Future weapons/equipment and their impact on the structure of infantry units

[Firn]

This is a rough analysis of the current structures and capabilities and an outlook on how new challenges, demands and equipment shape and will shape the way infantry fights.

Overview:

The squad/section is the building block of the platoon. It's size varies greatly between and within the different land forces and runs somewhere in the size of 7-15 men. It can be regarded as the smallest unit capable of "independent" small-scale maneuvers. The organic firepower to allow maneuver can be divided for most western forces in roughly 5 categories:

Organic Firepower

a) The readily available direct fire of the Assault Rifles: compact assault rifles chambered in the 5.56 NATO enable the 5-11 soldiers to shot accuratetly and to suppress with decent volumes of fire.

b) The high volume of direct fire of the 1-2 machineguns: Delivered with weapons chambered in the 5,56 NATO capable of a sustainable ROF of 500-800 rpms

c) The short-medium ranged indirect fire of the Granade launcher: 2-4 Grenadiers are equipped with a 40mmUGL while in other armies the riflemen use the riflegrenade

d) The very short indirect fire of the hand grenades: Usually all members of the squad carry a differing number of them

d) The shortranged Antitank/Bankerbuster capability: Delivered by RPGs or rockets (Carl Gustav, Panzerfaust, AT-4). Not always present.


The supporting firepower assets of the platoon:

a) CAS, artillery and organic or unorganic AFV and mortar fire called in by the Forward observer are the key to win the firefight: This makes the FO a very important member of the platoon

b) The high volume direct fire of 1-2 heavy/medium machineguns: Handled by a section of 2-3 men they are usually chambered in the 7.62 NATO they bring a heavy weight to bear in the firefight

c) The medium-long ranged guided AT/Bunkerbuster rocket launcher. The 1-2 sections of 2-3 men are able to defeat heavily armoured AFV and well protected positions.

d) Accurate medium-long ranged fire by Marksmen/Sharpshooters can be invaluable in a firefight, especially with strict ROE. Not always present or higer up.

e) Steep plunging indirect fire with considerable area effect compared to grenades: The mortar sections can engage well protected enemies from safe distances. Not always present and often organized higher up.


Conclusion:

So the platoon has a considerable amount of firepower at its disposal. However the combination of high personal protection and good firepower comes at the cost of very high burden and a terrific loss in mobility, endurance and thus fighting capability. The fighting load of some members of a marine squad is over 130 pounds - 50 pounds are usually considered to be the best combination of weight and capability.


So when we look at possible additions, the ratio between gain in capability and gain in weight must be closely watched.



Strengthening the base -watching the weight

a) The squad AFO or spotter. Currently only the FO the ability to geolocate and laze targets. However especially against multiple targets the ability to queue them up rapidly accelerates the firecycle for heavy firepower, mortars and CAS.

He also supports the Grenadiers and AT-gunner with accurate ranges making the burdensome rounds count. DM/Sniper also profit from precise ranging.

With no targets in sights he observes the environment with a variable (around 20-60x) spotting scope.

He carries the standard AC with compact sound suppressor and variable/standard optic (roughly 2-6x). If he acts as secundary ammo carrier he might use only PDW.

Performance/weight

This squad member should carry at most as much as a riflemen. The good spotter scope with light tripod and the geolocating Moskito.

This is perhaps the most effective addition to a squad, enabling to integrate fire support by AFV, CAS and IDF assets far better and faster than with a single FO for a whole platoon. This "outsourcing" of heavy firepower increases the fighting power greatly and must be used to lessen the burden of the infantry.


b) The Designated Marksmen or Sharpshooter. He works closely togheter with a squad spotter and forms with him one of the 1-3 DM training sections of the platoon. A riflemen of the "standard" 9 men strong squad could also be tasked as a DM. However a up to three man strong pool of DM would make training (coupled with the Spotters) easier and employment sounder.

Usually the DM should carry a semiautomatic sniperrifle (7.62 NATO) with a sound suppressor and a PDW (~HK7). Under special circumstances other weaponsystems up to an anti-material sniper rifle are possible.

