The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

KipPotapych said:

They surely know the size of their army; they know that the volunteer lines at the recruitment centers had dried up very long time ago and that mobilization is rather difficult; they know exactly how many men they recruit and mobilize each day; they have a fairly good idea about the casualties they sustain daily; and so on. In other words, they have a pretty good idea on the resources they have at hand. They are also well aware of the uncertainty in regard to the availability of resources supplied by the partners beyond short term. It just seems completely unreasonable to ignore the proper defenses by the Ukrainian decision makers. After all, with the limited information available to us, mostly in the open sources, some of us here could foresee the potential issues - namely the events that are unfolding now - with a fair degree of accuracy.

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I agree with most of the rest of your post but wanted to call this part out in particular. What makes you so sure that the Ukrainian government has all this information? It implies a level of accuracy in reports, verification mechanisms, honesty, lack of corruption, etc. that are not at all characteristic of post-Soviet regimes in general or Ukraine in particular. I think it's far likelier that the Ukrainian government has an imperfect knowledge of these things. Saying we don't know did not mean "trust Ukraine, they would know best". Rather it's to imply an imperfection in our ability to analyze decision-making that is itself rather imperfect and cloudy.

KipPotapych said:

Instead, at least publicly, there was no discussion of building Ukrainian defense lines until probably mid fall or so, give or take a month.

....
They started building their defence lines last December

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This is because they believed that their counter offensive would successfully move the front line in their advantage.
They didn't see the need for fortifications because Russians were withdrawing. Only in autumn 2023 it became clear that, instead, the Russians had the advantage and were advancing again.
We can say that the lack of defence line in the East is due to Ukrainian over confidence.

But in the North, they have started building a border protection much earlier. I don't remember when, but earlier than summer 2023. They started to consolidate the border with Belarus from West to East. This had no influence in the battle field, and got little notice except from guys like me who read Ukrinform. But at least, they felt safer with Belarus.

KipPotapych said:

we underestimated Russian determination, capacity to learn and adapt on the battlefield, capacity to produce, capacity to adapt to sanctions, Russian population’s support of the leadership, and a whole bunch of other underestimations.

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Yes. Because we think as westerners. Russians don't think the way we do.
And Americans don't think about war the way Europeans and, I think, Canadians, do. And Muslims think in a way that is different from anybody else. But this is off topic.

We underestimated Russian determination because what they do is against logic, from our point of view.
Russians (or the Russian leadership) has another logic.
For us, deploying so much forces and efforts just to control a few provinces of Ukraine, or even the entire Ukraine, is not worth it and, by any means not necessary for Russia. And that's why we never thought that they would.

For Russians, it's a question of pride, historical rights, respect, asserting their power and taking strategically important military locations useful to accomplish these motives.

Any other country wouldn't try something like that because they know that it could jeopardize their very existence. But the immensity of Russia makes a possible demise unthinkable. Maybe it's because of that, that Russians can take extreme decisions that nobody else would.

This is also reflected in the acceptation of the war by the Russian population. We also underestimated
population’s support of the leadership, and Putin in particular. The population doesn't really agree with the military operation, but they accept it. Because they have accepted much worse things in the past.

KipPotapych said:

The “main” proposed theory by the Ukrainians is that there was a rotation error, as you indicated (except it was 115th was supposedly to be replaced by the 47th). And it is understandable why they would rather push that chain of events. However, from all indications, it appears that the 115th was either easily battled out or simply abandoned their positions. See the post translated from Polish I cited above for reference. This article from Forbes suggests as much:

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Forbe said:

The 47th Mechanized Brigade was actually in the process of pulling back from the front when the Russian 30th Motor Rifle Brigade attacked two weekends ago. The Tactical Grouping of Troops Donetsk, which oversees Ukrainian brigades in the sector that includes Ocheretyne, ordered the 47th Mechanized Brigade to turn around and rejoin the fight.

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I don't know whose theory it was. I heard that on a french chanel. Their interpretation was that the rotation had to happen the day Russians took the salient.
It's not exact. However the 47th was being removed and the Russians noticed it. Not that day but, at some moment between two weeks ago (if Forbe's informations are correct because they too can make wrong interpretations) and that day.

It's possible that the explanation that the 115th arrived too late was not correct neither. They were on the place but were not enough mechanized, not strong enough to sustain the Russian assault.

It's very difficult to know what happens because of the interpretation of the various sources by the journalists, who sometimes read already interpretated reports. The reality is deformed by successive interpretations.

This link quoted by Forbe tells about yet another version, probably more accurate:

Trench Art said:

the Ukrainian army’s 115th Mechanized Brigade caught much of the blame.

The brigade “just fucked off,” wrote Mykola Melnyk, a famed 47th Mechanized Brigade company commander who lost a leg during Ukraine’s counteroffensive last year. Allegedly abandoning their positions, the 115th Brigade troopers all but invited the Russians into Ocheretyne.

But it’s wrong solely to blame the 115th Brigade, according to “Jerome” at Militaryland.net, which closely tracks the Ukrainian military’s order of battle. “Apart from 115th Mechanized Brigade, there were two other units operating in the area,” Militaryland.net pointed out: the 104th Territorial Defence Brigade and the 425th Assault Battalion.

At least a battalion from the 115th Brigade held positions north of Ocheretyne, while the 425th Battalion defended the village’s southern flank—and a battalion from the 104th Brigade garrisoned the village itself.

“If you want to ask questions, then ask the commander of Tactical Grouping of Troops Donetsk … why he decided to deploy a single territorial defence battalion to defend such strategically valuable place,” Militaryland.net insisted.

