While I've seen a number of analysis of the Kokoda Campaign, I cannot recall much discussion as to the wisdom of the forward defensive strategy adopted. It may be recalled that this strategy resulted in troops who were poorly supplied, without heavy weapons, and incapable of receiving timely reinforcements, facing an enemy superior in both numbers and weaponry.
That supplying any significant force in the Owen Stanley Ranges was going to be difficult was well known to the commander in New Guinea, Morris, and he proposed that, if the Japanese were to attempt the crossing of the ranges, they be met on the Moresby side of the range by troops that were fresh, well supplied and more able to concentrate to meet an attack due to the superior lines of communication. It may also be recalled that the current "Lessons Learnt" amongst senior Australian commanders would have been coming out of Northern Africa. While the terrain is obviously dissimilar, one of the lessons from that theatre was that he who wins the buildup, wins the battle.
Regardless, the directive came from High Command in Australia, to adopt an aggressive forward stance, and place troops beyond the crest of the Owen Stanleys, despite Morris' remonstrance that without adequate aerial supply-lines, his forward troops would be at risk of starvation. It is commonly believed that both Macarthur and Blamey were under political pressure to be seen to be "doing something", and it was this that motivated the orders for the forward deployment, rather than possible tactical advantage. It is certain that they were quite unfamiliar with the conditions under which they were ordering troops to fight.
It is interesting that, as the Kokoda Campaign progressed, the Japanese were fought to a standstill within sight of the point where Morris had planned to meet them, and with the Australians at last possessing the heavy weaponry which the hasty and difficult deployment up the Kokoda track had previously denied them.
Regards............ Peter
That supplying any significant force in the Owen Stanley Ranges was going to be difficult was well known to the commander in New Guinea, Morris, and he proposed that, if the Japanese were to attempt the crossing of the ranges, they be met on the Moresby side of the range by troops that were fresh, well supplied and more able to concentrate to meet an attack due to the superior lines of communication. It may also be recalled that the current "Lessons Learnt" amongst senior Australian commanders would have been coming out of Northern Africa. While the terrain is obviously dissimilar, one of the lessons from that theatre was that he who wins the buildup, wins the battle.
Regardless, the directive came from High Command in Australia, to adopt an aggressive forward stance, and place troops beyond the crest of the Owen Stanleys, despite Morris' remonstrance that without adequate aerial supply-lines, his forward troops would be at risk of starvation. It is commonly believed that both Macarthur and Blamey were under political pressure to be seen to be "doing something", and it was this that motivated the orders for the forward deployment, rather than possible tactical advantage. It is certain that they were quite unfamiliar with the conditions under which they were ordering troops to fight.
It is interesting that, as the Kokoda Campaign progressed, the Japanese were fought to a standstill within sight of the point where Morris had planned to meet them, and with the Australians at last possessing the heavy weaponry which the hasty and difficult deployment up the Kokoda track had previously denied them.
Regards............ Peter