely without taking the CEP circle up to roughly 70-100ft across (/with/ the IFFC mod). There is no combat tank to extend it's radius and with the crippling altitude shortfalls, you almost need to have separate Hog and Fighter tracks to keep a decent refueling efficiency going. Finally, the A-10 doesn't transit at much more than 300-320 knots and so it is /terribly/ slow to get from just a few, central, airbases out to the border firebases. And equally slow in coming home for a combat turn.
Insofar as it goes, the JSF is a superior bomb truck to the A-10. It has weather look through, four pylons and two bay stations compatible with 1760 standard databus weapons. It has almost a third again as much gas feeding just-the-one engine. And it's EOTS will likely match or exceed the capabilities of even late model LITENING while displaying multiple 'portals' (window in window) of overlapping troop, own, offboard CAS data on large format screens.
A UCAV would be better. But the Hog was a poor design from the outset and one whose day has long since come.
>>
UCAV will be the next big break through. I dont see why they even need the JSF on the aircraft carriers as it will be used for strike only which a UCAV can do better. The Airforce could replace the B-52, B-1B and strike with a large UCAV for close air support and strike too. The JSF does not fit in, plus no one can afford it.
>>
Once the asset value goes up beyond 200 million each and the platform weight exceeds a 250,000lbs, 'you might as well' add aircrew. Even on Global Reach type missions where you are looking at 30-40hr mission times. Humans CAN do somethings in the way of monitoring and compensating for mechanical reliability shortfalls that an autopilot interface cannot achieve. One is reminded of the RQ-4 which sent a potential fire-warning indication due to a failing avionics bay cooling loop, the jet was diverted and repairs made, only to FAIL TO CHECKLIST the flight plan which had a taxi-segment listed at 155 knots. The jet tried to fly, then tried to make a 90` turn onto the active and ended up sheering the nosegear and doing major damage to the wings and forward fuselage. Such idiocies don't happen when junior jet ranger is apt to personally bleed for his stupidities.
My big question then becomes configuring the jet for a assumed rather than real assigned mission given that:
1. We will typically not risk a bomber asset unsupported in anything like a contested theater. This means that tacair, with all it's superior numbers for short radius sortie generation advantages is going to 'be there' anyway. And so stealing from their own mission options to support a bomber with 80 weapons onboard and perhaps 2hrs to expend them all doesn't make too much sense. Particularly if you are also shy on realtime targeting.
2. Without rapid response (Mach 2 or better supercruise) it's unlikely that a strategic asset is going to be able to deploy /rapidly/ enough to beat Tacair in terms of standing up a force in-theater vs. sending one from outside it (Diego) or CONUS.
3. Naval vessels are superior sources of CM, both on bought inventory. And on penny's per mile transit costs. As well as in total theater persistent presence from even relatively small (DDG or SSN type) assets.
WHAT THEN is the design mission of the bomber? Is it a secondary CM shooter to help support forces in theater or to act as a standin while the Navy gets there? If so, don't waste money trying to excessively militarize what is effectively a truck asset for a 600-800nm AGM-158B. Is it a penetrating FDOW bomber? If so, then don't size it to the point where it's asset value exceeds the capabilities that it can bring WITHOUT compromising other tacair systems. Is it a rapid reaction system to suppress nuclear threats on short notification without going to a fullup strategic response? If so then you had better settle for a 20 plane fleet of Mach 25 FOBS type aircraft and be ready to put _megabucks_ into exotic propulsion and fuels to match, never intending to come closer than half a hemisphere to your target before rod-from-god slinging variable warhead solutions at various deep and/or hardened targets.
The ultimate nature of the Force Structure decisioning comes down to defining how you want to defeat a given threat. How many of those or similar (or dissimilar) threats you want to defeat at the same time. And whether or not you can do so with single systems or if you have to pay the penalty for 'system of systems' interlinked combat doctrine which forces everyone to play together, whether they need to or not.
In this, I see the following:
350 F-22
500 F/A-18E/F (half to the Marines
1,000-1,500 A-45CN or similar _common not joint_ cheap, endurant, ISR/Strike platform. 1/3rd to the Navy, and 1/4 of the remainder on short call (JPALS and ground crew training).
20 B-2 as a residual SIOP platform while we reconfigure the missile systems of the triad to include a cheap-and-easy CICBM option.
40-50 B-3 as an interim conventional mission platform with Sonic Cruiser low end supercruise and maximum economies of engineering (ETOPS qualified civil turbofan for instance, maximum payload of 40 or so SDB or 4 + 2 AGM-158B).
150-200 AV-16 as a STOVL/ESTOL CAS jet and helo escort for the Marines.
20-50 ABL-1 or ATL derived laser platforms. 'As the next best Air Superiority Fighter is a 747!' type investment in a future that WILL BE dominated by DEWS.
Whether we can get there from here is anyone's guess. Thanks to the poor production line optimizations for instance, we are now going to be looking at roughly TEN YEARS to build another 240 jets (the original plan was 60 per year line capability). I don't want to produce at uneconomical rates. And I don't want to commit to a force structure build which doesn't arrive online until both the technical (DEWS and Hunting Weapons) and fleet inventory mean age picture has robbed us of most of the benefits that these systems were originally designed to bring, _in numbers_, almost ten years ago.
KPl.
1. We will typically not risk a bomber asset unsupported in anything like a contested theater. This means that tacair, with all it's superior numbers for short radius sortie generation advantages is going to 'be there' anyway. And so stealing from their own mission options to support a bomber with 80 weapons onboard and perhaps 2hrs to expend them all doesn't make too much sense. Particularly if you are also shy on realtime targeting.
2. Without rapid response (Mach 2 or better supercruise) it's unlikely that a strategic asset is going to be able to deploy /rapidly/ enough to beat Tacair in terms of standing up a force in-theater vs. sending one from outside it (Diego) or CONUS.
3. Naval vessels are superior sources of CM, both on bought inventory. And on penny's per mile transit costs. As well as in total theater persistent presence from even relatively small (DDG or SSN type) assets.
WHAT THEN is the design mission of the bomber? Is it a secondary CM shooter to help support forces in theater or to act as a standin while the Navy gets there? If so, don't waste money trying to excessively militarize what is effectively a truck asset for a 600-800nm AGM-158B. Is it a penetrating FDOW bomber? If so, then don't size it to the point where it's asset value exceeds the capabilities that it can bring WITHOUT compromising other tacair systems. Is it a rapid reaction system to suppress nuclear threats on short notification without going to a fullup strategic response? If so then you had better settle for a 20 plane fleet of Mach 25 FOBS type aircraft and be ready to put _megabucks_ into exotic propulsion and fuels to match, never intending to come closer than half a hemisphere to your target before rod-from-god slinging variable warhead solutions at various deep and/or hardened targets.
The ultimate nature of the Force Structure decisioning comes down to defining how you want to defeat a given threat. How many of those or similar (or dissimilar) threats you want to defeat at the same time. And whether or not you can do so with single systems or if you have to pay the penalty for 'system of systems' interlinked combat doctrine which forces everyone to play together, whether they need to or not.
In this, I see the following:
350 F-22
500 F/A-18E/F (half to the Marines
1,000-1,500 A-45CN or similar _common not joint_ cheap, endurant, ISR/Strike platform. 1/3rd to the Navy, and 1/4 of the remainder on short call (JPALS and ground crew training).
20 B-2 as a residual SIOP platform while we reconfigure the missile systems of the triad to include a cheap-and-easy CICBM option.
40-50 B-3 as an interim conventional mission platform with Sonic Cruiser low end supercruise and maximum economies of engineering (ETOPS qualified civil turbofan for instance, maximum payload of 40 or so SDB or 4 + 2 AGM-158B).
150-200 AV-16 as a STOVL/ESTOL CAS jet and helo escort for the Marines.
20-50 ABL-1 or ATL derived laser platforms. 'As the next best Air Superiority Fighter is a 747!' type investment in a future that WILL BE dominated by DEWS.
Whether we can get there from here is anyone's guess. Thanks to the poor production line optimizations for instance, we are now going to be looking at roughly TEN YEARS to build another 240 jets (the original plan was 60 per year line capability). I don't want to produce at uneconomical rates. And I don't want to commit to a force structure build which doesn't arrive online until both the technical (DEWS and Hunting Weapons) and fleet inventory mean age picture has robbed us of most of the benefits that these systems were originally designed to bring, _in numbers_, almost ten years ago.
KPl.
Let's Look at This...