Also ask why such a critical sector lacked a heavy unit with tanks and artillery, Militaryland.net urged. The 115th and 104th Brigades and the 425th Battalion all are infantry formations with only a few armored vehicles, and yet were tasked to defend Ocheretyne against a fully mechanized Russian brigade backed by several other mechanized regiments and brigades as well as, in reserve, a tank division—the 90th.

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Russians target Ukrainian post office depot with balistic missile

Ukrinform said:

According to preliminary data, about 900 parcels were affected. The company will compensate customers for their losses

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Russians start using balistic missiles for just about anything they want to dammage.
They either have too many balistic missiles or not enough targets to fire at.
It's hard to understand what they have in mind.
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Russia says it sees no point in Ukraine peace talks in Switzerland
Russia gives as an excuse that Switzerland supports sanctions against Russia and is therefore not a neutral country.
They forget that Switzerland is the only European country with Hungary which has not sent military aid to Ukraine.

Ukrainians also said that Russia shouldn't be invited.

Kuleba said:

We know that it doesn't make sense to have Russia at the table if you cannot ensure that they act in good faith

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If they wanted to talk with Russia, they could do it without am international conference.

The goal of this summit, as long as Russia doesn't participate, will be to gather delegations from countries which are not involved. Sort of in parallel to UN meetings.

KipPotapych said:

they (Ukrainians) know exactly how many men they recruit and mobilize each day; they have a fairly good idea about the casualties they sustain daily; and so on. In other words, they have a pretty good idea on the resources they have at hand.

Feanor said:

I think it's far likelier that the Ukrainian government has an imperfect knowledge of these things.

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I think that the Ukrainian military leadership has a reasonably good knowledge of the state of their army. But it doesn't change much, if the resources of this army are insuficent.

Ukrainian don't lose a position because the headquarter was not aware of the weakness of this position, but because they didn't have the means to make it stronger.

Update;

Chasov Yar.

Russian forces have reached the canal itself through the southern forest on a fairly wide section of the front. This envelops the Canal neighborhood from the south. There is a secondary element from the north.


Russian turtle tank has shown up near Ivanovskoe, Chasov Yar area. I don't think it's the same one.


Russia took a BMP-1 out near Grigorovka.


Russian forces using incendiary munitions in Chasov Yar.


Ocheretino Salient.

Russian forces have all of Ocheretino, all of Novokalinovo, and all of Keramik. They are also contesting Arkhangel'skoe, holding about half of the village, and advancing on the flanks of it as well. Russia also holds the road connecting Ocheretino and Novokalinovo.


Russian forces in the Ocheretino rail station.


Another captured Abrams near Avdeevka. These are all vehicles lost in the heavy fighting that Russia can now haul away.


Russian forces capture a knocked out Bradley M7A3 artillery recon vehicle, and a regular Bradley.


Netaylovo-Pervomayskoe.

Russian forces destroying a Marder near Netaylovo. Given their recent sighting near Rabotino we can now confidently state that two separate units, probably two different brigades, are operating the type.


Mar'inka area.

Russian Lancet strike taking out an M113 in Kurakhovo. Lancet strikes have become far more common in recent months. What's interesting is they caught it refueling. There's another M113 behind it, and some sort of engineers vehicle on the trailer next to it. It seems like the type of target you might want to hit with more then one loitering munition, or better yet artillery.


Novomihailovka area.

Russian forces have resumed advancing along a wide front south of Novomihailovka. Ultimately these advances threaten the road to Ugledar but they're quite a long way away.


Zaporozhye front.

Russia is continuing their advance into Urozhaynoe. So far they have a firm foothold in the southern part of the village. Urozhaynoe and Staromayorskoe are next to each other, on opposite sides of a river that runs north-south, so it's likely Russia will advance in Staromayorskoe too if this push is successful.


Russia struck a bridge connecting Vremyevka and Velikaya Novoselka, across the Mokrie Yaly river.


Fighting continues in Rabotino.


Aerial footage of the ruins of Rabotino. The village is effectively gone.

Strikes.

Russia recently hit Odessa pretty hard, namely the Novaya Pochta storage facility. There has also been a post from a Ukrainian politician claiming Russia hit a Shadow Storm storage facility. Russian sources are connecting the two, though this isn't obvious. Note the target isn't a post office @Fredled but a private transportation company that's been spotted carrying military cargo before. We also have some appearance of secondary explosions and some pretty major fires, suggesting there's something there.


Another Russian strike in Odessa resulted in a college campus being damaged. Note Russian sources are claiming this is the result of a SAM detonating above the area. The angle of impact does suggest the munition came from inland, but... Russia intentionally maneuvers their inbounds to come from different directions so this doesn't really prove much.


Battle damage from another Russian strike in Odessa, it's unclear what the building in question is. Results from recent Russian strikes have resulted in at least one Ukrainian officer dying.


Russia is claiming they hit another IRIS-T near Ostroverkhovka, Kharkov region, but no trace of this SAM can be seen in the footage. We see a Ukrainian APC of some sort, and two containers, of what appears to be a military nature. They hit some military target, but it's unclear what it is.


What appear to be two HIMARS getting hit in Kharkov region. With the increased range on Russian UAVs we're seeing more targest being identified deeper behind Ukrainian lines. However BDA is tricky, since the HIMARS are hiding in the trees. A Tornado-S was allegedly used.


Russia hit allegedly an S-300 reloading vehicle in Kharkov region. I'm having a hard time making out what exactly it is.


