Brigade and Regiment
- Thread starter Scorpius
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That differs from country to country and often enough it has much to do with tradition.
In Germany a regiment normally consist just of one type of unit (Anti-Air, medical units, artillery, engineers, etc...) while brigades are combined arms units consisting of tanks, mechanized infantry, combat engineers, artillery, ...
In Germany a regiment normally consist just of one type of unit (Anti-Air, medical units, artillery, engineers, etc...) while brigades are combined arms units consisting of tanks, mechanized infantry, combat engineers, artillery, ...
very similer explanation...eg RAR is royal australian regiment,and is infantry.Comrises of 6-9 battalians...1RAR,2RAR,3RAR etc...all infanrtry corp. A brigade ussually consists of 2-3 infantry bns,an Artillery unit,engineers,logistics,armour etc and is a deployable war fighting unit, comanded (in Australia) by a brigadier...(brigade brigadeir ...get it). A division is 3 brigades and comded by a Major General...I think!
enigmaticuk
New Member
Similar in US army, Brigade or Brigade Combat Team (BCT) is commanded by a Full Bird Colonel and consists of a variety of units from different regiments. You may have an infantry regiment with battalions in different divisions altogether. There are some regiments which fight as a combined force such as the Armoured Cavalry Regiments. A BCT can employ many battalions and is structured with 3-4 other BCTs to form a Division. These names are being changed to Units of action, units of emplyment and some other levels as the army is restructured. Perhaps another poster has more info on this?
enigmaticuk
New Member
Brigadier Generals BG's can command brigades but in US army once they recieve their star they will move up to a division position. ADCM or ADCS assistant division commander manouver/support. Or they could go to a staff position depending on which track they choose. Then a two star Major General usually commands a division with a three star taking command of a corps.
So swedish regiment would be more likely translated as garrison?? In finnish army, most of the old regiments of our acient divisional structure were converted to brigades back in the 50's and they usually were added whit battalion or two of field artillery and related support branches that allows brigade to operate as independent manouvere echelon, were as regiments were more tied to the divisional command and relyed upon its support units, not having any of their own. But then again, Divisions usually had artillery regiment whit two ligth battalions and one heavy battalion of field artillery, but in the new brigades had usually only two battalions. During my army time, is served in Karelia Artillery regiment, which was the fire support branch of the Karelian brigade, normal mechanised infantry unit. Thougth our unit was called regiment, it was mere a battalion strength consisting four batteryes and was treaded similar as infantry, singal, engineering and air defence battalion despite its fancy name....
So to determ difference between regiment and brigade is as clear as to definate difference between destroyer and frigate. It may look clear but in the end, there are as much exceptions as there are armyes so some single way explanation of who it is done in US army or in GB related nations isent good answer.
So to determ difference between regiment and brigade is as clear as to definate difference between destroyer and frigate. It may look clear but in the end, there are as much exceptions as there are armyes so some single way explanation of who it is done in US army or in GB related nations isent good answer.
I made a mistake in my last post... Gollevainen was right - I was describing "garrison" not "regiment".I have a question related to the subject. All armed forces have groups of 5-10 soldiers, but which armed forces has a word for two-three groups?
I can't find any translation of the swedish word "tropp".
a in here we divide normal section to a two to three man half-section. But I believe that the word tropp could be same as troop or lance, which was (to my recall) in the good old days a cavalry formation of the actual knigth, squrre and page....
contedicavour
New Member
In Italy a regiment is a 1,000 - 1,500 unit including a combat battallion (700-800 strong) with several supporting companies (engineers, communications, logistics).
Our 16 brigades are made up of 4 to 7 regiments each, almost always including one dedicated artillery regiment and one dedicated engineers/logistics regiment. The others vary (the armoured brigade has 3 MBT regiments, the cavalry brigade has 4 armoured cavalry regiments, etc).
The smallest Italian brigade (Sassari) has 3,500 troops, the biggest (Ariete) well over 6,000.
cheers
Our 16 brigades are made up of 4 to 7 regiments each, almost always including one dedicated artillery regiment and one dedicated engineers/logistics regiment. The others vary (the armoured brigade has 3 MBT regiments, the cavalry brigade has 4 armoured cavalry regiments, etc).
