AUKUS

[spoz]

I didn't say Trump was a idiot but I did say Hegseth was a fool. Trump may or may not be an idiot but he is a felon, a pathological liar, bully, and all-around A-H. His MAGA base isn't happy with him at the moment over the Epstein affair so trashing AUKUS for enhancing American job prospects (albeit this would be BS) might be a means to pacify the MAGA crowd. All his actions are for what's best for him, not America or the rest of the world for that matter.

Regarding AUKUS, one has to wonder if the USN sees AUKUS as a threat to obtaining delivery on their subs.

Not from what I’m hearing - they appear to see it as a chance to get the build rate up to at least a certain 2, and hopefully 2.5, per year. Given the long history of shared endeavours by the two Navies they’re not too worried by a short term loss of what they believe wii be, in effect only one boat but which will give them a longer term gain. They see that they can hand off a bunch more tasks to an SSN based Australian submarine force compared to what a conventional force could take on.

 

[seaspear]

One of the issues delaying the production rate of the Virginia class is shortage of skilled workers why not develop a pathway for Australian workers who have those skills to be involved most would come back when the AUKUS class is ready to be commenced here

Shipbuilding to Citizenship: solving the US skills shortage with immigration | The Strategist

Skill-based immigration can help the United States fill its severe shortage of shipbuilding workers, for both naval and civilian construction. Bolstering the labour pool would help the US and its allies match the Chinese maritime ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

 

[John Fedup]

Not from what I’m hearing - they appear to see it as a chance to get the build rate up to at least a certain 2, and hopefully 2.5, per year. Given the long history of shared endeavours by the two Navies they’re not too worried by a short term loss of what they believe wii be, in effect only one boat but which will give them a longer term gain. They see that they can hand off a bunch more tasks to an SSN based Australian submarine force compared to what a conventional force could take on.

Some in the USN might see AUKUS as a path to increased sub production and all would agree the future Australian AUKUS SSNs could take on significant duties in the far east. However, there is likely many in the USN (submarine branch) that don't believe AUKUS SSNs will arrive fast enough and the program could be a drain on resources for the Virginia class production. Understandable given the shipyard problems wrt production and maintenance. The Columbia delay is another worry. Also, not really sure about the USN's view on their future SSN. Will it be AUKUS, a hybrid AUKUS or will it be yet another SSN design.

 

[John Fedup]

I'm not in front of a computer right now. Has there been any increase in shipbuilding budget and new ship orders beyond standing orders in FY25?

Financial investments by the US and Australia are underway for enhancing US sub production and the UK is adding money into AUKUS as well. Nevertheless, as others have commented on, skilled tradespeople are in short supply, especially for submarines. This will take time, something that the Pacific region may not have enough of.

 

[John Fedup]

Posting this here but will duplicate at the naval news thread as well. No real surprises but it summarises all the issues wrt SSNs (and SSKs) regarding availability. The one very troubling issue for Australia will be supporting first a mixed Collins/Virginia fleet then Virginia/AUKUS to a final all AUKUS fleet. Upon reading this article I now have a better appreciation for why the RCN wants 12 SSKs.

AUKUS submarines: US and UK partners show the realities facing Australia's small fleet - Strategic Analysis Australia

 

[ADMk2]

Posting this here but will duplicate at the naval news thread as well. No real surprises but it summarises all the issues wrt SSNs (and SSKs) regarding availability. The one very troubling issue for Australia will be supporting first a mixed Collins/Virginia fleet then Virginia/AUKUS to a final all AUKUS fleet. Upon reading this article I now have a better appreciation for why the RCN wants 12 SSKs.

AUKUS submarines: US and UK partners show the realities facing Australia's small fleet - Strategic Analysis Australia

I’d take Michael Shoebridge and Marcus Hellyer’s opinion on fleet availability with a very large grain of salt. Neither have any experience or authority whatsoever on naval fleet management and you must pay attention to the fact that Shoebridge has consistently argued the SSN plan should be scrapped in favour of buying B-21A Raiders (his pet favourite).