Russian strike hitting allegedly AN/TPQ-50 counter-battery radar on a Humvee, Kharkov region. Again, it's hard to tell what it really is, other then a Humvee. A loitering munition is visible doing the strike.


We have the results of Ukraine's recent strike on Dzhankoy, Crimea. They hit another S-300/400 unit, and took out at least one TEL. It's unclear how many others were damaged, since they're gone, either displacing, or getting hauled away. What's interesting is that here we have some dispersal of the TELs, and berms around the position, to protect them.


New air defense positions have been sighted in the Zhulyany airport in Kiev.


Other bits.

3 destroyed/knocked out T-62Ms with roof cages and EW stations. One also appears to have a camera set up over the roof cage. Location is unclear, but they were clearly used as part of a failed attack.


Russian WIA being evacuated using an unmanned platform. Note he's using a thermal shroud but it keeps blowing off.


There are reports coming in that Russian EW has had a significant impact on the effectiveness of GPS guided weapons used by Ukraine, including Excalibur rounds, and GLSDB munitions.


A Russian T-72A, with some extra ERA in action. In general we've seen relatively few T-72As and AVs in Russian service.


A Russian T-80BV loading not just legacy Soviet sabot rounds, but the '70s versions, not the newer Mango. Note it's possible that Russia isn't producing the Mango, instead producing the Svinets which of course can't be used unless you replace the autoloader. So T-80BVM, T-72B3, and T-90 of all variants can use it. But legacy '72s and '80s can't.


A T-90M with clean camo netting and a low roof cage. So low, that the RCWS and wind sensor stick out through the top. Personally I'm curious if the netting is a Nakidka variant, or just regular netting.


A Russian BTR column, all with roof cages. Note they look like BTR-82ATs with the extra armor, though it's hard to be sure.


Russian soldiers using electric scooters to move around the front line.


Russia has launched a rail line from Mariupol' to Volnovakha. The Volnovakha area in general has received relatively generous reconstruction efforts from Russian organizations out of the Yamal region. This is likely part of the bigger picture of rebuilding Mariupol' and it's surroundings.


Ukrainian forces with a captured T-72B3 mod'23, with the new roof cage type.


A shocking recent Azov recruiting post suggests that if you don't want to be utilized as "meat" in attacks, you should enlist with Azov instead of waiting to be mobilized.

Feanor said:

I agree with most of the rest of your post but wanted to call this part out in particular. What makes you so sure that the Ukrainian government has all this information? It implies a level of accuracy in reports, verification mechanisms, honesty, lack of corruption, etc. that are not at all characteristic of post-Soviet regimes in general or Ukraine in particular. I think it's far likelier that the Ukrainian government has an imperfect knowledge of these things. Saying we don't know did not mean "trust Ukraine, they would know best". Rather it's to imply an imperfection in our ability to analyze decision-making that is itself rather imperfect and cloudy.

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That’s actually a fair point and I probably give them more credit than I should. I do believe though that they have much better numbers and understanding (related to those numbers) than we do. This does not imply that anyone should believe their claims, by any means, but they are surely more informed than we are and the numbers at their disposal are likely fairly accurate, given the limitations that you mentioned.

I understood it exactly as you put it.

Fredled said:

This is because they believed that their counter offensive would successfully move the front line in their advantage.
They didn't see the need for fortifications because Russians were withdrawing. Only in autumn 2023 it became clear that, instead, the Russians had the advantage and were advancing again.

We can say that the lack of defence line in the East is due to Ukrainian over confidence.

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Again, that implies incompetence at some level. I am not sure how else to explain it better than I did in my previous post (maybe it was too long, but you may have noticed I have this “tendency”). Basically, this is how they lose. There also have been reports, that were shared here previously (like that great Washington Post article I summarized here a while ago, for example), that there was a general understanding that the (intended) counteroffensive failed a few days after it started.

I’ll also mention that Russians were certainly not withdrawing. I mean we can see the result, it’s not a secret. Russians ended up capturing more territory in 2023 than they lost (Wikipedia, citing a New York Times article, says that they captured less than half of the Russian gains). There were several breakthroughs reported by Ukraine beginning in June, but we never saw one.

Fredled said:

But in the North, they have started building a border protection much earlier. I don't remember when, but earlier than summer 2023. They started to consolidate the border with Belarus from West to East. This had no influence in the battle field, and got little notice except from guys like me who read Ukrinform. But at least, they felt safer with Belarus.

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Yes, I read that they built a bunker or two near the border with Belarus. That was last spring, if I recall correctly. About the same time there were reports that they were planning to put some money into fortifications around Chernihiv and maybe Kharkiv. Don’t know if it was ever materialized, but that it isn’t really relevant. Actually, on the second thought, if they did do that, that may indicate further incompetence of the decision makers, wouldn’t you agree? Why would they be building fortifications at Belarus border when they were or now? Zelensky also said they were planning to build some around Kiev (WSJ article I cited in the other post talks about it) as if it has any relevance to what was/is happening.

Fredled said:

Yes. Because we think as westerners. Russians don't think the way we do.
And Americans don't think about war the way Europeans and, I think, Canadians, do. And Muslims think in a way that is different from anybody else. But this is off topic.

We underestimated Russian determination because what they do is against logic, from our point of view.
Russians (or the Russian leadership) has another logic.
For us, deploying so much forces and efforts just to control a few provinces of Ukraine, or even the entire Ukraine, is not worth it and, by any means not necessary for Russia. And that's why we never thought that they would.