The smallest Italian brigade (Sassari) has 3,500 troops, the biggest (Ariete) well over 6,000.
cheers
To answer we'll have to go back to first principles.
Classically the regiment is the training and forming unit of Bataillions. Take the classical German Army (allway go there if you want principles):
1. recruit btn (conscripts in basic training 0-6 months of service) the reason for basic training of 6 months: It takes 3 months to build muscle and a further 3 to make bones and sinews follow. Before that time the conscripts cannot take the strain of training in company and batallion formation.
2. training btn (conscripts in unit training company and btn levels 6-12 months service)
3. and 4. btn (conscripts in active service ready for immediate action, service 1-2 years).
5. and 6. btn mobilisation reserve: 2 btn's that have just served under one year ago.
7. and 8. btn mobilisation reserve: 3 btn's served from between 1 and 2 years before.
AFAIR after that the conscripts were transferred to reserve regiments responsible for annual call-up refresher training the next 4 years.
AFAIR after that the conscript went into Landsturm - i.e. troops needing considerable training to get back to combat standard.
Repeat: Regiment is a training an forming unit, where everybody knows each other; but some (NCO's and Officers included) have function; but not training or rank. I.e. You can have a Lieutenant commanding a company, while he is training and awaiting his promotion to captain.
Brigades "brigades" batallions of different arms: Arty, Cav and Inf in combined arms.
That's the principle.
There has been a general movement towards brigading at lower levels:
In WW1 the typical division consisted of "clean" infantry regiments with brigading at corps level.
In WW2 the typical division consisted of a combination of regiments of different arms.
During the cold war a division was a made up of similar brigades that combined bataillions of different arms.
Today a combined arms btn combines companies of different arms.
I KNOW there is a host of exceptions; but for a rough first approxomation it should serve.
Classically the regiment is the training and forming unit of Bataillions. Take the classical German Army (allway go there if you want principles):
1. recruit btn (conscripts in basic training 0-6 months of service) the reason for basic training of 6 months: It takes 3 months to build muscle and a further 3 to make bones and sinews follow. Before that time the conscripts cannot take the strain of training in company and batallion formation.
2. training btn (conscripts in unit training company and btn levels 6-12 months service)
3. and 4. btn (conscripts in active service ready for immediate action, service 1-2 years).
5. and 6. btn mobilisation reserve: 2 btn's that have just served under one year ago.
7. and 8. btn mobilisation reserve: 3 btn's served from between 1 and 2 years before.
AFAIR after that the conscripts were transferred to reserve regiments responsible for annual call-up refresher training the next 4 years.
AFAIR after that the conscript went into Landsturm - i.e. troops needing considerable training to get back to combat standard.
Repeat: Regiment is a training an forming unit, where everybody knows each other; but some (NCO's and Officers included) have function; but not training or rank. I.e. You can have a Lieutenant commanding a company, while he is training and awaiting his promotion to captain.
Brigades "brigades" batallions of different arms: Arty, Cav and Inf in combined arms.
That's the principle.
There has been a general movement towards brigading at lower levels:
In WW1 the typical division consisted of "clean" infantry regiments with brigading at corps level.
In WW2 the typical division consisted of a combination of regiments of different arms.
During the cold war a division was a made up of similar brigades that combined bataillions of different arms.
Today a combined arms btn combines companies of different arms.
I KNOW there is a host of exceptions; but for a rough first approxomation it should serve.
The historical explanation is very nice. Thanks for that.
There were two main brigade types during cold war. The tank brigade (Panzerbrigade) and mechanized infantry brigade (Panzergrenadierbrigade).
I would also call the rest of the brigades (light infantry, airborne infantry, mountain infantry,...) exceptions but not these two main forms as they formed the core of the NATO forces in germany.
But I think this is not quite right and not just an exception.
There were two main brigade types during cold war. The tank brigade (Panzerbrigade) and mechanized infantry brigade (Panzergrenadierbrigade).
I would also call the rest of the brigades (light infantry, airborne infantry, mountain infantry,...) exceptions but not these two main forms as they formed the core of the NATO forces in germany.