Plummer makes some excellent points, but we also need to look at some data from other forums as well: for instance, the Hornet seems to have its own set of SERIOUS problems, and the "Super Horror" does NOT seem to be the solution! This may at least partly explain the seeming FRANTIC rush to procure and deploy the JSF, even though there are SERIOUS doubts that it will be able to solve the problems, either...<:-(>
Probably the most pointed of the comments I have seen on this subject regards the "1 nation, 3 kings" issue. Folks, NO one will EVER get a handle on the cost and capability problems unless you can bang politicians' and military brass' heads together to look at the entire "roles and missions" issue! Might I humbly suggest that, in the current technolgical environment, anything like the JSF simply MUST all have the ability to operate off carriers, whether the aircraft has "USN", "USMC" or "USAF" stamped on the side! For many years, I have been struck by the conundrum that "tactical" aircraft and their crews have different aircraft and training regimes for both Air Force and Navy, and this soaks up defense $$$ unnecessarily. First, all "tactical" aircraft pilots should be trained to US Navy standards, so that they can be tasked and deployed to either land or sea, and their aircraft should be designed accordingly, with the sort of folding wings and beefed up landing gear (for carrier storage and landing) that will permit such "either-or" operations. I will make a RADICAL suggestion, here: redefine the missions so that if it floats, it's Navy, if it flys, it's Air Force, if it's rapid deployment, it's Marine Corps! That way, you only have, at most, 2 "air kings" rather than 3 and they all use the same aircraft. You will note that this will save both procurement and maintenance (spare parts) $$$ by the bushel!
I perceive possible problems with UCAV: they either must be capable of acting WITHOUT human beings "in the loop" (i.e.: we are talking about ultra-expensive, artificially intelligent ROBOTIC vehicles!), with all the hazards about "collateral damage" and attacking civilians or our own military by mistake and risk the robots taking over ("Gort, Klatoo barada nikto."); otherwise, we must have remotely crewed vehicles, with human crew members controlling the UCAV from a distance, by wireless datalink. We have already mentioned the problems with Robot UCAVs: EXTREME expense and making sure they can do all that a human could, but without "taking over" from "higher" human command authorities. Remote crewing of UCAV raises issues of secure, wireless, data communication, probably in a heavy electronic countermeasures environment: if the enemy can jam your communications to and from the UCAV, the jig is up!:vamp
Another EXTREMELY important issue which was mentioned, even if only obliquely, is the problem of FUEL! Large, and long ranged "bomb trucks" for CAS (BUFF, Lancer, Spirit, modified Jumbo Jet) and VTOL tactical aircraft (AV-8B, Marine JSF) all suck up ENORMOUS amounts of petroleum and EXTREMELY quickly! Aerial refueling only "transfers" the problem, it does NOT solve it! If one could find a more economical way of performing VTOL, ALL aircraft could be VTOL and that would solve a lot of other problems: only ONE set of aircraft, rather than even two...procurement and spare parts $aving$ galore!
Interestingly enough, this may be FAR more possible than even UCAV with artificial intelligence: electrogravitics was demonstrated (admittedly, on a small scale: a 6 pound "demonstration" device which hovered above the test bench) as long ago as 1991-1992. A VTOL vehicle powered by electrogravitic thrusters, drawing its electricity from one or more quantum energy transducers (another relatively new development, see US Patent # 6,362,718 B1, granted on 26 Mar 2002; see also http://www.cheniere.org) would have effectively unlimited range and any speed which the airframe could stand, from hovering to hypersonic and any altitude from landed (or even underwater) to outer space! Inasmuch as electrical energy could be drawn from the quantum vacuum in MASSIVE quantities (into the TERAWATTS from a single transducer!), this will, probably within 5 to 10 years, completely revolutionize aircraft capabilities and designs. It could also revolutionize ship designs and, essentially, allow the merger of the two: consider a flying "bomb truck" the size of a nuclear "super carrier" and with equivalent (though different) weapons carriage and "loiter time" limited only by the amount of "consumables" (food, water, life support oxygen, expendable weapons and ammunition) aboard. Fuel would not be a problem, because it would be pure, clean, electrical power, continuously drawn from the quantum vacuum for as long as the electrical parts of the transducers do not wear out. It could also be able to fly from America to anywhere on the planet in low earth orbit at hypersonic speeds, and "re-entry" would not be a problem, either: you just use the electrogravitic thrusters to slow the vehicle to "hover" at orbital altitude and let it slowly "sink" back into the atmosphere over the desired target or landing point on Earth!
Now THAT will be a REVOLUTION in aerospace power!
Plummer makes some excellent points, but we also need to look at some data from other forums as well: for instance, the Hornet seems to have its own set of SERIOUS problems, and the "Super Horror" does NOT seem to be the solution! This may at least partly explain the seeming FRANTIC rush to procure and deploy the JSF, even though there are SERIOUS doubts that it will be able to solve the problems, either...<:-(>
Probably the most pointed of the comments I have seen on this subject regards the "1 nation, 3 kings" issue. Folks, NO one will EVER get a handle on the cost and capability problems unless you can bang politicians' and military brass' heads together to look at the entire "roles and missions" issue! Might I humbly suggest that, in the current technolgical environment, anything like the JSF simply MUST all have the ability to operate off carriers, whether the aircraft has "USN", "USMC" or "USAF" stamped on the side! For many years, I have been struck by the conundrum that "tactical" aircraft and their crews have different aircraft and training regimes for both Air Force and Navy, and this soaks up defense $$$ unnecessarily. First, all "tactical" aircraft pilots should be trained to US Navy standards, so that they can be tasked and deployed to either land or sea, and their aircraft should be designed accordingly, with the sort of folding wings and beefed up landing gear (for carrier storage and landing) that will permit such "either-or" operations. I will make a RADICAL suggestion, here: redefine the missions so that if it floats, it's Navy, if it flys, it's Air Force, if it's rapid deployment, it's Marine Corps! That way, you only have, at most, 2 "air kings" rather than 3 and they all use the same aircraft. You will note that this will save both procurement and maintenance (spare parts) $$$ by the bushel!
I perceive possible problems with UCAV: they either must be capable of acting WITHOUT human beings "in the loop" (i.e.: we are talking about ultra-expensive, artificially intelligent ROBOTIC vehicles!), with all the hazards about "collateral damage" and attacking civilians or our own military by mistake and risk the robots taking over ("Gort, Klatoo barada nikto."); otherwise, we must have remotely crewed vehicles, with human crew members controlling the UCAV from a distance, by wireless datalink. We have already mentioned the problems with Robot UCAVs: EXTREME expense and making sure they can do all that a human could, but without "taking over" from "higher" human command authorities. Remote crewing of UCAV raises issues of secure, wireless, data communication, probably in a heavy electronic countermeasures environment: if the enemy can jam your communications to and from the UCAV, the jig is up!:vamp
Another EXTREMELY important issue which was mentioned, even if only obliquely, is the problem of FUEL! Large, and long ranged "bomb trucks" for CAS (BUFF, Lancer, Spirit, modified Jumbo Jet) and VTOL tactical aircraft (AV-8B, Marine JSF) all suck up ENORMOUS amounts of petroleum and EXTREMELY quickly! Aerial refueling only "transfers" the problem
, it does NOT solve it! If one could find a more economical way of performing VTOL, ALL aircraft could be VTOL and that would solve a lot of other problems: only ONE set of aircraft, rather than even two...procurement and spare parts $aving$ galore!Interestingly enough, this may be FAR more possible than even UCAV with artificial intelligence: electrogravitics was demonstrated (admittedly, on a small scale: a 6 pound "demonstration" device which hovered above the test bench) as long ago as 1991-1992. A VTOL vehicle powered by electrogravitic thrusters, drawing its electricity from one or more quantum energy transducers (another relatively new development, see US Patent # 6,362,718 B1, granted on 26 Mar 2002; see also http://www.cheniere.org) would have effectively unlimited range and any speed which the airframe could stand, from hovering to hypersonic and any altitude from landed (or even underwater) to outer space! Inasmuch as electrical energy could be drawn from the quantum vacuum in MASSIVE quantities (into the TERAWATTS from a single transducer!), this will, probably within 5 to 10 years, completely revolutionize aircraft capabilities and designs. It could also revolutionize ship designs and, essentially, allow the merger of the two: consider a flying "bomb truck" the size of a nuclear "super carrier" and with equivalent (though different) weapons carriage and "loiter time" limited only by the amount of "consumables" (food, water, life support oxygen, expendable weapons and ammunition) aboard. Fuel would not be a problem, because it would be pure, clean, electrical power, continuously drawn from the quantum vacuum for as long as the electrical parts of the transducers do not wear out. It could also be able to fly from America to anywhere on the planet in low earth orbit at hypersonic speeds, and "re-entry" would not be a problem, either: you just use the electrogravitic thrusters to slow the vehicle to "hover" at orbital altitude and let it slowly "sink" back into the atmosphere over the desired target or landing point on Earth!
Now THAT will be a REVOLUTION in aerospace power!
BE,
>>
Plummer makes some excellent points, but we also need to look at some data from other forums as well: for instance, the Hornet seems to have its own set of SERIOUS problems, and the "Super Horror" does NOT seem to be the solution! This may at least partly explain the seeming FRANTIC rush to procure and deploy the JSF, even though there are SERIOUS doubts that it will be able to solve the problems, either...<:-(>
>>
The USN is going to buy 170 F-35C. The USMC is going to buy 240 F-35B. News of these drastic cuts (in 2001 airpower planning documents agreed on by the DCNO Air and Marine Corps equivalent) from the services originally 'in dire need of a 21st century airpower VLO facelift' have left the USAF, which itself has wanted to decrease it's buy to between 1,100 and 1,200 F-35A high centered on a industrial consortia problem whereby foreign customers have had their purchase levels guaranteed at around 48-58 million each. And the USAF is now the 'pillar customer' around which those numbers are based.