For Russians, it's a question of pride, historical rights, respect, asserting their power and taking strategically important military locations useful to accomplish these motives.

Any other country wouldn't try something like that because they know that it could jeopardize their very existence. But the immensity of Russia makes a possible demise unthinkable. Maybe it's because of that, that Russians can take extreme decisions that nobody else would.

This is also reflected in the acceptation of the war by the Russian population. We also underestimated
population’s support of the leadership, and Putin in particular. The population doesn't really agree with the military operation, but they accept it. Because they have accepted much worse things in the past.

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I think there is only one logic, regardless where one is from. How one interpreted the previous events over the years, if followed, would probably affect the thinking pattern. Likely, that would also affect what one would expect of the extent the Russians would be willing to go to. Or so I think.

Fredled said:

I don't know whose theory it was. I heard that on a french chanel. Their interpretation was that the rotation had to happen the day Russians took the salient.
It's not exact. However the 47th was being removed and the Russians noticed it. Not that day but, at some moment between two weeks ago (if Forbe's informations are correct because they too can make wrong interpretations) and that day.

It's possible that the explanation that the 115th arrived too late was not correct neither. They were on the place but were not enough mechanized, not strong enough to sustain the Russian assault.

It's very difficult to know what happens because of the interpretation of the various sources by the journalists, who sometimes read already interpretated reports. The reality is deformed by successive interpretations.

This link quoted by Forbe tells about yet another version, probably more accurate

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That was the course of events described by the Ukrainian authorities (still is, I will make a citation below) and many Ukrainian sources. The version described in Forbes, that you quoted, is the one I heard from the sources I generally find reliable, it makes most sense, and there were events prior to their withdrawal that support it further, so that one I think is the most accurate one. Not that it really matters, really.

Fredled said:

Russia gives as an excuse that Switzerland supports sanctions against Russia and is therefore not a neutral country.
They forget that Switzerland is the only European country with Hungary which has not sent military aid to Ukraine.

Ukrainians also said that Russia shouldn't be invited.
If they wanted to talk with Russia, they could do it without am international conference.

The goal of this summit, as long as Russia doesn't participate, will be to gather delegations from countries which are not involved. Sort of in parallel to UN meetings.

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First thing to note here, Russia wasn’t invited. Also, they weren’t going to be invited, so they ran ahead of the train and said that even if they were, they still wouldn’t attended because they think the entire event is nonsense. And I, frankly, agree. The theme of the event is supposed to be based on the “Zelensky formula”, which in itself is nonsense that has nothing to do with reality. If you were in place of “Russia”, without any good or bad and other feeling aside, would you attend the event even if you were invited? Pure logic suggests that the answer would be a no. Why would they? What purpose would it serve them?

The Swiss government said the talks will build on Zelenskiy's peace formula, calling for the withdrawal of Russian troops and bringing Russia to account for its actions, as well as other proposals based on the U.N. Charter and key principles of international law.

From today’s Reuters article. Personally, I don’t see how a rational person would even consider attending if they were in Russia’s shoes. Again, this is just reasoning from the perspective of reality, not fairness or anything like that.

The second thing is Switzerland’s neutrality. One would argue that sanctions is a weapon. No? Furthermore, while Switzerland didn’t directly supply weapons to Ukraine, they sure sold some tanks to Germany so that Germany, along with other nations, could supply their tanks to Ukraine. This is almost transparent. Just in case, a link for reference (first Google search result):


So neutrality here is at least questionable. But then the Russians would likely agree to (real) talks in Turkey, that did directly sell weapons to Ukraine, but only a “little bit”, lol. I guess sanctions are probably more personal, while a “little bit” of weapons is just business.

Another point to consider here is that Switzerland officially recognizes the International Criminal Court. I believe this may be important.

Now to the post that I actually came to make. I was browsing through Twitter and stumbled upon this article in the Economist that was cited by Tatarigami. No longer being a subscriber, I searched the web and collected some bits and pieces here and there, some of which I want to quote here. The article is based on the interview with Skibitsky (Budanov’s deputy).


On a side note, I haven’t seen his photo for a year or two and he surely got older. And what’s with the beard?

A few quotes with my comments in brackets:

- Things, he says, are as difficult as they have ever been since the early days of Russia’s full-scale invasion. And they are about to get worse.

- Ukraine’s immediate concern is its high-ground stronghold in the town of Chasiv Yar, which holds the keys to an onward Russian advance to the last large cities in the Donetsk region (see map). It is probably a matter of time before that city falls in a similar way to Avdiivka, bombed to oblivion by the Russians in February, says the general. “Not today or tomorrow, of course, but all depending on our reserves and supplies.”

- Russia has already won a tactical success in the south-west in the village of Ocheretyne, where a recent Ukrainian troop rotation was bungled. Russian forces succeeded in breaking through a first line of defence and have created a salient 25 square kilometres in size. (This may serve as the reference I promised to cite in my post above as to the Ukraine’s version of events that took place in Ocheretino)

- The Russian army is not the hubristic organisation it was in 2022, says the general, and is now operating as a “single body, with a clear plan, and under a single command”.

