Active defense systems and infantry
- Thread starter My2Cents
- Start date
none of the results I've seen are classified for uncontrolled distribution.
nobody is going to post proximity results as you can start to determine effects and energy issues.
weasel1962
New Member
its pretty basic info, and as I indicated, nobody is going to put effects based data for these systems into the public domain.
what would seem like trivial information could substantially allow someone to start to make calculations.
as there is a correlation between these effects based systems (aven though they are anti-RPG, AATW), they still have relationships on effects based events with IED's (eg)
weasel1962
New Member
Re:
One can't market an APS without telling the customer the safety distance of APS interception and the likely area of interception. The indicative safety distance would affect infantry tactics.
I don't really need to know how effective RPGs are in order to guess how it will be used. Same thing with the APS.
Agree though that when someone states low risk vs medium risk, there's a whole load of interpretation and analysis that goes into that.
However for the purpose of my2cents post, I think the link's information is sufficient to tackle that.
Cheers!
Hi gf
One can't market an APS without telling the customer the safety distance of APS interception and the likely area of interception. The indicative safety distance would affect infantry tactics.
I don't really need to know how effective RPGs are in order to guess how it will be used. Same thing with the APS.
Agree though that when someone states low risk vs medium risk, there's a whole load of interpretation and analysis that goes into that.
However for the purpose of my2cents post, I think the link's information is sufficient to tackle that.
Cheers!
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #6
Thanks for the replies.
I am sorry my post was unclear, but the question was not over how the active protection systems worked against infantry missiles, but about how your own infantry would have to adapt to the side effects of your vehicles being equipped with an active protection system.
I am sorry my post was unclear, but the question was not over how the active protection systems worked against infantry missiles, but about how your own infantry would have to adapt to the side effects of your vehicles being equipped with an active protection system.
agree, but its important for those unfamiliar to understand that we won't release meaningful data - even when we debrief competitors who fail to win a contract they aren't advised on technical details which would compromise IP as well as tactical issues.
even the low level proximity data are withheld from the public domain - for obvious reasons.
you would know as well as I do that even the Janes data published in the public domain is borderline rubbish with little relationship to actual capability outside of visible empirical data
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weasel1962
New Member
re:
As one can see from the article, differing APS have differing collateral damage risk.
To gf, thanks and agree.
One needs to understand how the APS works because that has the impact on infantry tactics. If collateral damage is very low or none, then there's no impact on existing infantry tactics. If collateral damage's high, then its unlikely to be adopted by the forces. And if there is risk and adopted, then would you station yourself and your troops in higher risk locations?
As one can see from the article, differing APS have differing collateral damage risk.
To gf, thanks and agree.
Well, apart from heavily urbanized terrain or heavy wood mech infantry shouldn't be that close to tanks that they are affected by an APS anyway.
So the question is if one puts the troops deliberately at risk or not in urban fighting. I assume that infantry tank cooperation isn't affected that much. When infantry is near by the system gets switched off. But thunder runs and rapid raids on unsophisticated enemies might be done more often.
So the question is if one puts the troops deliberately at risk or not in urban fighting. I assume that infantry tank cooperation isn't affected that much. When infantry is near by the system gets switched off. But thunder runs and rapid raids on unsophisticated enemies might be done more often.
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #10
Many developers, pundits, and posters here are advocating their use on troop carrying vehicles such as IFVs and APCs, as well as tanks. Would you say that active protection systems would be inappropriate for these vehicles?
the issue is what impact it has on extant CONOPS, or SOPS.
Any platform that involves safety critical issues will result in those procedures being reviewed for relevance and impact..
in this case. infantry support SOPs for armourced vehicles would need consideration.
In the end the same applies to IFVs and APCs albeit with some differences. If mounted the infantry isn't in danger. In areas where the infantry is close by and in the possible direction of enemy attacks the system gets switched off.
Surely these situations do happen more often with IFVs and APCs but maybe also not as often as one thinks. Infantry swarming between AFVs and incoming fire doesn't happen that often there either. (Russians and others who constantly ride ON their vehicles don't count...;-))
Surely these situations do happen more often with IFVs and APCs but maybe also not as often as one thinks. Infantry swarming between AFVs and incoming fire doesn't happen that often there either. (Russians and others who constantly ride ON their vehicles don't count...;-))
yep, all military systems, be they tactical, non-tactical, strategic go through validation processes to ensure that they don't impinge on the safety of any within a usage context.
its referred to as "safety critical" assessment, IOW, in the course of its use "will it put the users and/or nearby operators at risk"? - if it does, then the mission or situational SOPs are reviewed to ensure that if its needed it can be used safely etc...
eg the system may not need switching off, a solution may be the position and distance of supporting infantry within a given operational context.