Source: GlobalSecurity.org
In a public session of the Iranian Parliament on 24 November 2003, Ahmad Shirzad, a deputy from the city of Isfahan, stated that there was a large nuclear-related underground facility near the city of Parchin, without providing an other details.
In Iran's nuclear menace Washington Times March 07, 2004, Mansoor Ijaz, chairman of Crescent Investment Management in New York and a foreign affairs commentator on Fox News and in the National Review, claimed that Iran's nuclear weapons program included use of "Belarus-Russian filtering and high-temperature melting technologies for uranium enrichment. These facts were revealed by Ahmad Shirzad, a member of Iran's Parliament representing Isfahan, in late 2003 as he passionately argued Iran's children were starving while the mullahs processed uranium at secret underground facilities near Parchin (southeast of Tehran) and in the mountains between Qazvin and Karaj (northwest of Tehran)." The precise technique allegedly involved here is unclear, but would appear to be thermal diffusion. The thermal-diffusion process is characterized by its simplicity, low capital cost, and high heat consumption. The thermal-diffusion plant in Oak Ridge was dismantled when the much more energy-efficient (by a factor of 140) gaseous-diffusion plant began operation in the 1940’s. The electrical consumption of a gas centrifuge facility is much less than that of a gaseous diffusion plant. The specific energy consumption is 2300-3000 kWh/SWU for Gaseous Diffusion, versus 100-300 kWh/SWU for gas centrifuge. So the gas centrifuge is probably a thousand times less energy intensive than thermal diffusion, rendering this allegation implausible.
On 11 September 2004 it was reported that the IAEA had requested a visit to Parchin, but the Iranians had not yet agreed to the inspection. The IAEA questioned whether Iran might be doing nuclear weapons work there. The agency had requested to send inspectors to Parchin, but this was not mentioned in the IAEA report on Iran published 01 September 2004.
One area at Parchin may be assessed as a "probable" nuclear weapons development facility. The extensive weapons development activity at the rest of the complex makes it an entirely logical location for weaponization work for Iran's atomic bomb program. The overall Parchin complex represents is the leading center of Iran's munitions industry, so a nuclear weapons program would already have all the expertise needed within commuting distance. The suspect site is physically isolated from the rest of the complex, suggesting that it is not part of the conventional ammo, poison gas or missile programs. The recent construction activity is also consistent with the recent construction activity at other parts of Iran's bomb program, and the recent completion is consistent with estimates of when Iran would get the bomb. The United States is suspicious that Iran is testing high explosives at Parchin.
Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Iran's chief delegate to the IAEA, angrily rejected claims that new satellite photos show a military complex at Parchin, near Tehran, to be a site for the testing and production of nuclear weapons. Mr. Mosavian said there was no basis for U.S. concern and that Iran was doing all that was asked of it by the IAEA. "First of all we completely, categorically deny any nuclear activities in Parchin. Americans, again, they are lying because the IAEA have never asked for inspections and because they have claimed we rejected the inspections of the IAEA and the IAEA up to now they have never asked for inspections." Mr. Mousavian accused the United States of deliberately using misinformation to embarrass Iran at IAEA hearings. He said at an earlier IAEA meeting, the United States produced satellite images for a demolished site at Lavisan, where, he said, there had never been any nuclear activity. "This is the routine behavior of the Americans in every board of governors meeting, they raise such issues, like last time they raised Lavisan, this time Parchin".
"Neither the design of the facility nor the nature of the tests is unique to nuclear weapons," said Jay C. Davis, former head of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency at the US Department of Defense. "This is always a problem in trying to detect nuclear activity, and one that only on-site inspection can establish." Davis added that environmental sampling done by IAEA inspectors could detect the presence of byproducts used in the testing of high explosives for a nuclear weapon. "A surrogate material, such as depleted uranium, for example, could be used in such testing and would be detectable via sampling," he said.
In a public session of the Iranian Parliament on 24 November 2003, Ahmad Shirzad, a deputy from the city of Isfahan, stated that there was a large nuclear-related underground facility near the city of Parchin, without providing an other details.
In Iran's nuclear menace Washington Times March 07, 2004, Mansoor Ijaz, chairman of Crescent Investment Management in New York and a foreign affairs commentator on Fox News and in the National Review, claimed that Iran's nuclear weapons program included use of "Belarus-Russian filtering and high-temperature melting technologies for uranium enrichment. These facts were revealed by Ahmad Shirzad, a member of Iran's Parliament representing Isfahan, in late 2003 as he passionately argued Iran's children were starving while the mullahs processed uranium at secret underground facilities near Parchin (southeast of Tehran) and in the mountains between Qazvin and Karaj (northwest of Tehran)." The precise technique allegedly involved here is unclear, but would appear to be thermal diffusion. The thermal-diffusion process is characterized by its simplicity, low capital cost, and high heat consumption. The thermal-diffusion plant in Oak Ridge was dismantled when the much more energy-efficient (by a factor of 140) gaseous-diffusion plant began operation in the 1940’s. The electrical consumption of a gas centrifuge facility is much less than that of a gaseous diffusion plant. The specific energy consumption is 2300-3000 kWh/SWU for Gaseous Diffusion, versus 100-300 kWh/SWU for gas centrifuge. So the gas centrifuge is probably a thousand times less energy intensive than thermal diffusion, rendering this allegation implausible.
On 11 September 2004 it was reported that the IAEA had requested a visit to Parchin, but the Iranians had not yet agreed to the inspection. The IAEA questioned whether Iran might be doing nuclear weapons work there. The agency had requested to send inspectors to Parchin, but this was not mentioned in the IAEA report on Iran published 01 September 2004.
One area at Parchin may be assessed as a "probable" nuclear weapons development facility. The extensive weapons development activity at the rest of the complex makes it an entirely logical location for weaponization work for Iran's atomic bomb program. The overall Parchin complex represents is the leading center of Iran's munitions industry, so a nuclear weapons program would already have all the expertise needed within commuting distance. The suspect site is physically isolated from the rest of the complex, suggesting that it is not part of the conventional ammo, poison gas or missile programs. The recent construction activity is also consistent with the recent construction activity at other parts of Iran's bomb program, and the recent completion is consistent with estimates of when Iran would get the bomb. The United States is suspicious that Iran is testing high explosives at Parchin.
Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Iran's chief delegate to the IAEA, angrily rejected claims that new satellite photos show a military complex at Parchin, near Tehran, to be a site for the testing and production of nuclear weapons. Mr. Mosavian said there was no basis for U.S. concern and that Iran was doing all that was asked of it by the IAEA. "First of all we completely, categorically deny any nuclear activities in Parchin. Americans, again, they are lying because the IAEA have never asked for inspections and because they have claimed we rejected the inspections of the IAEA and the IAEA up to now they have never asked for inspections." Mr. Mousavian accused the United States of deliberately using misinformation to embarrass Iran at IAEA hearings. He said at an earlier IAEA meeting, the United States produced satellite images for a demolished site at Lavisan, where, he said, there had never been any nuclear activity. "This is the routine behavior of the Americans in every board of governors meeting, they raise such issues, like last time they raised Lavisan, this time Parchin".
"Neither the design of the facility nor the nature of the tests is unique to nuclear weapons," said Jay C. Davis, former head of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency at the US Department of Defense. "This is always a problem in trying to detect nuclear activity, and one that only on-site inspection can establish." Davis added that environmental sampling done by IAEA inspectors could detect the presence of byproducts used in the testing of high explosives for a nuclear weapon. "A surrogate material, such as depleted uranium, for example, could be used in such testing and would be detectable via sampling," he said.