- Looking at a wider horizon, the intelligence chief suggests Russia is gearing up for an assault around the Kharkiv and Sumy regions in the north-east. (I personally do not believe this is a possibility at this point in time as that would require a lot of the Russian resources that are not apparently available)

- Russia has a total of 514,000 land troops committed to the Ukrainian operation, he says, higher than the 470,000 estimate given last month by General Christopher Cavoli, nato’s top commander. The Ukrainian spymaster says Russia’s northern grouping, based across the border from Kharkiv, is currently 35,000-strong but is set to expand to between 50,000 and 70,000 troops. (I believe this supports my assessment above, not his)

- Ukrainian officials worry that the next wave of mobilised recruits will make for unmotivated soldiers with poor morale. One saving grace, says the general, is that Russia faces similar problems. (While I believe the former is the case, the latter is not (likely the opposite), which I already discussed in one of my recent posts)

- General Skibitsky says he does not see a way for Ukraine to win the war on the battlefield alone. Even if it were able to push Russian forces back to the borders—an increasingly distant prospect—it wouldn’t end the war. Such wars can only end with treaties, he says. Right now, both sides are jockeying for the “the most favourable position” ahead of potential talks. But meaningful negotiations can begin only in the second half of 2025 at the earliest, he guesses. (This is a very interesting comment, in my opinion)

- Russian military production capacity has expanded but will reach a plateau by early 2026, he reckons, due to shortages in material and engineers. Both sides could eventually run out of weapons. But if nothing changes in other respects, Ukraine will run out first. (He basically suggested that there may be negotiations before Russia reaches its capacity limits or what he thinks they are)

- He plays down Article 5 of NATO’s collective-defence charter and even NATO’s troop presence in states bordering Ukraine, which he says may mean little when put to the test. “The Russians will take the Baltics in seven days,”he argues, somewhat implausibly. “NATO’s reaction time is ten days.” (This is unsubstantiated nonsense, in my opinion, and fear mongering)

- Ukraine’s bravery and sacrifice have given Europe a multi-year head start, removing the immediate threat from Russia’s once feared airborne forces and marine corps for at least a decade, he says. (More nonsense that is now parroted by many western politicians)

Don’t know what else is there of interest, but that is what I found.

Another article I read at Foreign Policy:


I will only make one direct quote:

SR: Can Ukraine take back all its territory? If not, what’s the best hope for Ukraine in the war?

AS: I think what is realistic is that Ukraine and our 50-plus-country alliance that is helping and supporting them are able to build enough capacity so that Ukraine can hold on to what they have. I think we need to be more aggressive about trying to find ways to negotiate directly with Russia to get an end to the war in Ukraine.

The really crucial part of Ukraine’s survival is for them to maintain what they currently have, to not lose access to the Black Sea and to not have Kyiv threatened. If you have that, you have a sovereign, democratic country, and that is an enormous success.

SR: Do the United States and Europe have the defense industrial base to sustain aid to Ukraine in the long run? Are you satisfied with the pace that the West is rearming?

AS: No, I’m not satisfied with the pace. I would have to do a deeper dive to get more precise numbers on this. But if it’s a scale of 1 to 10, when the Ukraine war started, well, let’s just say we were at like a 1. All right. We’re now maybe at a 4. You started to see some increases in production. You’ve definitely started to see some partners increase their production.

Note that this is not some… marginal, let’s politely call it that, talking, like JD Vance or Marjorie Greene. This is Adam Smith, the top Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee (everything after the last comma is quoted from the article). Something to ponder about.

Yesterday Reuters posted and then withdrew an article where they claimed that David Cameron of GB said that Ukraine can use British weapons on the Russian territory. The article was withdrawn for reviewing of certain details. Today, they posted more or less identical arricle:


Cameron said Ukraine had a right to use the weapons provided by London to strike targets inside Russia, and that it was up to Kyiv whether to do so.

"Ukraine has that right. Just as Russia is striking inside Ukraine, you can quite understand why Ukraine feels the need to make sure it's defending itself," Cameron told Reuters outside St. Michael's Cathedral.

That’s definitely an interesting development. Are we also going to provide and/or adjust coordinates for these strikes as we do for others? Sending two dozen troops to the western Ukraine would certainly be in the rear view mirror then.

Cameron also said that they gave all the weapons they could and they got no equipment left to give. But they would provide £3B every year “ for as long as it is necessary”.

"We will give three billion pounds every year for as long as is necessary. We've just really emptied all we can in terms of giving equipment," he told Reuters in an interview on a visit to in Kyiv, adding that the aid package was the largest from the UK so far.

Edit: Just going over the news. Some stats cited in a Politico article:


According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Social Policy, the number of Ukrainians with disabilities has increased by 300,000 since the February 2022 full-scale invasion by Russia. More than 20,000 people have had amputations.

While it may shine some light on the losses, the stuff is quite devastating. There are even problems here and in the US, probably other places in the developed world, with veteran affairs; I can’t even imagine how it is for them in Ukraine (or Russia).

Edit 2: According to Bloomberg, nearly half the Russians that left the country when invasion began and during the mobilization are back to Russia.

The outflow has slowed, if not reversed. In June, the Kremlin boasted that half of all who fled in those early days had already returned, and that seems to reflect available statistics from the most popular destination countries as well as data from relocation companies. Based on client data at one relocation firm, Finion in Moscow, an estimated 40%-45% of those who left in 2022 have returned to Russia, said the company’s head, Vyacheslav Kartamyshev.

It looks like Russia's push around Ocheretino has stopped or slowed. It remains to be seen if this is a pause for resupply and reserves or if the effort is spent. The salient is currently fairly stable with two clear MSRs to Ocheretino, one through Novobakhmutovka-Berdychy-Stepovoe, and the other through Novokalinovo towards Krasnogorovka and the Avdeevka chemical plant. So in principle the current configuration of the front line is sustainable for Russia. Ukraine also doesn't have firm defenses around the area of the salient. So even if Russia has to pause, they could resume attacks in a number of directions. Some indirect evidence that Russia may be out of steam for this push is that no further attempts to push westward out of Berdychy or Semenovka have occurred. Of course only time will tell.

