Battle of Surigao Strait changeup

Daryl

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I have been wondering along these lines. If Adm. Toyoda had 6 battleships at Brunei and sent Yamato and Musashi to Surigao and thus Yamashiro and Fuso to Samar in Sho-go, then Yamato would have fought the multiple battleships she was designed to kill, specifically the 5 Pearl Harbor ghosts and Mississippi. But it was a night battle so Yamato's superior optical ranging was disadvantaged and because topography limited Yamato sighting fleet until both fleets were in firing range, could the Oldendorfs 6 batttleships and supporting fleet take the two Yamato class with Nishimura's supporting fleet, and throw in Shima too since we can assume he would have joined up a battle in progress.
 

CB90

The Bunker Group
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I don't think the outcome would've changed substantially. The AARs from that battle were that the radar fire control systems played big role...3/6 of the US BB's did the majority of the effective shooting with more advanced FCRs than the other 3, of which only Maryland was able to contribute substantially using optical sighting. As you've noted, this is still a factor in the night battle.

In a slugfest between BB's, the guys who got the first well aimed salvos in usually won. Good, direct hits from 16" AP shells were going to do something substantial to even the biggest BB of the day....take out a main battery turret, slow speed or limit steering, take out sighting systems. Also contributing is that by this stage of the war, the IJN was not the highly trained and drill instrument it was in the early years. Now, if you changed up a whole lot of other things and had it happen at the same point in the timeline as Midway? That'd swing things the other way.
 

Daryl

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I don't think the outcome would've changed substantially. The AARs from that battle were that the radar fire control systems played big role...3/6 of the US BB's did the majority of the effective shooting with more advanced FCRs than the other 3, of which only Maryland was able to contribute substantially using optical sighting. As you've noted, this is still a factor in the night battle.

In a slugfest between BB's, the guys who got the first well aimed salvos in usually won. Good, direct hits from 16" AP shells were going to do something substantial to even the biggest BB of the day....take out a main battery turret, slow speed or limit steering, take out sighting systems. Also contributing is that by this stage of the war, the IJN was not the highly trained and drill instrument it was in the early years. Now, if you changed up a whole lot of other things and had it happen at the same point in the timeline as Midway? That'd swing things the other way.
Interesting points, but the durability of the Yamato class over the Yamashiro needs to be taken into account. They both took a lot of damage to sink them. If there were two of them at this point, could they have lasted long enough to sink a major portion of the US fleet and punch through to the landing beaches? The US BBs were older models, 2 with eight 16"/45 cal guns and 4 with twelve 14" guns. On the other hand the BBs opened fire at just under 13 miles so longer range of 18" guns were negated.
 
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CB90

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Interesting points, but the durability of the Yamato class over the Yamashiro needs to be taken into account. They both took a lot of damage to sink them. If there were two of them at this point, could they have lasted long enough to sink a major portion of the US fleet and punch through to the landing beaches?
It's not the sinking I'm worried about, it's damaging them. Stern hits have a high probability of taking out steering. Take out propulsion and they slow down. Hit the bow, and it forces it to slow down. With any mobility casualty, in a protracted fight, the IJN then has to decide if they circle the wagons (mission failure) or press on -1 BB to the fight. Being on the offensive here is a major disadvantage in that scenario.

Damage sighting systems and the big guns become less effective. Hit a turret, and those big guns may not even shoot. Firepower kill effectively takes the ship out of the fight completely.

Before radar directed gunnery, the challenge was getting good clean hits on a moving zigzagging target. You get a large caliber AP shell on target, it's doing damage. And again, the indicators of proficiency by the IJN's performance isn't exactly convincing either.
 

Daryl

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Very good thinking on your part CB90. I found some information which makes the analysis a little harder and added it to yesterday's data. Also we should remember that we should take into account the two possible admirals, Kurita and Nishumura, and how they may have reacted. Last, even though damaged, was there a chance to turn around and run for it in the strait, let alone would Japanese BBs retreat under fire.
I think some might call you to task on the quality of Japanese seamen on the pride of their fleet. The damage control displayed by both ships when they went down slowed the sinking significantly.
 

