Catalysts in warfare

[FutureTank]

At various times in various global regions ideas changed the conduct of war and granted victory to those who embraced them. These ideas were catalysts of change, and their proponents, agents of change.

Can these catalysts be defined and categorised?
Can their emergence be foreseen?
What is the process of innovation in warfare?
Does it always go hand-in-hand with technological innovation?

 

[Big-E]

The conduct of war reflects the values of society and their time. It is generally instigated by movements in the intelligensia.

 

[FutureTank]

The conduct of war reflects the values of society and their time. It is generally instigated by movements in the intelligensia.

You mean the sector of society which is usually against war?

 

[merocaine]

I hate one liners but defeat or a set back is the usual one

 

[wittmanace]

i think its seeing a decisive outcome. whether this is oneself losing or another side in another conflict outperforming expectation by some margin. for an example of the latter look at the gulf war 1 effect on the chinese military. i suspect this war was one major driving issue for the complete change in the chinese military, or at very least, the acceleration of the change and the change in mentality from numbers vs qualitative edge to an approach of attempting to reach parity or close to.

i do agree though that it also reflects society, such as the greater reliance and emphasis on stand off capabilities, and the need to end wars faster, at lower human cost. there is also the aspect of striving to avoid civilian casualties on the other side, as an example. this is a relatively recent phenomenon, given the long histroy of war.

 

[FutureTank]

an example of the latter look at the gulf war 1 effect on the chinese military. i suspect this war was one major driving issue for the complete change in the chinese military, or at very least, the acceleration of the change and the change in mentality from numbers vs qualitative edge to an approach of attempting to reach parity or close to.

I would disagree even if some commentators have tried to present the change in this way. There is no possible comparison of campaign in either of the wars with Iraq that can be applied to any scenario of a US conflict with China.

What is more, I would suggest that trajectory of US doctrinal development illustrates a lack of innovation which is best compared with that of the 'Prussian system' in the 18th century.

 

[wittmanace]

my point is not that the chinese change cam as a result of seeing the gulf war 1 as the way a sino-us war would develop, rather that they sought to emulate the us success, in adapting high tech solutions. if anything, i think the chinese saw the conflict as a matter of them being able to conduct the war in a manner similar to the way the coalition did, rather than considering the potential to be on the receiving end of the disaster as the iraqis were. i should have made that clearer. looking at my earlier post again, i think i should have elaborated that point.

 

[FutureTank]

my point is not that the chinese change came as a result of seeing the gulf war 1 as the way a sino-us war would develop, rather that they sought to emulate the us success, in adapting high tech solutions. if anything, i think the chinese saw the conflict as a matter of them being able to conduct the war in a manner similar to the way the coalition did, rather than considering the potential to be on the receiving end of the disaster as the iraqis were. i should have made that clearer. looking at my earlier post again, i think i should have elaborated that point.

Modernisation of the Chinese forces begun significnatly before the Kuwait War, so I don't think you can link US forces performence to have been a model for Chinese force development. Nor have they said anything about aspiring to match this performance. Aside from the realisation that they can not catch up in 1-2 decades what US took 5 decades to achieve, it seesm to me tha tthe thinking in Beijing is still very much "defeat the enemy before a shot is fired" philosophy (or better, withour firing any shots).

Keep in mind that US major claim to superiority is the ability to use offensive use of airpower. However offensive airpower has failed on numerous occasions in history, and has not been ignored by China. One notable example is the German offensive over England in 1940-41, and the Chinese are very mindfull of this example in respect of their own strategic scenarios. The other even more telling example is the preference to use nuclear weapons by the US (granted without full knowledge of the effects of radiation) rather then fight it out in the air over Japan, although the capability was there.

The Chinese have always preached patience in strategy. It seems to me their real target is Japan rather then US, and after Iraq I think they will pursue a more aggressive policy in the region.

 

[Ths]

I have no clear idea of catalyst of warfare, such as I understand the term defined here; but I'll like to give a contribution.

1. Technological Change. Example: The German raise to Naval Power as a result of the ability to cast steel in large quantity. This meant that some of the traditional naval powers got lost by the wayside because some of the traditional requirements for naval power was less relevant. I.e. seamanship and ability to build good seaworthy ships. Many of the Battleships were terrible ships.

2. Sudden influx of wealth. The renaissance demand for copper for guns really meant that Sweden was litteraly digging money out of the ground. This lead to a short period in history when Sweden was a major power. The break through of Alexander the Great can in my view in no small way be attributed to his inheritence of a goldmine - and the capture of the Persian war chest.

3 might be a subset; but economic development was no doubt behind the forming of Germany (railroads) - thus the appearence of Germany as such on the stage of war.

