Afghan National Army Air Corps

[anan]

The ANAAC (Afghan National Army Air Corps) is currently building out a 126 aircraft steady state air force. The specifics are detailed below:
http://www.longwarjournal.org/oob/afghanistan/index.php
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/02/afghan_national_army.php
(check out the comment section of the above article)

the ANAAC plans to purchase twenty eight fixed-wing single-engine turboprop light attack aircraft with precision weapons capability:
-one squadron of 14 aircraft in the Kabul Air Wing
-one squadron of 14 aircraft in the Kandahar Air Wing

Does anyone have any insights into what light attack aircraft the ANAAC is considering? What aircraft the ANAAC should consider?

One question I have is why is the ANAAC going with turboprop, beside the upfront one time acquisition cost?

What is the annual operations cost (measured in miles flown) of a turboprop light attack aircraft compared with a light attack supersonic aircraft such as the F/A 50? This is excluding the one time aircraft purchase cost.

Thanks for everyone's insightful comments in advance.

 

[anan]

EMB-314 Super Tucano / AT-29 versus F/A 50

If the ANAAC (Afghan National Army Air Corps) decided to implement their current plan to purchase twenty eight fixed-wing single-engine turboprop light attack aircraft with precision weapons capability, what is the best quality multi function aircraft they could purchase? It seems like there are only three choices available.

Is it the EMB-314 Super Tucano / AT-29 the best choice? The IqAF (Iraqi Air Force) purchased 36 AT-6B instead of purchasing the EMB-314 Super Tucano / AT-29. What are the advantages of purchasing each aircraft (or other comparable aircraft)? For example does a weaponized version of the KAI KT-1C Ungbi (versus the trainer model) that compares favorably with the EMB-314 Super Tucano / AT-29, and the AT-6B?

It looks like the listed price of the EMB-314 Super Tucano / AT-29 two seater is about $10 million per unit. Would the lifecycle cost of operating this plane be about $150 million over 20 years (assuming heavy use)? ($40 million for maintenance, $50 million for fuel, $40 million for munitions as a rough ball park.) What is the marginal fuel/maintenance cost per mile flown when fully loaded? How does it compare to the competition?

It appears as if the ANAAC is leaning towards selecting the AT-6B versus the EMB-314 Super Tucano/AT-29. The ANAAC doesn't seem enamored with the KT-1C Ungbi.

How does the maintenance/operations cost of the EMB-314 Super Tucano / AT-29 compare with a light attack jet such as the F/A 50 (excluding the one time procurement cost of the aircraft)? Cost per mile flown fully loaded?

I think that the US/ISAF/international community should consider buying the ANAAC one squadron of light attack supersonic jets with multifunction capability (including light air to air combat capability.) If the US/ISAF/international community went in this direction, what would the best aircraft for the ANAAC? The important criteria for the ANAAC are:
1) low long term operations costs (in maintenance, upgrades, fuel, and munitions) {Since the long term funding for the ANAAC is uncertain}
2) reliability . . . {Since the ANAAC has limited skilled mechanics/engineers, and uncertain long term ability to buy spare parts}
3) light multifunction capability including light air to air combat capability (tactical air support, strategic air strikes, and air superiority east of the Durand line is the capability the Afghans want)

 

[anan]

What light attack supersonic aircraft with slight multifunction capability is the cheapest to operate (maintain, upgrade, fuel economy, munitions costs)?

How do the Chinese aircraft stack up versus the Korean F/A 50, versus the Indian Tejas, Soviet, and other comparable aircraft of comparable capabilities?

Would it be fair to say that all these aircraft are significantly cheaper to operate than any Gen 4.5 aircraft (such as F16s or Grippens)?

 

[Feanor]

Second-hand L-39 might be a more reasonable option given the current financial situation.

 

[OPSSG]

There is a story on the New York Times on how U.S. trains Afghan pilots to fly Mi-17 helicopters (link included).

It looks like US is capable of providing all the necessary training even for the Russian equipment and will cost American taxpayers $5 billion into 2016. Americans have in the past been taught to fly MI-17s, mostly for military exercises to teach them how to counter enemy aircraft. The Afghan program is modeled after an earlier American effort to build up the Iraqi Air Force, which also includes some MI-17s.

 

[OPSSG]

What light attack supersonic aircraft with slight multifunction capability is the cheapest to operate (maintain, upgrade, fuel economy, munitions costs)?