Meanwhile, the USN Admiral in charge of the program has _specifically stated_ that the JSF numbers hit a steep incline at anything under 1,600 jets. This from an original order for roughly 3,000 aircraft _for our services alone_.
i.e. The JSF is not anything but a political pork animal now. And Americans should not be forced to buy what even the user services don't want, simply so that _fewer_ foreign purchases can be had 'buy' our Allies than the numbers originally foreseen for home use. That this is ALSO coming at a programmatic cost increase from 191 billion dollars to 276 billion dollars is what takes this to felony levels of RICO act conspiracy (CBO was predicting massive technology instability in key areas of propulsion, composites and reliability/maintainability as early as 1997) and Anti Deficiency Act fraud.
For which, people should go to jail. From Congress, from each of the Air Services and from the Contractor and DOD.
We DO NOT NEED heavy weight munitions carriers 'as fighters' in an era of small wars and lightweight standoff munitions. The entire methodology by which you target that which you can see (fixed, structural, targets) has FOREVER CHANGED with the advent of netcentric warfare and miniature PGMs as well as long range offboard targeting.
Such is the fundamental basis by which the Just So Bleeped's existence must first be measured. THEN we can apply the loiter and DCO variables for truly persistent airpower to whatever follows on.
>>
Probably the most pointed of the comments I have seen on this subject regards the "1 nation, 3 kings" issue. Folks, NO one will EVER get a handle on the cost and capability problems unless you can bang politicians' and military brass' heads together to look at the entire "roles and missions" issue! Might I humbly suggest that, in the current technolgical environment, anything like the JSF simply MUST all have the ability to operate off carriers, whether the aircraft has "USN", "USMC" or "USAF" stamped on the side! For many years, I have been struck by the conundrum that "tactical" aircraft and their crews have different aircraft and training regimes for both Air Force and Navy, and this soaks up defense $$$ unnecessarily.
>>
I agree to the extent that I think a common airframe is necessary. I do not believe that configuring it as a 'fighter' is going to be possible while controlling costs and maintaining the most critical elements of performance. The USN JSF is the heaviest of all the variants. Only a part of this is the enlarged airfoil. Where wait equates directly to cost, you suffer /tremendously/ when you attempt to add mission systems and performance capabilities secondary to ONE primary role. Multimissioning a given platform made some sense when you were forced to go toe to toe with the Kodiak in the coat closet that was NATO Europe. Now, the combination of LO engineering and standoff munitions/sensors makes this very much a questionable talent. PARTICULARLY since air to air combat is one BVR with seldom more the 3-4G put on the airframe and at this, a drone can play the 'my other weapons by has...' game as well as any manned asset for the relatively unlikely eventuality of encountering another aircraft or SAM site which needs a powered weapon kill (speed vs. speed).
>>
First, all "tactical" aircraft pilots should be trained to US Navy standards, so that they can be tasked and deployed to either land or sea, and their aircraft should be designed accordingly, with the sort of folding wings and beefed up landing gear (for carrier storage and landing) that will permit such "either-or" operations.
>>
I don't know about carqualling. I do believe that we should greatly increase the reliance on redundant, automated, landing systems like JPALS (Joint Precision Approach Landing System) which is effectively differential GPS with the carrier acting as a pseudolite. Accuracies are down to within a few inches now and reliability is vastly better than the 'moving calibration problem' ACLS of years gone by.
The real question then becomes: If Naviators don't do /anything else unique/ (i.e. no dive bomber/torpedo bomber specialties) why is it that we continue to demand the specialization of a MANNED airframe coming aboard at all?
Further to this, let me say that the USN runs a really tight combined arms package drill with multiple 'come as you are' organic systems which are just not found elsewhere: network Tacjam, AEW&C and Tanking. And they practice like mad in the final 2-3 months before leaving on cruise out at Fallon to make it all work together in the overland power projection joint ops. i.e. THEY ARE a joint mission force, all the time.
BUT.
About 1-2 months into a long cruise, they start to suffer from what is quaintly known as the 'bathtub effect' wherein they start to lose tactical competencies even as they become really really good at behind-the-boat stuff. Unfortunately, coming aboard is worth all of nothing when it comes to winning a war and so coming home all wrinkled from months spent out at sea is not as great a sounding thing as you might guess. Particularly since the initial efforts to carqual for each cruise are themselves so rigorous and time consuming.
Indeed, many consider this to be a 'third role' beyond A2A and A2G basic mission divisions.
Compare this to USAF standards in which 20 hours PER MISSION, per month are considered the absolute minimum to retain tactical skills at more than a check-the-box level. And so you are often 'swinging' from role to role every 30 days in terms of currency in a multi mission environment. And add another role. Are you now going to be tripling your already ops-account stretched training hours to accomodate naviator training?
>>
I will make a RADICAL suggestion, here: redefine the missions so that if it floats, it's Navy, if it flys, it's Air Force, if it's rapid deployment, it's Marine Corps! That way, you only have, at most, 2 "air kings" rather than 3 and they all use the same aircraft. You will note that this will save both procurement and maintenance (spare parts) $$$ by the bushel!
>>
All' I want is a system that is as cheap as possible as capable as possible and as PRESENT as possible so that, no matter where something goes to hell at, I can bring a winning fight to end the battle before it becomes a war. Not in 1 month (September 11 -> October 10). Not in three months (Sept 11 December 20th). But RIGHT NOW.
The USN pretends with their urgent-sortie program to never have so many carriers ported or otherwise commited as to be gapped in critical areas. The even ran the 'legendary' seven carrier photex a little while back. But it's a hollow force and they will not be able to sustain the ops funding for readiness after we run howling from Iraq. Nor the deployment cycles and retention rates in the morale bottoming out that is also certain to come.
>>
I perceive possible problems with UCAV: they either must be capable of acting WITHOUT human beings "in the loop" (i.e.: we are talking about ultra-expensive, artificially intelligent ROBOTIC vehicles!),
>>
Nonsense. Take off, fly to X fence-in, unmoat the weapons system, accept commands for a given patrol interval, fly to Y (exit corridor for the battlespace) for delousing. Come home. Take stacking commands for the marshall. Relay systems report for greenshirt repair, refill, rearm process. Land at cue time in Marshall.
Admittedly SOME expert system level capabilities to prevent the 155 knot taxi condition idiocy might be 'rather nice' as a conservative self minding (housekeeping) approach to common sense. But this is far from a Terminator level capability and indeed, already largely extant in systems like cruise missiles. No true autonomous reasoning capablity is necessary at all.
>>
...with all the hazards about "collateral damage" and attacking civilians or our own military by mistake and risk the robots taking over ("Gort, Klatoo barada nikto."); otherwise, we must have remotely crewed vehicles, with human crew members controlling the UCAV from a distance, by wireless datalink.
>>
Go outside, look up. Now lower your eyeline to the horizon. If you could pick any one direction to fly off to, do you think you could leave the atmosphere before hitting an obstacle? Comparitively, how far could you walk, blindfolded, before coming to some misfortune?
Such is the basic simplicity of aircraft navigation compared to terrestrial equivalents in that _you just don't need to know_ that much about your environment and it's ontologic integration when flying.
Such tends to limit the potential for robots taking over or being misused.
OTOH, when you drop a bomb there are about three ways to make it happen:
1. Take a prebriefed aimpoint or offset from a mission plan and 'match cursors to zero drift' until the point the bomb starts at agrees with the satellite or otherwise surveyed aimpoint. And the weapon follows the shortest course to get there. In this, again, a UCAV is little more than a cruise missile with a return address (landing gear and separable sub warheads).
2. Have someone on the ground call for the strike. Here things tend to get a bit more complicated, simply because junior is not always altogether sure where he is, where the enemy is and certainly what conditions you have to have to put your ordnance on the bad guy and not him. Particularly if he is trying to hide his 6ft, 170lb frame behind a two foot rock as bullets go whizzing by.
Of particular concern is the ability to designate a given coordinate reference that is more accurate than a map grid but not apt to invite equivalent (intelligent mortar or RCL) counterfire onto the friendlies if the net is exploited.
But there are multiple technology solutions to this problem as well. The ROVER terminal is effectively a small laptop system which lets the ground trooper see an overhead equivalent to what the (A-10 or F-14/18 with LITENING pod and datalink relay) does. Gods Eye gives you an ability to see things from a little less urgent perspective as you sort the glowing white-hot dots against a background you can slope-and-structure recognize. Not least of which sheep-from-goats localization being possible because you can ring the good guys with an exclusion marker while (for the first time) SEEING the mortar position on the reverse slope 2 clicks up the ridgeline. Equally important, you can use /offset/ references (target is 200 yards from the big round rock 1,000 yds over thataway) to work the eyes on for both pilot and drone controller without just saying you are in that big black gully next to the crossroads.
