ADF General discussion thread

[ADMk2]

I thinks it’s more of a question would 1 of the 3 AWD be available when needed.

1 of the two. For the next half a decade, plus change, one AWD will be undergoing the Destroyer Capability Upgrade Program at any one time.

It won’t be until the 2030’s we will see 3x AWD’s available to the RAN again.

HMAS Hobart entered Osborne to begin the upgrade on Feb.6 and if everything goes to schedule will see “light off” in the last quarter 2026 with a further 50 weeks of planned trials.

 

[downunderblue]

What's the logic behind sending AIM-120's?

If we're wanting to reduce our old stocks (?), then maybe the RAAF or an Army NASAMS-3 fire unit could be the ones firing them and gaining valuable experience?

Australia to provide military support to Gulf states

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese confirms the Australian Defence Force will deploy an E-7A Wedgetail aircraft to the Gulf to help protect and defend the region, providing long-range reconnaissance activity.

www.abc.net.au

 

[downunderblue]

Meanwhile going back on the IAMD mini thread, I saw the below post dated 10SEP25 titled "What Can the ADF Learn From Ukraine's Air Defences?" allegedly written by a fella allegedly in the RAAF. He states:

"These capabilities are similar to those faced by Ukraine – long-range cruise and ballistic missiles with precision targeting (US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2025). And like Ukraine, Australia should be prepared for an adversary to target civilian infrastructure. While the missile threat is therefore comparable, Australia’s geography makes the use of short-range, disposable drones, incorporated into massive attacks in Ukraine, far less of a threat".

It seems crazy to think we are developing an high level IAMD capability whilst completely ignoring the threat from low cost drones solely because of our geography.

Does anyone doubt that an adversary could breach our borders and safely predeploy a group of shipping containers full of drones within reasonable proximety to RAAF Base Tindal, Darwin, Williamtown, Edinburgh, Amberley and FBE/ FBW?

If you are confused, please google Ukrainian Operation Spiderweb. If they penetrated a contested Russian Airspace featuring multilayered IAMD platforms then I assume our IAMD solution would be easily overwelmed (or bypassed).

For me, any IAMD strategy needs to counter all threats, and not be binkered thinking an adversary will only play to their strengths alone.

https://airpower.airforce.gov.au/blog/what-can-adf-learn-ukraines-air-defences#:~:text=Russia%20responded%20to%20Ukraine's%20resilience,responders%20(Malyasov%2C%202025)

.

 

[ADMk2]

Meanwhile going back on the IAMD mini thread, I saw the below post dated 10SEP25 titled "What Can the ADF Learn From Ukraine's Air Defences?" allegedly written by a fella allegedly in the RAAF. He states:

"These capabilities are similar to those faced by Ukraine – long-range cruise and ballistic missiles with precision targeting (US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2025). And like Ukraine, Australia should be prepared for an adversary to target civilian infrastructure. While the missile threat is therefore comparable, Australia’s geography makes the use of short-range, disposable drones, incorporated into massive attacks in Ukraine, far less of a threat".

It seems crazy to think we are developing an high level IAMD capability whilst completely ignoring the threat from low cost drones solely because of our geography.

Does anyone doubt that an adversary could breach our borders and safely predeploy a group of shipping containers full of drones within reasonable proximety to RAAF Base Tindal, Darwin, Williamtown, Edinburgh, Amberley and FBE/ FBW?

If you are confused, please google Ukrainian Operation Spiderweb. If they penetrated a contested Russian Airspace featuring multilayered IAMD platforms then I assume our IAMD solution would be easily overwelmed (or bypassed).

For me, any IAMD strategy needs to counter all threats, and not be binkered thinking an adversary will only play to their strengths alone.

https://airpower.airforce.gov.au/blog/what-can-adf-learn-ukraines-air-defences#:~:text=Russia%20responded%20to%20Ukraine's%20resilience,responders%20(Malyasov%2C%202025)

.

We’re not ignoring the drone threat. Project LAND 156 exists for that very reason.

Leidos selected as Land 156 systems integrator - Australian Defence Magazine

Defence has appointed Leidos Australia as its Land 156 Systems Integration Partner in a $45.9 million contract announced today | Kirra Davey

www.australiandefence.com.au

We are just doing in our usual, own sweet time, with limited amounts of ultimate capability being acquired at absolute top dollar…

 

[ADMk2]

What's the logic behind sending AIM-120's?

If we're wanting to reduce our old stocks (?), then maybe the RAAF or an Army NASAMS-3 fire unit could be the ones firing them and gaining valuable experience?

Australia to provide military support to Gulf states

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese confirms the Australian Defence Force will deploy an E-7A Wedgetail aircraft to the Gulf to help protect and defend the region, providing long-range reconnaissance activity.

www.abc.net.au

Those AIM-120’s will be mounted on coalition combat aircraft and used to shoot down missiles and drones.

The logic is, they have expended theirs or nearly so and are running short and if they fire them instead of us, big, tough, scary Iran might not hold us to account for doing so…

The chances of us send something “shooty” anywhere under the current Government is approximately the same as me marrying Sidney Sweeney and winning the Powerball on the same night.