Your question is too broad.

You may lack understanding of the various aircraft and their respective development stage. The aircraft types you listed are so different and at various stages of development. Further, to have an accurate discussion on operating costs, it is necessary to talk about specific aircraft engine models used in the relevant fighter. I would not attempt to compare them in the manner you have suggested.

How do the Chinese aircraft stack up versus the Korean F/A 50, versus the Indian Tejas, Soviet, and other comparable aircraft of comparable capabilities?

I make no attempt to compare Russian aircraft as they are not my area of interest.

Further, Pakistan is going to be the only user of JF-17 A2A fighter (China-Pakistan co-development with a Chernyshev RD-93 engine, a variant of the Mikoyan MiG-29's Klimov/Isotov RD-33a) at the moment and India's HAL Tejas (with the potentially interim solution - the F404-GE-IN20 engine) is not fully developed at this stage. After the numerous delays with the indigenous GTRE GTX-35VS Kaveri engine, there may be plans to issue a request for proposal for a more powerful engine. How can their operating costs be compared? At this stage of their development, I am not excited about both aircraft types, as they are not ready to be called multi-role (they only have the potential to be multi-role) and we are still waiting for a final decision on the engine to be used on the Tejas.*

Save for Pakstan, there are no other immediate potential export sales for China's J-10 (the alleged F-16 killer). I am still waiting for China to introduce their own engine on the J-10. I understand China's current J-10 squadrons are using the Salyut AL-31FN (a derivative of the Sukhoi Su-27's Saturn/Lyulka AL-31F - please correct me if I am wrong). China can really focus on export sales for the J-10 after they are happy with their own fighter engine development. The long-term Chinese plan is for the LMAC WS-10A Taihang engine to become the basis for several successively more powerful designs. The WS-10A will first be introduced into the J-11 multirole fighter - the Chinese licence-assembled version of the Su-27 and the J-11B, which is the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation's copy of the Su-27. IMHO, too early to try to compare operating costs but you may want to check with tphuang.

The T-50 is a collaboration between the Koreans and Lockheed Martin (the makers of the F-16). Of the three aircraft mentioned, the T-50 (or the A-50, the strike variant) is ready for export sale (using a variant of the F404-GE engine and is a mature design). It is not intended to compete with new F-16s (as it will not have AESA radar) and is intended to cost less than a late model F-16. As such, I expect it to cost slightly less or the same to maintain and operate as a F-16. IIRC the makers of the Saab JAS 39 Gripen claims it cost less than the F-16 to operate.

---------------------------------
*Footnote: In 1989, the F404-GE-100D engine shoved into the A-4SU, as part of a service life extension program by the RSAF. Don't get me wrong, the F404 is a great engine but I'll be more impressed if the engine used were as powerful as:
(i) the F414-GE which generates up to 22,000 lbf of thrust (and used in the Super Hornet), or
(ii) the F100-PW-229 which generates up to 29,160 lbf of thrust (and used in certain block 52 F-16s and some F-15Es), or
(iii) the F110-GE which can generate even more thrust (used in the majority of USAF F-16s, some F-15Ks and F-15SGs), see details of the F110-GE-132 developments (used in the block 60 F-16s).

 

[OPSSG]

Would it be fair to say that all these aircraft are significantly cheaper to operate than any Gen 4.5 aircraft (such as F16s or Grippens)?

Initial acquisition costs for western aircraft is significantly more and their upgrade options are also more expensive. My guess is that the initial costs for aircraft with Russian or China designed engines will cost less than aircraft with Western engines.

I have no access to actual figures operating and maintenance figures and it is often assumed that Western aircraft will cost less to operate as their airframe will last longer (eg. Malaysia will decide whether to retire their MiG-29 fleet in 2010 but currently do not intend to retire their F-18Ds) and have lower long term operating costs.

Please see this 2006 defense-aerospace.com report on estimating the real cost of a western fighter.

 

[anan]

OPSSG, your point on aircraft engines are well taken. Thanks for your links as well. My question, however, deals with non acquisition life cycle costs.

I know that I am oversimplifying the question to the point that it is very difficult to answer comprehensively.

What is the modern cheapest supersonic light attack aircraft configuration with slight multifunction capability when measured in terms:
1) acquisition costs
2) fuel economy
3) other operations maintenance costs
4) cost of future upgrades

Should the international community buy the ANAAC one small squadron of light attack supersonic jets; or only buy the ANAAC light attack turboprop aircraft?