Lastly, you typically will have someone 'looking through' the same optics set and monitoring the same radio net (albeit through a relay or ABCCC system of some kind). And so if something looks henky, they can override the weapons release consents.
Most important to this scenario is the notion of corporate intelligence. Because the drone is _Right There_ when the fighting develops, it may well see the enemy moving into position early. And will certainly give the operator a firm understanding of the progress and course of the engagement from the very start (because this is 'his' ground combat team being gunned).
3. Self Hunting.
This comes as close as you are likely to get to being an HK autonomous level killing machine. And yet it isn't. Because basically what the machine is doing is taking constant scans of given areas, looking for thermal or radar signatures which betray human presence, comparing those signatures to a given database and deciding whether or not to mark and store them for a data dump every 10-20 minutes. Or to pass them on immediately to a combat controller who may be a 1,000 miles away, running 10-20 drones off the same console.
Now, in this case, YES, there is some definite ATC/ATR 'intelligence' going on. But only to the extent that the machine is saving the human from having to manually issue magnification and clarification commands. Such a capability to mark targets for later analysis and tasking has been an essential part of RSO duties since the mid 60's when we were doing it on Phantoms and Viggies at least. It's just that now we have the mass video memory, clipping and compression routines (think super-JPEG) and AI geometry/contrast intensity software to automate the process. While of course some areas around specific high-activity locations or traffic arteries can also be designated for immediate handoff, no matter what. The last obstacle to the problem is quite simply datarates. An X-band datalink which uses more or less the same channels as an AESA radar can transmit 70 megabyte radar maps in about 3 seconds. But the cost of having that kind of system SOLELY configured as a directional microwave commo system is one of the driving cost modifiers for UCAVs which require it as a unique system capability not related to manned equivalents.
>>
We have already mentioned the problems with Robot UCAVs: EXTREME expense and making sure they can do all that a human could, but without "taking over" from "higher" human command authorities.
>>
Bahhh, most experts still peg a decent, bomb truck in the 10-15 million dollar range. Indeed, THAT was the cost that Congress specified when they said they wanted TWO THIRDS of our deep strike to be unmanned by 2010.
And the only thing that 'taking over from higher authority' means is that you no longer have an officer rank conspiracy between those who give orders and those who pull triggers. Corporals have flown the Hunter, with weapons onboard, for the Army.
The UCAV takes this a step further in that _it flies itself_ on little more than an autopilot plus orbit/swath/retrace set of preplanned waypoint geometries (move mouse, select plan B type GUI interface with the desired outcome shown on a digital terrain map adjacent to or over the target of interest).
Which means that 90% of the 'gentleman' classes are now obsolete as an element of top-down warfighter COST of salary. And political insularism from their only nominal civillian masters.
I'm not saying it's not a serious problem inherent to the existing hierarchy (a general may command men, a private can fly a UCAV) but such is hardly a legitimate concern as a _technical_ issue.
>>
Remote crewing of UCAV raises issues of secure, wireless, data communication, probably in a heavy electronic countermeasures environment: if the enemy can jam your communications to and from the UCAV, the jig is up!:vamp
>>
>>
Plummer makes some excellent points, but we also need to look at some data from other forums as well: for instance, the Hornet seems to have its own set of SERIOUS problems, and the "Super Horror" does NOT seem to be the solution! This may at least partly explain the seeming FRANTIC rush to procure and deploy the JSF, even though there are SERIOUS doubts that it will be able to solve the problems, either...<:-(>
>>
The USN is going to buy 170 F-35C. The USMC is going to buy 240 F-35B. News of these drastic cuts (in 2001 airpower planning documents agreed on by the DCNO Air and Marine Corps equivalent) from the services originally 'in dire need of a 21st century airpower VLO facelift' have left the USAF, which itself has wanted to decrease it's buy to between 1,100 and 1,200 F-35A high centered on a industrial consortia problem whereby foreign customers have had their purchase levels guaranteed at around 48-58 million each. And the USAF is now the 'pillar customer' around which those numbers are based.
Meanwhile, the USN Admiral in charge of the program has _specifically stated_ that the JSF numbers hit a steep incline at anything under 1,600 jets. This from an original order for roughly 3,000 aircraft _for our services alone_.
i.e. The JSF is not anything but a political pork animal now. And Americans should not be forced to buy what even the user services don't want, simply so that _fewer_ foreign purchases can be had 'buy' our Allies than the numbers originally foreseen for home use. That this is ALSO coming at a programmatic cost increase from 191 billion dollars to 276 billion dollars is what takes this to felony levels of RICO act conspiracy (CBO was predicting massive technology instability in key areas of propulsion, composites and reliability/maintainability as early as 1997) and Anti Deficiency Act fraud.
For which, people should go to jail. From Congress, from each of the Air Services and from the Contractor and DOD.
We DO NOT NEED heavy weight munitions carriers 'as fighters' in an era of small wars and lightweight standoff munitions. The entire methodology by which you target that which you can see (fixed, structural, targets) has FOREVER CHANGED with the advent of netcentric warfare and miniature PGMs as well as long range offboard targeting.
Such is the fundamental basis by which the Just So Bleeped's existence must first be measured. THEN we can apply the loiter and DCO variables for truly persistent airpower to whatever follows on.
>>
Probably the most pointed of the comments I have seen on this subject regards the "1 nation, 3 kings" issue. Folks, NO one will EVER get a handle on the cost and capability problems unless you can bang politicians' and military brass' heads together to look at the entire "roles and missions" issue! Might I humbly suggest that, in the current technolgical environment, anything like the JSF simply MUST all have the ability to operate off carriers, whether the aircraft has "USN", "USMC" or "USAF" stamped on the side! For many years, I have been struck by the conundrum that "tactical" aircraft and their crews have different aircraft and training regimes for both Air Force and Navy, and this soaks up defense $$$ unnecessarily.
>>
I agree to the extent that I think a common airframe is necessary. I do not believe that configuring it as a 'fighter' is going to be possible while controlling costs and maintaining the most critical elements of performance. The USN JSF is the heaviest of all the variants. Only a part of this is the enlarged airfoil. Where wait equates directly to cost, you suffer /tremendously/ when you attempt to add mission systems and performance capabilities secondary to ONE primary role. Multimissioning a given platform made some sense when you were forced to go toe to toe with the Kodiak in the coat closet that was NATO Europe. Now, the combination of LO engineering and standoff munitions/sensors makes this very much a questionable talent. PARTICULARLY since air to air combat is one BVR with seldom more the 3-4G put on the airframe and at this, a drone can play the 'my other weapons by has...' game as well as any manned asset for the relatively unlikely eventuality of encountering another aircraft or SAM site which needs a powered weapon kill (speed vs. speed).
>>
First, all "tactical" aircraft pilots should be trained to US Navy standards, so that they can be tasked and deployed to either land or sea, and their aircraft should be designed accordingly, with the sort of folding wings and beefed up landing gear (for carrier storage and landing) that will permit such "either-or" operations.
>>
I don't know about carqualling. I do believe that we should greatly increase the reliance on redundant, automated, landing systems like JPALS (Joint Precision Approach Landing System) which is effectively differential GPS with the carrier acting as a pseudolite. Accuracies are down to within a few inches now and reliability is vastly better than the 'moving calibration problem' ACLS of years gone by.
The real question then becomes: If Naviators don't do /anything else unique/ (i.e. no dive bomber/torpedo bomber specialties) why is it that we continue to demand the specialization of a MANNED airframe coming aboard at all?
Further to this, let me say that the USN runs a really tight combined arms package drill with multiple 'come as you are' organic systems which are just not found elsewhere: network Tacjam, AEW&C and Tanking. And they practice like mad in the final 2-3 months before leaving on cruise out at Fallon to make it all work together in the overland power projection joint ops. i.e. THEY ARE a joint mission force, all the time.
BUT.
About 1-2 months into a long cruise, they start to suffer from what is quaintly known as the 'bathtub effect' wherein they start to lose tactical competencies even as they become really really good at behind-the-boat stuff. Unfortunately, coming aboard is worth all of nothing when it comes to winning a war and so coming home all wrinkled from months spent out at sea is not as great a sounding thing as you might guess. Particularly since the initial efforts to carqual for each cruise are themselves so rigorous and time consuming.
Indeed, many consider this to be a 'third role' beyond A2A and A2G basic mission divisions.
Compare this to USAF standards in which 20 hours PER MISSION, per month are considered the absolute minimum to retain tactical skills at more than a check-the-box level. And so you are often 'swinging' from role to role every 30 days in terms of currency in a multi mission environment. And add another role. Are you now going to be tripling your already ops-account stretched training hours to accomodate naviator training?
>>
I will make a RADICAL suggestion, here: redefine the missions so that if it floats, it's Navy, if it flys, it's Air Force, if it's rapid deployment, it's Marine Corps! That way, you only have, at most, 2 "air kings" rather than 3 and they all use the same aircraft. You will note that this will save both procurement and maintenance (spare parts) $$$ by the bushel!