Waylander:
Sure! Brigading is cherry picking for what you need for a specific mission.
The cold war meant 2:1 brigades in infantry and panzer. You even had an engineering brigade.
This is where the flaw of these general rules shows itself: when the exceptions are more common than the rule (a bit like tax law). Jyske Division had 3 brigades with art, cav and inf.
The area where the diffent units of a brigade has to be in harmony is in mobility and protection.
Sure! Brigading is cherry picking for what you need for a specific mission.
The cold war meant 2:1 brigades in infantry and panzer. You even had an engineering brigade.
This is where the flaw of these general rules shows itself: when the exceptions are more common than the rule (a bit like tax law). Jyske Division had 3 brigades with art, cav and inf.
The area where the diffent units of a brigade has to be in harmony is in mobility and protection.
FutureTank
Banned Member
purpose/mission
It seems to me the question is not one of difference in the name, but purpose for employment.
Armies plan for operations, and generally have some idea what will be required to achieve given objectives.
Some types of objectives require companies, some battalions and some armies to acheive them.
A brigade is the type of force that contains sufficient resources to acheive objectives for which a regiment is too underpowered and a division is too cumbersome.
Much of the confusion in these identities is created by historical application.
The British are at fault by having for much of their history regiments that consisted of a single battalion (and now even company) otside of the times of war.
Elsewhere regiments are retained for legacy reasons, and can have as many as 5-6 battalions (USA) or 25-26 battalions (India). However these battalions need not serve as part of the same formation, or even all exist at the same time.
A brigade is a formation because it seeks to combine non-homogenous arm and service units into a single tactical framework. This was their purpose from first use when infantry were first combined with relatively mobile guns and later had cavalry added.
The Soviet Army reconstituted brigades after several decades when they realised that in Afghanistan a motor-rifle division is too unwieldy as a force. Consequently some were reformed as brigades with reduced staffs and with their tank and SAM regiments removed from establishment.
In the case of Australia, the Army maintains the British regimental tradition, but has always brigaded the battalions, with only the Royal Australian Regiment having more then two (all other regiments have two battalions because the first battalion was raised for WW1, and the second for WW2). However in operational roles the Australian brigades are roughly regimental in size when compared to the Soviet model and light brigades when compared to Western model.
Cheers
Greg
It seems to me the question is not one of difference in the name, but purpose for employment.
Armies plan for operations, and generally have some idea what will be required to achieve given objectives.
Some types of objectives require companies, some battalions and some armies to acheive them.
A brigade is the type of force that contains sufficient resources to acheive objectives for which a regiment is too underpowered and a division is too cumbersome.
Much of the confusion in these identities is created by historical application.
The British are at fault by having for much of their history regiments that consisted of a single battalion (and now even company) otside of the times of war.
Elsewhere regiments are retained for legacy reasons, and can have as many as 5-6 battalions (USA) or 25-26 battalions (India). However these battalions need not serve as part of the same formation, or even all exist at the same time.
A brigade is a formation because it seeks to combine non-homogenous arm and service units into a single tactical framework. This was their purpose from first use when infantry were first combined with relatively mobile guns and later had cavalry added.
The Soviet Army reconstituted brigades after several decades when they realised that in Afghanistan a motor-rifle division is too unwieldy as a force. Consequently some were reformed as brigades with reduced staffs and with their tank and SAM regiments removed from establishment.
In the case of Australia, the Army maintains the British regimental tradition, but has always brigaded the battalions, with only the Royal Australian Regiment having more then two (all other regiments have two battalions because the first battalion was raised for WW1, and the second for WW2). However in operational roles the Australian brigades are roughly regimental in size when compared to the Soviet model and light brigades when compared to Western model.
Cheers
Greg
Future tank:
I generally agree with You; but a nitpicking detail: Regiments are not underpowered in relation to brigades, they are wrongly powered in the sense that they in principle don't combine arms.
The reorganisation of the Soviet Divisions in the 1980'ies is quite a subject;
The Motorrifle divisions lost their tank regiment, probably to create more armoured divisions. In my interpretation is that was due to a realisation, that the first assault need all the protection it could get; but at the same time increased the gap between 1. and 2. wave.