How much more expensive are light attack supersonic aircraft than light attack turboprop aircraft when measured in terms of:
1) Acquisition costs (I think $35 million versus $11 million)
2) Fuel economy (cost of flying fully loaded per mile including per mile maintenance costs) {Is it a factor of two times more expensive?}
3) Cost of other maintenance {Is it a factor of 1.5 times as expensive}

I am trying to compare the life cycle costs of the two aircraft. Since the ANAAC has a small annual budget, it will have difficulty affording spares and maintenance personnel.

 

[the road runner]

anan the cost of aircraft will be a very dificult thing to find out as there are to many variables involved.

As for the cost of turbo prop Vs jet engine the benifits for turbo prop would be;-

1)lower aqusition price
2)lower mantinence price
3)lower fuel consumption

Of course with a Jet Powered aircraft there are benifits such as

1)less aircraft needed (to cover the same area)
2)better capability

Getting a Recommended retail price on an aircraft will be very difficult.

As you are looking for the comparison of jet powered Vs turbo prop,
Its a safe bet to say that the costs of a light attack jet powered aircraft would be more expensive to operate than a turbo prop.As to the Fractions involved in savings,i have no idea


These are the figures i have for th ANAAC

The Afghan National Army Air Corps.

Transport
An-12.........................(4 stored)
An-26.........................2
An-32.........................7 Active and 4 ordered
G222...........................18 ordered

Combat helicopters
Mi8/17..........................29
Mi-24/35.......................12
UH-1.............................9

Training aircraft
L-39..............................3

There is no doubt about it that the ANAAC is in a rebuilding phase.
AS Feanor has sugested it may be wise to purchase additional L-39 trainers.

 

[Feanor]

I'm sure that many L-39 will hit the second-hand market soon. Russian L-39 are being replaced with the Yak-130 over the next decade. East-European L-39 are also slowly being retired. I'm sure some surplus stocks are still left in Ukraine. Get them cheap, second hand, refurbish and maybe minor modernization, and you have a decent trainer/light attack at bargain bin prices.

 

[anan]

Feanor, some think that the ANAAC should not bother with trainers and just train their pilots abroad (America, Europe, India, South Korea, Japan, Australia, Canada, Russia, and other allies.) I tend to agree with that.

I think the ANAAC should restrict itself to purchasing light attack turboprop aircraft; ideally the Korean KAI KT-1C Ungbi if South Korean tax payers can be persuaded to foot much of the acquisition costs. If not the Tucano AT 29. The third choice would be the AT 6B.

Maybe the international community could be persuaded to buy one small squadron of light attack supersonic aircraft for Afghanistan. {Ideally the Chinese could be persuaded to foot much of the bill for the ANAAC to get Chinese light attack supersonic jets. If not, then perhaps the cheapest option would be the F/A 50 (if Korea agrees to chip in some of the cost for them.) Would anything be cheaper on a life cycle basis than the F/A 50 or a Chinese light attack jet?}

 

[Feanor]

I think that the L-39 is a decent option because it's very very cheap, can be used as a light-attack, and if in the future the ANAAC decides to go for a full jet-fighter, they can still be used as a trainer for it. The F/A-50 is new, and as such more expensive, by a notable margin. Why do you think anyone else (other then Afghanistan) would be willing to pay for equipping the ANAAC? I mean I guess the USA or other NATO allies, in abstract.... but China or Korea? Makes very little sense to me.

Given the world financial situation, the bad situation in Afghanistan, and the nature of the threat (insurgents), I would think that ideally you want a cheap, simple to operate, aircraft with wide availability of spares. The L-39 fits the bill perfectly. Almost everything else would be most likely more expensive, in many cases more complex.

 

[anan]

The Afghans only get $800 million a year in tax revenue. About $400 million a year is paid by Chinese companies who manage a copper mine in Aynak, Afghanistan.

Almost the entire ANAAC and ANA (Afghan National Army) is paid for by foreigners. An international fund is being assembled to pay for the ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces) and afghan reconstruction.

