only if each of the fighters were using LPI radar and whose local RWR did not pick up (identify) the targeting from the launch platform's radar...then they would probably not be notified until the missile's seeker went active....i would imagine, yes. otherwise, i would imagine the RWR would pick up the targeting emissions as early-warning before or at launch
Certainly not ARH missiles don't need a specific lock-on illumination mode unlike SAHR missiles. You launch ARH missiles in TWS mode, the mode won't change so there is no sign about a missile being launched or not. But it is necessary to take into account that an increasing number of modern combat aircraft is equiped with missile approach warners. Wether those are effective enough to detect an AAM at long ranges is questionable however.
understood - it is entirely too basic a conclusion that i drew. this might be an obvious question (but i cant recall seeing it here recently) - but what is holding back from incorporating LPI onto/into the missile seeker? is the technology too expensive? does it require newer technology AESA - that might not be able to be fit into such a small package? is there even a requirement for this, since generally when the missile goes active it's already NEZ - and with the high-g turn rate of the missile, it's not really a necessity whether the target knows he's being painted at that point/end-game?
Well LPI is just an umbrella term. It merely indicates the effort to reduce detectability of RF emissions and this can be achieved by various means. Frequent changes of the signal characteristics such as frequency (frequency hopping) at best occuring randomley, meaning that those signals can't be identified by repeating patterns, power managing the signal to avoid unnecessary poweroutputs, focussing emissions in areas of interest etc. all reduce detectability. If there aren't repeating patterns and just small transmissions, at best multiple at once at different frequencies the receiver might be overfed as it simply can't scope with so many signals and as there is no pattern which can be identified the software/algorithms of some RWR's must just sort out the signals as it can't adquately process them or discards it as background noise. LPI is not an AESA inherent design feature, but agile beam steering and the ability to focus narrow beams at a target or use even multiple beams at once offers opportunities which can't be provided by a mechanically scanning radar. MSA radars can still incoorperate LPI techniques, but not to the extend of an AESA radar.
regarding RWR's and radar patters - i know i have read about decoys that give off fighter/specific platform emissions (e.g. to make/trick the enemy think there is a fighter overhead, and to light up its radar - giving away it's position)..but is this used in combat (EW) at all? wouldn't it be a great advantage to have a platform give off multiple radar patterns/emissions for multiple types of fighter platforms concurrently - and (falsely / false positive) overwhelm the enemy's RWR; essentially making his RWR useless/non-trustable?
i suppose for US forces (systems umbrella/AWACs/SA) - it wouldn't be an issue and root cause/confirmation could be easily identified (via confirmation of contacts from AWACS)... but for another force who doesn't have that luxury, im curious what the procedure or protocol would be for independent fighters/patrols who suddenly start seeing phantom contacts via the RWR. is/would that element of confusion be of any advantage?
I could be mistaken, but I believe you are thinking of standoff munitions like JSOW, JASSM and other equivalents. These are munitions which are intended to carry out strikes on ground/ship targets at mid to long range. In order to carry a large enough warhead, an advanced guidance system and sufficient fuel to reach the desired targets it results in a fairly large missile. There have been sig management efforts to make it more difficult to detect or destroy these missiles while they are inbound.This is kind of stupid, and I'm not 100% positive
But don't several country's have programs for "Stealth Missiles"
There is a lot of Rumors that the Russian Su-27SM will be armed with them
AFAIK a 'standoff' munition is one that can be launched against a target that is not directly observable by the launching aircraft at the time of launch. In other words, LGB are not standoff weapons because the launching aircraft needs to be close enough to the target to either laze it, or tell that someone/something else is.
please correct your grammatical errors in order that the rest of us can read your posts more easily.
Next time please read the thread more carefully