Future of Ground Warfare

[levathan]

Hi all, I read this interesting theory in a book some time back.
The book talks about the rising cost of arming a soldier nowadays and what the author prediction about war.

Generally, general moblisation was first practiced in the west during the napoleonic wars. The relative low cost of equiping a soldier (just a firearm) meant that armies destroyed can be easily regenerated. Examples would be the Austrian and Prussian armies. However, the cost per soldier has went up tremendously since then. An armored or combined arms division nowadays would cost millions of dollars to equip which is why modern armies are shrinking in numbers.
The lesser numbers and cost to equip has resulted in a situation similar to that of navies ie Once destroyed, it will take years (if at all) to regenerate. As such, it will not be possible to fight long, all out wars in the future. Any future war will be intensive and short and that the victors will most likely be the one who strikes first.

Wonder what you guys think of this theory? Sometimes i look at the production rate of aircrafts nowadays and i wonder how anyone can fight a war when the factories can only produce a couple of aircrafts per year. In comparison, during WWII, Germany was constantly producing 50000 aircrafts per month despite the blockage and bombings.

 

[djxcaliber]

If you can tell us what the book is, I'd like to read it before I make any formal comments about the theory.

But based on what you've posted so far, I agree with the theory. You have to look at it this way: you get what you pay for. Quick regeneration does not necessarily mean you've got crappy soldiers or equipment, nor does a lengthy regeneration period mean that you've got supersoldiers. If a country wants quality soldiers in record time, and with other factors withheld, that country will have to dish out the cash for it.

The quality of the training, the quality of the equipment, and the particular mission a soldier is required to peform dictates how big or small the balance sheets will be. Today's world frowns upon attrition warfare (as history's witnessed in the previous world wars), so the emphasis on quality is alluring so long as the capital is there. Otherwise, countries resort to assymetric warfare or emphasize that "quantity has a quality of it's own".

 

[levathan]

Hi djxcaliber, sorry but offhand i can't remember what the title of the book is. I read it at least half a year ago and only discovered this forum a week ago
I'll try to find it again in the library and let you know.
Have anyone else read something similiar?

 

[djxcaliber]

No worries.

I'm also waiting for some of the more senior guys in here to give their two cents as well. I'm looking into a fresh perspective on this as well, or a reality check.

 

[Scorpius]

maybe we should have droids,droidekas,etc in the future.
In fact robots are starting to be used in security operations(no nothing like battle droids from SW hehe) like for bomb disposal ops in some countries.IIRC US is researching on robots for ground warfare (for communications during combat I think).

 

[funtz]

Technology will play a part in the future, it always has. There are plenty of examples in history.

Already there are systems which hope to make a networked soldier and an informed officer, even simple technological solutions like the corner shot do there bit in modernizing land forces, using machines is a possibility in future, however that entirely depends on breakthroughs in the field of AI and robotics

Germany was constantly producing 50000 aircrafts per month despite the blockage and bombings.

I have never heard this, why didn’t they just blocked the sun and starved there opponents.

War is a costly business, not worth fighting against an equal, however even in future there will always be unstable regions on this earth, military action will become more limited as it will be mostly against opponents with limited resources, however the basic structure of having an edge over others in terms of resources, technology and training will always remain there, many civilizations have came to power and faded away.

The cost of equipment also pays a lot back as they can serve more, the modern aircrafts/tanks/bombs etc. are also able to do that much more damage. The prime example being that fleet of B-2 Spirit USA possess, they were made with a amount of money that could fund a small nations annual budget, however they are able to destroy that small nation unchallenged.

The technological gap between nations will always remain there, as nations with a edge will keep on investing to keep that edge, which in turn justifies the investment as long as this edge can provide a source of profit (energy, dominance etc. etc.)

As for what might be, who knows people in the 1960s used to think by 2010 we will have robots doing all our work.

 

[Chrom]

As for what might be, who knows people in the 1960s used to think by 2010 we will have robots doing all our work.

Quite funny, they was right by 90%. Indeed, now most of the dirt work is done by robots. Humans just control them.

