Meanwhile going back on the IAMD mini thread, I saw the below post dated 10SEP25 titled
"What Can the ADF Learn From Ukraine's Air Defences?" allegedly written by a fella allegedly in the RAAF. He states:
"These capabilities are similar to those faced by Ukraine – long-range cruise and ballistic missiles with precision targeting (US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2025). And like Ukraine, Australia should be prepared for an adversary to target civilian infrastructure. While the missile threat is therefore comparable, Australia’s geography makes the use of short-range, disposable drones, incorporated into massive attacks in Ukraine, far less of a threat".
It seems crazy to think we are developing an high level IAMD capability whilst completely ignoring the threat from low cost drones solely because of our geography.
Does anyone doubt that an adversary could breach our borders and safely predeploy a group of shipping containers full of drones within reasonable proximety to RAAF Base Tindal, Darwin, Williamtown, Edinburgh, Amberley and FBE/ FBW?
If you are confused, please google Ukrainian Operation Spiderweb. If they penetrated a contested Russian Airspace featuring multilayered IAMD platforms then I assume our IAMD solution would be easily overwelmed (or bypassed).
For me, any IAMD strategy needs to counter all threats, and not be binkered thinking an adversary will only play to their strengths alone.
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