>>
All' I want is a system that is as cheap as possible as capable as possible and as PRESENT as possible so that, no matter where something goes to hell at, I can bring a winning fight to end the battle before it becomes a war. Not in 1 month (September 11 -> October 10). Not in three months (Sept 11 December 20th). But RIGHT NOW.
The USN pretends with their urgent-sortie program to never have so many carriers ported or otherwise commited as to be gapped in critical areas. The even ran the 'legendary' seven carrier photex a little while back. But it's a hollow force and they will not be able to sustain the ops funding for readiness after we run howling from Iraq. Nor the deployment cycles and retention rates in the morale bottoming out that is also certain to come.
>>
I perceive possible problems with UCAV: they either must be capable of acting WITHOUT human beings "in the loop" (i.e.: we are talking about ultra-expensive, artificially intelligent ROBOTIC vehicles!),
>>
Nonsense. Take off, fly to X fence-in, unmoat the weapons system, accept commands for a given patrol interval, fly to Y (exit corridor for the battlespace) for delousing. Come home. Take stacking commands for the marshall. Relay systems report for greenshirt repair, refill, rearm process. Land at cue time in Marshall.
Admittedly SOME expert system level capabilities to prevent the 155 knot taxi condition idiocy might be 'rather nice' as a conservative self minding (housekeeping) approach to common sense. But this is far from a Terminator level capability and indeed, already largely extant in systems like cruise missiles. No true autonomous reasoning capablity is necessary at all.
>>
...with all the hazards about "collateral damage" and attacking civilians or our own military by mistake and risk the robots taking over ("Gort, Klatoo barada nikto."); otherwise, we must have remotely crewed vehicles, with human crew members controlling the UCAV from a distance, by wireless datalink.
>>
Go outside, look up. Now lower your eyeline to the horizon. If you could pick any one direction to fly off to, do you think you could leave the atmosphere before hitting an obstacle? Comparitively, how far could you walk, blindfolded, before coming to some misfortune?
Such is the basic simplicity of aircraft navigation compared to terrestrial equivalents in that _you just don't need to know_ that much about your environment and it's ontologic integration when flying.
Such tends to limit the potential for robots taking over or being misused.
OTOH, when you drop a bomb there are about three ways to make it happen:
1. Take a prebriefed aimpoint or offset from a mission plan and 'match cursors to zero drift' until the point the bomb starts at agrees with the satellite or otherwise surveyed aimpoint. And the weapon follows the shortest course to get there. In this, again, a UCAV is little more than a cruise missile with a return address (landing gear and separable sub warheads).
2. Have someone on the ground call for the strike. Here things tend to get a bit more complicated, simply because junior is not always altogether sure where he is, where the enemy is and certainly what conditions you have to have to put your ordnance on the bad guy and not him. Particularly if he is trying to hide his 6ft, 170lb frame behind a two foot rock as bullets go whizzing by.
Of particular concern is the ability to designate a given coordinate reference that is more accurate than a map grid but not apt to invite equivalent (intelligent mortar or RCL) counterfire onto the friendlies if the net is exploited.
But there are multiple technology solutions to this problem as well. The ROVER terminal is effectively a small laptop system which lets the ground trooper see an overhead equivalent to what the (A-10 or F-14/18 with LITENING pod and datalink relay) does. Gods Eye gives you an ability to see things from a little less urgent perspective as you sort the glowing white-hot dots against a background you can slope-and-structure recognize. Not least of which sheep-from-goats localization being possible because you can ring the good guys with an exclusion marker while (for the first time) SEEING the mortar position on the reverse slope 2 clicks up the ridgeline. Equally important, you can use /offset/ references (target is 200 yards from the big round rock 1,000 yds over thataway) to work the eyes on for both pilot and drone controller without just saying you are in that big black gully next to the crossroads.
Lastly, you typically will have someone 'looking through' the same optics set and monitoring the same radio net (albeit through a relay or ABCCC system of some kind). And so if something looks henky, they can override the weapons release consents.
Most important to this scenario is the notion of corporate intelligence. Because the drone is _Right There_ when the fighting develops, it may well see the enemy moving into position early. And will certainly give the operator a firm understanding of the progress and course of the engagement from the very start (because this is 'his' ground combat team being gunned).
3. Self Hunting.
This comes as close as you are likely to get to being an HK autonomous level killing machine. And yet it isn't. Because basically what the machine is doing is taking constant scans of given areas, looking for thermal or radar signatures which betray human presence, comparing those signatures to a given database and deciding whether or not to mark and store them for a data dump every 10-20 minutes. Or to pass them on immediately to a combat controller who may be a 1,000 miles away, running 10-20 drones off the same console.
Now, in this case, YES, there is some definite ATC/ATR 'intelligence' going on. But only to the extent that the machine is saving the human from having to manually issue magnification and clarification commands. Such a capability to mark targets for later analysis and tasking has been an essential part of RSO duties since the mid 60's when we were doing it on Phantoms and Viggies at least. It's just that now we have the mass video memory, clipping and compression routines (think super-JPEG) and AI geometry/contrast intensity software to automate the process. While of course some areas around specific high-activity locations or traffic arteries can also be designated for immediate handoff, no matter what. The last obstacle to the problem is quite simply datarates. An X-band datalink which uses more or less the same channels as an AESA radar can transmit 70 megabyte radar maps in about 3 seconds. But the cost of having that kind of system SOLELY configured as a directional microwave commo system is one of the driving cost modifiers for UCAVs which require it as a unique system capability not related to manned equivalents.
>>
We have already mentioned the problems with Robot UCAVs: EXTREME expense and making sure they can do all that a human could, but without "taking over" from "higher" human command authorities.
>>
Bahhh, most experts still peg a decent, bomb truck in the 10-15 million dollar range. Indeed, THAT was the cost that Congress specified when they said they wanted TWO THIRDS of our deep strike to be unmanned by 2010.
And the only thing that 'taking over from higher authority' means is that you no longer have an officer rank conspiracy between those who give orders and those who pull triggers. Corporals have flown the Hunter, with weapons onboard, for the Army.
The UCAV takes this a step further in that _it flies itself_ on little more than an autopilot plus orbit/swath/retrace set of preplanned waypoint geometries (move mouse, select plan B type GUI interface with the desired outcome shown on a digital terrain map adjacent to or over the target of interest).
Which means that 90% of the 'gentleman' classes are now obsolete as an element of top-down warfighter COST of salary. And political insularism from their only nominal civillian masters.
I'm not saying it's not a serious problem inherent to the existing hierarchy (a general may command men, a private can fly a UCAV) but such is hardly a legitimate concern as a _technical_ issue.
>>
Remote crewing of UCAV raises issues of secure, wireless, data communication, probably in a heavy electronic countermeasures environment: if the enemy can jam your communications to and from the UCAV, the jig is up!:vamp
>>
A production X-45 would have carried between 10 and 12,000lbs of fuel to gain it's 1,200nm + 2hr capability. By comparison, both the F-35A and C have roughly 700nm 'in and out' radius capabilities. While carrying almost 20,000lbs of internal fuel.
Most people don't believe it but the typical fighter is actually /quite the pig/ under cruise conditions, particularly at altitude. Any airliner or even bizjet will fly rings around them for sustained Ps and particularly range point SFC performance at any given _military_ equivalent thrust level. Just ask an F-15E jockey whose had 'all of three bombs onboard' while trying to get above 25,000ft and 300 knots minimum KIAS control speed in a 220 engined jet. Suddenly watching the _1950s_ KC-135 he's approaching get a little nervous and firewall the throttles to leave him behind (heading for 35K and beyond) like an Apollo moonrocket.
This is because fighter jets are equipped with all kinds of useless items like heavy weight structure to withstand 9G+ maneuver loads with a 50% margin. ECM and Radar appropriate to tracking and trackbreaking threat aircraft over 50nm out. Twin tails of immense proportional size to maintain control at high alphas over a variety of speed ranges. Supersprint capabilities to include A/B extensions with heavy ceramic liners and gaping inlets which provide about four times the massflow they need to for a given _subsonic_ cruise point and of course the added fuel volume to feed the dragon of supersonics with. External ordnance pylons and targeting systems also add to the problem as just the sway braces alone can chop 10-15 knots per rack or pylon that is so equipped.
If you remove ALL OF THIS unnecessary tripe, and _concentrate_ on doing ONE MISSION (Strike and ISR with LO-configured=low drag sensor and weapons bay systems), your cruise efficiencies instantly doubles for the given thrust and as a function of wingloading L@D and parasitics in a typical .85-.92 Mach point standard for long range ops in all subcruise airframes.
The question then becomes what you want to do with the resulting range increase that 'has to have' a human physically onboard. The answer is actually _darn few missions_ in the 1,000nm and 10hr plus category are 'better done by man' inside the executing platform.
He can watch through it's eyes. He can take the product collection and process and exploit it. He can even pull the trigger. But he _should not_ be onboard that jet.
Since his presence is not only another unnecesary increase in airframe weight. But one which compromises the LO engineering by which it remains inconspicuous.