For example, India has given or pledged $2.1 billion in grants and will likely provide more in the future. Other large contributors are China, Iran, Russia, and NATO. Of course the two largest providers of aid to Afghanistan are the US and Japan. The Czechs have provided 12 Mi35 attack helicopters free of charge to the ANAAC. Almost all the other equipment of the ANA has similarly been provided free of charge or heavily subsidized. South Korea has already given several hundred million in grants and sent troops to Afghanistan. South Korea might be willing to put up several hundred million in additional grants if it goes to buying South Korean fighters.

Currently, Afghanistan's largest trading partner, investor, business collaborator and reconstruction facilitator is China. The Taliban and AQ linked networks pose a great risk to China, including the possibility of terrorist attacks against Chinese population centers. China is under pressure to give the Afghans billions of dollars in additional grants. Would China prefer economic grants, or might they foot the bill for a small squadron of ANAAC Chinese built fighters? This would also facilitate a long term friendly alliance with the Afghan government; as well as a close relationship with NATO, Russia, India, Japan and Iran . . . all of which are very close to the Afghan government and all of which excluding Iran and deeply involved in building up and paying for the ANSF. China might like to diversify from their Pakistan alliance.

So far the training and equipping of the ANAAC has been lead by the US, UK and India. Bringing China and/or South Korea into the mix would significantly benefit the Afghans.

I don't think the Russians can foot the bill for ANAAC fixed wing aircraft until oil prices recover. That leaves China, South Korea and the US. {Since no other country builds the type of fighters the Afghans will need that could potentially pay for them.}

 

[Feanor]

Interesting. I did not know that.

Russia could however hand over some of the retiring L-39s... So could a number of other countries for that matter. Possibly even more advanced fighters then that. Russia did hand over 10 Fulcrums to Lebanon recently.

 

[anan]

What would the operations costs of an L-39 be relative to a Tucano AT 29 or Korean KAI KT-1C Ungbi? How does the L-39 compare in capabilities?

 

[anan]

"Russia could however hand over some of the retiring L-39s"
That would be a good idea. Russia gives hundreds of scholarships to ANA officers/NCOs to study in Russia.

Unfortunately, last year the Afghan MoD (Ministry of Defense) was caught between Russia and NATO. Maybe the L-39s offer a way around that; and can coincide with greater Russian involvement in the ANAAC. {Within Afghanistan there have been angry editorials castigating NATO for using Afghanistan in its conflict with Russia, versus helping the Afghans fight the Taliban and AQ linked networks . . . as the Afghans want.}

My concern is that the ANAAC gets new birds with low intermediate term maintenance and operations costs (which is less likely if they are used.) ANAAC is very dependent on foreign funding . . . and cannot guarantee funding for spares.

 

[anan]

The latest summary of the ANAAC (Afghan National Army Air Corps) from CSTC-A, which is responsible or training and equipping the ANSF:
http://csis.org/files/publication/090727_ansf_draft.pdf
Page 34 in Adobe, and page 24 on the document:
By end2015, the ANAAC plans to have a total of 139 aircraft and 7254 personnel:
* Rotary wing aircraft
o 58 MI-17v5 (battlefield mobility, close air support)
o 3 Mi-17DV (VIP transport)
o 6 trainers (e.g. B-407)
* Fixed wing aircraft
o 20 C-27 propeller transport (18 transport, 2 transport configurable for VIP transport)
o 4 propeller cargo aircraft / ISR (e.g. C-208)
o 14 propeller light attack / ISR (e.g. A-29)
o 20 light multi role attack / air superiority jets (e.g. L-159)
o 8 propeller basic trainers (e.g. C-208)
o 6 propeller advanced trainers (e.g. A-29)

Any thoughts on this end state for the ANAAC. What do other commentators here think the end state should look like?

I have many questions:
1) Why is a subsonic L-159 jet better than an A-29 type turboprop? Isn't the A-29 much cheaper when measured over its life time?
2) Why shouldn't ANAAC field a small squadron (14 aircraft) of light attack supersonic fighters with slight multifunction capabilities such as the F/A 50 or a Chinese aircraft or India's Tejas instead of procuring 20 L-159 type subsonic jets? Might Afghanistan not be better off with having many cheap A-29s for CAS and having a small number of supersonic light attack fighters that could be used in air defense or air defense suppression in an emergency (which the L-159 is not as good at performing)?
3) Could one or two of ANAAC's twenty C27s be converted to a close air support platform the way the Marines use the C130s? Might this be useful up in the mountains?
4) What is the lifecycle cost of an A 29? Cost per hour flown (fuel+maintenance+future upgrade/refits)? I assume munition costs would be similar to an L-159. Is this true?
5) Wouldn't Afghanistan need more close air support at end state? Are light attack turboprop (A29, KT01s) the most cost effective way to provide it?

