The F-35 Lightning II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), is the Department of Defense’s (DOD) most costly and ambitious aircraft acquisition, seeking to simultaneously develop and field three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international partners. The JSF is critical for recapitalizing tactical air forces and will require a long-term commitment to very large annual funding outlays.
The current estimated investment is $323 billion to develop and procure 2,457 aircraft.
As required by law, this report discusses (1) program cost, schedule, and performance; (2) manufacturing results; and (3) test plans and progress. GAO’s work includes interviews, cost data, test plans, production measures, and analyses by defense and contractor officials.
The JSF program continues to struggle with increased costs and slowed progress–negative outcomes that were foreseeable as events have unfolded over several years. Total estimated acquisition costs have increased $46 billion and development extended 2 more years, compared to the program baseline approved in 2007.
DOD leadership is now taking some positive steps which, if effectively implemented, should improve outcomes and provide more realistic cost and schedule estimates. Officials increased time and funding for system development, added 4 aircraft to the flight test program, and reduced near-term procurement quantities.
Restructuring is not finished and further cost growth and schedule extensions are likely.
The program is at risk for not delivering aircraft quantities and capabilities on time.
Dates for achieving initial operational capabilities may have to be extended or some requirements deferred to future upgrades.
Aircraft unit costs will likely exceed the thresholds established by the statutory provision commonly referred to as Nunn-McCurdy and may require DOD to certify the need for the JSF to Congress.
Program setbacks in costs, deliveries, and performance directly affect modernization plans and retirement schedules of the legacy aircraft the JSF is slated to replace.
Manufacturing JSF test aircraft continues to take more time, money, and effort than budgeted. By December 2009, only 4 of 13 test aircraft had been delivered and labor hours to build the aircraft had increased more than 50 percent above earlier estimates. Late deliveries hamper the development flight test program and affect work on production aircraft, even as plans proceed to significantly ramp-up annual procurement rates.
Some improvement is noted, but continuing manufacturing inefficiencies, parts problems, and engineering technical changes indicate that design and production processes may lack the maturity needed to efficiently produce aircraft at planned rates. The independent manufacturing review team determined that the planned production ramp rate was unachievable absent significant improvements.
Although restructuring actions should help, there is still substantial overlap of development, test, and production activities while DOD continues to invest in large quantities of production aircraft before variant designs are proven and performance verified.
Slowed by late aircraft deliveries, technical problems, and low productivity, the flight test program only completed 10 percent of the sorties planned during 2009.
Other technical challenges include (1) relying on an extensive but largely unproven and unaccredited network of ground test laboratories and simulation models to evaluate system performance; (2) developing and integrating very large and complex software requirements; and (3) maturing several critical technologies essential to meet operational performance and logistical support requirements.
Collectively, testing and technical challenges will likely add more costs and time to development, affecting delivery of warfighter requirements and hampering start up of pilot and maintainer training and initial operational testing.
Report Excerpts
- Steadily lengthening schedules to complete key system developefforts further exacerbates the already extreme overlap among development, test, and production activities.
- The program office currently estimates total life-cycle costs for operating, sustaining, and maintaining JSF fleets at $764 billion, substantially higher than earlier estimates. The cost per flying hour of the CTOL variant is projected to be higher than the F-16, one of the Air Force aircraft it is slated to replace. NAVAIR officials recently projected total life-cycle costs even higher, at more than $1 trillion.
- In addition to ongoing software challenges, the program continues to address several technical issues:
- The carrier variant requires significant design modifications to the keel web, a key structural joint to enable catapult takeoffs. Proposed design changes are still being reviewed and cost and schedule impacts are unknown at this time.
- The program continues to address significant technical and design challenges with the F135 engine. The STOVL engine’s lift fan has required design changes in response to damages incurred during testing which will limit flight test efficiency and will likely require additional modifications, time, and resources.
- Logistic support: NAVAIR reported that the software to support the system’s communication with legacy information systems is currently not planned and may affect interoperability. In addition, the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) reported that the current integrated support system for the JSF prohibits operating two detachments from one squadron simultaneously. This limitation will severely affect current operating practices.
- Helmet Mounted Display. Critical to information integration and situational awareness, issues with the helmet mounted display continue to impact system effectiveness and air system integration.
- Damage to flight deck and runways. The F-35 engine and integrated power package exhaust may cause excessive damage to the flight deck environment and runway surfaces that may result in operating limits or drive costly upgrades and repairs of JSF basing options.
- Thermal management. Heat build-up and exhaust impedes the aircraft’s ability to conduct missions in hot environments. The program has made design changes to address this issue, but those changes are not expected to go into effect until the third low-rate procurement lot and are likely to affect operational testing. The development of a fuel pump to mitigate excessive heat is not expected to fully achieve requirements. As a result, the program has instituted restrictions on how the aircraft can be used [which] will limit flight test efficiency and may not be feasible for operational deployment.
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