CONCLUSION:
I don't hold much truck with AGrav, though I believe single point theory may be workable someday, I have yet to see anyone believably explain, not so much cancellation as reversal of physical constants for active propulsion. As I recall, Tesla and Heisenberg both tried it 'way back when' and until we have a firmer handle upon the realities of time:space as a multinodal field effect, I don't think any single electromagnetic influence is apt to lead to anything like exploitable electrogravitics in a military airframe class.
In any case, I would rather start with what works NOW and halt the transition as something better comes online, than be stuck with a dated warfighter concept that is grossly inefficient and unable to properly exploit NCW technologies that ARE RIMA'ing the battlefield as we 'wait for the ultimate solution'.
Because the cost of maintaining the old Force Structure methodology is both our looming defeat in today's wars and the inability to transition (through training. logistics and ops account savings as well as base acquisition prices that are superior in robotic platforms) when that super-slick technical innovation arrives.
We are going to be financial cripples when we flee Iraq and the OPEC fiat currency status on the USD switches to Euros or even a truly free market state of shifting currencies markers.
It would behoove us NOW to start thinking about making the downsizing of the military happen in a way which should have been occuring throughout the 90's timeframe of BUR ad nauseum 'studies and recommendations' about consolidating R&M overlaps. Unfortunately, it is my opinion that the entire ONW/OSW and Deny Flight efforts happened solely for the convenience of military politics in a period when the Armed Forces agreed to agonizing full-stretch 'peacekeeping' deployments at the cost of both modernization and proper reconfiguration, SOLELY (from their perspective) to maintain a bloated command architecture of a massively oversized 'total force'.
Now it is too late as we have yet to really start a process which the ROW (including Russia and China) have been carefully executing for the better part of 15 years.
KPl.
Most people don't believe it but the typical fighter is actually /quite the pig/ under cruise conditions, particularly at altitude. Any airliner or even bizjet will fly rings around them for sustained Ps and particularly range point SFC performance at any given _military_ equivalent thrust level. Just ask an F-15E jockey whose had 'all of three bombs onboard' while trying to get above 25,000ft and 300 knots minimum KIAS control speed in a 220 engined jet. Suddenly watching the _1950s_ KC-135 he's approaching get a little nervous and firewall the throttles to leave him behind (heading for 35K and beyond) like an Apollo moonrocket.
This is because fighter jets are equipped with all kinds of useless items like heavy weight structure to withstand 9G+ maneuver loads with a 50% margin. ECM and Radar appropriate to tracking and trackbreaking threat aircraft over 50nm out. Twin tails of immense proportional size to maintain control at high alphas over a variety of speed ranges. Supersprint capabilities to include A/B extensions with heavy ceramic liners and gaping inlets which provide about four times the massflow they need to for a given _subsonic_ cruise point and of course the added fuel volume to feed the dragon of supersonics with. External ordnance pylons and targeting systems also add to the problem as just the sway braces alone can chop 10-15 knots per rack or pylon that is so equipped.
If you remove ALL OF THIS unnecessary tripe, and _concentrate_ on doing ONE MISSION (Strike and ISR with LO-configured=low drag sensor and weapons bay systems), your cruise efficiencies instantly doubles for the given thrust and as a function of wingloading L@D and parasitics in a typical .85-.92 Mach point standard for long range ops in all subcruise airframes.
The question then becomes what you want to do with the resulting range increase that 'has to have' a human physically onboard. The answer is actually _darn few missions_ in the 1,000nm and 10hr plus category are 'better done by man' inside the executing platform.
He can watch through it's eyes. He can take the product collection and process and exploit it. He can even pull the trigger. But he _should not_ be onboard that jet.
Since his presence is not only another unnecesary increase in airframe weight. But one which compromises the LO engineering by which it remains inconspicuous.
CONCLUSION:
I don't hold much truck with AGrav, though I believe single point theory may be workable someday, I have yet to see anyone believably explain, not so much cancellation as reversal of physical constants for active propulsion. As I recall, Tesla and Heisenberg both tried it 'way back when' and until we have a firmer handle upon the realities of time:space as a multinodal field effect, I don't think any single electromagnetic influence is apt to lead to anything like exploitable electrogravitics in a military airframe class.
In any case, I would rather start with what works NOW and halt the transition as something better comes online, than be stuck with a dated warfighter concept that is grossly inefficient and unable to properly exploit NCW technologies that ARE RIMA'ing the battlefield as we 'wait for the ultimate solution'.
Because the cost of maintaining the old Force Structure methodology is both our looming defeat in today's wars and the inability to transition (through training. logistics and ops account savings as well as base acquisition prices that are superior in robotic platforms) when that super-slick technical innovation arrives.
We are going to be financial cripples when we flee Iraq and the OPEC fiat currency status on the USD switches to Euros or even a truly free market state of shifting currencies markers.
It would behoove us NOW to start thinking about making the downsizing of the military happen in a way which should have been occuring throughout the 90's timeframe of BUR ad nauseum 'studies and recommendations' about consolidating R&M overlaps. Unfortunately, it is my opinion that the entire ONW/OSW and Deny Flight efforts happened solely for the convenience of military politics in a period when the Armed Forces agreed to agonizing full-stretch 'peacekeeping' deployments at the cost of both modernization and proper reconfiguration, SOLELY (from their perspective) to maintain a bloated command architecture of a massively oversized 'total force'.
Now it is too late as we have yet to really start a process which the ROW (including Russia and China) have been carefully executing for the better part of 15 years.
KPl.
Some further comments...
I agree that the JSF is a disaster in the making, and I think I alluded to that in my last post.
As for who is responsible, the Top Brass involved should probably be cashiered for simple incompetence. Congress is another issue. This idiocy of pork barrel politics has been going on for quite a spell. It was Will Rogers (in the early 20th Century) who pointed out that Congress in session is viewed by the average American with the same horror as when the baby gets ahold of a hammer! But it's been going on longer than that: Sam Clements ("Mark Twain"), in the late 19th Century, allowed as how the only native criminal class in America was Congress!:nutkick Unfortunately, the problem resides with BOTH Republicrats AND Demicans! The REAL solution is to "throw the rascals out" and try a Third Party: might I humbly suggest the Constitution Party. But I digress...
As for "fighter" aircraft, I can remember the era between Korea and Vietnam when the "geniuses" in the Pentagon kept preaching the Gospel of BVR missiles, and stopped putting guns on fighters: we paid a SIGNIFICANT price in blood in SE Asia for this stupidity! Actually, it was COMPOUND stupidity: while BVR may have worked, if the generals had run the war, but the war was actually being run from the White House and the Tombstone on the East River. Most people, even now, over 30 years after it ended, do NOT realize that Vietnam was another "no win" war under the UN (just like Korea) in the guise of the SE Asia Treaty Organization. Thank Heaven we never had to fight the Bear under NATO auspices: it would have made Vietnam look like a polite and sedate game of Hearts! In short, what caused the problem in the 'Nam was politicians trying to replace the generals when they had no competence for the job: we couldn't even TRY to use BVR because of political restrictions placed on pilots by the UN via Washington, DC! Relying on BVR again, and not building fighter aircraft capable of high maneuverability gun combat in a highly hostile, close range environment is an invitation to utter disaster, because some rectal orifice of a politician will, undoubtedly slap on restrictions that will cost many lives!
The whole and only reason for Naval aircraft carriers is to provide a mobile "air base" which can be dispatched to the scene of the action within roughly one or two weeks. They have been accurately described as the "911" which the White House calls in the event of a military crisis: invariably, when there's serious trouble, the occupant of the Oval Office will make "where are the carriers?" the first question asked!
I heartily agree that we need systems as capable as possible, as present as possible, and as inexpensive as possible, wherever and whenever "the balloon goes up" and that the resulting fight be to WIN as quickly and inexpensively (in both blood and treasure) as possible! The only way it can happen "RIGHT NOW" (i.e.: less than 24 hours) would be if we had rapidly deployable fighting machines such as the electrogravitic vehicles I was discussing. Even nuclear carriers, with a top speed of 35 knots, can only move 840 NM in 24 hours or 5,880 NM in 7 days: however, their "conventional" escorts need to slow down for "underway replenishment" with fuel.
Somehow, I don't think you have fully answered my reservations about UCAV. The issue of "autonomous" operation was "glossed over": cruise missiles are great if the intended target is (1) within range of the launching point and, (2) stationary. Otherwise, the UCAV will either have to be FULLY autonomous (too expensive and too risky, from both a military and political standpoint) or it must have a "human in the loop" (I agree that an "officer" is NOT required: you can teach a pre-teen how to fly an RC airplane!), controlling the UCAV (either completely or partially) from a remote "off board" control point.
Such a situation STILL raises the issue of "How can you guarantee that UCAV communications CANNOT be totally "jammed" by a determined enemy?" Just given enough electrical power and a powerful enough jammer, with multi-frequency capability, and an enemy can "barrage jam" and screw up UCAV commo: it doesn't take a scalar physicist, nor even a rocket scientist, to do this, and the costs would be less than a flight deck full of now useless UCAVs! Also, I would advise you speak with some experienced pilots about the difficulty of aerial refueling: could a UCAV actually do it by remote control? I sincerely DOUBT that aerial refueling could be done autonomously, but I could be wrong: did the tests of the various UCAV prototypes ever tackle this issue? I know that Global Hawk did NOT test this, because it was designed with horrendously long wings (like an oversized sailing plane) to enable it to fly half-way around the planet, at high altitude, WITHOUT refueling!