 

[Stampede]

1 of the two. For the next half a decade, plus change, one AWD will be undergoing the Destroyer Capability Upgrade Program at any one time.

It won’t be until the 2030’s we will see 3x AWD’s available to the RAN again.

HMAS Hobart entered Osborne to begin the upgrade on Feb.6 and if everything goes to schedule will see “light off” in the last quarter 2026 with a further 50 weeks of planned trials.

View attachment 54421

Fingers crossed all goes to timetable and the ANZACs retire slowly.

Cheers S

 

[Todjaeger]

The chances of us send something “shooty” anywhere under the current Government is approximately the same as me marrying Sidney Sweeney and winning the Powerball on the same night.

I believe this is the correct response.

Something I think people need to stop and consider, whenever anyone starts going on about the need for Australia to setup a domestic production line for XXX missile or drone, is what would be involved in actually doing just that, as well as how long it would take and how much it would cost. Right now it appears that the first Australian-produced GMLRS are being made in a new facility for delivery some time later this month. The new facility itself was finished in late 2025 after ~seven months of construction. Either at the same time the facility was being constructed, or perhaps even in advance of this, a team of Australian engineers were detailed to US LockMart missile production facilities to get specialized training for a year. From other searches, it appears that AusGov decided in January 2024 on a domestic GMLRS production capability, with actual production expected to take ~26 months to start and that is with help.

This sort of timeframe to get production started could be problematic if the timeline for problems kicking off is three years or less.

 

[downunderblue]

The chances of us send something “shooty” anywhere under the current Government is approximately the same as me marrying Sidney Sweeney and winning the Powerball on the same night.

Clearly a boob fella you are!

 

[downunderblue]

.This sort of timeframe to get production started could be problematic if the timeline for problems kicking off is three years or less.

Yes you are correct and yes we know that but it doesn't mean I have to like it in the same sentence.

All those politicians sprouting "the protection of Australians' is our first primary responsibility ... it's just a line, isn't it as they were AWOL when needed years ago.

 

[Todjaeger]

Yes you are correct and yes we know that but it doesn't mean I have to like it in the same sentence.

All those politicians sprouting "the protection of Australians' is our first primary responsibility ... it's just a line, isn't it as they were AWOL when needed years ago.

Part of the issue is that many of the solutions that might provide the best outcomes would have required programmes being launched several years ago. Making the matter worse, is that in order for those same programmes to have existed several years ago, significant prior work would also have been required before that.

Unfort I keep seeing some of the very same parallels between now and the inter-war period between around 1922 and 1936 or so. IIRC Australia at the time lacked significant heavy industry so that many of the 2nd AIF units which were sent to serve in the Eighth Army did not get issued many of their 2-pdr's and other heavy weaponry until the units arrived in Egypt and they were issued British-built guns (not small arms). I vaguely seem to recall that at the time the 2nd AIF started to be raised, there were only a handful of real 2-pdr AT guns in the entirety of Australia, with most crew training done using dummy guns until they could get issued real ones.

Australia does not appear to be in quite that bad a position at present, but the fuse does appear to keep burning down further whilst Australia would need several years (and a fair bit of luck and agreement among allies) to build and begin running defence and ordnance industries.

 

[ADMk2]

I believe this is the correct response.

Something I think people need to stop and consider, whenever anyone starts going on about the need for Australia to setup a domestic production line for XXX missile or drone, is what would be involved in actually doing just that, as well as how long it would take and how much it would cost. Right now it appears that the first Australian-produced GMLRS are being made in a new facility for delivery some time later this month. The new facility itself was finished in late 2025 after ~seven months of construction. Either at the same time the facility was being constructed, or perhaps even in advance of this, a team of Australian engineers were detailed to US LockMart missile production facilities to get specialized training for a year. From other searches, it appears that AusGov decided in January 2024 on a domestic GMLRS production capability, with actual production expected to take ~26 months to start and that is with help.

This sort of timeframe to get production started could be problematic if the timeline for problems kicking off is three years or less.

Lets not get too carried away. What they built at Port Wakefield in 7 months is a tin shed with a crane, a couple of assembly jigs and a forklift.

We don’t “make” any part of GMLRS from the propellant, to the missile body, control surfaces, guidance system or warhead, all of it is imported. We assemble, test, certify, package and distribute here...

There is a long term aspiration to qualify domestic Australian suppliers to actually ”make” these things, but as yet there are none. Zilch.

Pretty pics are below:

Port Wakefield Missile Assembly Facility Photos - Web

Lockheed Martin Australia Engineers working at the Port Wakefield Missile Assembly Facility - PIRA LAU2025120061

www.smugmug.com

 

[Volkodav]

Those AIM-120’s will be mounted on coalition combat aircraft and used to shoot down missiles and drones.

The logic is, they have expended theirs or nearly so and are running short and if they fire them instead of us, big, tough, scary Iran might not hold us to account for doing so…

The chances of us send something “shooty” anywhere under the current Government is approximately the same as me marrying Sidney Sweeney and winning the Powerball on the same night.

Shes a bit young for you isnt she, but the lotto would be nice?

