PINR, Turkey's decision to send troops to Iraq highlights Ankara's need to control the political and economic future of its southern neighbor. Cemil Cicek, a spokesman for the Turkish government, bluntly explained Ankara's decision: “The country most affected by what is going on in Iraq is Turkey.” Just as importantly, Ankara's decision will help to mend relations with the United States, which asked Turkey to send troops to assist with the U.S. occupation. Before the U.S. intervention in Iraq, the United States made a similar request, asking that Turkey allow the U.S. military to use Turkish bases during its invasion. But the Turkish parliament narrowly voted against supporting the U.S. intervention. The reason for this was that Turkey did not want to look to be supporting a unilateral U.S. war — one in which the United Nations refused to sanction — and also because ninety percent of its population was outspokenly against any Turkish cooperation with the United States in Iraq. Now with the war phase of the conflict largely over, it will be easier for Turkey to intervene in Iraq since it can characterize its involvement as a peacekeeping mission. Turkey's physical intervention in Iraq is necessary if Ankara is interested in influencing political, economic and security arrangements in northern Iraq.
When Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party ruled Iraq, Turkey enjoyed thriving economic benefits from the bustling border trade between the two countries. Situated between Europe and the Middle East, Turkey is in a prime location to act as a Eurasian economic hub. But after the Gulf War in 1991, and the subsequent United Nations' sanctions that were placed on Iraq, the Iraqi state suffered immensely, and its pain had a tremendous effect on Turkey's economy. Before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March of 2003, Ankara claimed that it had suffered $60 billion in lost trade since the end of the Gulf War due to the U.N. sanctions on Iraq and the subsequent degradation and destruction of Iraq's infrastructure.
Along with lost trade, Turkey's political and security arrangements in its southeastern border region remained tense. Southeastern Turkey is home to the country's large Kurdish population, comprising about 20 percent of the Turkish population. Beginning in 1984, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a separatist group, began causing security problems for Ankara. Rebelling from what it perceived as Ankara's mistreatment of its Kurdish population, the PKK initially sought to establish an independent Kurdish state, partly based on the Treaty of Sevres (1920), which provided for an autonomous Kurdistan; the treaty, however, was never implemented due to the growing power of the Turkish nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal in the 1920s. In response to the Kurdish uprisings of the past two decades, Ankara ruthlessly cracked down on Turkish Kurds, resulting in much loss of life on both sides of the ongoing conflict.
In order to flee from the Turkish crackdown, the PKK situated many of its resources and manpower in northern Iraq. There they enjoyed relative stability due to the large Kurdish population in northern Iraq that was protected from Baghdad through a no-fly zone organized by the U.S., Great Britain and France following the Gulf War. The unity between Turkish and Iraqi Kurds is what worries policymakers in Ankara. If Turkish and Iraqi Kurds are able to unite in their quest for independent statehood, it could incite Turkey's large Kurdish population to attempt to cede off parts of southeastern Turkey — such as the Turkish cities of Batman and Silvan — into a greater Kurdistan.
Fortunately for Turkey, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, this declaration of statehood did not occur. Nevertheless, the Turkish military was prepared in case an invasion to prevent Kurds in northern Iraq from declaring statehood became necessary. But now as Operation Iraqi Freedom has come to an end, and Washington is seeking to develop Iraq's political, economic and military infrastructure, Ankara has recognized that it is in Turkey's best interests to join the United States in its pursuit of these objectives.
For its part, the United States could use Turkey's manpower; Turkey has the second largest army in NATO. Unprepared by the high number of U.S. casualties in Iraq — with U.S. forces being injured and killed every week — the Bush administration has been forced to keep U.S. troop levels in Iraq unchanged since the end of the major combat phase of the war. Initially expecting to pull troops out shortly after the fall of Baghdad, these plans have been scrapped due to the continued multifaceted resistance movements against the U.S. occupation forces. This has prevented Washington from allowing its reserve forces to return back to the United States.