 

[FutureTank]

Ths, yes, you are giving examples of change that affected warfare, and there are many of these at different levels of application. Technology is actually a subset of the economic development, with most application being a derivative of civilian application.

I did a study of the impact of technological change on warfare in the late 19th century. I was surprised to find that many potentially significant innovations and inventions were not selected for use by military for months or even years from their invention. In fact I could not find a pattern for induction of invantion and innovation by the military in an age no less, and may be more saturated in change then our own time.

It does seem to me that the 'vital' ingredient in technology becoming a force of change is the coming together of the promoter of technology and an individual with the foresight for its implementation (not always as intended). Such individuals are quite often seen by their collegues as 'unusual' in their thinking.

 

[Pinky]

Maybe one could say doctrinal changes and technological changes alternate, prompting each other in turn?

For instance, the French adoption of massive fortifications in the late 1870's through the beginning of WW1 in increasing sophistication resulted in a doctrinal change on the part of the Germans to deal with the forts with firepower (which turned out to be just as effective on armies in the field as the forts), which resulted in the development of modern Howitzers and Mortars, howevever the opportunity to develop a set of heavier-hitting, faster-moving weapons wouldn't have been possible without a hydraulic recoil system, which the French had already invented.

Or, thinking about it a little more, it's really doctrinal change vs doctrinal change, with each doctrinal advance casting about for any off-the-shelf technology that might be available to fulfil it. Faced with Germans using firepower and combined arms tactics, the allies decided the solution was a "breakthrough." So they developed and used tanks to try and break the German line. Unfortunately the tank's time was not yet come and they hadnt' developed methods for exploiting a break in the line (if they could ever make one.) Of course by the 30's the demands of the doctrine ended up bringing viable machines and formations into being.

So... the French adopted the old idea of a chain of forts in depth.

The Germans responded by creating a firepower doctrine to deal with forts that involved the new off-the-shelf French recoil system applied to howitzers.

So the allies responded by trying to develop tanks to support the concept of a breakthrough even though the technology wasn't yet ready for the concept, but which later caused it to be fully developed.

However the Allies never really mastered the Firepower or Combined Arms doctrine the Germans were using against them, even though they had the technology for it all along, even prior to the war.

...so, using WW1 as an illustration, it seems like doctrinal changes bring on doctrinal responses which introduce existing technology for the first time or stimulate development of new technology.


As for Alexander and Philip, surely the doctrinal response to hoplite warfare resulted in the faster-moving, denser, farther-reaching phalanx? (along with the use of a refused/back-echeloned flank with meticulous drill?) ...and surely this in turn made all further conquest possible?

As for the gold mine, Philip made an offer to "protect" Crenides from Thracian "aggression" and then moved in with soldiers and miners once he got an invitation. (most likely an invitation solicited by Philip in the first place) However this didn't make the Phalanx possible, as Philip had already learned most of the concepts in Theban captivity and then had already created a heavily drilled infantry along those lines and used it to beat the Illyrians.

 

[FutureTank]

Maybe one could say doctrinal changes and technological changes alternate, prompting each other in turn?

For instance, the French adoption of massive fortifications in the late 1870's through the beginning of WW1 in increasing sophistication resulted in a doctrinal change on the part of the Germans to deal with the forts with firepower (which turned out to be just as effective on armies in the field as the forts), which resulted in the development of modern Howitzers and Mortars, howevever the opportunity to develop a set of heavier-hitting, faster-moving weapons wouldn't have been possible without a hydraulic recoil system, which the French had already invented.

Or, thinking about it a little more, it's really doctrinal change vs doctrinal change, with each doctrinal advance casting about for any off-the-shelf technology that might be available to fulfil it. Faced with Germans using firepower and combined arms tactics, the allies decided the solution was a "breakthrough." So they developed and used tanks to try and break the German line. Unfortunately the tank's time was not yet come and they hadnt' developed methods for exploiting a break in the line (if they could ever make one.) Of course by the 30's the demands of the doctrine ended up bringing viable machines and formations into being.

So... the French adopted the old idea of a chain of forts in depth.

The Germans responded by creating a firepower doctrine to deal with forts that involved the new off-the-shelf French recoil system applied to howitzers.

So the allies responded by trying to develop tanks to support the concept of a breakthrough even though the technology wasn't yet ready for the concept, but which later caused it to be fully developed.

However the Allies never really mastered the Firepower or Combined Arms doctrine the Germans were using against them, even though they had the technology for it all along, even prior to the war.

...so, using WW1 as an illustration, it seems like doctrinal changes bring on doctrinal responses which introduce existing technology for the first time or stimulate development of new technology.

Interesting...I wonder why I didn't think of it but it was staring me in the face for years!