Secondly there is no doubt that the air defence of the division was quite a challenge - at one point I counted 4-5 different missile systems in addition to fighters. Coordinating these would be difficult enough; but a clear nightmare for a division on the move. Especially the 2. and 3. wave would have suffered massive losses from Tornadoes coming from in all directions in 100' spewing mines and cluster bombs left, right and center.
I generally agree with You; but a nitpicking detail: Regiments are not underpowered in relation to brigades, they are wrongly powered in the sense that they in principle don't combine arms.
The reorganisation of the Soviet Divisions in the 1980'ies is quite a subject;
The Motorrifle divisions lost their tank regiment, probably to create more armoured divisions. In my interpretation is that was due to a realisation, that the first assault need all the protection it could get; but at the same time increased the gap between 1. and 2. wave.
Secondly there is no doubt that the air defence of the division was quite a challenge - at one point I counted 4-5 different missile systems in addition to fighters. Coordinating these would be difficult enough; but a clear nightmare for a division on the move. Especially the 2. and 3. wave would have suffered massive losses from Tornadoes coming from in all directions in 100' spewing mines and cluster bombs left, right and center.
FutureTank
Banned Member
Brigade vs Regiment and Russian use
Far be it from me to disagree with a Denmark professional, but it seems to me there needs to be a rather clear distinction between unit identity as a historical legacy and as a tactical unit of employment.
In the 'West' a regiment is of type 1, i.e. a largely administrative entity that retains historical legacy of the unit which in some countries goes back to the 16th century. The regiment may be formed from anything between a couple of companies and several battalions, but are employed as part of a brigade that is a combined arms tactical unit of employment configured for its role in a given area of operation in accordance with national doctrine. This is why the NATO brigades are all generally same in tactical structure although they use different equipment.
In the Soviet Union, and now Russia, the regiment has been of the type 2, i.e. a tactical unit of employment. The Soviet regiment, and it's Russian inheritor is a combined arms unit of employument similar in tactical structure to a NATO brigade. There is a degree of confusion on the structure of Soviet forces due to 15 tank and 25 motor-rifle tables of establishment existing in the Soviet Army since the reforms of the 60s. However the regiments do have a standard five-battalion + supporting arms and services structure. This is because according to Soviet quantitive assessment this is the fire density required on a given frontage in given combat situation.
In the 60s however it was realised that scientific assessment of combat can not account for all eventualities. From that period there begun a steady adjustment of force structure to mission (subject to consideration of terrain and expected opposition in the theatre). That was also when the Naval Infantry and Helicopter Infantry were created. A number of divisions within the All Arms Armies became brigades, though this was less noticable in Europe. There a number of divisions changed their standard structure to include a greater proportion of infantry.
In the West the discussion of restructuring forces to dispense with divisions was borne from two factors - post Cold War force reduction due to perceived change in threats, and the C3I enhancements which made brigade staffs more independent of the previously required higher echelon assets.
In the former Soviet Union and Russia doctrine rather then budgetry considerations and technology guided creation of brigades. Although the Russian Army had downsized considerably in the last decade, its structure has not changed, and the equipment placed in storage had followed a direct division-to-storage complex conversion (for example 43 Motor rifle division would become 5463rd storage complex). The brigades that do exist in the Russian Army are not there because of reduction in forces or improved C3I (though the last iss being rapidly implemented also), but because that is the size of force required to acheive a given tactical mission. It seems to me that Russians think of brigades as more compact and manageable divisions, and most Russian brigades were divisions in the past. Interestingly the staffs from divisions were retained, but this was not seen as a demotion because the brigades attained what is seen as a 'special' status not in the Special Forces sense, but in that they have a specialized structure to acheive special missions.