Some sort of "human in the loop" is required because the battlespace (whether air, land or sea) is ALWAYS a very dynamic environment: situations can and do change rapidly, and only the human mind presently has the flexibility and the adaptability to make the decisive changes necessary to "keep up" with and get ahead of an opponent and his human mind's changing positions and tactics. Creating a silicon brain which can match the human "meat computer", not for speed of operation (THAT race was won by the silicon chips YEARS ago!), but for flexible adaptability is presently UNpossible, and will probably remain so for the immediately foreseeable future...meaning, "for at least a human generation" which is 20 to 30 years.
While your idea of building PRESENT technology equipment NOW, rather than waiting for a better solution in the future makes a lot of sense, I would simply caution that any attempt to establish a SENSIBLE procurement and training regime to replace the present insanity is doomed to FAILURE unless the "Roles and Missions" mess is addressed and corrected, FIRST. Once the "Roles and Missions" are sorted out, THEN one can restructure the training and procure sensible systems in accordance with the revamped roles and missions. Otherwise, one is attempting to "put the cart before the horse". As the "new" technology (probably based on the advanced technology systems previously discussed and further elaborated, below) comes on-line (probably within 5 to 10 years), it is HIGHLY probable that adjustments will need to be made in BOTH the "Roles and Missions" AND the resulting training regime and procurement schema.
Also, don't look now, but OPEC is ALREADY changing its price structure AWAY from US$ and TOWARD the Euro, as has been planned by certain anti-American groups (the same ones who have been busily trying to create the EU since just after World War II) for several decades. I also have a VERY strong feeling that the next few years will require, not a "downsizing" of the US military, but rather a vast INCREASE in the US Military as World War III (in the beginnings of which we already are!) tries to swamp us all and the immediate defense of the USA, itself, from invasion, becomes an absolute NECESSITY!
Finally, what I was referring to was "electrogravitic thrusters" NOT "anti-gravity". an electrogravitic thruster can best be likened to a "super ion" thruster: it is relatively small for the TREMENDOUS amount of thrust it develops. The thrust mechanism is electrically generated gravitons: hence, the name, electrogravitic. Depending upon how one bends local space time, one can either pull "positive" electrical energy (NOT to be confused with "positive" electrical CHARGE!), which is the kind of electrical energy with which we are most familiar, or "negative" electrical energy (again, NOT to be confused with "negative" electrical CHARGE!) from the quantum vacuum with a quantum energy transducer. Such "negative" electrical energy has some AMAZING and highly useful properties. Negative electrical energy COOLS electrical circuits, rather than HEATING them! Negative electrical energy also brings with it, NEGATIVE GRAVITONS, which can "feed" a gravitic thruster; oddly enough, negative electrical energy also creates localized "time reversal" zones, so that a person traveling in an electrogravitic vehicle AGES at a SLOWER rate than one who doesn't! You referred to "single point theory", when I suspect you were referring to "Zero-Point Energy", the generators for which are often referred to as "Zero-Point Modules" in the mass entertainment media. James Clerk Maxwell (the genius behind modern electromagnetics) actually developed some of the basic theories of this science of hyperdimensional (scalar) physics before his untimely death in 1879, but the evidence of it was expunged from his theoretical work by Oliver Heaviside and William Gibbs, who were assigned to compile and publish Maxwell's work after his death, but had no understanding of what Maxwell was actually doing. Quantum energy transducers (part of the theoretical basis of hyperdimensional or scalar physics comes from quantum mechanics) are NOT simple to produce: the Motionless Electromagnetic Generator (MEG), the patented device I referred to in the last posting, includes several feedback and feedforward loops and is only the latest in a line of research which various inventors have been pursuing for several decades. There is some evidence that Nicola Tesla was working on what we now know as quantum energy extraction and some aspects of hyperdimensional (scalar) physics from about the 1920s to his death. The late Doctor T. Henry Moray, of Salt Lake City, UT, sank his life savings into and built a 60 pound device in the mid-1920s which generated at least 50,000 to 100,000 watts of negative energy, creating NO pollution and requiring NO fuel...until a saboteur smashed his prototype machine in about 1940, but not before he had demonstrated the unit to dozens of scientists and engineers, collecting their accounts and verifications that the device was doing all he said it did. Sadly, the US Patent Office REFUSED his patent application, simply because he could NOT state the actual source of the energy being tapped! In the 1950s, he estimated it would have cost him about $5 million to reproduce the device: in today's (2006) dollars, and allowing for inflation, it would cost his descendants (I have spoken to his son to get this data) somewhere between $35 million and $43 million to reconstruct his hand made prototype. The five co-inventors of the MEG are presently searching for $11 million to $12 million to set up the required lab so they can do the year of hard work required to dope out the scaling factors so they can build MEG units to whatever size is required. At that point, they can ramp up production on MEGs at whatever power level they need, from power units the size of flashlight batteries to those large enough to move an aircraft carrier sized ship into outer space! As a former astronomy major, I can really appreciate the elegance of the science behind all this...
I agree that the JSF is a disaster in the making, and I think I alluded to that in my last post.
As for who is responsible, the Top Brass involved should probably be cashiered for simple incompetence. Congress is another issue. This idiocy of pork barrel politics has been going on for quite a spell. It was Will Rogers (in the early 20th Century) who pointed out that Congress in session is viewed by the average American with the same horror as when the baby gets ahold of a hammer!
But it's been going on longer than that: Sam Clements ("Mark Twain"), in the late 19th Century, allowed as how the only native criminal class in America was Congress!:nutkick Unfortunately, the problem resides with BOTH Republicrats AND Demicans! The REAL solution is to "throw the rascals out" and try a Third Party: might I humbly suggest the Constitution Party. But I digress...As for "fighter" aircraft, I can remember the era between Korea and Vietnam when the "geniuses" in the Pentagon kept preaching the Gospel of BVR missiles, and stopped putting guns on fighters: we paid a SIGNIFICANT price in blood in SE Asia for this stupidity! Actually, it was COMPOUND stupidity: while BVR may have worked, if the generals had run the war, but the war was actually being run from the White House and the Tombstone on the East River. Most people, even now, over 30 years after it ended, do NOT realize that Vietnam was another "no win" war under the UN (just like Korea) in the guise of the SE Asia Treaty Organization. Thank Heaven we never had to fight the Bear under NATO auspices: it would have made Vietnam look like a polite and sedate game of Hearts! In short, what caused the problem in the 'Nam was politicians trying to replace the generals when they had no competence for the job: we couldn't even TRY to use BVR because of political restrictions placed on pilots by the UN via Washington, DC! Relying on BVR again, and not building fighter aircraft capable of high maneuverability gun combat in a highly hostile, close range environment is an invitation to utter disaster, because some rectal orifice of a politician will, undoubtedly slap on restrictions that will cost many lives!
The whole and only reason for Naval aircraft carriers is to provide a mobile "air base" which can be dispatched to the scene of the action within roughly one or two weeks. They have been accurately described as the "911" which the White House calls in the event of a military crisis: invariably, when there's serious trouble, the occupant of the Oval Office will make "where are the carriers?" the first question asked!
I heartily agree that we need systems as capable as possible, as present as possible, and as inexpensive as possible, wherever and whenever "the balloon goes up" and that the resulting fight be to WIN as quickly and inexpensively (in both blood and treasure) as possible! The only way it can happen "RIGHT NOW" (i.e.: less than 24 hours) would be if we had rapidly deployable fighting machines such as the electrogravitic vehicles I was discussing. Even nuclear carriers, with a top speed of 35 knots, can only move 840 NM in 24 hours or 5,880 NM in 7 days: however, their "conventional" escorts need to slow down for "underway replenishment" with fuel.
Somehow, I don't think you have fully answered my reservations about UCAV. The issue of "autonomous" operation was "glossed over": cruise missiles are great if the intended target is (1) within range of the launching point and, (2) stationary. Otherwise, the UCAV will either have to be FULLY autonomous (too expensive and too risky, from both a military and political standpoint) or it must have a "human in the loop" (I agree that an "officer" is NOT required: you can teach a pre-teen how to fly an RC airplane!), controlling the UCAV (either completely or partially) from a remote "off board" control point.
Such a situation STILL raises the issue of "How can you guarantee that UCAV communications CANNOT be totally "jammed" by a determined enemy?" Just given enough electrical power and a powerful enough jammer, with multi-frequency capability, and an enemy can "barrage jam" and screw up UCAV commo: it doesn't take a scalar physicist, nor even a rocket scientist, to do this, and the costs would be less than a flight deck full of now useless UCAVs! Also, I would advise you speak with some experienced pilots about the difficulty of aerial refueling: could a UCAV actually do it by remote control? I sincerely DOUBT that aerial refueling could be done autonomously, but I could be wrong: did the tests of the various UCAV prototypes ever tackle this issue? I know that Global Hawk did NOT test this, because it was designed with horrendously long wings (like an oversized sailing plane) to enable it to fly half-way around the planet, at high altitude, WITHOUT refueling!