The DM can be employed as squadmembers on the side of the AFO/spotters or as sharpshooters under the direct command of the platoon leader.

Performance/weight

Traditionally Sharpshooter at squad level or (some) at platoon level proved to be of immense importance in the WWII, especially on the eastern front. The recent wars/campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have once again proven the worth of a trained long-range shooter with high skills of observation. So in almost all cases it is a worthy addition. The DM should not carry more than a riflemen.


c) The specialized grenadier: Some Multi-shot 40mm grenade launchers are already available and battleproven. They provided tremendous firepower and increased accuracy but are heavy (~6kg). They rely on a PDW (with limited ammunition) for personal defense. Future weapons like the XM25 might make this role more widespread. A member of the squad might swap the AR with UGL for a MGL and a PDW but ammunition will be quite limited.

Such MGL profit greatly from accurate ranging and large amounts of ammuntion. The AFO/spotter is therefor an ideal companion for a section of two, togheter with a DM of three. With 18 grenades per men the MGL and accurate targeting.

Performance/weight

A heavy weapon and heavy ammunition make the great firepower very heavy to carry. While it might be a great addition for dismounted troops who operate short distances away from AFV it is IMHO too burdensome/costly for long operations on foot. I see this weapon really shine in convey operations as it can throw a lot of HE on ambushing units, helping to break it.


d) The UV-operator (Communications, Control of UGV/Micro UAV): While the SL/ FTL/Spotter may have in the near term the ability to get and share live informations in visual form in a small portable package (~PDA) this soldier adds specific capabilities. He carries the communication equipment and possibly a micro UGV or UAV. Other soldiers may assist in this task. With the same interface he controls them and the possible UGV "mule" which supports the squad by carrying large amounts amount of weight in difficult terrain - the traditional role of the good old mule. The equipment he carries is of course ideal for the tasks to to plug into the digital battlefield management systems. His primary weapon could be the standard bullup carabine or a PDW.

While this function/role/soldier might first appear in/as a platoon section it is certainly possible that it might become a organic squad capability. Togheter with the spotter he could form a formidable team, as they should be able to identify the enemy positions/forces and interpret, geolocate and digitalize the informations about them.

Performance/weight

The exact weight this soldier must carry is of course highly dependent on the level of technology available and his tasks. However it should be manageable and a light PDW might be possibly considered to lighten the burden.




More to come soon

 

[Tavarisch]

Let's not forget short-ranged hand-held AAs for helis and slow-moving aircraft like the Igla, Strela and Stingers. I think, it's common for each squad to only have one of these men, depending on the situation though there may be more or none at all. Avenger AA sections supporting infantry can also fit this category.

For supporting, it would be a medium to long range AA missile system like the S-300 and S-400. These would take out high-altitude bombers and if possible, OpFor CAS and fast-movers.

AA Gun Systems like the ZSU-23-4M2, 2S6M and M163 Vulcans can provide low-to-mid level protection against aircraft that are going for the heavy AA missiles.

Radar coverage from AWACS (E-3 and Mainstays), if possible. Ground radars work too. Both must be protected in order to maintain air superiority.

 

[Firn]

Well actually I think that a western army should handle threats from the air exclusivly with the airforce and the airdefence artillery. The infantry is typically so heavily overburdened already that adding a MANPAD "just in case" is another blow to the fighting prowess.

I also think that "outsourcing" the firepower is the way to go, especially in difficult terrain. I read about how much members of the US forces were forced to carry in Afghanistan in mountain operations. Having myself marched with heavy packs on boots, skishoes and skies in the mountains I think it is almost criminal to burden your soldiers in such a way. For training it is fine - as long the back holds - but for fighting not.

With the ever longer reach of the artillery/mortars and CAS and the ever more precise ammunition and the ever easier and faster ways to geolocate targets the IDF assets should do the heavy work. AFV are usually also within reach. Use their firepower as much as possible, use their presence to resupply as often as possible - up to 3-4 times a day. With this 24/7 support I think for example that Bunkerbuster RPGs or rockets should only carried if unavoidable.