Sometimes the nature of missions led to neither the division nor brigade to be used. This is the case in the Caucasus where the Group of Forces consists of three bases (12,62 and 102), but these were formed on 145th, 147th and 127th motor-rifle divisions. Looking at their structure one can easily see the specialized nature of their 'base' structures and how these are really brigades by other name. All three are missing a MRR each, there are no tank regiments, and most MRR have their tank battalions reduced to a company of 10 or 13. However the 102 'base' has an independent tank battalion of its 127th division structure retained. Two of the artillery regiments retained the D-30 towed pieces although there is no shortage of the SP artillery, and the number of Grad pieces varies from base to base.
This sort of mission-tailored structure is not new to Soviet Army which learned the hard way to combine and recombine forces in the early period of WW2, and later from German add-hoc kampfgrupe formation. They had learned from history without being trapped in it. If the Preobrazhensky regiment was to be reconstituted in the new Russian Army, it will not serve to change Russian doctrine, and will not contain a single infantry battalion, but will rather assume the structure appropriate to it's mission wherever it is stationed.
Cheers
Greg
Far be it from me to disagree with a Denmark professional, but it seems to me there needs to be a rather clear distinction between unit identity as a historical legacy and as a tactical unit of employment.
In the 'West' a regiment is of type 1, i.e. a largely administrative entity that retains historical legacy of the unit which in some countries goes back to the 16th century. The regiment may be formed from anything between a couple of companies and several battalions, but are employed as part of a brigade that is a combined arms tactical unit of employment configured for its role in a given area of operation in accordance with national doctrine. This is why the NATO brigades are all generally same in tactical structure although they use different equipment.
In the Soviet Union, and now Russia, the regiment has been of the type 2, i.e. a tactical unit of employment. The Soviet regiment, and it's Russian inheritor is a combined arms unit of employument similar in tactical structure to a NATO brigade. There is a degree of confusion on the structure of Soviet forces due to 15 tank and 25 motor-rifle tables of establishment existing in the Soviet Army since the reforms of the 60s. However the regiments do have a standard five-battalion + supporting arms and services structure. This is because according to Soviet quantitive assessment this is the fire density required on a given frontage in given combat situation.
In the 60s however it was realised that scientific assessment of combat can not account for all eventualities. From that period there begun a steady adjustment of force structure to mission (subject to consideration of terrain and expected opposition in the theatre). That was also when the Naval Infantry and Helicopter Infantry were created. A number of divisions within the All Arms Armies became brigades, though this was less noticable in Europe. There a number of divisions changed their standard structure to include a greater proportion of infantry.
In the West the discussion of restructuring forces to dispense with divisions was borne from two factors - post Cold War force reduction due to perceived change in threats, and the C3I enhancements which made brigade staffs more independent of the previously required higher echelon assets.
In the former Soviet Union and Russia doctrine rather then budgetry considerations and technology guided creation of brigades. Although the Russian Army had downsized considerably in the last decade, its structure has not changed, and the equipment placed in storage had followed a direct division-to-storage complex conversion (for example 43 Motor rifle division would become 5463rd storage complex). The brigades that do exist in the Russian Army are not there because of reduction in forces or improved C3I (though the last iss being rapidly implemented also), but because that is the size of force required to acheive a given tactical mission. It seems to me that Russians think of brigades as more compact and manageable divisions, and most Russian brigades were divisions in the past. Interestingly the staffs from divisions were retained, but this was not seen as a demotion because the brigades attained what is seen as a 'special' status not in the Special Forces sense, but in that they have a specialized structure to acheive special missions.
Sometimes the nature of missions led to neither the division nor brigade to be used. This is the case in the Caucasus where the Group of Forces consists of three bases (12,62 and 102), but these were formed on 145th, 147th and 127th motor-rifle divisions. Looking at their structure one can easily see the specialized nature of their 'base' structures and how these are really brigades by other name. All three are missing a MRR each, there are no tank regiments, and most MRR have their tank battalions reduced to a company of 10 or 13. However the 102 'base' has an independent tank battalion of its 127th division structure retained. Two of the artillery regiments retained the D-30 towed pieces although there is no shortage of the SP artillery, and the number of Grad pieces varies from base to base.