 

[levathan]

Agree with the comments about robots being more prevalent nowadays. However, you must agree the cost of a robot is not likely to be cheap so the theory still applies where war will be waged using fewer quantity of assets as compared to the past.
This in turn leads us to a point where even though the assets (robots, B2, F22 etc) can perform more tasks than in the past, they are still vulnerable to low cost or even obsolete weapons. Examples, a gun system can still bring down a B2 of F22 if they fly close enough, or in Iraq, even though the US troops are all equiped with all kinds of high-tech equipment, many are still being killed by home-made bombs.
It is possible that a high tech army can be defeated by a low tech army if the low tech force do not care about losses (eg Vietnam) and the high tech army once defeated stay defeated because they will not be able to regenerate or produce weapons to replace their losses in a short period of time.

 

[Stuart Mackey]

snip
The lesser numbers and cost to equip has resulted in a situation similar to that of navies ie Once destroyed, it will take years (if at all) to regenerate. As such, it will not be possible to fight long, all out wars in the future. Any future war will be intensive and short and that the victors will most likely be the one who strikes first.

Wonder what you guys think of this theory? Sometimes i look at the production rate of aircrafts nowadays and i wonder how anyone can fight a war when the factories can only produce a couple of aircrafts per year. In comparison, during WWII, Germany was constantly producing 50000 aircrafts per month despite the blockage and bombings.

I wonder when this book was published? because those arguments that it seems to advance, are the same arguments that were advanced pre 1914 as to why future wars would be short, and we all know how well that idea turned out.

 

[levathan]

Hi Mackey, I can't remember when the book was published but it's definitely in the past few years as i remember one section mentioning that even the russians can no longer afford to maintain or raise a 100 divisions army like they did in the past.

 

[Stuart Mackey]

Hi Mackey, I can't remember when the book was published but it's definitely in the past few years as i remember one section mentioning that even the russians can no longer afford to maintain or raise a 100 divisions army like they did in the past.

I think its probable that 100 divisions was beyond their economic capacity for peacetime but realistic for wartime? also, is that figure for the Russia of today or the old Soviet Union? two different entities. The distinction between peace and war is important.

 

[levathan]

I think its probable that 100 divisions was beyond their economic capacity for peacetime but realistic for wartime? also, is that figure for the Russia of today or the old Soviet Union? two different entities. The distinction between peace and war is important.

Hi Mackey, the 100 division was refering to the Soviet Union both during WWII (11 million soldiers in 1945) and during the cold war.

 

[Stuart Mackey]

Hi Mackey, the 100 division was refering to the Soviet Union both during WWII (11 million soldiers in 1945) and during the cold war.

Exactly. Given the collapse of the USSR, perhaps it is reasonable to say that the maintenance of a wartime footing in peacetime is not viable, but possible for the duration of a war? If so, then perhaps it follows that the author is writing from a false premise as nations habitually do not maintain their nations at a wartime footing during peacetime?. I admit that I have not read this book, but Its seems to me that the prosecution of a war is more a case of national will than any thing else.

 

[levathan]

Not really, a hundred division army was not that uncommon during the cold war, assuming 1 division has around 15000 soldiers, a hundred division will only need 1.5 million soldiers as opposed to the WWII soviet strength of 11million. So, I would say that for large countries, a 100 division is not out of the ordinary.

 

[shimmy]

reference?

I found an Associated Press article that might be the source of this thread:
wmal.com/Article.asp?id=487039&spid=

 

[levathan]

I found an Associated Press article that might be the source of this thread:
wmal.com/Article.asp?id=487039&spid=

Thks Shimmy, nice article, ties in with what i'm saying. But i don't think this is the source for the book i read or vice versa as the book was talking about naval forces and how destruction of a fleet means years of rebuilding, and how land forces are going the same way.

 

[Stuart Mackey]

Not really, a hundred division army was not that uncommon during the cold war, assuming 1 division has around 15000 soldiers, a hundred division will only need 1.5 million soldiers as opposed to the WWII soviet strength of 11million. So, I would say that for large countries, a 100 division is not out of the ordinary.

