http://www.defencetalk.com/news/publish/airforce/Next_generation_A10C_arrives10009264.php
Interesting. Look at the picture and you will see both the 'return of the LAU-88' (which is very unusual with the TF34 upgrade still unfunded) and what attempts to be a representative PE warload. Specifically, note that the AAQ-28 appears to have been displaced to the outboard midwing station instead of supplanting the Maverick on the inner-outboard station. It will be interesting to see if that particular location works well both in clearing the Gear sponson mask line and providing decent, stable, target tracking capability at a significantly higher index point on the wing dihedral (hog outboard panels flex considerably). I certainly would not want to be firing Sidewinder from an adjacent station however I also wouldn't want to put both my electronics pods that close either.
Unfortunately, I can't tell if the Mk.82 shape on the port inner wing pylon is a GBU-38 or not (I think I can see the canard strake but it's dim at best) and without /also/ seeing it on the centerline (WCMD is far too expensive for 'everyday' CAS) it's hard to tell how much of an improvement has been made as a function of 'JDAM compatible' pylon wiring. Given that the GBU-12 is restricted to the inner wings only, it could be that a -realistic- loadout would remain 1-2 powered standoff shots and 2 unpowered ones unless the GBU-38 also fits to the fuselage stations.
Probably the biggest disappointment of the article is the failure to highlight how the A-10C PEP now fits the contemporary roles and missions functioning that the A-10 now undertakes as part of joint air attack these days and particularly 'what remains to be done' relative to that mission scenario in later Spirals.
Last I heard, JTRS imploded due to inability of NSA to resolve secure crypto issues relative to SDR driven waveform and channel definitions for the various MIDS/L16 and EPLRS or followon TTNT (which nobody seems to wanted to pay for the added bandpipe) formats. Specifically, Army wouldn't pay for Air Force integration of their waveform within an otherwise cheapest-possible MIDS-LVT box. If so, SADL and the DSMS must have been decoupled and that means god-knows-what relative to decent functional blue tooth connectivity with the ground forces.
Something which is important given the A-10 is functionally the only lo-FAC in many instances; you _need_ an adhoc network agent to get the tactical picture up to the F-jets and that may not always be direct-pipe possible given the low number of ROVER terminals out there. The A-10 also lacks a radar and a fast-scoot ability so it may be a case of 'lasing on or nothing' from a decent standoff relative to getting the fast movers eyes on, quickly without mutual assured positioning.
Yet this is also impractical (IMO) from a single seat cockpit without the digital map and an ability to precue the pod, rapidly.
Of course it's always nice to have added smart weapons but here too, the notion that a grossly underpowered airframe is going to be flying high enough to make best use of ballistic ordnance is, IMO, a challengeable assumption. I would like to see the bubble around a ground target for a 12-18K foot, <>300 knot, GBU-38 release. I'm betting that it's not much different from CDIP. Keeping the Hogs nose out of the dirt is 'always a good thing', given the exceptionally prolonged climbout (5 minutes for 15,000ft after a gun run) but IMO, there remains a significant disconnect between the high and low standoff approach to PGM warfare and particularly the single pilot workload issues in the A-10 PEP which tend to bring you back to 'old school' with guns and bombs as a _very_ dangerous exponent of reactive fast-suppression.
And this is something which will remain a crucial problem both on the front end (reliable SADL/EPLRS/ROVER functionality in predesignating targets)and backend (shoot and shoot again before coming off) whatever tactics eventuate in prosecuting the kill-chain.
Specifically, the A-10 needs to be out of easy Mk.1 Ball parameters for recognition of target area variables while supporting ballistic munitions delivery from 'higher and faster' off other platforms in the FAC-A mission and on it's own, needs a significantly better, lighter, smart-racked, _powered_ standoff munition to give it some precued and rapid slewed weapon servicings from internally stored and headsdown compatible target marks that the pilot can reference from outside all trashfire envelopes.
Unfortunately, the best weapon for this role: the JCM, itself remains on life support after having over reached itself for seeker moding and cost, or we might FINALLY have a decent (simple) SALH+Inertial Hellfire followon to put on the Hog (the missile and quadrail were originally cleared to the type back in 1984 or so) so that you could get 20,000ft+ standoffs while remaining at or below 10,000ft AGL heights.
CONCLUSION:
In the end, I think they are putting the cart before the horse in pushing out the engine and netcentrics into Spiral 2/3, even as I think they have vastly overestimated the amount of funding likely to be available, post-Iraq. This will effect both the initial upgrade itself (356 airframes is about twice again as much as will be affordable) and the sustainment once the A-10 becomes a software driven airframe with all the quarterly tape issues and DMS problems that plague other 'high end' jets.
When Lockheed Owego did their original PE funding estimates, back in 1998 or so, everything was based on cracking the primary airframe JUST ONCE to install the principle avionics backbone and make the remaining Hog Up structural updates. This looks to me to be multiple make work replacement effort going through the USAF depot system instead (which will be /very/ costly) and even if it is fully funded, I frankly question how tactically viable the 'final standard' A-10 will be when the last jet comes out of it's last PDM update cycle. Only to be flown to the boneyard, sometime in the late 20-teens.