Thanks in advance for everyone's insights.

 

[anan]

ANAAC article:
Afghan National Army Air Corp (ANAAC) Order of Battle update: August 2009 - The Long War Journal
The Long War Journal: Comment on Afghan National Army Air Corp (ANAAC) Order of Battle update: August 2009

Why is ANAAC buying only 14 turboprops? What is the lifecycle cost of ownership for a turboprop? Cost to fly per hour (maintenance + fuel)?

ANAAC strikes me as massively underfinanced. Some would rather spend $100 billion a year on ISAF operations than a fraction of that on the ANAAC.

 

[OPSSG]

What do other commentators here think the end state should look like?

I'll just give you my 2 cents. And I hope others will chime in to enrich the discussion for your benefit. BTW, I just want you to know that you are asking questions in a way that is unlikely to elicit a response from another enthusiast.

Let me give you example. If you go to a car forum and ask people: Please tell me how to drive a car? Few forum members will respond. However, if you are talking about certain specific features or mods to the car, you will get more responses. The problem with your posts is that it is clear you asking basic questions when you are capable of discovering the answers for yourself, particularly since some aspects have been covered in prior threads. You seem to be asking the same T-50 questions again, which was covered in this T-50 thread.

I have many questions:
1) Why is a subsonic L-159 jet better than an A-29 type turboprop? Isn't the A-29 much cheaper when measured over its life time?

First you must understand the difference between fast movers (F-16, T-50, BAE Hawk or L-159) and low movers (turboprops or specialist jets like the A-10) in a CAS role. I won't explain but there is a prior thread called 'airpower for counter insurgency'. Please read gf0012-aust, chrisrobsoar and what other professionals are saying in their posts in that thread. These should serve as a starting point for your own further searches/reading on how slow movers are employed.

The most important thing to know about air power in A2G missions is the guy on the ground. Please acquaint yourself with the role of ground based FACs or Forward Air Controllers (to call air strikes). For a US centric perspective go here. Please note that not all countries require their FACs to be rated pilots for cost reasons.

2) Why shouldn't ANAAC field a small squadron (14 aircraft) of light attack supersonic fighters with slight multifunction capabilities such as the F/A 50 or a Chinese aircraft or India's Tejas instead of procuring 20 L-159 type subsonic jets?

The ANAAC is not a capable organisation and is unlikely to gain sufficient proficiency in the next decade against another A2A threat (ie. go to war against another air force). In fact, I doubt if the ANAAC will be competent in their required A2G role in the same time period. I'm not being harsh, I'm just realistic. The Afghans need FOs or Forward Observers (to call and shift artillery fire or indirect fire) and FACs. For the Americans, they now have people with both FO and FAC skills in a new combined role. These people are called JFOs or Joint Fires Observers. Singapore calls our equivalent STORM. I've now given you all the key words for you to google and read up.

The basic fact is that the Afghans need lots of FOs, FACs or JFOs in the next decade rather than more capable jets - as you wouldn't want to call air strikes on troops in contact without a guy in the ground. They have a bigger problem than just a lack of FOs/FACs/JFOs. The Afghan government and the ANA at an army level are not competent. Pockets of ANA are competent but they as a force can't operate a division level. In fact, as most armies understand it, there is nothing 'special' about Afghan commando units. The Americans just give them that title to make them feel good for slightly better basic soldiering skills (in contrast to the non-elite ANA units). The ANA only look competent when compared to the Afghan police. The Americans are stuck in Afghanistan because the local Afghan partners suck. They suck so much that they make the present Iraqi army look good. So basically they are poor workmen. All tools given to poor workmen will be misused or employed wrongly. From my perspective, I only care about how they are trained (and if they can retain trained personnel). I could not careless about what they use. In many ways, third world countries need to work out their own third world solutions - you can't impose 'logical' first world solutions for them.

Might Afghanistan not be better off with having many cheap A-29s for CAS and having a small number of supersonic light attack fighters that could be used in air defense or air defense suppression in an emergency (which the L-159 is not as good at performing)?

Please read the basic specs for the Super Tucano and the Czech L-159. Please do some work on the differences and I hope other forum members will chime in here.