KipPotapych said:

that may indicate further incompetence of the decision makers, wouldn’t you agree? Why would they be building fortifications at Belarus border when they were or now? Zelensky also said they were planning to build some around Kiev

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No, I don't think so. It made sens to secure the northern border while the fightings were in the south and the east.
The incompetence was not to build them on the Dombas and Zaporizha.

KipPotapych said:

The version described in Forbes, that you quoted, is the one I heard from the sources I generally find reliable,

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But Forbe takes forcibly their sources from Ukrainian official sources. I don't think that commanders are able to talk to foreign journalists directly.
Also, I don't see too many contradictions in the version by Forbe and the Ukrainian version.

I think that the Ukrainians didn't use the word "rotation" properly. Rotation maens that a brigade is replaced by an equivalent one. The 45th was not replaced at all or was replaced by a fully infantry one (with very few vehicles, and if the photo on the website is descriptive of the reality, there is no wonder why they lost their position.)
Apparently it's just the 45th that left, taking with them the Abrams that were withdrawn from the front everybody talked about for days. Then came back in emergency.

KipPotapych said:

The Swiss government said the talks will build on Zelenskiy's peace formula, calling for the withdrawal of Russian troops and bringing Russia to account for its actions, as well as other proposals based on the U.N. Charter and key principles of international law.

From today’s Reuters article. Personally, I don’t see how a rational person would even consider attending if they were in Russia’s shoes.

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No rational person would fit in Russian shoes at the moment.
But, jokes aside, yes, there is no point for Russia attending but it has nothing to do with the lack of Swiss neutrality or with Zelensky.

It's not a peace negociation summit. It's just a conference with all the countries who wish to participate. It's like the COP23 for Ukraine or something like that. Lots of talks, handshakes, group pictures but no tangible result.

Note that the article mention "Zelenskiy's peace formula" as well as other proposals. It's not only about Zelensky's utopian desires. It's about various proposals that any participant can bring up. I guess the Chinese Peace Plan will also be discussed. Thought it doesn't contain anything concrete. But for the form, they will.
In this context there is no added value for Russia to go there to hear that they are criminals and that they should withdraw their troops. They won't hear anything new there. And we won't hear anything new from them neither.

A peace summit won't happen in Switzerland with 150 participants. It will be Russian and Ukrainian delegates only, somewhere in Belarus.

KipPotapych said:

General Skibitsky said:

The Russians will take the Baltics in seven days,”he argues, somewhat implausibly. “NATO’s reaction time is ten days

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(This is unsubstantiated nonsense, in my opinion, and fear mongering)

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Absolutely. NATO's reaction won't be ten days, but ten seconds.
To invade and hold the three Baltic States, Russia would need 200,000 soldiers and a solid equipment.

I think that by ten days, he means that countries forming NATO are extremely slow to react. Of course, NATO troops watching the border with Russia will react immediately if someone tries to cross.

David Cameron said:

Ukraine had a right to use the weapons provided by London to strike targets inside Russia

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I would say it's bad news for Putin. So far he could count on the cautious policies of European states. This + Macron's talk of sending troops gives him gradually another message.

That, of course, brings us closer to the day when Russia will bomb targets on a NATO territory. But I don't think that he will drop nukes. Not immediately.

In the meantime, Ukrainians could target a little bit more logistic inside Russia. I don't think that the new capability used by the Ukrainians inside Russia will be of such importance that Putin will go nuclear.

Ukraine’s Ministry of Social Policy said:

the number of Ukrainians with disabilities has increased by 300,000 since the February 2022 full-scale invasion by Russia. More than 20,000 people have had amputations.

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If these were WIA, and considered that you should, then, add half this amount of KIA, the Ukrainian defence forces would have ceased to exist already.
I imagine that a lot of them have paid their family doctor to write disability certificates.
Another big part of the unfortunates who where really amputated or disabled, are also civilians.
These numbers are no less worrysome.

Bloomberg said:

nearly half the Russians that left the country when invasion began and during the mobilization are back to Russia.

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Perhaps it's not the same that left that came back. As I wrote already earlier, there is a widening Russian resurgence movement in Europe and some ethnic Russians decide to go live in Russia.
I don't know if the numbers are statisticallly significant because it's mostly Russians from the Baltics. But there is such movement.

A more probable reason is that many of them are not allowed to stay in Europe as their visa or residence permit expired and authorities makes clear that they don't want them to stay.
At the same time, European embassies in Moscow reject most asylum and visa applications.

Thirdly, the panic has tamed. They see that the general mobilisation didn't materialised. And at the same time, these Russians don't want more trouble, like losing their citizenship, losing their real estate, losing the possibility to visit their parents as they lose the possibility to return to Russia at all if they don't do it now.
The same reasons which prevent Russians to leave force them to come back.

Quote

David Cameron said:
Ukraine had a right to use the weapons provided by London to strike targets inside Russia

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I would say it's bad news for Putin. So far he could count on the cautious policies of European states. This + Macron's talk of sending troops gives him gradually another message.

That, of course, brings us closer to the day when Russia will bomb targets on a NATO territory. But I don't think that he will drop nukes. Not immediately.

In the meantime, Ukrainians could target a little bit more logistic inside Russia. I don't think that the new capability used by the Ukrainians inside Russia will be of such importance that Putin will go nuclear.