He goes completely silent on how Australia should then achieve the effects that SSN’s do as opposed to the effects that strategic bombers also provide. (He also goes silent on fleet availability of B-21A Raiders from his notional fleet of 12, but that is by the by).

RAN maintains a fleet availability greater than 2 routinely as a peace time level of availability from it’s fleet of 6x “old, clapped out“ Collins class, so where he gets the idea that only 2 will be generated from a brand new fleet of 8x SSN’s is something only he can explain, and he (of course) chooses not to…

He also chooses not to engage on wartime surge capacity within a fleet of 8 because it would detract from his points, displaying the intellectual integrity of the fellow.

He is a slightly less ridiculous version of APA from 20 years ago, only insofar as his obsession is the B-21A and not the F-111 / F-22A combo of those other imbeciles, because at least that aircraft “might” be made available to us, were we serious in any attempt at trying to acquire it, notwithstanding all the things that would have to give way to it, were we to try to and notwithstanding any other option for the sorts of effects at range that they deliver, for example an aircraft carrier (or 2)…

In any case, both major sides of politics in Australia and defence are invested in the SSN plan, so that’s all that really matters at the end of the day.

 

[Stampede]

I’d take Michael Shoebridge and Marcus Hellyer’s opinion on fleet availability with a very large grain of salt. Neither have any experience or authority whatsoever on naval fleet management and you must pay attention to the fact that Shoebridge has consistently argued the SSN plan should be scrapped in favour of buying B-21A Raiders (his pet favourite).

He goes completely silent on how Australia should then achieve the effects that SSN’s do as opposed to the effects that strategic bombers also provide. (He also goes silent on fleet availability of B-21A Raiders from his notional fleet of 12, but that is by the by).

RAN maintains a fleet availability greater than 2 routinely as a peace time level of availability from it’s fleet of 6x “old, clapped out“ Collins class, so where he gets the idea that only 2 will be generated from a brand new fleet of 8x SSN’s is something only he can explain, and he (of course) chooses not to…

He also chooses not to engage on wartime surge capacity within a fleet of 8 because it would detract from his points, displaying the intellectual integrity of the fellow.

He is a slightly less ridiculous version of APA from 20 years ago, only insofar as his obsession is the B-21A and not the F-111 / F-22A combo of those other imbeciles, because at least that aircraft “might” be made available to us, were we serious in any attempt at trying to acquire it, notwithstanding all the things that would have to give way to it, were we to try to and notwithstanding any other option for the sorts of effects at range that they deliver, for example an aircraft carrier (or 2)…

In any case, both major sides of politics in Australia and defence are invested in the SSN plan, so that’s all that really matters at the end of the day.

I want to like the notion of the RAN having an SSN,but every time I analyse the concept I get a great feeling of discomfort .
This enterprise has many layers to it and as such many points of fail.
Build,training,servicing,politics,deep maintenance, budget ,defence opportunity cost,the stuff off life ,etc
It’s a very bold and ambitious endeavour for a nation of our size.

The only thing I would debate in what I thought was a well written article was the suggestion that we would have 8 SSNs in 30 years time.
Realistically it will most likely be closer to 40 years based on the current planning.

Thats a lot of coin and human capital for a limited defence return.
Thats also a best case scenario.

Maybe at best just one to three submarines available for service in a real world scenario.

Not talking surface photo ops a couple of k’s off the WA coast.

Yes SSNs are apex predators that can shape certain scenarios.

They are also a niche capability.

In a balanced defence force for a nation of our size are they a realistic proposition.

A lot would say yes

I however just feel more uncomfortable with the passing of time.
The politics part of the many layers has been amplified in 2026

Cheers S

 

[John Fedup]

I’d take Michael Shoebridge and Marcus Hellyer’s opinion on fleet availability with a very large grain of salt. Neither have any experience or authority whatsoever on naval fleet management and you must pay attention to the fact that Shoebridge has consistently argued the SSN plan should be scrapped in favour of buying B-21A Raiders (his pet favourite).

