The Iraqi Government has a problem, a problem partially of their making. They do not have an air defense capability and the US is departing soon. It takes years to build a legitimate air defense capability and Iraq does not have the time.
Since 2006, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense has been briefing about a three phased series of five-year plans for Iraqi Security Force development. In May 2009, the Iraqi Minister of Defense stated that Phase 2 and Phase 3 will be delayed given current funding.
1. Phase 1 (2006-2010): Tactical Independence. This means the ability for the Iraqi Security
Forces to independently handle internal security.
2. Phase 2 (2011-2015): Operational Independence. This is the ability of the Iraqi ground
and naval forces to provide for external ground and naval defense.
3. Phase 3 (2016-2020): Strategic Independence. This is the ability for the Iraqi Air force to
provide air defense of Iraq. The most optimistic estimate from the Iraqi Ministry of Defense
for Phase 3 completion was 2018 and that was when the Iraqi budget was considerably
higher.
The Iraqi Government negotiated the agreement requiring the US Forces to depart Iraq by 2012, knowing that they would not have an air defense by then. They were counting on either an extension of US Forces in Iraq or that the political deals with adjacent countries would cover the gap in Iraqi air defense between 2012 and 2020.
The protests in Tehran provided the current Iraqi Government with a serious wake-up call concerning any arrangements with Iran. It does not matter what deal they may have with adjacent countries when they do not know if the deal will be honored or if the people they had the deal with will still be in power.
Then the Iraqi Minister of Defense pointed out that the current budget was going to extend that gap in Iraqi air defense even further in May of 2009.
So the Iraqi Government started talking about potential extension of US Forces in Iraq. Then they found out that US internal politics and Iraqi internal politics made any such extension a no-go. [Beware of what you wish for, your wish may be granted.]
The earliest that any new purchased fighters could start to be delivered is in 2013 or 2014. When you factor in training time that means the earliest that the first new fighter squadron would become operational is 2015.
At current oil prices, Iraq can only afford one squadron’s worth of fighters per year. It takes a minimum of five operational fighter squadrons for Iraq to have a credible air defense. That was the basis of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense’s plan for air defense development. The optimistic projection of 2018 was based on the peak price of oil in 2008 potentially giving Iraq the ability to buy two fighter squadrons per year. Now the Iraqi Minister of Defense does not think the 2020 plan can be met.
There has been no public discussion of surface-air missile purchases by Iraqi or US officials. Given the Iraqi Government’s lack of credit, any purchases have to be cash up front. First they would need to negotiate a deal. Then there is the manufacturing, delivery, infrastructure, and training time. Put together with the limited coverage and flexibility of SAMs plus the numbers needed, this is not a credible option to cover Iraq’s air defense gap. It would take too long to field and it is not in the budget.
While the Iraqi Ministry of Defense has been looking into aircraft not delivered and alternate sources for fighters, the total of all the aircraft reported “found” would not provide the minimum numbers and/or capability in the timely fashion necessary to provide for Iraq’s air defense. The other used aircraft being offered are obsolete, the wrong type, and/or require rebuilds that would delay delivery and cost Iraq money needed for the long term new aircraft purchases. Aircraft do not store well even when in dry climates. France and Serbia are not dry.
In August 2009, US senior officials started publically talking about donating, loaning, or leasing used fighters from the USAF. As a cost cutting measure, the USAF plans to early retire 134 F16s and 112 F15s in 2010. In the case of the seven squadron’s worth of F16s, these are operational aircraft that still have some life left in them. Many of the older F15s being retired have metal fatigue problems [cracks in the fuselage]. Thus the F15s are unlikely to be considered viable.
This idea of providing used F16s to Iraqi is currently under study in the Pentagon. And the terms “lend or lease” keep turning up in the public statements about this proposal. The reason for that is it would mean the US would still legally own the aircraft and thus could legally provide contractor maintenance and training support.