But obviously unsustainable during peace.

 

[kato]

Sometimes i look at the production rate of aircrafts nowadays and i wonder how anyone can fight a war when the factories can only produce a couple of aircrafts per year.

Ah, but factories can be quickly converted. Germany has this to the point where they supposedly only need to switch out the memory chips in CNC lathes to switch certain large industry factories to weapons production. A holdover from the Cold War pretty much, and i doubt it would ever be needed.

It's similar e.g. in the shipyard industry as well as the aircraft industry. Easily 80-90% are dedicated to commercial production in peacetime really. But few countries really keep purely military yards up. The know-how is spread throughout the industry, and wartime production figures could be a lot higher almost instantly.

With regard to manpower, true, the Cold War reserves have pretty much gone. The US Navy Reserve Fleet is rusting, the German reserve tank depots with thousands of tanks have swindled to a few hundred at most. The reserve structures (capable of raising divisions) have gone in most Western states, or have been transformed into semi-active deploying units (eg in the US).

If you look at more recent wars, it was really a nasty surprise that Yugoslavia held out as long as it did against NATO bombing, and ground war was really up for discussion the last few weeks. As for the quick-strike destructive power, if Egyptian radar units had picked up on the Israeli fighters in that first strike, the '73 War could have gone quite differently. And now in the 21st century, warfare is increasingly turning asymmetric too (not that we didn't already have that before). And that's a point where manpower increasingly becomes important again.

 

[Falstaff]

Sometimes i look at the production rate of aircrafts nowadays and i wonder how anyone can fight a war when the factories can only produce a couple of aircrafts per year. In comparison, during WWII, Germany was constantly producing 50000 aircrafts per month despite the blockage and bombings.

Mmh. The thing is, during WWII and WWI sooner or later the whole German economy was switched to "wartime mode" which means that all ressources were allocated to war-related production. And this makes the hole difference: Germany is (and was) one of the biggest economies in the world and it's traditionally strong in engineering. Think of how many million cars we're producing in one year! How many tool machines, trucks, trains, chemical plants and so on and so on and so on. Imagine how many consumer goods are produced for a wealthy 80 million people. Now imagine Germany (or any other well developed industrial country) switches all its ressources to producing military hardware and related stuff, money is not an issue for a few months. No doubt a Eurofighter needs a bit more ressources than a Bf (Me) 109 or a FW 190. But the outcome would be tremendous as well. I think a several hundred per month should easily be possible, along with several thousend Leos.

I agree with kato: manpower is the big issue here, not hardware.

 

[FutureTank]

I agree with kato: manpower is the big issue here, not hardware.

China easily has 1.5m infantry weapons, the there is your 100 divisions.
The question is in their effectiveness.
During WW2 only 25% of the Red Army's personnel were used in support roles as opposed to 35-40% in the Wehrmacht, and closer to 50% in the US Army.

During the Vietnam war the US Army had a 1:2 combat to support personnel ratio. What makes modern armed forces more lethal, but also more effective and therefore expensive, is the increased requirement for support personnel which is not 1:3 in ratio. The ACTUAL number of US forces employed to conduct the operations in Iraq are not the 130,000 average (over 4 years), but closer to 400,000 if not more. What the article sited in another post does not mention is that infantry soldiers at $17,500 tag are very cheap compared to some of their support comrades (not to degrade the role of the infantry in any way of course). In fact the US DoD has some 15,000 accountants to ensure costs are kept as low as possible, bit consider the driver of a HUMMWV, or divide the cost of the M1A2 between the four crew and two maintenance personnel. Some of the comms people routinely use millions of dollars of equipment in their daily work.

How much would 100 WW1-type infantry divisions achieve against 21st century modern divisions?

The changes that are coming will however drastically change the force structures because of the fuel issue. Remove petroleum products from the defence consumable list and you also remove much of the mobility that makes them lethal. Are there alternatives available?
A more aware (through advanced electronics) division which is immobile is far more vulnerable to low-tech opponents, and the future promises many of them.