He goes completely silent on how Australia should then achieve the effects that SSN’s do as opposed to the effects that strategic bombers also provide. (He also goes silent on fleet availability of B-21A Raiders from his notional fleet of 12, but that is by the by).

RAN maintains a fleet availability greater than 2 routinely as a peace time level of availability from it’s fleet of 6x “old, clapped out“ Collins class, so where he gets the idea that only 2 will be generated from a brand new fleet of 8x SSN’s is something only he can explain, and he (of course) chooses not to…

He also chooses not to engage on wartime surge capacity within a fleet of 8 because it would detract from his points, displaying the intellectual integrity of the fellow.

He is a slightly less ridiculous version of APA from 20 years ago, only insofar as his obsession is the B-21A and not the F-111 / F-22A combo of those other imbeciles, because at least that aircraft “might” be made available to us, were we serious in any attempt at trying to acquire it, notwithstanding all the things that would have to give way to it, were we to try to and notwithstanding any other option for the sorts of effects at range that they deliver, for example an aircraft carrier (or 2)…

In any case, both major sides of politics in Australia and defence are invested in the SSN plan, so that’s all that really matters at the end of the day.

Hellyer is biased and I don't know about the Collins numbers available but there is a lot information regarding troubles with availability of RN SSNs and to a lesser extent USN boats. The big investments by Australia will help but perhaps not enough given capacity in both and US and UK. The Australian pollie class are all onboard with SSNs so time will tell how this all works out.

 

[hauritz]

Just did a bit of napkin math on how much the Aukus subs have cost us so far.

There was $800 million early contribution for the US shipbuilding industry. Then there were two more allocations of $4.6 billion and $4.8 billion to the US and UK for shipyards, nuclear reactor and engine production. Infrastructure spending $3.9 billion for Osborne and $12 billion for Henderson. Another $310 million for long lead components for SSN AUKUS. Around $8 billion on Fleet Base West. You may as well throw in another $2.4 billion to pay out the French and $5 billion for the Collins Life of Type Extension.

That is nearly $42 billion already spent or approved for payment. This project is now almost already in the too big to fail category.

 

[ADMk2]

Hellyer is biased and I don't know about the Collins numbers available but there is a lot information regarding troubles with availability of RN SSNs and to a lesser extent USN boats. The big investments by Australia will help but perhaps not enough given capacity in both and US and UK. The Australian pollie class are all onboard with SSNs so time will tell how this all works out.

It’s in that article. RAN have routinely maintained 2 available subs from it’s fleet of 6, but won’t do better from a fleet of 8 brand new subs (because of reasons…) and that’s why we should junk the program and buy 12x B-21A’s. (Which will give us 4 routinely available…) or something…

 

[John Fedup]

It’s in that article. RAN have routinely maintained 2 available subs from it’s fleet of 6, but won’t do better from a fleet of 8 brand new subs (because of reasons…) and that’s why we should junk the program and buy 12x B-21A’s. (Which will give us 4 routinely available…) or something…

His point is maintaining SSNs will be a greater challenge than SSKs, which I think is true. That IMO is not a reason to abandon SSNs and buy B-21s. I seriously doubt the US would sell them anyway. A sub has a bigger fear factor because it can hide longer and pick its optimal time to kill. SSN stealth will probably be less vulnerable to new emerging detection technologies than aerial stealth but that is a guess on my part.

 

[spoz]

It’s in that article. RAN have routinely maintained 2 available subs from it’s fleet of 6, but won’t do better from a fleet of 8 brand new subs (because of reasons…) and that’s why we should junk the program and buy 12x B-21A’s. (Which will give us 4 routinely available…) or something…

Actually, 8 should give us at least 2 and probably 3 operationally available; and one boat working up/light maintenance, one intermediate, and two deep. There could be times when four are available for short periods. Neither of those gentlemen are experts in submarine maintenance of any kind, and certainly not SSNs (nor am I really although I’m pretty sure I have more experience than they do) and are talking to reinforce their long held positions.