What you are saying is that there is a kind of 'attractor' that causes military doctrine to swing between defencive and offensive ideas.
The greater the 'swing' one way or the other, the greater the 'motivator force' (for want of a better expression) to counteract it.

Its a kind of sine wave...

 

[Ths]

Future tank

I don't think it is an attractor thing.

I think the nature is that offensive/defensive:movement/fortification:artillery/cavalry/infantry relationships move towards an equlibrium:

1. These movements have a momentum of their own which makes them pass the equilibrium.
2. Economic and technological changes shift the equilibrium temporaly. You can se this illustrated by the stability of the Roman Empire: For centuries the had squabbles on the eastern boarder and on their northern boarder - which were quite stable. There was NO technological development during the period and trade was quite stable.
On the other hand: Krupp did what they could to destabilise technologically.
They constructed new guns all the time; but only marketed them after the German Army had bought the old ones to the hilt. The older model was then marketed to secondary powers on the Balkan f.i. And as soon as those markets were milked dry. Then the next technological wonder was marketed and the merry-go-round could continue. Unfortunately WW1 started by mistake and put an end to this profitable circus.

 

[merocaine]

It seems to me militaries are rather conservative, (Like any large publicly funded org!)they will resist change if it means a loss of social status, so along with doctirine, technology, one must put in social order.
I suppose the use of cavalry in western and central europe in the 2nd world war would be an example. World War 1 had shown that there was no future in cavalry, but the old guard proved them selfs remarkably resesitant to change. The same with the Samari and the marmalukes, Consription and gun powder ment there skills became oboslete, but that did'ent stop them trying to suppress the knowladge.
If we look around at todays armys (paratroopers!) are there arms that have become superflous? But hang on due to the prestiage of past victorys?

 

[Ths]

The conservatism is one of the factors that create the momentum that makes change pass the equilibrium.

 

[merocaine]

The conservatism is one of the factors that create the momentum that makes change pass the equilibrium.

I dont quite get what you mean

 

[Rich]

If we look around at todays armys (paratroopers!) are there arms that have become superflous? But hang on due to the prestiage of past victorys?

Airborne regiments are as important today as they have ever been. The decrease in size in many powerful systems, and their increase in lethality, has made airborne light infantry as good an investment today as it ever was. The dinosaurs of military systems are many of those big ticket items, with a lot of egos and careers behind them, that were designed for the cold war scenario on European battlefields that never happened.

With the recent garroting of Saddam there will be many military planners who will study why he failed in his wars of conquest. I'd say he failed in Kuwait because he stopped in Kuwait and allowed the Yank led coalition to build up its conventional forces to a point where everyone knew the Iraqis were dead except Saddam. Imagine if Saddam hadn't stopped at Kuwait and didn't allow the coalition the time to build up its Cold War NATO forces? What then? He did the same thing with the Iranians. He would advance 10 miles with his armor and then dig a ditch.

There are a couple of hot spots where we can pre-position military assets but generally we are going to have to get smaller, faster, and more mobile. Nothing fits that bill more then airborne regiments and stuff you can chuck out the back of a C-130.

 

[Ths]

Let me give an example:

The period leading up to WW1 the conservatism of the cavalry was up against the artillery, and as the cavalry's position slowly crumbled:

They were left only with recce, as the movement of large formations was hampered by the longer range of artillery, but primarely by infantry transported by rail - and taxi.

As the cavalry crumbled, the artillery took over big time, just think of the masses of guns that rained innumerable amounts of shells into the same piece of dirt. This meant that artillery had moved past the equilibrium and was more or less considered the silver bullet.

The answer was a third place: With the infantry and new infatry tactics, as outlined by Rommel in "Infanterie Greift An".
The title is in itself somewhat a contradiction in terms, as unprotected infantry is not supposed to storm in the face of heavy artillery.

The traditional paper, knife, stone game of artillery, infantry, cavalry was turned upside down. The role of artillery had passed the equilibrium - which it since regained with the advent of the tank.

 

[Ths]

Rich is in my view pointing out another equilibrium:

Light/motorised.
Medium/mechanised.
Heavy/armoured.

I prefer the weight designations, as they are more permanent and general than the actual taxi company they use.
And I do agree that light infantry is perhaps one of the things there is to little of - due to the legacy of the cold war with its massive amounts of heavy armour. Personally I'm looking for a renovation of the medium forces.

 

[FutureTank]

offensive/defensive:movement/fortification:artillery/cavalry/infantry relationships move towards an equlibrium.

Not at all.
The objective of militaries is to create a condition of easiest victory. Therefore the equilibrium is the worst state of affairs when offensive and defencive 'forces' are in a state of ballance.

Unballancing the enemy is the goal of most tactical, operational and strategic methods. Hence the catalyst...the sudden change in balance which rapidly swings the advantage one way or another.