Such support would not count as “troops”. The US has Military Advisory and Assistance Groups (MAAG) or Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) personnel in over 60 countries. Including countries where the stationing of foreign troops is illegal. Those offices are legally part of the American Embassy staff. [Some people wondered at the size of the American Embassy complex in Baghdad. I didn’t.]
If the US goes through with this, then the used F16s could be delivered in 2010 as they are retired from the USAF and the Iraqi pilots and support crews could be trained by 2012 or 2013. These aircraft would still need to be replaced with new purchased fighters, since these used aircraft have only five to ten years of operational life remaining.
This would also provide US contractor, training, and advisors to train and support the Iraqi Air Force until it has its own purchased fighter squadrons and their support operational to replace the Lend/Lease fighters. This lend/lease support would be training the support personnel and pilots while maintaining the US owned aircraft.
This would also make the purchase of new F16s from the US more cost effective for the Iraqi Air Force. The Iraqi Air Force would be already trained and their support structure formed to support the used F16s. They would transition to the new bought F16s as they are delivered starting in 2014 without requiring significant retraining or re-equipping.
These factors also explain why the Pentagon is taking time to study this idea. They are determining the support/training requirements and costs for a Lend/Lease program. A straight donation would dump all of those support and training issues on the Iraqis. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Iraqi Air Force is not currently up to that level of support and training. A straight donation would probably result in most of those aircraft being parked as static displays.
This type of operation is not unprecedented. The first large-scale US Lend/Lease program was prior to the US entry into World War II. When Denmark needed F16 instructors in the 80s and early 90s, the USAF pilots were provided under ODC Copenhagen. The assistance was provided while avoiding violating the Danish law against foreign troops on their soil in peacetime. Similar programs in the Mid-East include the Saudi AWACS lease program which turned into a purchase. The aircrews and support were provided from the USAF. Saudi still uses significant contractor support and has a large MAAG. Such MAAG/ODC operations and support does not count as “troops” since they are legally assigned as part of the American Embassy.
One of the many questions remaining is: If the Pentagon is looking at Lending or Leasing USAF F16s being retired from the US inventory, what other equipment being retired from the US inventory might be Loaned or Leased?
Since 2006, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense has been briefing about a three phased series of five-year plans for Iraqi Security Force development. In May 2009, the Iraqi Minister of Defense stated that Phase 2 and Phase 3 will be delayed given current funding.
1. Phase 1 (2006-2010): Tactical Independence. This means the ability for the Iraqi Security
Forces to independently handle internal security.
2. Phase 2 (2011-2015): Operational Independence. This is the ability of the Iraqi ground
and naval forces to provide for external ground and naval defense.
3. Phase 3 (2016-2020): Strategic Independence. This is the ability for the Iraqi Air force to
provide air defense of Iraq. The most optimistic estimate from the Iraqi Ministry of Defense
for Phase 3 completion was 2018 and that was when the Iraqi budget was considerably
higher.
The Iraqi Government negotiated the agreement requiring the US Forces to depart Iraq by 2012, knowing that they would not have an air defense by then. They were counting on either an extension of US Forces in Iraq or that the political deals with adjacent countries would cover the gap in Iraqi air defense between 2012 and 2020.
The protests in Tehran provided the current Iraqi Government with a serious wake-up call concerning any arrangements with Iran. It does not matter what deal they may have with adjacent countries when they do not know if the deal will be honored or if the people they had the deal with will still be in power.
Then the Iraqi Minister of Defense pointed out that the current budget was going to extend that gap in Iraqi air defense even further in May of 2009.
So the Iraqi Government started talking about potential extension of US Forces in Iraq. Then they found out that US internal politics and Iraqi internal politics made any such extension a no-go. [Beware of what you wish for, your wish may be granted.]
The earliest that any new purchased fighters could start to be delivered is in 2013 or 2014. When you factor in training time that means the earliest that the first new fighter squadron would become operational is 2015.