 

[Tavarisch]

Well actually I think that a western army should handle threats from the air exclusivly with the airforce and the airdefence artillery. The infantry is typically so heavily overburdened already that adding a MANPAD "just in case" is another blow to the fighting prowess.

I also think that "outsourcing" the firepower is the way to go, especially in difficult terrain. I read about how much members of the US forces were forced to carry in Afghanistan in mountain operations. Having myself marched with heavy packs on boots, skishoes and skies in the mountains I think it is almost criminal to burden your soldiers in such a way. For training it is fine - as long the back holds - but for fighting not.

With the ever longer reach of the artillery/mortars and CAS and the ever more precise ammunition and the ever easier and faster ways to geolocate targets the IDF assets should do the heavy work. AFV are usually also within reach. Use their firepower as much as possible, use their presence to resupply as often as possible - up to 3-4 times a day. With this 24/7 support I think for example that Bunkerbuster RPGs or rockets should only carried if unavoidable.

Let's remember that you also have to include not only western armies, but also that of the East. Ukraine, Russia and friends are trying to get there too. And let's not forget that there are many environments and types of warfare that each army has to go through. It can range from the typical tank battle in the open field to the cramped fights of Urban living.

Nevertheless, totally neglecting anti-air missile systems can come at a cost, just as much as neglecting CAP support for air. They should be integrated, and must be carefully coordinated so that they don't blow each other up.

 

[Firn]

I think we have rather similar thoughts. This thread focuses on western infantry. While I hardly think of a realistic scenario where a NATO army fights without total air and sea superiority GBAD is still an important part of the overall picture. I just said that it is nonsense to task western infantry with selfdefense against airthreats. If the airforce isn't able to dominate the air than the airdefense artillery should protect with its wide umbrella the land forces. Only in desperate situations it is worth for western forces to rely on manpads and to carry them.

 

[Tavarisch]

I think we have rather similar thoughts. This thread focuses on western infantry. While I hardly think of a realistic scenario where a NATO army fights without total air and sea superiority GBAD is still an important part of the overall picture. I just said that it is nonsense to task western infantry with selfdefense against airthreats. If the airforce isn't able to dominate the air than the airdefense artillery should protect with its wide umbrella the land forces. Only in desperate situations it is worth for western forces to rely on manpads and to carry them.

Then you should add a bit to the title. If you mainly focus on Western Armies that is.

In any case, I think NATO airpower is sure to dominate their potential OpFors. Russian pilots get barely 1/3rd of what NATO pilots do in the amount of training hours. At the end of the day, the Pilot is the ultimate decision maker when it comes to battle tactics and maneuver. If the pilot is not sufficiently trained, he will lose his aircraft.

I guess that's why the Russians have so many different types of SAM systems and AA cannons.

 

[Firn]

Rereading the first part I agree that it isn't clear that I focus on "western" forces.

For all the other armies which have not the wealth/allies to be sure to dominate the air, GBAD and especially Manpads are of very high importance...

 

[lobbie111]

I think one thing worth mentioning, is that unit sizes will increase to cope with the amount of computers and networking involved in modern warfare, Future soldier systems are not stuff of legend anymore...

 

[Tavarisch]

I think one thing worth mentioning, is that unit sizes will increase to cope with the amount of computers and networking involved in modern warfare, Future soldier systems are not stuff of legend anymore...

Yeah, more rear echelon technicians and computer experts. Somebody has to be over the other side of the network.

 

[exuroseason]

interesting thread gentlemen.

 

[lobbie111]

When you say multi shot, what exactly do you mean by that? as in the six shooter that the US has at the moment or the metalstorm concept of multistacked rounds, or maybe both, now there will be an interesting theory...I like the STK concept maybe combined with a revolving multishot metalstorm all in one launcher now tharrr is a weapon

 

[Tavarisch]

You know what would be cool to see?

A HMG section carrying an M134 Minigun instead of a regular M240 or FN MAG. Not very practical but would be fun to look at.

However, there is talk of satellite targeting solutions for riflemen that will be fitted on their small personal computers. It's a good idea, but do you honestly think troops can carry an additional 2 kg for a computer?

 

[lobbie111]

You know what would be cool to see?