There appears to be a consensus forming among supporting countries tha Ukraine should be able to strike Russian territory. Some countries just never put restrictions on weapons they provided. Now it almost seems like Ukraine is being encouraged to use the long range munitions where they will. Hopefully collateral damage will be minimized

Larry_L said:

There appears to be a consensus forming among supporting countries tha Ukraine should be able to strike Russian territory.

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Less of consensus but more resignation/appreciation of the current reality.

The stalled situation (or worse) and the lack of Ukrainian manpower doesn't afford Ukraine and the Western backers the luxury to ignore Russian targets in the rear, despite the risk of escalation.

Sending troops to Ukraine
Not ruled out... Not ruled out... again.
Remember Poland was the first country to send Leopard tanks to Ukraine when other European countries ruled that out by fear of escalation.

Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski said:

Nie będziemy pokazač naszych kart
(We will not show our cards
We will let President Putin wonder what we will do)

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Link in Polish

Ukrinform link in English

Fredled said:

Sending troops to Ukraine
Not ruled out... Not ruled out... again.
Remember Poland was the first country to send Leopard tanks to Ukraine when other European countries ruled that out by fear of escalation.

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This talk about troops on the ground seems more about signaling than something militarily significant.

I don't see Poland or France sending mechanised divisions into Ukraine and going to the frontline like Chasiv Yar (which is what Ukraine really needs, other than munitions). Maybe intelligence, training and support roles at best. The litmus test for such talk will be when coffins of Prench and Polish dead are received by Macron and Duda.

Fredled said:

No, I don't think so. It made sens to secure the northern border while the fightings were in the south and the east.
The incompetence was not to build them on the Dombas and Zaporizha.

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I think it made a lot more sense to improve Donbas defense lines than the border where any Russian offensive would require the amount of resources that likely do not exist at the moment. But we are really talking about the same thing here anyway. All I am saying is that luck of planning and prioritizing is quite staggering. Here is, while from a Russian source, a Ukrainian soldier on TikTok (which I do not use) talking about being promised concrete trenches and fortifications, etc (on the next line of defense they have been moved to) and he shows what they have instead, calling it a dugout, basically. He says it is several km in length. He also says they don’t know what they are going to do with it. He points in some direction and says that there, towards Ocheretino, the Russians have already broken through the defences and that they will be here (where he is) tomorrow. I have no idea when the video was made, but guessing within the last week or so.


Another thing to mention is, while we have seen some videos and photos posted by the Ukrainian MoD (recently, starting from January, I believe), we don’t really have any other evidence of these “extensive” fortifications existing anywhere, including north of the country. What you mentioned from a year ago, there were claims but nothing more. At the border with Belarus, they built a bunker for whatever reason:


Just to note, in the same article they are also talking about the conditions of the landscape where they built the bunker and they say that those conditions are harsh and it is unlikely that heavy equipment, including tanks and armoured vehicles, can advance there, but “infantry and saboteurs” could. So there they now have a bunker there. Other than that, there were reports last April or March (?) they were investing… I don’t remember now, but call it $20 or so million (I could be wrong, but I don’t think it is relevant anyway - I do recall $16 pr $18 million for Kharkiv and a single digit for Chernihiv), on the fortified trenches and bunkers in Kharkiv and Chernihiv last spring. Nothing beyond that was shown or talked about. Exactly a month ago, they were saying they were constructing these very fortifications in Kharkiv and Chernihiv “late last month” (so late March 2024):


I wouldn’t exclude at least a couple of things that had happened: 1) they never actually allocated any money and nothing was done, or 2) the money was “appropriated” and still nothing or very little was done. Leaning heavily towards 1) myself, but 2) is almost just as likely.

In other words, what the Ukrainian officials claimed and showed pictures of, whether last spring or over the past few months, and what we see and read about from the real reports are two completely different things. There is only one reality though, haha.

Fredled said:

Also, I don't see too many contradictions in the version by Forbe and the Ukrainian version.

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There are no real contradictions because the result is the same. However, the main difference is that in one version is the Russians came to the empty trenches because the Ukrainian troops had left for rotation (the highly unlikely version because that is not how rotations work) and the other is that either the Russians came to empty tranches because the Ukrainian troops abandoned their positions due to what was coming or were easily forced out. While I see it as a big difference, like I already said though, I don’t think it matters.

The Russians also hit another Abrams since all that happened, reportedly belonging to the 47th:

Fredled said:

No rational person would fit in Russian shoes at the moment.
But, jokes aside, yes, there is no point for Russia attending but it has nothing to do with the lack of Swiss neutrality or with Zelensky.

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Yes, it has nothing to do with the Swiss neutrality, I agree. The Russians said that they don’t see a point of the summit, which is why they aren’t going, but added that the real talks cannot take place in Switzerland because it is not a neutral country.

Fredled said:

It's not a peace negociation summit. It's just a conference with all the countries who wish to participate. It's like the COP23 for Ukraine or something like that. Lots of talks, handshakes, group pictures but no tangible result.

Note that the article mention "Zelenskiy's peace formula" as well as other proposals. It's not only about Zelensky's utopian desires. It's about various proposals that any participant can bring up. I guess the Chinese Peace Plan will also be discussed. Thought it doesn't contain anything concrete. But for the form, they will.
In this context there is no added value for Russia to go there to hear that they are criminals and that they should withdraw their troops. They won't hear anything new there. And we won't hear anything new from them neither.

A peace summit won't happen in Switzerland with 150 participants. It will be Russian and Ukrainian delegates only, somewhere in Belarus.