The Bush administration, therefore, continued its pleas to the Turkish government to send troops to assist in the U.S. occupation. To help coax Ankara's involvement, Washington issued Turkey an $8.5 billion loan in late September dependent on Turkey's support of the U.S. in Iraq. The Bush administration also assured Turkey that it would work to stifle the activities of the PKK in northern Iraq. Up until now, the U.S. has taken a laissez faire approach to the PKK and other Kurdish groups because the Kurds have been cooperative of U.S. plans in Iraq and are assisting in keeping the northern part of the country stable — this despite the fact that the PKK is listed by the U.S. State Department as a terrorist organization. The Bush administration was required to provide this assurance to Ankara since Turkish troops would not be concentrated in northern Iraq, but instead around Baghdad, which is populated by Arab Sunni-Muslims rather than by ethnic Kurds. This deployment location would prevent Turks and Kurds from intermingling — a situation that could easily break down into violence and one that Washington would like to avoid.
Even with this limitation, Iraq's Kurdish population is upset; they fear that Turkey will suppress their political ambitions and block their quest for autonomy. Iraqi Kurds also dislike Washington's close relationship with Ankara; indeed, they still remember in 1991 when former President George H.W. Bush encouraged them to rise up and revolt against Saddam Hussein — when they did, the Bush administration withheld support for their actions and did not prevent Saddam Hussein from ruthlessly crushing the rebellion.
Non-Kurdish Iraqis have also reacted coldly to the troop deal between Washington and Ankara. Members of the Iraqi Governing Council — the group installed by the Pentagon to act as a temporary government in Iraq — publicly rejected Washington's decision to allow Turkish troops to assist in the occupation. Nabeil al-Moussawi, of the Iraqi National Congress, which is headed by Ahmad Chalabi — who is a member of the Governing Council — warned, “The Governing Council's stand is against the presence of troops from neighboring countries without exception, and Turkey is one of these countries.” Indeed, Iraq's current leaders fear the security risks in allowing Ankara to gain influence in Baghdad's domestic affairs.
There is also the constant fear that Ankara may attempt to lay claim to parts of northern Iraq that it considers part of Turkey. Ankara has floated the idea of pursuing legal claims over Kirkuk and Mosul, the two former Ottoman Empire cities ceded to Iraq in the 1920s. Nationalist sentiment inside Turkey claims that the country was stripped of their rights when pieces of the Ottoman Empire were broken off after World War I. This history is yet another concern of the Iraqi Governing Council and explains their cautious outlook toward Turkish troop deployment. However, since the Iraqi Governing Council holds no real power in Iraq, it will ultimately be up to Washington, not Baghdad, to decide whether Turkish troops will be deployed.
In the end, Turkey's troop involvement in Iraq will be necessary if Ankara is able to protect its future interests in the region. Ankara needs to have troops stationed inside Iraq in order to carefully monitor Kurdish actions in the northern part of the country. By having troops active in the border area between Turkey and Iraq, in addition to the central part of Iraq, Ankara will have sandwiched the various Kurdish factions between its powerful military. This military position will give Ankara the ability to swiftly take action against any threatening movement by the PKK, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) or other Kurdish groups such as the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). While the United States would not necessarily condone such an attack, it is not clear how long the United States will remain in force in Iraq, as the war is becoming increasingly unpopular at home and the Bush administration could lose the upcoming presidential election in 2004 to a candidate who may have the political leverage to pull U.S. forces out of the country.
It is for these reasons that the Turkish government has decided to send troops to assist the U.S. occupation of Iraq. From the point of view of Ankara, Turkey's national interests in Iraq are more important than the political ramifications of becoming involved. As Recep Tayyip Erdogan, leader of the majority Justice and Development Party, said before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, by failing to become involved in the affairs of Iraq, “Turkey's long-term interests and even security could be in jeopardy.”