This sort of mission-tailored structure is not new to Soviet Army which learned the hard way to combine and recombine forces in the early period of WW2, and later from German add-hoc kampfgrupe formation. They had learned from history without being trapped in it. If the Preobrazhensky regiment was to be reconstituted in the new Russian Army, it will not serve to change Russian doctrine, and will not contain a single infantry battalion, but will rather assume the structure appropriate to it's mission wherever it is stationed.
Cheers
Greg
Future Tank:
I don't think we disagree. I was trying to provide a template for a first order approximation. The discussion of the Russian armoured divisions in the late cold war was just to illustrate the problem you run into if you use templates prescriptive instead of descriptive.
As to the brigading at lower level in the west: I don't think it has much to do with force reduction, but:
1. as You point out better C3.
2. the increase in effective firepower for nearly all weapons. Tanks today kill at 4000m instead of 1500m, artillery shoot further due to base-bleed and infantry generally hit at 300m instead of 200m with rifle fire.
Take WW1 where you really had to collect a lot of rifles to hit a target. This developed along the know "dinosaur" line where both sides collected large parties to shoot at each other - leading to even larger parties collecting, as there was now more targets - we could go on in the meandering.
As to me being a defence professional - forget it: If I'm unclear or talking plain nonsense say your piece.
I use these forums to provoke critique. Sometimes I deliberately go out on a limb, because hindsight is valueless and you can only be right, if you can be wrong. You must have a theory that can be disproven - a theory that is right in every imaginable circumstance is worthless. Like saying: Sooner or later Sweden will fall apart as a nation. Well if it doesn't happen in my life time, then it will happen later - thus the statement is worthless.
I accept the "class system" of this board as a device to limit flamers and trolls, but it doesn't make anyone an a priory sage - least of all me.
I don't think we disagree. I was trying to provide a template for a first order approximation. The discussion of the Russian armoured divisions in the late cold war was just to illustrate the problem you run into if you use templates prescriptive instead of descriptive.
As to the brigading at lower level in the west: I don't think it has much to do with force reduction, but:
1. as You point out better C3.
2. the increase in effective firepower for nearly all weapons. Tanks today kill at 4000m instead of 1500m, artillery shoot further due to base-bleed and infantry generally hit at 300m instead of 200m with rifle fire.
Take WW1 where you really had to collect a lot of rifles to hit a target. This developed along the know "dinosaur" line where both sides collected large parties to shoot at each other - leading to even larger parties collecting, as there was now more targets - we could go on in the meandering.
As to me being a defence professional - forget it: If I'm unclear or talking plain nonsense say your piece.
I use these forums to provoke critique. Sometimes I deliberately go out on a limb, because hindsight is valueless and you can only be right, if you can be wrong. You must have a theory that can be disproven - a theory that is right in every imaginable circumstance is worthless. Like saying: Sooner or later Sweden will fall apart as a nation. Well if it doesn't happen in my life time, then it will happen later - thus the statement is worthless.
I accept the "class system" of this board as a device to limit flamers and trolls, but it doesn't make anyone an a priory sage - least of all me.
FutureTank
Banned Member
defence reforms
Ths, all reforms of forces in the West were/are are political decisions based on budgetry expediency. Over time this has driven defence users to push technological developments to "do more with less", hence the improved C3I.
There has been discussion of comparative enhancement in firepower in numerous forums, and so I am less surprised now when I hear that a modern tank can engage targets at 4000m rather then 1500m, which is also not true.
It was a well known practice in WW2 for Red Army tank units to fire intirect during initial breakthrough phases, so they clearly can engage targets at beyond 1500m. What you meant was that modern tanks are a lot more accurate. However this accurace still depends on LOS. I hope you will not be shocked to find out that the places on the planet's surface where LOS of 4000m is commonly encountered also by some weird coincidence happen to be testing grounds for tank gunnery
The average LOS in Europe during Cold War (and continues to be for all I know) had been variously reported over the decades as being between 600m and 1100m. If anything this has been reducing due to increased level of urbanisation and utility structure enhancements. This by the way is a major reason why some Soviet MRDs were changed to 2xMRR+2 TRs structure. This is because infantry has greater short range fire density then tank units.