KPl.
Interesting. Look at the picture and you will see both the 'return of the LAU-88' (which is very unusual with the TF34 upgrade still unfunded) and what attempts to be a representative PE warload. Specifically, note that the AAQ-28 appears to have been displaced to the outboard midwing station instead of supplanting the Maverick on the inner-outboard station. It will be interesting to see if that particular location works well both in clearing the Gear sponson mask line and providing decent, stable, target tracking capability at a significantly higher index point on the wing dihedral (hog outboard panels flex considerably). I certainly would not want to be firing Sidewinder from an adjacent station however I also wouldn't want to put both my electronics pods that close either.
Unfortunately, I can't tell if the Mk.82 shape on the port inner wing pylon is a GBU-38 or not (I think I can see the canard strake but it's dim at best) and without /also/ seeing it on the centerline (WCMD is far too expensive for 'everyday' CAS) it's hard to tell how much of an improvement has been made as a function of 'JDAM compatible' pylon wiring. Given that the GBU-12 is restricted to the inner wings only, it could be that a -realistic- loadout would remain 1-2 powered standoff shots and 2 unpowered ones unless the GBU-38 also fits to the fuselage stations.
Probably the biggest disappointment of the article is the failure to highlight how the A-10C PEP now fits the contemporary roles and missions functioning that the A-10 now undertakes as part of joint air attack these days and particularly 'what remains to be done' relative to that mission scenario in later Spirals.
Last I heard, JTRS imploded due to inability of NSA to resolve secure crypto issues relative to SDR driven waveform and channel definitions for the various MIDS/L16 and EPLRS or followon TTNT (which nobody seems to wanted to pay for the added bandpipe) formats. Specifically, Army wouldn't pay for Air Force integration of their waveform within an otherwise cheapest-possible MIDS-LVT box. If so, SADL and the DSMS must have been decoupled and that means god-knows-what relative to decent functional blue tooth connectivity with the ground forces.
Something which is important given the A-10 is functionally the only lo-FAC in many instances; you _need_ an adhoc network agent to get the tactical picture up to the F-jets and that may not always be direct-pipe possible given the low number of ROVER terminals out there. The A-10 also lacks a radar and a fast-scoot ability so it may be a case of 'lasing on or nothing' from a decent standoff relative to getting the fast movers eyes on, quickly without mutual assured positioning.
Yet this is also impractical (IMO) from a single seat cockpit without the digital map and an ability to precue the pod, rapidly.
Of course it's always nice to have added smart weapons but here too, the notion that a grossly underpowered airframe is going to be flying high enough to make best use of ballistic ordnance is, IMO, a challengeable assumption. I would like to see the bubble around a ground target for a 12-18K foot, <>300 knot, GBU-38 release. I'm betting that it's not much different from CDIP. Keeping the Hogs nose out of the dirt is 'always a good thing', given the exceptionally prolonged climbout (5 minutes for 15,000ft after a gun run) but IMO, there remains a significant disconnect between the high and low standoff approach to PGM warfare and particularly the single pilot workload issues in the A-10 PEP which tend to bring you back to 'old school' with guns and bombs as a _very_ dangerous exponent of reactive fast-suppression.
And this is something which will remain a crucial problem both on the front end (reliable SADL/EPLRS/ROVER functionality in predesignating targets)and backend (shoot and shoot again before coming off) whatever tactics eventuate in prosecuting the kill-chain.
Specifically, the A-10 needs to be out of easy Mk.1 Ball parameters for recognition of target area variables while supporting ballistic munitions delivery from 'higher and faster' off other platforms in the FAC-A mission and on it's own, needs a significantly better, lighter, smart-racked, _powered_ standoff munition to give it some precued and rapid slewed weapon servicings from internally stored and headsdown compatible target marks that the pilot can reference from outside all trashfire envelopes.
Unfortunately, the best weapon for this role: the JCM, itself remains on life support after having over reached itself for seeker moding and cost, or we might FINALLY have a decent (simple) SALH+Inertial Hellfire followon to put on the Hog (the missile and quadrail were originally cleared to the type back in 1984 or so) so that you could get 20,000ft+ standoffs while remaining at or below 10,000ft AGL heights.
CONCLUSION:
In the end, I think they are putting the cart before the horse in pushing out the engine and netcentrics into Spiral 2/3, even as I think they have vastly overestimated the amount of funding likely to be available, post-Iraq. This will effect both the initial upgrade itself (356 airframes is about twice again as much as will be affordable) and the sustainment once the A-10 becomes a software driven airframe with all the quarterly tape issues and DMS problems that plague other 'high end' jets.
When Lockheed Owego did their original PE funding estimates, back in 1998 or so, everything was based on cracking the primary airframe JUST ONCE to install the principle avionics backbone and make the remaining Hog Up structural updates. This looks to me to be multiple make work replacement effort going through the USAF depot system instead (which will be /very/ costly) and even if it is fully funded, I frankly question how tactically viable the 'final standard' A-10 will be when the last jet comes out of it's last PDM update cycle. Only to be flown to the boneyard, sometime in the late 20-teens.
KPl.