At current oil prices, Iraq can only afford one squadron’s worth of fighters per year. It takes a minimum of five operational fighter squadrons for Iraq to have a credible air defense. That was the basis of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense’s plan for air defense development. The optimistic projection of 2018 was based on the peak price of oil in 2008 potentially giving Iraq the ability to buy two fighter squadrons per year. Now the Iraqi Minister of Defense does not think the 2020 plan can be met.
There has been no public discussion of surface-air missile purchases by Iraqi or US officials. Given the Iraqi Government’s lack of credit, any purchases have to be cash up front. First they would need to negotiate a deal. Then there is the manufacturing, delivery, infrastructure, and training time. Put together with the limited coverage and flexibility of SAMs plus the numbers needed, this is not a credible option to cover Iraq’s air defense gap. It would take too long to field and it is not in the budget.
While the Iraqi Ministry of Defense has been looking into aircraft not delivered and alternate sources for fighters, the total of all the aircraft reported “found” would not provide the minimum numbers and/or capability in the timely fashion necessary to provide for Iraq’s air defense. The other used aircraft being offered are obsolete, the wrong type, and/or require rebuilds that would delay delivery and cost Iraq money needed for the long term new aircraft purchases. Aircraft do not store well even when in dry climates. France and Serbia are not dry.
In August 2009, US senior officials started publically talking about donating, loaning, or leasing used fighters from the USAF. As a cost cutting measure, the USAF plans to early retire 134 F16s and 112 F15s in 2010. In the case of the seven squadron’s worth of F16s, these are operational aircraft that still have some life left in them. Many of the older F15s being retired have metal fatigue problems [cracks in the fuselage]. Thus the F15s are unlikely to be considered viable.
This idea of providing used F16s to Iraqi is currently under study in the Pentagon. And the terms “lend or lease” keep turning up in the public statements about this proposal. The reason for that is it would mean the US would still legally own the aircraft and thus could legally provide contractor maintenance and training support.
Such support would not count as “troops”. The US has Military Advisory and Assistance Groups (MAAG) or Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) personnel in over 60 countries. Including countries where the stationing of foreign troops is illegal. Those offices are legally part of the American Embassy staff. [Some people wondered at the size of the American Embassy complex in Baghdad. I didn’t.]
If the US goes through with this, then the used F16s could be delivered in 2010 as they are retired from the USAF and the Iraqi pilots and support crews could be trained by 2012 or 2013. These aircraft would still need to be replaced with new purchased fighters, since these used aircraft have only five to ten years of operational life remaining.
This would also provide US contractor, training, and advisors to train and support the Iraqi Air Force until it has its own purchased fighter squadrons and their support operational to replace the Lend/Lease fighters. This lend/lease support would be training the support personnel and pilots while maintaining the US owned aircraft.
This would also make the purchase of new F16s from the US more cost effective for the Iraqi Air Force. The Iraqi Air Force would be already trained and their support structure formed to support the used F16s. They would transition to the new bought F16s as they are delivered starting in 2014 without requiring significant retraining or re-equipping.
These factors also explain why the Pentagon is taking time to study this idea. They are determining the support/training requirements and costs for a Lend/Lease program. A straight donation would dump all of those support and training issues on the Iraqis. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Iraqi Air Force is not currently up to that level of support and training. A straight donation would probably result in most of those aircraft being parked as static displays.
This type of operation is not unprecedented. The first large-scale US Lend/Lease program was prior to the US entry into World War II. When Denmark needed F16 instructors in the 80s and early 90s, the USAF pilots were provided under ODC Copenhagen. The assistance was provided while avoiding violating the Danish law against foreign troops on their soil in peacetime. Similar programs in the Mid-East include the Saudi AWACS lease program which turned into a purchase. The aircrews and support were provided from the USAF. Saudi still uses significant contractor support and has a large MAAG. Such MAAG/ODC operations and support does not count as “troops” since they are legally assigned as part of the American Embassy.
One of the many questions remaining is: If the Pentagon is looking at Lending or Leasing USAF F16s being retired from the US inventory, what other equipment being retired from the US inventory might be Loaned or Leased?