5) Wouldn't Afghanistan need more close air support at end state? Are light attack turboprop (A29, KT01s) the most cost effective way to provide it?

What do you think (after reading the specs)?

 

[anan]

OPSSG, thanks for your information and response. I did read the specifications. There remain many things I don't understand.

On air controllers, for now this function is carried out by OMLTs and other ETTs. However developing this capacity is an important intermediate term priority for the ANA. However, Gen McChrystal seems reluctant to allow the ANA to call air strikes on its own in the short run since he has greatly restricted close air support (CAS) by ISAF and ANAAC (the latest ANAAC briefing confirmed this.) For that matter, this seems to be the de facto view of President Karzai as well (to greatly limit CAS in support of the ANSF and ISAF.)

Comparing subsonic L159 to turboprop light attack for the four ANAAC requirements:
1) L159 is better at air to air combat
2) L159 is better at suppressing ground based air defense. But how much better?
3) I don't see why the L159 would be better than turboprop at close air support (CAS) and strategic bombing. {L159 flies faster and could reach its target more quickly; however the turboprop could dwell near the potential target longer and might be more accurate in its air strikes.}
4) L159 is much more expensive to operate per hour in the air than a turboprop, but how much more expensive? What are the costs for the two aircraft per hour flown (fuel + maintenance)?

If the need for ground attack is managed by turboprop, then the question becomes what aircraft is best at managing air to air and ground based air defense suppression. Here I would think that a supersonic light attack fighter such as the F/A 50, Guizhou JL-9, or Hongdu L-15 Falcon would be much better than a subsonic L159. Is this true? Are supersonic aircraft much better than subsonic aircraft at these two functions? Another question I have is the relative cost per hour flown between an F/A 50 (or Guizhou JL-9, Hongdu L-15 Falcon) and an L159?

I would think that the ANAAC should probably have:
-12 F/A 50s, Guizhou JL-9, or Hongdu L-15 Falcon (air to air and ground air defense suppression)
-30 to 35 light attack turboprop (A29 or KT-1) for ground attack;
rather than the current proposal for 20 L159s and 14 turboprops light attack aircraft.

Strategically developing the ANAAC is very important since the Afghan public is more likely to accept ANAAC CAS than ISAF CAS, especially over the long run. The Afghans have long mountainous borders, large scale foreign infiltration, and have substantial need for CAS along the mountains.

Quality of the ANA:
The vast majority of militaries in the world are low quality. Only a couple such as Singapore's, Australia's, South Korea's, Japan's, some NATO countries are competent. Is Malaysia's competent? I don't know. Indonesia's sucks. Almost every Arab, Latin American and African military is atrocious. So does Pakistan's. Pakistan has lost more dead soldiers and police to the Taliban recently than the sum of all foreign troops that have died in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001. If you compare the ANA to Pakistan's army, they aren't doing quite as bad as some critics of the ANA imply.

Biggest ANA challenges:
-funding (only $242 million annual budget in 2006)
-illiterate (only half of officers can read. Illiteracy among NCOs is much higher.) The ANA added its first class of 84 4 year academy graduates in January, 2009. That is it for the entire ANA right now. There is a major shortage of educated captains, let alone senior officers. {More positively, there are many good quality lieutenants.}
-senior officers don't use NCOs properly
-lack of professionalism, discipline, team work and planning
-too much focus on politics, respect for authority, and following orders; not enough initiative is permitted by ANA senior officers.
-hiring and promotion by nepotism and politics rather than meritocracy.
-most of the ANA joined the army very recently and had an abbreviated basic training. Through put (number training at any given point in time) is perhaps a fifth of what it needs to be.
ANA's strengths:
-recklessly brave . . . or as some put it . . . too brave
-highly motivated to fight . . . in fact too motivated to fight and chase the enemy. Too eager to kill Taliban even when COIN suggests they shouldn't
-many more applicants eager to join the ANA than the ANA can hire
-eager to become educated and attend training academies
-one good quality ANA Corps that is capable of division level operations (ANA 203 Corps.)
-several good quality brigades

If the international community funds educating more officers and NCOs, the quality of the ANA is likely to improve significantly. In particular, ANAAC shouldn't have a shortage of educated highly capable personnel within a few years. {Afghanistan now has 45,000 freshman a year in college versus about one thousand per year in 2001.}