From this perspective it seems to me tank effectiveness has not really increased. This is another thread, but what has increased in the West is tank crew survivability. This is a direct design legacy from German WW2 practice, and isunrelated to tactical structuring of the units. Given different tank design philosophy, the Soviet tanks have not changed significantly other then enhance rate of fire, which is logical if one considers that the targets are better armoured and faster moving in still shorter distances (compared to the more flat terrain of Western Russia and Ukrainian stepps.
As for WW1, Australians have a somewhat different expereince then "developed along the know "dinosaur" line where both
sides collected large parties to shoot at each other - leading to even larger parties collecting, as there was now more targets". The Ausralians were fortunate to have a number of outstanding commanders and troops that did not believe in being led like sheep to the slaughter. Sir John Monash developed a tactic which used small parties used to raid German positions, and later combined arms tactics which ensured reduced casualties and placed less emphasis on the sort of tactics that caused dreadfull Allied casualties elsewhere.
What do you mean by "use templates prescriptive instead of descriptive"?
"hindsight is valueless and you can only
be right, if you can be wrong. You must have a theory that can be disproven - a theory that is right in every imaginable
circumstance is worthless. "
Probably another thread for analyst phylosophy. However I disagree. A theory is always disprovable. The realm of an analyst is to provide application not theory, which is the realm of the academics. Academics may study and correlate data to provide 'hindsight' as you say, but the analyst is paid for foresight not hindsight.
Does it matter if Sweden is a nation or not in future? If it is a part of EU, it seems to me this hardly matters. Howeverthis s really off topic.
Cheers
Greg
Ths, all reforms of forces in the West were/are are political decisions based on budgetry expediency. Over time this has driven defence users to push technological developments to "do more with less", hence the improved C3I.
There has been discussion of comparative enhancement in firepower in numerous forums, and so I am less surprised now when I hear that a modern tank can engage targets at 4000m rather then 1500m, which is also not true.
It was a well known practice in WW2 for Red Army tank units to fire intirect during initial breakthrough phases, so they clearly can engage targets at beyond 1500m. What you meant was that modern tanks are a lot more accurate. However this accurace still depends on LOS. I hope you will not be shocked to find out that the places on the planet's surface where LOS of 4000m is commonly encountered also by some weird coincidence happen to be testing grounds for tank gunnery
The average LOS in Europe during Cold War (and continues to be for all I know) had been variously reported over the decades as being between 600m and 1100m. If anything this has been reducing due to increased level of urbanisation and utility structure enhancements. This by the way is a major reason why some Soviet MRDs were changed to 2xMRR+2 TRs structure. This is because infantry has greater short range fire density then tank units.
From this perspective it seems to me tank effectiveness has not really increased. This is another thread, but what has increased in the West is tank crew survivability. This is a direct design legacy from German WW2 practice, and isunrelated to tactical structuring of the units. Given different tank design philosophy, the Soviet tanks have not changed significantly other then enhance rate of fire, which is logical if one considers that the targets are better armoured and faster moving in still shorter distances (compared to the more flat terrain of Western Russia and Ukrainian stepps.
As for WW1, Australians have a somewhat different expereince then "developed along the know "dinosaur" line where both
sides collected large parties to shoot at each other - leading to even larger parties collecting, as there was now more targets". The Ausralians were fortunate to have a number of outstanding commanders and troops that did not believe in being led like sheep to the slaughter. Sir John Monash developed a tactic which used small parties used to raid German positions, and later combined arms tactics which ensured reduced casualties and placed less emphasis on the sort of tactics that caused dreadfull Allied casualties elsewhere.
What do you mean by "use templates prescriptive instead of descriptive"?
"hindsight is valueless and you can only
be right, if you can be wrong. You must have a theory that can be disproven - a theory that is right in every imaginable
circumstance is worthless. "
Probably another thread for analyst phylosophy. However I disagree. A theory is always disprovable. The realm of an analyst is to provide application not theory, which is the realm of the academics. Academics may study and correlate data to provide 'hindsight' as you say, but the analyst is paid for foresight not hindsight.
Does it matter if Sweden is a nation or not in future? If it is a part of EU, it seems to me this hardly matters. Howeverthis s really off topic.
Cheers
Greg