A HMG section carrying an M134 Minigun instead of a regular M240 or FN MAG. Not very practical but would be fun to look at.

However, there is talk of satellite targeting solutions for riflemen that will be fitted on their small personal computers. It's a good idea, but do you honestly think troops can carry an additional 2 kg for a computer?

A 2 kilo computer not likely, It was my thinking that troops will recieve a radio transmission device something like the MBTIR (the thales one) and a pda linked via a flexible cord that can do anything hardly 2kg of computer. You will say batteries, but they can be charged with solar power etc. I thin k you will find computers will become a large part of the soldier system

 

[Firn]

I personally think that in the near term alll western squads/platoons will have the abilityt to get direct informations by ISTAR sources and feed them into the Digital Battlefield management system. The input device (something like a robust PDA with a large display and long battery life) should also allow to control UAV/UGV indirectly (giving them a GO-TO grid or a path) and to some degree directly (when a UGV gets stuck). A Gamepad/Controller might be used to manipulate the UGV/UAV through the radio. But usually it should of course be controlled by somebody in the rear.


A rather large UAV section at the platoon/company level should be a huge asset and force multiplier. UAV's like Raven should of course be primarely launched and supported by AFV and firebases. The Tier I UAV Raven [ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XqFf-Li0ai4"]Raven[/ame]



In MOUT things like that would be great[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y4jtguSF0n4"]microdrone[/ame].
Tier II UAV could also become an organic capability at company level of the modular force depending on the operational situation. Here a Tier II [ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qlJ0wxe9QZE"]Scaneagle[/ame]



Things like Miniguns are of course impossible to carry and impossible to support. Even the MGL M32 is already very difficult to support (heavy ammunition, heavy weapon) in dismounted operations...

 

[OPSSG]

Rereading the first part I agree that it isn't clear that I focus on "western" forces.

For all the other armies which have not the wealth/allies to be sure to dominate the air, GBAD and especially Manpads are of very high importance...

@Firn,

I would like to give you a little feedback. You started the thread very well and some comments/ questions have taken it a little off-track. This is simply because of some minor conceptual misunderstanding in the comments. You should limit the discussion to infantry weapons and sensors. IMHO, sharpen the focus. Typically Manpads are a division asset or at the lowest a brigade asset (usually under attachment).

If you want, you can extend the discussion on sensors/tools/weapons used by MRRPs (medium range recce patrols) and LRRPs (long range recce patrols) and brigade level intelligence assets. Try not to go too broad - loss of focus means loss of ability to understand how a organic unit will operate.

Best Regards

 

[Firn]

OPSSG

I agreee with you assessment and it is good to have some feedback by members which have a different military experience. It is hard to keep the focus when talking about highly interconnected organizational layers and abilites. Most people with no military background have a hard time to understand them. I will try to keep at the squad/platoon level and point out which assets should/are at the company level.

 

[OPSSG]

@Firn,

Thanks for the kind reply.

IMHO, weight is key and there is a max. weight load beyond which soldiers in a section become ineffective. I can't speak for other armies but I can quote an example of load trials and equipment trials held by the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) in the late 1980s:

BG Leong was thankful for the opportunity as CO of an Army 2000 experimental battalion in 4 SIR. He was tasked to work on the reorganisation of the Army infantry battalion as part of the Army 2000 programme. This was an awesome responsibility that BG Leong met head on:

"[4 SIR] was to conduct a series of field trials and experiments. But experiments could fail! I was worried... but we learned to be creative and look for the best ways to measure and quantify our trial results. It was important to ensure that the findings and observations were correct and we spent much time designing checklists and repetitive actions."

These experiments and trials were not without their fair share of problems however, especially when it came to managing the morale of the men. 4 SIR had to undergo overseas training and evaluation in two countries within three months with little time in between:

"We went to two countries in the first year of our training. The soldiers were only seven months old and when we finished our first overseas training, we had 42 days to redesign trials before we went overseas again. Some soldiers and parents were very upset, and it was hard to manage that. I gave a CO talk to every soldier and showed them a simple training programme so that they could help communicate to their parents why we had to go for two overseas training in such a short period of time. In our second overseas training, the battalion conducted a total of nine Battalion Mission exercises in two weeks, always operating with full combat loads."