My2Cents

Active Member
Interesting points, but the durability of the Yamato class over the Yamashiro needs to be taken into account. They both took a lot of damage to sink them. If there were two of them at this point, could they have lasted long enough to sink a major portion of the US fleet and punch through to the landing beaches?
  • The question is would they be willing to sacrifice them in an attempt to do so? The indications from the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea and the Battle off Samar is that they weren’t.
  • The Japanese had limited fuel supplies and the journey to join with the Southern Force would have added considerable distance for those fuel hogs, plus escorts. It would also add time at sea making the operation more likely to be detected early.
  • The Surigao Strait is a narrow passage littered with islands, which is why the destroyer attacks were unusually successful. The Japanese were forced to make the passage in line astern only to exit the passage to find the US ships positioned crossing their ‘T’ in the open sea and no room to maneuver. Any way you cut it this is a losing position since only the lead couple of ships would be able to engage with their forward guns, leaving them at best outgunned 16x16”+48x14” to 12x18”.
 
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Bonza

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I have been wondering along these lines. If Adm. Toyoda had 6 battleships at Brunei and sent Yamato and Musashi to Surigao and thus Yamashiro and Fuso to Samar in Sho-go, then Yamato would have fought the multiple battleships she was designed to kill, specifically the 5 Pearl Harbor ghosts and Mississippi. But it was a night battle so Yamato's superior optical ranging was disadvantaged and because topography limited Yamato sighting fleet until both fleets were in firing range, could the Oldendorfs 6 batttleships and supporting fleet take the two Yamato class with Nishimura's supporting fleet, and throw in Shima too since we can assume he would have joined up a battle in progress.
Important to remember (as briefly mentioned above) that the battle didn't start when the two battleship forces met one another - the US Navy torpedo boats and destroyers had a field day doing high speed passes at the IJN battleships and unloading torpedoes into them before they were even in range of the US battleships. The Yamatos were amazing vessels but they were by no means invulnerable. Hard to kill, absolutely, but then you don't have to sink them to win the battle, you only have to sufficiently degrade its capabilities. If you can't steam at full speed, can't bring all your guns to bear, suffer a loss of onboard fuel, etc... all these things damage the target vessel's ability to function as an effective unit.
 

Daryl

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  • The question is would they be willing to sacrifice them in an attempt to do so? The indications from the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea and the Battle off Samar is that they weren’t.
  • The Japanese had limited fuel supplies and the journey to join with the Southern Force would have added considerable distance for those fuel hogs, plus escorts. It would also add time at sea making the operation more likely to be detected early.
  • The Surigao Strait is a narrow passage littered with islands, which is why the destroyer attacks were unusually successful. The Japanese were forced to make the passage in line astern only to exit the passage to find the US ships positioned crossing their ‘T’ in the open sea and no room to maneuver. Any way you cut it this is a losing position since only the lead couple of ships would be able to engage with their forward guns, leaving them at best outgunned 16x16”+48x14” to 12x18”.
I think I am learning from you some fine points I have not read about. I did not know about the channel being that much of a problem as the maps must have mislead me. I do have to question your first point in that Adm. Kurita was at the helm in those two battles and Nishimura was at the Strait, and he did lose both his battleships going forward. Also the Musashi continued forward as much as possible, even when mortally hit. It appears to me, still, that most Japanese commanders considered this their last chance at a "decisive battle".
 

Daryl

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Important to remember (as briefly mentioned above) that the battle didn't start when the two battleship forces met one another - the US Navy torpedo boats and destroyers had a field day doing high speed passes at the IJN battleships and unloading torpedoes into them before they were even in range of the US battleships. The Yamatos were amazing vessels but they were by no means invulnerable. Hard to kill, absolutely, but then you don't have to sink them to win the battle, you only have to sufficiently degrade its capabilities. If you can't steam at full speed, can't bring all your guns to bear, suffer a loss of onboard fuel, etc... all these things damage the target vessel's ability to function as an effective unit.
Much thanks to you for responding. Morrison noted that all the PT boats missed, (or some duds?) but a Yamato BB is a much bigger target and could have picked up a few that missed. The destroyers put 3 apparently into Fuzo that sank her. The Musashi took 19 torpedoes and 17 bombs and stayed afloat for hours. I am ignorant if the US boats could reload torpedoes and get back into the fight. Also, after reading that a 500 lb bomb hit turret 1 and did not penetrate I wonder if the 14" shells of the 4 US BBs could from ten miles out, or if the 8" and 6" CA and CL shells could find a soft spot. This is rather complex analysis. In the end though it would not have mattered. It was too late for the "Decisive Battle" the Japanese pinned their hopes on. Even if they sank or disabled the US fleet elements and got at the transports the 3rd fleet carriers would have eventually caught them. It is just intellectual curiousity.
 