 

[ADMk2]

His point is maintaining SSNs will be a greater challenge than SSKs, which I think is true. That IMO is not a reason to abandon SSNs and buy B-21s. I seriously doubt the US would sell them anyway. A sub has a bigger fear factor because it can hide longer and pick its optimal time to kill. SSN stealth will probably be less vulnerable to new emerging detection technologies than aerial stealth but that is a guess on my part.

And someone could point to the relative priority of submarine resourcing among those three navies he points to.

Is anyone honestly going to argue the Royal Navy is being funded to an adequate level to ensure it’s capabilities are reaching the availability levels they should?

Similar for the USN, the difference of course, is if they have 3 subs unavailable due to a lack of resources, they STILL have 64x available submarines in their fleet…

Their resourcing is so far in advance of both the RN and the RAN combined, I’m not even sure what the point of mentioning them is. They could halve their resourcing tomorrow and STILL have a fleet that is more than twice as large as the entire combined UK / AUS fleet.

No-one is denying that maintaining more advanced capabilities is more difficult and more costly. Certainly the ADF isn’t and neither is Government.

This is in fact precisely the reason the program is being resourced to an absolutely unprecedented level. The criticism is founded on nothing more than their opinion the US won’t provide the Virginias in the early 2030’s, when Trump has literally said, repeatedly, that he will and in fact wants the program accelerated if possible.

Now he won’t be president then, short of major constitutional change in the US, but the Congress literally enacted legislation to make it happen and the former Democrat president literally signed the agreement.

The Republicans support it. The Democrats support it. The ALP and the LNP in Australia support it.

The only naysayers are the ones who have vested interests in this debate. Vice Adm Griggs? Naval Group spokesperson. Turnbull? Bitter ex-PM who is trying to burn everything except his own interests down.

 

[StevoJH]

One major reason for the lack of RN availability was that the ship lift at HMNB Clyde was unavailable for a period of time, leading to a reduction in refit capacity.

At the same time, a dry dock at Devonport was being reconfigured from being setup to support Trafalgar class to supporting Astute class.

They are buying a pair of floating docks for Faslane to prevent this from happening again.

No idea what the US maintenance bottleneck is, but wouldn't be surprised if it was purely down to the age of their fleet leading to an increased need for maintenance.

 

[SammyC]

One major reason for the lack of RN availability was that the ship lift at HMNB Clyde was unavailable for a period of time, leading to a reduction in refit capacity.

At the same time, a dry dock at Devonport was being reconfigured from being setup to support Trafalgar class to supporting Astute class.

They are buying a pair of floating docks for Faslane to prevent this from happening again.

No idea what the US maintenance bottleneck is, but wouldn't be surprised if it was purely down to the age of their fleet leading to an increased need for maintenance.

I think there are some similar themes for the American yards.

A chronic lack of support equipment investment, both in people and infrastructure. Subs are parked up waiting access to dry docks for instance. They don't have enough people to put on extra shifts, even if the money was made available.

A severe shortage of parts. Cannibalism is commonly employed. Many of the parts required for the older Los Angeles class are in rare supply and often obtained from decommissioned boats rather than new. Even the Virginias suffer from this, with priority often given to new builds rather than maintenance.

At least Australia has been serious about its investment in port and maintenance facilities and parts manufacture. These will be essential to keeping the new subs operational.

 

[Volkodav]

Actually, 8 should give us at least 2 and probably 3 operationally available; and one boat working up/light maintenance, one intermediate, and two deep. There could be times when four are available for short periods. Neither of those gentlemen are experts in submarine maintenance of any kind, and certainly not SSNs (nor am I really although I’m pretty sure I have more experience than they do) and are talking to reinforce their long held positions.

They also skip over the fact that both the Virginia and AUKUS boats will both be members of a much larger class, enjoying the benefits of supply chain and upgrade spirals. Potentially sustainment will be easier, in many ways, than it has been for Collins.