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No, it is not negotiations. I think it is a waste of everyone’s time, not just the Russians’ (and Swiss francs that will be spent on the organization of the event). Zelensky, however, believes that the summit “must succeed” in order to end the war in Ukraine. Another bit of delusion, in my opinion.


The same article indicates that he also claimed the Ukrainian forces shot down another Russian Su-25. We will see if there is any support or contradiction this in the next few days.

Fredled said:

That, of course, brings us closer to the day when Russia will bomb targets on a NATO territory. But I don't think that he will drop nukes. Not immediately.

In the meantime, Ukrainians could target a little bit more logistic inside Russia. I don't think that the new capability used by the Ukrainians inside Russia will be of such importance that Putin will go nuclear.

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Quite a bet that nukes won’t be dropped “immediately”. No, I don’t think they will drop nukes and definitely not immediately (haha) and on the NATO states in particular. While I have ideas I don’t want to discuss at the moment, I am actually not sure what they will do in response. I am also not convinced that Ukraine will hit the targets on the actual Russian territory with these missiles. Neither am I convinced that everyone is ok with it either, as opposed to the claims, some of which are contradictory. Perhaps:



I also think koxinga is on basically point in both of his posts above.

Fredled said:

If these were WIA, and considered that you should, then, add half this amount of KIA, the Ukrainian defence forces would have ceased to exist already.
I imagine that a lot of them have paid their family doctor to write disability certificates.
Another big part of the unfortunates who where really amputated or disabled, are also civilians.
These numbers are no less worrysome.

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I was actually wondering how many of these new disabilities are the people buying theirs to avoid being sent to the front. I think the number of amputees though suggests that not as many as one would think. But this is just a guess and I don’t really know. The hope on my part is that the real numbers are as little as possible, but it is hard to argue with what seems to be real and most likely.

Fredled said:

Perhaps it's not the same that left that came back. As I wrote already earlier, there is a widening Russian resurgence movement in Europe and some ethnic Russians decide to go live in Russia[…]

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Yes, some are coming back just because they want to come back. Others are coming back because they have no other (better) choice due to expired permits and whatnot (the Bloomberg article talks about that as well). In any case, it is a boost to Russia as far the human resources and economy goes. For the former, they appear to be gaining here more than the people they have been sending to the battle. The equation previously was the population minus those sent to fight minus those who left equals a significant loss; now it is the population minus those sent to fight minus those who left equals the population minus half of those who left equals a considerably smaller loss. Quite a difference.

I will post later (probably in the other thread) about the “resurgent” movement.

I'm sorry but I'm seriously going to put this on meme thread before. So US aid aim for next year counter offensive. How about prioritizing the aid to Ukraine deffense now ?

Fredled said:

Sending troops to Ukraine
Not ruled out... Not ruled out... again.
Remember Poland was the first country to send Leopard tanks to Ukraine when other European countries ruled that out by fear of escalation.

Link in Polish

Ukrinform link in English

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My mind goes back to WW2 when the German invasion of Poland resulted in the Russians invading the Eastern part of the country. In fact go back and you can find a long history of conflict between Russia and Poland. Should Ukraine defences completely collapse I find it hard to believe that Poland wouldn't send troops into Ukraine.

koxinga said:

This talk about troops on the ground seems more about signaling than something militarily significant.

I don't see Poland or France sending mechanised divisions into Ukraine and going to the frontline like Chasiv Yar (which is what Ukraine really needs, other than munitions). Maybe intelligence, training and support roles at best. The litmus test for such talk will be when coffins of Prench and Polish dead are received by Macron and Duda.

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The lowest point of escalation in bringing troops into UKR would be to garrison the BEL-UKR border, and free up those UKR troops there. This keeps the possibility of contact with RU forces low, although not free of danger from missile attacks.

hauritz said:

Should Ukraine defences completely collapse I find it hard to believe that Poland wouldn't send troops into Ukraine.

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It depends on the nature of the "said collapse" and what RU does after. RU has bounced back from the setbacks in 2023 and has a slight upper hand as this conflict drags on in an attritional fashion. A partial collapse in certain parts seems more plausible if aid remains delayed. However, RU's ability to exploit them to completely turn it around is questionable. Certainly, I don't see them driving all the way to the Polish border. They are not the Red Army of 1943 with Zhukov and Sokolovsky.

koxinga said:

It depends on the nature of the "said collapse" and what RU does after. RU has bounced back from the setbacks in 2023 and has a slight upper hand as this conflict drags on in an attritional fashion. A partial collapse in certain parts seems more plausible if aid remains delayed. However, RU's ability to exploit them to completely turn it around is questionable. Certainly, I don't see them driving all the way to the Polish border. They are not the Red Army of 1943 with Zhukov and Sokolovsky.

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I'd like to add that for now it seems Russia's industrial capacity has, for the most part, peaked. They are occasionally showing new capabilities, but these have more to do with negative developments on Ukraine's side, like increased airstrikes due to Ukraine's increasingly limited air defense capabilities.
But I don't think Ukraine's industrial capacity has peaked. Far from it, actually. It has its own industry, sure, which it started building much later than Russia built up its own, but there is also the ramping up production across the west.
Unlike Russia, Ukraine's capabilities don't ramp up gradually but rather in spikes, with deliveries of new weapon and system types.
I think we're just before a new spike, and a pretty significant one. Ukraine isn't far from getting its F-16, and with that it may receive new weapons with new exotic capabilities, including, hopefully, some home-on-jam weapons to help it with EW suppression.