Some sort of "human in the loop" is required because the battlespace (whether air, land or sea) is ALWAYS a very dynamic environment: situations can and do change rapidly, and only the human mind presently has the flexibility and the adaptability to make the decisive changes necessary to "keep up" with and get ahead of an opponent and his human mind's changing positions and tactics. Creating a silicon brain which can match the human "meat computer", not for speed of operation (THAT race was won by the silicon chips YEARS ago!), but for flexible adaptability is presently UNpossible, and will probably remain so for the immediately foreseeable future...meaning, "for at least a human generation" which is 20 to 30 years.
While your idea of building PRESENT technology equipment NOW, rather than waiting for a better solution in the future makes a lot of sense, I would simply caution that any attempt to establish a SENSIBLE procurement and training regime to replace the present insanity is doomed to FAILURE unless the "Roles and Missions" mess is addressed and corrected, FIRST. Once the "Roles and Missions" are sorted out, THEN one can restructure the training and procure sensible systems in accordance with the revamped roles and missions. Otherwise, one is attempting to "put the cart before the horse". As the "new" technology (probably based on the advanced technology systems previously discussed and further elaborated, below) comes on-line (probably within 5 to 10 years), it is HIGHLY probable that adjustments will need to be made in BOTH the "Roles and Missions" AND the resulting training regime and procurement schema.
Also, don't look now, but OPEC is ALREADY changing its price structure AWAY from US$ and TOWARD the Euro, as has been planned by certain anti-American groups (the same ones who have been busily trying to create the EU since just after World War II) for several decades. I also have a VERY strong feeling that the next few years will require, not a "downsizing" of the US military, but rather a vast INCREASE in the US Military as World War III (in the beginnings of which we already are!) tries to swamp us all and the immediate defense of the USA, itself, from invasion, becomes an absolute NECESSITY!
Finally, what I was referring to was "electrogravitic thrusters" NOT "anti-gravity". an electrogravitic thruster can best be likened to a "super ion" thruster: it is relatively small for the TREMENDOUS amount of thrust it develops. The thrust mechanism is electrically generated gravitons: hence, the name, electrogravitic. Depending upon how one bends local space time, one can either pull "positive" electrical energy (NOT to be confused with "positive" electrical CHARGE!), which is the kind of electrical energy with which we are most familiar, or "negative" electrical energy (again, NOT to be confused with "negative" electrical CHARGE!) from the quantum vacuum with a quantum energy transducer. Such "negative" electrical energy has some AMAZING and highly useful properties. Negative electrical energy COOLS electrical circuits, rather than HEATING them! Negative electrical energy also brings with it, NEGATIVE GRAVITONS, which can "feed" a gravitic thruster; oddly enough, negative electrical energy also creates localized "time reversal" zones, so that a person traveling in an electrogravitic vehicle AGES at a SLOWER rate than one who doesn't! You referred to "single point theory", when I suspect you were referring to "Zero-Point Energy", the generators for which are often referred to as "Zero-Point Modules" in the mass entertainment media. James Clerk Maxwell (the genius behind modern electromagnetics) actually developed some of the basic theories of this science of hyperdimensional (scalar) physics before his untimely death in 1879, but the evidence of it was expunged from his theoretical work by Oliver Heaviside and William Gibbs, who were assigned to compile and publish Maxwell's work after his death, but had no understanding of what Maxwell was actually doing. Quantum energy transducers (part of the theoretical basis of hyperdimensional or scalar physics comes from quantum mechanics) are NOT simple to produce: the Motionless Electromagnetic Generator (MEG), the patented device I referred to in the last posting, includes several feedback and feedforward loops and is only the latest in a line of research which various inventors have been pursuing for several decades. There is some evidence that Nicola Tesla was working on what we now know as quantum energy extraction and some aspects of hyperdimensional (scalar) physics from about the 1920s to his death. The late Doctor T. Henry Moray, of Salt Lake City, UT, sank his life savings into and built a 60 pound device in the mid-1920s which generated at least 50,000 to 100,000 watts of negative energy, creating NO pollution and requiring NO fuel...until a saboteur smashed his prototype machine in about 1940, but not before he had demonstrated the unit to dozens of scientists and engineers, collecting their accounts and verifications that the device was doing all he said it did. Sadly, the US Patent Office REFUSED his patent application, simply because he could NOT state the actual source of the energy being tapped! In the 1950s, he estimated it would have cost him about $5 million to reproduce the device: in today's (2006) dollars, and allowing for inflation, it would cost his descendants (I have spoken to his son to get this data) somewhere between $35 million and $43 million to reconstruct his hand made prototype. The five co-inventors of the MEG are presently searching for $11 million to $12 million to set up the required lab so they can do the year of hard work required to dope out the scaling factors so they can build MEG units to whatever size is required. At that point, they can ramp up production on MEGs at whatever power level they need, from power units the size of flashlight batteries to those large enough to move an aircraft carrier sized ship into outer space! As a former astronomy major, I can really appreciate the elegance of the science behind all this...
CinC or CoCom?
I suggest using CoCom (formerly CinC) in circumstances like this where the period of time under discussion spans the pre and post ban. Note: the term CinC is now used only for the President of the United States (POTUS) who is the Commander in Chief (CinC).
Not to nitpick or take a free shot at a banned poster, but as this gent seems to thrive on details, a correction is in order. In 2002, SECDEF ordered discontinuation of the term "CinC" by Combatant Commanders (COCOM) in a strict interpretation of Title X, the United States Code (U.S.C.) that defines organization as well as roles and missions of US forces.
I suggest using CoCom (formerly CinC) in circumstances like this where the period of time under discussion spans the pre and post ban. Note: the term CinC is now used only for the President of the United States (POTUS) who is the Commander in Chief (CinC).
heyjoe..(heard you shot my brother down)...nice to have you on board,great info mate. do you think the US will contiue to make F15,s purely for export (S/Korea and Singapore?)
Boeing would certainly like that...last thing they want is to shut down that production line.
I'm sure you are right. I was surprised to see the Australian Defence Minister state, in a question/answer attachment to his media release about the RAAF's FA-18F purchase, that the F15 is no longer in production in the US.
http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/NelsonMintpl.cfm?CurrentId=6437
I thought this answer was 'interesting' to say the least! I thought that Korean and Singapore orders were keeping it in production until at least 2009.
Cheers
When he says "not in US production", he may mean "not in production for the USA" - which is correct. The F-15 is only in production for S. Korea & Singapore.I'm sure you are right. I was surprised to see the Australian Defence Minister state, in a question/answer attachment to his media release about the RAAF's FA-18F purchase, that the F15 is no longer in production in the US.
http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/NelsonMintpl.cfm?CurrentId=6437
I thought this answer was 'interesting' to say the least! I thought that Korean and Singapore orders were keeping it in production until at least 2009.
Cheers
Referring back to something Kurt Plummer said - while F-15Cs may well not have enough airframe life remaining to be worth rebuilding for ground attack, except for a very small number, that can't be because of the stress caused by the weight of the APG-63(v)2 AESA, because that was only fitted to 18 aircraft. Those 18 are still the only AESA-equipped F-15s in service, and the only additional AESA F-15s funded so far* are the 12 Singapore F-15s & 6 conversions for the ANG, all of which will have the much lighter APG-63(v)3.
*Though the USAF & ANG plan a lot more conversions - APG-63(v)3 for 178 F-15C/D, & over APG-63(v)4 for over 200 F-15E. Funding has been requested for 2008.
Concur, the orders for Korea and Singapore will keep production line going for now and if options for more are exercised, the line may still be open past 2009. I think the USAF is still hoping to increase its number of F-22 Raptors and won't risk that by asking for more F-15s.
Not sure I buy Kurt Plummer's assertion that airframe life limits the light grey Eagles from performing the air-to-ground role. Flying ACM and the resultant high G maneuvers drains airframe life just as quickly. Today's relatively benign ordnance delivery modes for JDAM and other GPGWs as well as the family of LGBs aren't burning up airframe life the way earlier tactics, techniques and procedures did for the so-called dumb bombs. First I heard that argument.
There is a distinctly different culture and mindset in the Air Force between the light grey and dark grey Eagles with air superiority traditionally being the higher calling. After Desert Storm, the US Navy placed a higher priority on power projection and the Tomcat community that had resisted taking on the air-to-ground mission for several decades only to have it become their ultimate legacy in its last decade of service. Perhaps, the Air Force could learn from that.
1) Fits what they're saying publicly, e.g. "we don't want to buy any more F-15s or F-16s" - a USAF general I can't remember the name of, quoted in, IIRC, JDW last week.
2) Agreed. I said "may" because I know nothing of the state of the airframes, so didn't want to debate the point. But I couldn't let ride his assertion that this supposed exhaustion of airframes was due to AESA radars which >90% of them don't have.