My2Cents

Active Member
Also, after reading that a 500 lb bomb hit turret 1 and did not penetrate I wonder if the 14" shells of the 4 US BBs could from ten miles out, or if the 8" and 6" CA and CL shells could find a soft spot.
Depends on whether that 500 lb bomb didn’t penetrate because the Musashi got lucky. But it doesn’t really matter, it would probably be more effective to avoid the turrets and drop the rounds through the deck into the magazine. Or take out the superstructure and the big gunnery directors/rangefinders, the backup rangefinder in the turrets cannot feed the fire control system, so you lose ability to compute the target leading angle and your accuracy goes to hell. Or knock out the engine room and the turret drives, shell hoist and rammers are out of action. Or start fires in the superstructure that accomplish one of those.

You don’t have to penetrate the main turrets to take a BB out of action. In fact it is usually hits somewhere else that do it.
 

Daryl

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Depends on whether that 500 lb bomb didn’t penetrate because the Musashi got lucky. But it doesn’t really matter, it would probably be more effective to avoid the turrets and drop the rounds through the deck into the magazine. Or take out the superstructure and the big gunnery directors/rangefinders, the backup rangefinder in the turrets cannot feed the fire control system, so you lose ability to compute the target leading angle and your accuracy goes to hell. Or knock out the engine room and the turret drives, shell hoist and rammers are out of action. Or start fires in the superstructure that accomplish one of those.

You don’t have to penetrate the main turrets to take a BB out of action. In fact it is usually hits somewhere else that do it.
You know, in the battle off Samar the 3 destroyers and the destroyer escort kinda did just that to the Battleships and Heavies they attacked. The 5" guns did not penetrate armor so they set the topsides on fire. I imagine it is kinda hard to attack with all the smoke and flame and explosions going on, even if it is superficial. And although the Yamato was not damaged they did have to repair the other BBs. Thanks.
 

Bonza

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Any battleship-scale naval artillery is going to leave a mark when it hits, even if it doesn't penetrate through to the ship's vitals. There's still a lot of systems in the superstructure and upper decks to get messed up, and you don't have to sink a ship to take it out of the fight, rather just cause enough damage that it is rendered combat ineffective. As you say, it's evident from Samar that attacking a ship's upper structures rather than trying for penetrating vertical hits can take ships out of the fight.

And even if the battle had changed somewhat, in my opinion the fate of the Yamato and Musashi would have remained the same - deprived of adequate air cover and, despite their defensive armament, highly vulnerable to the torpedo planes and dive bombers of the day. A lot of people get caught up in notional battles and how the Yamato would have done fighting an Iowa-class, for example, but the fact of the matter is the Iowa would most likely be escorting a fast carrier, and that would swing the battle, not the capability of either battleship.

You might also find it interesting to look at the case of the battleship Bismarck, as it was as close to a floating fortress as you could get in the Atlantic in 1941, yet the most tactically significant damage was that done by Swordfish-dropped torpedoes that jammed her rudder and caused a semi mobility kill, enabling massed forces of the RN to catch up with her and sink her. She was an outstanding ship for her time, but for her rudder arrangement.
 

Daryl

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Any battleship-scale naval artillery is going to leave a mark when it hits, even if it doesn't penetrate through to the ship's vitals. There's still a lot of systems in the superstructure and upper decks to get messed up, and you don't have to sink a ship to take it out of the fight, rather just cause enough damage that it is rendered combat ineffective. As you say, it's evident from Samar that attacking a ship's upper structures rather than trying for penetrating vertical hits can take ships out of the fight.

And even if the battle had changed somewhat, in my opinion the fate of the Yamato and Musashi would have remained the same - deprived of adequate air cover and, despite their defensive armament, highly vulnerable to the torpedo planes and dive bombers of the day. A lot of people get caught up in notional battles and how the Yamato would have done fighting an Iowa-class, for example, but the fact of the matter is the Iowa would most likely be escorting a fast carrier, and that would swing the battle, not the capability of either battleship.

You might also find it interesting to look at the case of the battleship Bismarck, as it was as close to a floating fortress as you could get in the Atlantic in 1941, yet the most tactically significant damage was that done by Swordfish-dropped torpedoes that jammed her rudder and caused a semi mobility kill, enabling massed forces of the RN to catch up with her and sink her. She was an outstanding ship for her time, but for her rudder arrangement.
I see your point. Same thing happened to the Hiei. Rudders must be a soft spot. My earlier line of reasoning, that even if successful that only doom would result, was based on the idea that if Yamato or Musashi had got to the beach it would take time to shell troops and transports, time that would allow 3rd fleet fast battleships, or McCain's carrier group refueling SW, to catch them. Although I wondered if US 6 fleet BBs could take on the two Yamatos, I have no doubt the fast battleships outmatched them.
 
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