 

[OldTex]

It might be that the individual services provide their own SHORAD/VSHORAD, using where possible common systems and effectors, whilst the RAAF is responsible for MRAD, LRAD/ABM and the IAMDS is a joint responsibility. RAN would have the MRAD, LRAD/ABM responsibility for deployed MFUs.
The SHORAD/VSHORAD manning would be a combination of regular and reserve forces (as currently reserves can only be deployed under specific conditions).

Perhaps existing or emerging systems, like American Rheinmetall's uSHORAD (ultra short range airdefence system) Skyranger 30 and Mistral3 and eNASAMS, could provide the VSHORAD/SHORAD for Army and RAAF applications, whilst Mistral3, Skyranger 30 (in limited cases) and eNASAMS provide SHORAD for RAN base defence.

MRADS (like Patriot etc) provide and area defence and screen (albeit not perfect) with the closer systems covering the leakers or the low and slow targets.

It isn't perfect and it isn't cheap, but it is needed.

 

[downunderblue]

After watching the ANZMIN press conference today and wishing I got my time back, I saw a reference to 'ANZAC 2035' as an agreed statement.

Below is the link. Lors of words so I got AI to 'summarise' (I'm not sure where it got the AUKUS southern flank comment from) the key points as follows:

"The "ANZAC 2035" statement marks a shift from historical cooperation to a more aggressive, integrated military posture. Stripping away the diplomatic language, the core commitment is to transform two separate national forces into a single, interchangeable "Anzac force" capable of high-end combat.
Here is what the agreement actually commits both countries to:

1. Military Integration (Interchangeability)
Unified Command: Moving beyond "working together" to "interchangeability." This means Australian and NZ units will be trained and equipped so they can be swapped into each other’s formations seamlessly during a conflict.

Shared Personnel: Increasing the number of "embedded" staff in each other’s headquarters to ensure that when a crisis hits, the two militaries act as one entity.

Common Equipment: A commitment to buy the same gear (drones, ships, planes, and land systems). This reduces costs and ensures both countries use the same ammunition, parts, and software.

2. Force Posture and "Basing"
Territorial Access: Each country will increase the rotation of troops, ships, and aircraft through the other’s territory.

Projecting Power: Using shared geography to "project force" further into the Indo-Pacific. This is a move toward a more "forward-leaning" presence to deter adversaries (specifically aimed at countering regional influence from China).

3. Industrial and Supply Chain Merger
Sovereign Industrial Base: Treating the Australian and New Zealand defense industries as a single ecosystem.

Shared Logistics: Creating a joint supply chain for critical platforms (like the P-8A Poseidon and C-130J Hercules). If Australia runs out of parts or missiles, it can pull from NZ stockpiles, and vice versa.

Joint Development: Exploring "co-production" of weapons and technology, effectively linking NZ’s tech sector directly into Australia’s larger defense procurement machine.

4. Pacific "Policing"
Pacific Response Group: Formalizing a permanent joint maritime and disaster response asset to be the "first responder" in the Pacific.

Maritime Surveillance: Increased joint patrols to monitor "military activities" in the region. This is a commitment to maintain a constant Anzac "eye" on the Pacific to identify and discourage foreign military encroachment.

5. Shift in Strategic Tone
Combat Readiness: The statement explicitly pivots from "peacekeeping/disaster relief" toward "combat capability."
Deterrence: For the first time in decades, the alliance is being framed through the lens of "collective deterrence." It signals that an attack on one is an attack on both, backed by a unified military structure rather than just a historical sentiment.
Summary of the "Real" Meaning:
By 2035, New Zealand is effectively folding its high-end defense capabilities into Australia’s military structure. In exchange for NZ providing geographic access and niche tech/personnel, Australia provides the "heavy lifting" (strike power and industrial scale). This creates a unified "Southern Flank" for the AUKUS/US-aligned strategy in the Indo-Pacific"

Thoughts? Sensible-yes, a bit dull-maybe, ambitious- not by 2035 if you're really in a hurry.

https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/statements/2026-03-17/operationalising-australia-new-zealand-alliance-anzac-2035-closer-defence-relations-statement

 

[StingrayOZ]

I think 2035 is a nice sounding date. The real truth these things are never truely complete, you just get better with time anyway. So I think an agreement of this direction, new projects with this in mind, existing adapting when possible. Enables this to happen without delaying other projects or harming other capabilities. Some of these have always been possible, but not officially part of the plan.

Increasing embedded staff is something that can start happening straight away, and now actively work towards unified response in crisis. Given the current world disorder, this would be a powerful step forward. AU-NZ having an informed unified military capability ready to go is a real must have. It will shape other programs around it, cut needless duplication, increase synergy. Stronger together. Forces, possibly even allies, might try to separate us or pressure us independently.

We can see how the EU has really been caught out with its unified capability beyond a US lead NATO. Hopefully we won't have that problem. It may even allow a frame work others can copy or even integrate into as allies.

 

[hauritz]

Let's see if NZ is willing to reverse its posture on visting nuclear warships.

 

[downunderblue]

Let's see if NZ is willing to reverse its posture on visting nuclear warships.

Let's go with "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" instead.