Besides concluding the battalion experiments successfully, BG Leong believed in pushing the boundaries and setting high standards and goals for his men. Telling of his proudest moments as CO, BG Leong recalled the 50 km fast march he ordered to test the capability and endurance of the battalion. This was done with full combat load over 16 hours:

"We walked overnight for 50km, and we finished at Chestnut Drive at about 6.00am. It was the single proudest moment when I received the last soldier at the end-point. I was proud of the fact that as infantry soldiers, there was not a single drop-out. Every one of the soldiers who started the march in Live Firing Area A arrived with pride at the end-point. I then happily declared a super long weekend for the Battalion without first clearing with my Brigade Commander."

The 50km fast march was a load trial, to see if we had overloaded the infantry section. That's a grunt's life and the 4th Singapore Infantry Regiment (4 SIR) are a infantry battalion comprised of normal conscripts.

Thanks to trials above, the SAF decided to equip our section fire teams with the Ultimax 100 (a section automatic weapon), disposable anti-tank/anti-wall weapons called the Matador and 40mm grenade launchers. Please see the video below:

[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZHx9rneYL88]Matador[/ame]

For us, other assets like 7.62mm general purpose machine guns, longer range anti-tank weapons and the mortar platoon are not section support weapons.

 

[Firn]

Could you please post how high the combat load was for the 50km march?

Weight is certainly key. In the Alpini not the distance but the altitude covered was considered "il criterio" the key beside the weight to estimate the difficulty to the march. The altitude and the grade and outline of the slopes covered play an even more important when using skies (only suited for experienced members). While the support by vehicles has become vastly better (especially with the Bv206) the mulo is sourly missed on alot of slopes. The Fresia replaces it very well on certain terrain but not at all on very rocky and steep one. But in training/combat it could lift a huge amount of weight from the soldiers (ammunition, water/food, sleeping equipment).

Although I not sure how exactly things are organized nowadays (the Alpini became as the whole army a volunteer force) it was clear that the Milan could only be meaningfully employed by a special section (poor guys) or/and with the support of the Fresia. The Panzerfaust was also very heavy but more suited for a squad. Togheter with a laser ranging device it is far more accurate at long ranges. The same goes for the UGL in 40mm. Given that especially on mountains you can carry just so much accuracy becomes even more important in such a terrain. And with the long ranges - you can see sometimes vehicles at distances from huge ranges (IIRC sometimes up to 40-50km, spotting scope) excellent fire support is the supreme asset.

 

[Firn]

Available/Near term Technology which will make a huge impact near term:

a) Light wearable sniper detections system like the vehicle mounted Boomerang combined with GPS: This enables a soldier to geolocate with rapid speed the sources of fire. Add the ability to feed it into the common digital battlefield map and everybody sees where the shooter fired from. This gives a huge, huge advantage over the enemy.... Kill cycles can be accelerated. Fire support can already start preparing for the fire mission.

b) Compact sound suppressors: Amazing how much they can cut the noise of war on your side. The greatly reduce the accoustic and especially the visable signature of the shot. The make shooting a lot easier, and greatly increase the hit probability in rapid semi-automatic and fullauto fire.

To be continued

 

[lastdingo]

...
b) The high volume of direct fire of the 1-2 machineguns: Delivered with weapons chambered in the 5,56 NATO capable of a sustainable ROF of 500-800 rpms
...The fighting load of some members of a marine squad is over 130 pounds - 50 pounds are usually considered to be the best combination of weight and capability.

That rate of fire is cyclic, not "sustainable" at all!
The full ammunition load for such a light machine gun would last only for about one minute of cyclic fire.
The barrel could only sustain twenty seconds, the spare barrel could sustain another twenty seconds. There's usually only one spare barrel being carried - if at all.



By the way; it's more useful to discuss general infantry platoons than to discuss squads. Important support for the infantry firefight should be platoon-level, not squad-level.
Good assault tactics even promote the use of dissimilar squads (assault / fire support), thus rendering standard squad discussions irrelevant.